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RNZAF PHOTO
By Mark Romanow
ew Zealands (NZ) main defence constraints are her small population and size, her 200 nautical miles EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone) which is the worlds fourth largest covering some 3 million sq. km and her remoteness being located in the South Pacific. Constitutionally NZ is responsible for Niue and the Cook and Tokelau Islands with defence commitments ranging over a vast area of the Pacific Ocean from Tokelau in the north to the Antarctic in the south.
The NZ Defence Force (NZDF) recently completed its largest deployment of personnel overseas since the Korean war when it had over 1,000 personnel from all three services committed to the international force in East Timor. This commitment is ongoing as the Kiwis are maintaining a battalion group, the 2ND Bn Royal NZ Infantry Regiment (RNZIR) which is replacing the 1ST Bn RNZIR, as part of the UN Transitional Authority. As mentioned in a recent government report the NZDF has been continuously involved in peacekeeping duties, principally with the United Nations, since 1952. Over 4,000 personnel have been deployed to peacekeeping missions in that time. The NZDF is currently deployed on 15 peace support operations world-wide across 14 locations ranging from the Sinai to Kosovo and Bougainville. Operations such as these have garnered strong support as shown by recent public opinion polls that have indicated an
85% approval rate for peacekeeping. There have also been rotational frigate deployments to the Persian Gulf to support the Multinational Interdiction Force (MIF) plus a mechanised company attached to the British in Bosnia. The 1997 NZ Defence Review acknowledged that the continued stability of South-East Asia is one of our most important security goals. It is second only to the common security of Australia and NZ. The Asia Pacific Region is the only region where arms spending is increasing and the potential for conflict is increased due to continuing tensions on the Korean peninsula, between China and Taiwan and with conflicting territorial claims in the area. This is partially addressed by the formal security obligations of the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) linking NZ with Aus tralia, Singapore, Malaysia and the United Kingdom. Due to her remoteness NZ forces are annually required to travel vast distances to take part in FPDA exercises in the South China Sea. NZ forces have greatly benefited from the training opportunities available under the FPDA. The defence relationship with Singapore is the second most active after Australia with an extensive range of defence exercises occurring regularly. This mutual cooperation, which
PHOTOS COURTESY OF NZDF
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has seen numerous training opportunities for Singapore forces in NZ and the basing of equipment there, assists the NZDF with technologies like the Mistral VLLAD system. As s tated in the 97 Review Australia is New Zealands closest and most important security partner. The alliance with Australia, born of the Canberra Pact and formalised in ANZUS, remains central to N ew Zealands defence policy. Polls also showed that 94% consider the security of Australia to be very or fairly important to NZ. Reliance on Australia has increased ever since NZ implemented a nuclear free policy that weakened US defence relations. Since 1991, cooperation has been reinforced by a multitude of links as part of Closer Defence Relations (CDR). These CDR have manifested themselves in ways like the joint ANZAC frigate program, joint exercises and training opportunities and the basing of RNZAF Skyhawks in Nowra to assist RAN fleet training.
The 97 Review approved funding injections of some NZ$663 million over five years, on top of the baseline budget, for capital programs but this has been shown to be woefully inadequate, considering the range of required programs that currently lack funding. This is especially true considering the unfavourable downturn in the value of the NZ$ vs. the US$ as this drives up the cost of most capital acquisitions.
New Zealand
A rm y
Auckland
4,500 personnel
Christchurch
Pacific Ocean
South Island
Burnham
Air Force:
Stewart Island
3,065 personnel
19 7 6 3/5 14
Religion
Languages
Some NZ politicians do not seem to grasp the benefits of maintaining an adequately funded general purpose military that would give the government a wider range of options. Defence spending has been cut by over 30% during the past decade and currently stands at less than 1.1% of GDP which is well below international average. Post-election defence briefing papers have stated that the tight defence budgets of the 1980s and 1990s have resulted in a decline in current force equipment reliability, interoperability with friendly forces and combat viability. This is out of step with public opinion polls which have shown over half the responents support increasing government expenditures on defence. The previous governments stance was that security within the AsiaPacific region is of prime importance to NZ. We are a mar itime region s ur rounded by vast distances that can only
Strike aircraft (A-4K Skyhawk) Transports (5 C-130H, 2 B727) Maritime Patrol (P-3K Orion) Light Maritime helicopters (SH-2F/G Seasprite) Light Tactical Transport helicopters (UH-1H Iroquois)
be protected by a str ong and wellequipped naval and air force. a reform of defence force capabilities (under a new Labour Government) that focuses on land forces and downplays the need for a blue-water navy and air strike capability would dramatically reduce the deployment options available to a future government to respond to what is an uncertain future security environment. The new Labour government has alr eady completed a new Defence Assessment, to determine the future structure of the NZDF to enhance its ability to support peace support operations by the RNZA, that places an air combat capability as its lowest priority. The new Assessment was fast tracked (in two months), even though Labour had billed this as the first comprehensive review of overall defence policy
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since the substantive 1991 Review. It is mainly based on the conclusions of the Review of the lease of the F-16 report by former MP Derek Quigley which, some argue, had flawed and erroneous assumptions. This approach basically rests upon the tenets, as mentioned in the latest issue of NZ Defence Quarterly by commentator Colin James, that only such fighting is to be done and prepared for as is necessary to make or maintain peace and that only such money as is necessary for that limited capability is to be spent, thus relegating the RNZAF and RNZN to be transport forces for the RNZA in the future. This abrupt shift in strategic policy is already witnessed by the recent decision to terminate the F-16 lease to free up transport funds and fo r re-equ ipping of the RNZA. Additionally, it was decided against the purchase of a third ANZAC frigate in preference of smaller multi-role Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs). Meanwhile the RNZAF is unlikely to be able to replace its Skyhawks if they are retired by 2007 as it is improbable that funds, much greater than the generous NZ$363 million for two five-year leases including support equipment and start-up costs plus NZ$287 million for outright purchase of the F-16s, would be approved. This is unfortunate considering the 1999 Annual Report stated that NZ would contribute effectively to the common security of the AustraliaNZ strategic area by maintaining defence capabilities that are interoperable with those of Australia and that can look after New Zealands fair share of the defence burden. This approach is at odds with the fundamental tenets of NZ defence policy and could alienate both regional allies, and the US, as both naval and air combat capabilities are fundamental in demonstrating that NZ is serious about its own defence and committed to regional security. This also ignores the prevailing environment, such as instability in Indonesia, the rise of nationalism and expanding military capabilities of key regional states, just as Australia perceives that the post-Cold war strategic environment has deteriorated, and is publishing a new White Paper this year to reflect this updated strategic assessment of the region.
A N o2 Squadron A4-K Skyhawk overflies Royal Australian Navy ship HMAS ADELAIDE during exercises off the Australian Coast.
deploy and sustain a reinforced battalion group away from NZ. The delay in implementing the modifications has been s orely felt as HMNZS Char les Upham was unavailable for the East Timor deployment. The remaining 5 operational Inshore Patrol Craft (IPC) of the indigenously designed and produced MOA class are operated by the RNZNVR and provide a limited MCM capability for NZ harbours, similar to that provided by the better armed Canadian Kingston class MCDVs, although it is planned to add a remote minehunting system. The decision to walk away from the purchase of a third ANZAC frigate is ill considered as the former Chief of Naval Staff (CNS) Rear Adm. Fred Wilson noted that based on our analysis, four ANZAC frigates are required to meet current output requirements and fully meet the defence policy objectives. As noted by the current CNS Rear Adm. Peter McHaffie the ANZAC scores in terms of endurance, interoperability, supportability, and the logistics availability that comes by being part of a 10ship program with the Royal Australian Navy (RAN).
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A previous CNS Rear Adm. Jack Welch notes that an analysis of smaller OPVs being procured as an ANZAC alternative reveals that they are not as cheap overall as their capital cost would suggest. The Navy would have to purchase the infrastructure to support yet another class of ship and would need to train for additional special skills to man them. In a small navy such as ours, the effect would be quite profound and costly . Besides, in terms of force structure, the OPV does not sit well in the NZ situation. This is a small island nation which is assessed as unlikely to be territorially threatened in the foreseeable future. It follows that the Navy does not need to develop a force specifically for territorial defence The OPV is, by its size, limited in its ability to contribute to operations with a coalition force at long distances from NZ, in all weathers and for long periods. The frigate does not have these limitations. The purchase of a third ANZAC frigate could make fiscal sense as it could allow for the operational rotation of one deployed on MIF type missions and as noted in the 97 Review t h e Southern Ocean includes some of the roughest seas. The farthest part of the Cook Islands, for which we have defence responsibilities, is 4,000 km from NZ. To overcome the operational limitation of a small navy the RNZN could sign an Admiral Benelux type agreement with the RAN similar to that signed by the Belgian and Dutch navies. Operation as an integrated fleet would strengthen capability in peacekeeping, SAR and humanitarian operations and financial benefits would accrue through joint logistics procurement and training while fully utilising common infrastructures.
Royal Regiment New Zealand Artillery. 105mm gun detachment live firing during exercises at Waiouru Army Camp.
HMNZS Te Kaha entering Auckland for the first time 11 July 1997.
family and their Australian ASLAV variants to replace the current tracked fleet which is proving very expensive to keep operating. This is expected to comprise 24 fire-support vehicles (FSV) and some 80 infantry mobility vehicles (IMV) configured for various roles. The FSV/IMV project will provide the RNZA with enough vehicles to motorise one RF Bn group and a company of the second Bn with approval to purchase to be presented to the government mid-year for an in service date of mid-2002. There is presently a program in place to r efurbish 150 Unimog medium trucks to double their operational life to 30 years and allow the medium vehicle replacement program to be postponed until at least 2010. NZ has already purchased 30 (out of total of 115) Holden Rodeo 4WD vehicles for the East Timor deployment out of a total of 423 new Light Oper ational Vehicles ( LOV) being purchased to replace the Armys 567 obsolete Landrovers. The total purchase including some 115 non-military vehicles and the balance as standard military vehicles. A program to acquire Sincgars tactical radios under a FMS from the US is underway to improve interoperability with likely allies. New FN heavy machine guns have been acquired for Point Direct Fire Support Weapon (DFSW) role although tender s have been deferred for the Area DFSW and the Medium Range Anti-Armour Weapon as have targeting systems for the Point DFSW and the VLLAD detachment.
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equipment partially upgraded in the early 1980s under project Rigel, in addi tion to having their obsolete autopilots replaced by early 2001. Kestrel seeks to extend airframe life by at least 20 years and should be complete by July 2001 while Sirius will comprehensiv ely modernise the Orions tactical systems, and is similar to the Canadian planned Aurora Life Extension project. Funding issues and the new Gover nments desire to move away from combat capability are serious challenges to Sirius. It is suggested that it is still not too late for the NZ government to reverse its decision, influenced by the Quigley report that favoured cancellation, and continue with the lease of the 28 F-16s
Seasprite SH-2F operating down in the Ross Sea, Antarctica.
as this would provide new combat aircraft that would be operational until at least 2030, as supported by the 1998 Air Combat Future Options study that underpinned the original acquisition decision, and recoup the NZ$58 costs already incurred, the suggested exit cost of NZ$11 million plus save the Skyhawk upgrade costs. Additionally, if, as has been suggested, the Skyhawks are sold to the Philippines for just enough to cover the cost of the required ECM pods, this would show NZs commitment to regional stability. As noted in the 99 Report the rebuilding of the NZDF is seen as a litmus test of NZs resolve and commitment to meet its fair share of the burden in maintaining peace, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. A reduction of air bases to Ohakea only, and the sale of the Macchi jet training fleet, plus participation in a multinatio nal training scheme such as the NFTC could effect significant additional savings. b