Improving UN Disaster Response

Tying UN Aid to Host Countries’ Adherence to UN Disaster Relief Protocol and Inclusion of Local Experts in UNDAC Cluster Response Teams

By Jane Coaston, Jerrit Z. Tan, Kurston Cook, Erika Gonzalez, Chris Reade, Christine Rhee,Jessica Tang, Dheeraj Thapliyal

Originally founded as a humanitarian organization, one of the United Nation's primary objectives is to aid countries in times of need. However, the UN's current disaster responseprotocol contains systematic flaws, and can lead to obstacles to providing quality relief. In a variety of instances both in the past and ongoing, these shortcomings have undermined itsdisaster response work. Problems of cultural ignorance and a lack of coordination havehistorically plagued relief efforts. If left unaddressed, we can expect that these problems willcontinue to hamper UN relief programs. In our policy, we will introduce a system which:1)

Ties UN aid to a host country's adherence to a binding relief protocol to ensure greatercoordination between the UN and host governments2)

Provides UN relief planning teams with preemptively trained local team members toallow for planning to be tailored to local specificities

The Need to Tie UN Aid to Countries’ Adherence to Disaster Relief Protocol

Shortcomings in the current UN relief protocol have led to systematic failures in the distributionof aid to those in need. Countries which request aid often erect barriers, both intentionally andunintentionally, which can undermine relief efforts. An example of this can be found in theUN's efforts to aid the humanitarian crisis in Sudan. While the Sudanese president has said that"the government of Sudan welcomes all financial, material, logistic or technical assistance fromthe UN"

, the government has implemented countless legal measures in order to thwart theUN’s attempts to bring in food and medical supplies to those in need. The UN’s lack of controlover the situation in Darfur is not a new development. Sudan’s government has resistedcooperation with the UN’s relief efforts since the late 1980s, and “in 1998, Sudanese officialsprevented all UN relief flights to Bahr el-Ghazal Province for two months…the aid ban helpedtrigger a famine that killed 30,000 to 50,000 people, according to some estimates.”

TheSudanese government’s continued tactics of resistance to UN relief efforts expose flaws in thecurrent UN protocol; cooperation between those coordinating relief efforts and hostgovernments is not sufficiently addressed. Political agendas, lack of access to information, andin some cases, incapable administrations are all serious obstacles to international aid, especially in developing countries with unstable governments and shaky infrastructures. Barriers to aid areironically, often constructed, whether intentionally or not, by the governments of countries which request it, and can prolong the suffering of those they govern. While the UN has traditionally emphasized the sovereignty of nations in international affairs, we believe that the extraordinary conditions that exist in disaster situations require policies thatcan deter uncooperative governments from deliberately erecting barriers, and prevent othergovernments from unintentionally creating obstacles to relief efforts stemming from lack of coordination with international relief organizations like the UN.

As part of this proposal, we

“Sudan accepts ‘help’ from UN” BBC News http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/6158038.stm)

“Sudan Government Again Blocks Relief Aid: A Familiar Tactic with Tragic Results”http://www.interaction.org/newswire/detail.php?id=935)

introduce a system of preemptive contractual agreements between the UN and willingmember nations, which will dictate clear guidelines regarding disaster relief to help improvecoordination.

To affirm and more importantly to validate the conditions of this new protocol,the terms and limitations that constitute the responsibilities and entitlements of both parties will be prearranged to ensure the most efficient disaster response possible. Whereas noexplicitly defined conditions currently exist as a prerequisite to UN aid, our policy recommendation wishes to alter the terms of this arrangement.

UN aid will therefore beconditional upon a host country’s adherence to its predetermined disaster relief agreement with the UN.

Clear guidelines will be agreed upon by both the UN and member nationspreemptively. This system has been conceptualized as an overhaul to the current system in orderto enhance efficiency and ensure the proper administration of aid in specific regions where it ismost needed. The analysis of the current model reveals a large degree of aid is wasted,misdirected, etc. A more strict system of control and administration is required to correct theseproblems.

UNDAC “Cluster Team” Reconfiguration

Current UN relief is coordinated by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Within OCHA, the sub-organization most relevant to our policy analysis is the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination team (UNDAC), a stand- by response team of disaster management professionals which can be deployed upon request within hours to any location in the world.

Once deployed, these cluster teams, as they arecalled, help state and non-state actors to provide humane, neutral, and impartial assistance tothe population in need through coordination and relief planning. These "cluster teams", as they are more commonly referred to, ensure that basic services are provided; including access toclean water and food, temporary shelter for those displaced, and that the tools necessary tofacilitate search and rescue efforts are available. All of these services are designed to coordinateinternational relief on site within 12 to 24 hours in the event of a natural disaster.

However, afundamental flaw of UNDAC cluster teams is that they are trained exclusively in Geneva,Switzerland and the deployment of teams often do not take into account the level of knowledgeof team members for local conditions. Training is not tailored to geographic regions, and thosedeployed often have inadequate knowledge of local environmental, religious, or culturalspecificities.Lack of cultural awareness by relief workers can be obstacles to effective disaster response. Anexample of this can be found in the aftermath of the Pakistani Earthquake in 2005 when the lack of female doctors and health care workers limited the availability of care to women whosereligious beliefs ban physical contact with male doctors. Many female patients went withoutmedical care or ventured on dangerous journeys to hospitals that had female staff on hand.

After the Asian Tsunami of 2004, similar problems relating to cultural ignorance continued tohamper international relief. For instance, the distribution of non-Halal food by the UN toMuslim areas made some rations inedible. Additionally, some temporary shelters werestationed inside Buddhist temples which rendered them unsuitable for displaced Muslims.

Language discrepancies proved to be problematic for UN relief workers after the Tsunami,

OCHA Field Coordination Support Section UNDAC Main Site: http://ochaonline.un.org/webpage.asp?Page=552

UNDAC Handbook chp. B (2006): http://ochaonline.un.org/webpage.asp?ParentID=12091&MenuID=12104&Page=565

Pakistan Earthquake October 2005. Health Cluster Bulletin 8.27 (2006)

Lebel, Louis, Supaporn Khrutmuang, and Jesse Mantua. "Tales from the Margins: Small Fishers inPost-TsunamiThailand." Disaster Prevention and Management 15:124-134 Unit for Social and Environmental Research

which caused significant barriers to medical care and other services.

The lack of informationand adequate training for relief workers create misunderstandings and miscommunication which can undermine the quality of disaster relief work.Historically there has existed a lack of cooperation between the UN and non-governmentalorganizations (NGO) in disaster relief. Beginning in the late 1990s, restrictive measures have been put in place by the General Assembly limiting the scope of NGO participation ininternational relief efforts. These policies withhold essential information from NGOs regardingconditions in disaster areas and increase the cost of participation by NGOs in relief responseplanning. For example, the UN Secretariat imposes heavy fees on NGOs for access to electronicUN documents through the Optical Disk System and is now also considering a fee for access tothe Treaty Database. These fees drain valuable funds from NGOs and create barriers toinformation essential for relief planning.The lack of cooperation between NGOs and the UN in disaster relief poses additional problemsfor countries in need of immediate aid. In 2005, after the tsunami disaster in Aceh, Indonesia,the relief efforts of various NGOs were ineffective and, at some times, harmful to therehabilitation of the area. The lack of coordination among the “various international actors” in Aceh led to “tremendous breakdowns in cooperation” that could not be properly addressed;many NGOs “did not participate in coordination meetings organized by the UN”.

Inexperiencedorganizations administered improper medical care and inappropriate supplies to disaster victims. These issues arose in Aceh after “an unknown NGO had vaccinated…children leaving norecords and no sure way to determine who had and had not already been served.”

Uncoordinated efforts also resulted in “houses [that] were poorly built… rendering some of thehousing uninhabitable.”

In addition, Pakistani victims of the earthquake in 2005 were therecipients of inefficient aid due to NGOs' lack of information about local conditions. In onenotable instance, the needs of victims went unmet as a particular international NGO distributed“used clothing unsuited to cold conditions" to refugees in need of warm clothes.

The above problems stem from1)

Lack of local expertise and cluster team familiarity with local conditions2)

Lack of coordination between NGOs and the UN

As part of the binding protocol outlined above, local authorities must agree to allow cluster teams to engage in autonomous relief work in specific regions where the disaster is most deadly.

Local authorities, according to their respective preemptive agreements with the UN, will allow UN-trained cluster teams to manage all UN related relief efforts and to take aleadership role in coordination with other NGOs without interference from local governments.This does not imply that the UN will overtake the autonomous relief efforts of NGOs, nor does itimply that the UN will have any powers outside of the arena of relief operations, but rather thatcluster teams will facilitate cooperation in planning through the assignment and training of team member(s) to specifically handle coordination between UN, NGOs, and local governmentsto allow for better communication between these actors. These cluster teams will comprise of

Johnson, Luke J., and Angela R. Travis. "TRIMODAL DEATH AND THE INJURIES OF SURVIVORS IN KRABIPROVINCE, THAILAND, POST-TSUNAMI," ANZ Journal of Surgery 76, 5 (2006): 288-289.

Bannon, Victoria and David Fisher. "International Disaster Response Laws, Rules, and Principles Programme"International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.