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Local Government (Guanzon)S.Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
SYLLABUS PART 1: LOCAL GOVERNMENTS;CREATION, MERGER, ABOLITION AND POWERS.
Creation of Local Government Units
:
Patricio Tan et al. v. COMELECFacts:
Prompted by the enactment of BP 885 (Act CreatingProvince of Negros del Norte), petitioners who are residentsof the Province of Negros Occidental filed with this Court acase for Prohibition for the purpose of stopping Comelecfrom conducting the plebiscite which, pursuant to and inimplementation of the law. Petitioners contend that BP 885 isunconstitutional and it is not in complete accord with theLGC as in Article XI, Section 3 of our Constitution regardingthe requirements in land area and estimated annual income.Petitioners also contend that a number of voters wereexcluded since the plebiscite was confined only to theinhabitants of three cities and eight municipalities in Negrosdel Norte, to the exclusion of the voters of the Province of Negros Occidental..Comelec contends that the law is not unconstitutional. Theyclaim that BP 885 does not infringe the Constitution becausethe requisites of the LGC have been complied with. Theysubmit that the case has now become moot and academicwith the proclamation of Negros del Norte as during theplebiscite, 164,734 were in favor of the creation of the newprovince while only 30,400 were against it.
Issue:
WON the province complied with the plebisciterequirement
Held:
No
Ratio:
The more significant and pivotal issue in thepresent case revolves around in the interpretation andapplication in the case at bar of Article XI, Section 3 of theConstitution. It can be plainly seen that the constitutionalprovision makes it imperative that there be first obtained"the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in theunit or units affected" whenever a province is created,divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of theboundaries. It is thus inescapable to conclude that theboundaries of the existing province of Negros Occidentalwould necessarily be substantially altered by the division of its existing boundaries in order that there can be created theproposed new province of Negros del Norte. Plain and simplelogic will demonstrate than that two political units would beaffected. The first would be the parent province of NegrosOccidental because its boundaries would be substantiallyaltered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province toconstitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte.We find no way to reconcile the holding of a plebiscite thatshould conform to said constitutional requirement buteliminates the participation of either of these two componentpolitical units. No one should be allowed to pay homage to asupposed fundamental policy intended to guarantee andpromote autonomy of local government units but at thesame time transgress, ignore and disregard what theConstitution commands in Article XI Section 3 thereof We fail to find any legal basis for the unexplained changemade when Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 was enacted intoBatas Pambansa Blg. 885 so that it is now provided in saidenabling law that the plebiscite "shall be conducted in theproposed new province which are the areas affected." Weare not disposed to agree that by mere legislative fiat theunit or units affected referred in the fundamental law can bediminished or restricted by the Batasang Pambansa to citiesand municipalities comprising the new province, therebyignoring the evident reality that there are other peoplenecessarily affected. The court reversed the ruling inParedes vs Executive Secretary (same issue but concernsbarangay).Petitioners have averred without contradiction that after thecreation of Negros del Norte, the province of NegrosOccidental would be deprived of the long established Citiesof Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos, as well as the municipality of Victorias. No controversion has been made regardingpetitioners' assertion that the areas of the Province of Negros Occidental will be diminished by about 285,656hectares and it will lose seven of the fifteen sugar millswhich contribute to the economy of the whole province. Inthe language of petitioners, "to create Negros del Norte, theexisting territory and political subdivision known as NegrosOccidental has to be partitioned and dismembered. Whatwas involved was no 'birth' but "amputation." We agree withthe petitioners that in the case of Negros what was involvedwas a division, a separation; and consequently, as Sec. 3 of Article XI of the Constitution anticipates, a substantialalteration of boundary.
Issue:
WON the new Province of Negros del Nortecomplied with the requirements as to land area
Held:
No
Ratio:
The original parliamentary bill no 3644 expresslydeclared that the new province contained an area of 285,656ha. More or less. However, when Parliamentary bill wasenacted into BP 885, the province now comprised a territoryof 4,019.95 square kilometers. The certification of theprovincial treasurer also indicates that there the provincecomprised of a lesser area. Although the certification statedthat the land area of the municipality of Don Salvador wasnot available, it appeared that such is only 80.2 kilometers. This area if added to 2,685.2 square kilometers will result inapproximately an area of only 2,765.4 square kilometers. The last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 LGC
(requirements) is most revealing. As so stated therein the"territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or moreislands." The use of the word territory in this particularprovision of the Local Government Code and in the very lastsentence thereof, clearly, reflects that "territory" as thereinused, has reference only to the mass of land area andexcludes the waters over which the political unit exercisescontrol. Said sentence states that the "territory need not becontiguous."Contiguous means (a) in physical contact; (b) touching alongall or most of one side; (c) near, text, oradjacent."Contiguous", when employed as an adjective, as inthe above sentence, is only used when it describes physicalcontact, or a touching of sides of two solid masses of matter. The meaning of particular terms in a statute may beascertained by reference to words associated with or relatedto them in the statute. Therefore, in the context of thesentence above, what need not be "contiguous" is the
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SEC. 197. Requisites for Creation. A province may becreated if it has a territory of at least three thousand fivehundred square kilometers, a population of at least five hun-dred thousand persons, an average estimated annual in-come, as certified by the Ministry of Finance, of not less thanten million pesos for the last three consecutive years, and itscreation shall not reduce the population and income of themother province or provinces at the time of said creation toless than the minimum requirements under this section. Theterritory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or moreislands. The average estimated annual income shall includethe income alloted for both the general and infrastructuralfunds, exclusive of trust funds, transfers and nonrecurring in-come.
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Local Government (Guanzon)S.Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem."territory" ---- the physical mass of land area. There wouldarise no need for the legislators to use the word contiguousif they had intended that the term "territory" embrace notonly land area but also territorial waters, It can be safelyconcluded that the word territory in the first paragraph of Section 197 is meant to be synonymous with "land area"only. The words and phrases used in a statute should begiven the meaning intended by the legislature. The sense inwhich the words are used furnished the rule of construction. The distinction between "territory" and "land area" whichrespondents make is an artificial or strained construction of the disputed provision whereby the words of the statute arearrested from their plain and obvious meaning and made tobear an entirely different meaning to justify an absurd orunjust result. The plain meaning in the language in a statuteis the safest guide to follow in construing the statute. Aconstruction based on a forced or artificial meaning of itswords and out of harmony of the statutory scheme is not tobe favored.
Teehankee, concurring:
The challenged Act is manifestlyvoid and unconstitutional. Consequently, all theimplementing acts complained of, viz. the plebiscite, theproclamation of a new province of Negros del Norte and theappointment of its officials are equally void. The limitedholding of the plebiscite only in the areas of the proposednew province (as provided by Section 4 of the Act) to theexclusion of the voters of the remaining areas of the integralprovince of Negros Occidental (namely, the three cities of Bacolod, Bago and La Carlota and the Municipalities of LaCastellana, Isabela, Moises Padilla, Pontevedra, Hinigaran,Himamaylan, Kabankalan, Murcia, Valladolid, San Enrique,Ilog, Cauayan, Hinoba-an and Sipalay and Candoni), grosslycontravenes and disregards the mandate of Article XI,section 3 of the then prevailing 1973 Constitution that noprovince may be created or divided or its boundarysubstantially altered without "the approval of a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected. " It isplain that all the cities and municipalities of the province of Negros Occidental, not merely those of the proposed newprovince, comprise the units affected. It follows that thevoters of the whole and entire province of Negros Occidentalhave to participate and give their approval in the plebiscite,because the whole province is affected by its proposeddivision and substantial alteration of its boundary. To limitthe plebiscite to only the voters of the areas to bepartitioned and seceded from the province is as absurd andillogical as allowing only the secessionists to vote for thesecession that they demanded against the wishes of themajority and to nullify the basic principle of majority rule. The argument of fait accompli viz. that the railroadedplebiscite of January 3, 1986 was held and can no longer beenjoined and that the new province of Negros del Norte hasbeen constituted, begs the issue of invalidity of thechallenged Act. This Court has always held that it "does notlook with favor upon parties 'racing to beat an injunction orrestraining order' which they have reason to believe mightbe forthcoming from the Court by virtue of the filing andpendency of the appropriate petition therefor. Where therestraining order or preliminary injunction are found to havebeen properly issued, as in the case at bar, mandatory writsshall be issued by the Court to restore matters to the statusquo ante." Where, as in this case, there was somehow afailure to properly issue the restraining order stopping theholding of the illegal plebiscite, the Court will issue themandatory writ or judgment to restore matters to the statusquo ante and restore the territorial integrity of the provinceof Negros Occidental by declaring the unconstitutionality of the challenged Act and nullifying the invalid proclamation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte and theequally invalid appointment of its officials.
Torralba v. Mun. of Sibagat (1987)Facts:
BP 56, creating the Municipality of Sibagat, Provinceof Agusan del Sur, is being challenged as violative of Section3 Article XI of the 1973 Constitution
.Petitioners areresidents and taxpayers of Butuan City, with petitioner,Clementino Torralba, being a member of the SangguniangPanglunsod of the same City. Respondent municipal officersare the local public officials of the new Municipality.According to the petitioners, the Local Government Codemust first be enacted to determine the criteria for thecreation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alterationof the boundary of any province, city, municipality, or barrio;and that since no Local Government Code had as yet beenenacted as of the date BP 56 was passed, that statute couldnot have possibly complied with any criteria whenrespondent Municipality was created, hence, it is null andvoid.
Issue:
WON BP 56 is invalid
Held:
No
Ratio:
The absence of the Local Government Code at thetime of its enactment did not curtail nor was it intended tocripple legislative competence to create municipalcorporations. Section 3, Article XI of the 1973 Constitutiondoes not proscribe nor prohibit the modification of territorialand political subdivisions before the enactment of the LGC. Itcontains no requirement that the LGC a condition sine quanon for the creation of a municipality, in much the same waythat the creation of a new municipality does not preclude theenactment of a LGC. What the Constitutional provisionmeans is that once said Code is enacted, the creation,modification or dissolution of local government units shouldconform with the criteria thus laid down. In the interregnum,before the enactment of such Code, the legislative powerremains plenary except that the creation of the new localgovernment unit should be approved by the peopleconcerned in a plebiscite called for the purpose. The creation of the new Municipality of Sibagat conformed tosaid requisite. A plebiscite was conducted and the people of the unit/units affected endorsed and approved the creationof the new local government unit. The officials of the newMunicipality have effectively taken their oaths of office andare performing their functions. A de jure entity has thus beencreated.It is a long-recognized principle that the power to create amunicipal corporation is essentially legislative in nature. Inthe absence of any constitutional limitations, a legislativebody may create any corporation it deems essential for themore efficient administration of government.The creation of the new Municipality of Sibagat was a valid exercise of legislative power then vested by the 1973 Constitution in theInterim Batasang Pambansa. There are significant differences, however, in Tan vs Comelecand in this case: in the Tan case, the LGC already existed atthe time that the challenged statute was enacted on 3December 1985; not so in the case at bar. Secondly, BP 885in the Tan case confined the plebiscite to the "proposed newprovince" to the exclusion of the voters in the remainingareas, in contravention of the Constitutional mandate and of the LGC that the plebiscite should be held "in the unit orunits affected." In contrast, BP 56 specifically provides for aplebiscite "in the area or areas affected." Thirdly, in the Tancase, even the requisite area for the creation of a new
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"Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality, or barrio may becreated, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary sub-stantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria es-tablished in the Local Government Code, and subject to theapproval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in theunit or units affected."
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