School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) Monograph by Major Gay M. McGillis,United States Air Force, 68 pages.A Theater Special Operations Command (SOC), a sub-unified command, advises combatantcommanders on the capabilities of Special Operations Forces (SOF), provides SOF for employment, and integrates SOF fully into theater plans by planning, coordinating, conducting,and supporting the geographical unified commander. The SOC is a trained and resourced rapiddeployment joint task force headquarters, if needed. The new unified command, U.S. NorthernCommand (NORTHCOM), attained “initial operations capability (IOC)” on October 1, 2002. NORTHCOM is not organized for success to accomplish its new mission of homeland defenseand civil support. NORTHCOM must transform to an organization that can anticipate and adaptto its new missions.By analyzing the planning, command and control, and coordination of SOF supportduring Hurricane Andrew and the 1996 Atlanta Olympics, it was determined that a SOC would be a critical component to this new organization. The SOC will be vital during both deliberateand crisis action planning, advising on the best method to integrate SOF capabilities. Early planning efforts by SOCOM for SOF support to JTF-Olympics determined only a small JSOTFwas needed to coordinate with the lead federal agency for counterterrorism, the FBI. In contrast,JTF-Andrew did not have a Special Operations Coordination element and had to learn thecapabilities and limitations of SOF before being able to employ them effectively for the disaster relief efforts. This was a problem in the time-sensitive environment of a massive hurricanerecovery operation. SOCNORTH would ensure SOF are integrated into any operational plan, sothey can assist NORTHCOM responses to any future homeland crises.A critical element to a crisis response is the chain of command established to delineatecommand relationships and responsibilities. Normally, command and control of SOF, like theother service components, should be executed within the SOF chain of command. JTF Andrew’scommand and control structure was not optimized because Special Forces and psychologicaloperations assets were assigned to the ARFOR and civil affairs soldiers were assigned to theJTF/J5. In contrast, the JSOTF assigned to support the 1996 Atlanta Olympics adequately planned for and lead SOF who were supporting JTF-Olympics. SOCNORTH would provide theneeded command and control to integrate SOF in future NORTHCOM operations. Necessary within the command and control structure are liaison officers who understandthe capabilities and limitations of their represented organization. These officers and specificliaison elements assigned to the components within the JTF will ensure coordination,synchronization, and deconfliction. No SOF liaison existed at the JTF level during HurricaneAndrew. In comparison, liaisons were used extensively between the many command and controlcenters for coordination and collaboration at the Atlanta Olympics. SOCNORTH would advisethe NORTHCOM commander to ensure SOF functions were integrated appropriately, and work with SOCOM if additional special operations forces are necessary. SOCNORTH will ensureSOF are synchronized, coordinated, and deconflicted in any operation assigned to NORTHCOM.