Issue No.

24 November 2008

November 2008

Issue No. 24

From the Editor

E-Jets NEWS is a publication that presents EMBRAER 170/190 aircraft technical items. This newsletter, compiled by Embraer Fleet Technical Center (EFTC), brings the latest developments and shares in-service knowledge and maintenance best practices. It also provides troubleshooting tips to optimize aircraft utilization and efficiency in daily operation. E-Jets NEWS addresses Operators concerns with maintenance support and dispatchability of EMBRAER 170/190 aircraft. It has relevant information to be shared with the technical departments, such as Engineering and Maintenance. Recipients are encouraged to distribute this newsletter to Embraer Customers. Earlier editions of E-Jets NEWS publication can be found at Flyembraer Portal at http://www.flyembraer.com - Login (enter username and password); - Select Maintenance and then Technical Support; - Select E-Jets NEWS for Operators; - Click on desired E-Jets NEWS. If any additional information regarding the in-service items covered in the E-Jets NEWS is needed, please contact the local Embraer Field Service Representative. General questions or comments about the E-Jets NEWS publication can be addressed to:

E-Jets NEWS Tel: Fax: +55 12 3927 7075 +55 12 3927 5996

E-mail: ejets.news@embraer.com.br

PROPRIETARY NOTICE The articles published in E-Jets NEWS are for information only and are an EMBRAER S/A property. This newsletter must not be reproduced or distributed in whole or in part to a third party without EMBRAERs written consent. Also, no article published should be considered authority-approved data, unless specifically stated.

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November 2008

Issue No. 24

New root cause for BRK CONTROL FAULT on Power-Up UPDATE

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170/190 As informed previously in E-Jets NEWS Release 22, an additional root cause for BRK CONTROL FAULT on power-up was identified on aircraft equipped with Brake Control Module (BCM) PN 142071142 (EMBRAER 170) and PN 142091141 (EMBRAER190). In that case, the CAS message is correlated simultaneously to maintenance messages BCM1 FAULT and BCM2 FAULT. Appropriate FIM tasks will be revised and made available by the next scheduled revision in January 2009. Revision of SNLs 170-32-0017 and 19032-0011 will be released in November 2008, presenting all the details.

EMBRAER 170/175 TR Deflectors Update

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 As informed in E-Jets NEWS Release No. 22, Embraer has received reports from the field regarding failure of postmod CF34-8E TR Deflectors PN 14G0415-203 and 14G0415-204. These deflectors were incorporated by GE SB 78-0044 or by TR SN 430 and on, on the production line. Investigation pointed to a high cycle fatigue due to alternate bending of the free external edge of the deflector as a root cause of this new failure mode. Due to the low reliability of the new PN released by SB 78-0044, GE developed two new deflector designs to avoid these failures after root cause definition. Additionally, a field evaluation plan was developed to guarantee the robustness of the proposed new deflector designs. According to GE, Evaluation Service Bulletin was released in November 2008 and final evaluation date is expected by August 2009. Until the final fix is available, GE/MHD recommends that SB 78-0044 only be incorporated on-attrition basis, upon breakage of the TR Deflectors. If failures occur on newly delivered post-mod configurations, replacement parts will be covered under warranty. For more details, refer to Service letter CF34-8E MHD 78-33-597 released on June 2, 2008.

Final Solution BCM PN 142-091142, which will be common for the E-Jets family, will be the final solution for this issue. Service Bulletin and parts are planned for December 2009. Besides, other alternative solutions have been under evaluation.

Recommendations BCM PN 142-071142 was introduced by SB 170-32-0036 issued in June 2008. BCM PN 142-091141 was introduced by SB 190-32-0023 issued in February 2008. Considering the possible impacts of this failure on aircraft operation, Embraer recommends that operators stop the implementation of SBs 170-32-0036 and 190-32-0023, and wait for the final solution. Aftermarket support for the BCM PN 142071141 and PN 142-09114 will continue. The retrofit campaign will be maintained for operators who decide to keep it going on.

SNL Loss of NIM Synchronism Due to Excessive Noise in the MIC Buses Revision
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 A new revision (REV.02) is being issued for SNLs 170-34-0014 and 190-34-0013 to include immediate actions for those aircraft configurations that have an HF 1 system connected to the backup radio of the copilot DAP.
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Issue No. 24

APU Ice Formation Report

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 Embraer has recently received two reports related to ice formation on the APU after landing. According to the report, there was ice formation outside the APU gearbox and inside the APU air inlet. Both reports were in the same route, departing from a humid hot airport and landing at a high-altitude airport. In one of the events, the aircraft went through ice conditions in the approach phase. After landing the APU had a no rotation due to automatic APU FADEC protection against low oil temperature (ground protection only). Further investigations are ongoing to detect if the low oil temperature was due to a sensor fault or a real condition. The ground personnel heated the APU with the pneumatic unit and the APU started successfully. The second event had no ice condition detected during the flight, but the same ice formation was observed in the APU, as in the previous event. Aircraft data shows that the APU had a no-rotation after landing due to an ESC fault. The aircraft data is still under investigation for further field recommendation, as necessary. Embraer requests operators to report any similar event and attach pictures together with aircraft and APU data (FHDB, DVDR and APU FADEC NVM).

Cockpit Door Passive Lock Modification Service Bulletin

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 Embraer has issued Service Bulletins 170-52-0052 and 190-52-0035 - Cockpit Door Passive Lock Modification.

LOAD 21.4 ACMF User Incompatibility of Applications

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 Embraer has released Service News Letters 170-45-0007 and 190-45-0007 to advise about a verified Load 21.4 incompatibility issue with the ACMF user applications previously installed.

Events in the field showed that screws of the passive lock striker may get loose over time due to its short length and aircraft vibration. This can result in the loss of the passive lock striker and, consequently, the cockpit door falling off the door hinges. The SBs mentioned above will replace the current passive lock by a new one with a design that allows installation of longer screws that fully go through the striker.

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November 2008

Issue No. 24

SNL Escape Slide Safety Tie Restoration

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 In-service issues have been reported about escape slides unlacing during operation of the passenger/ service doors. A condition of safety tie not attached to the parachute pin may lead to an increased movement of that pin during the operation of the passenger/service doors and the escape slide pack may get unlaced.

Emergency/ Parking Brake Cable Stiff or Broken

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 Embraer has received field reports concerning instances of emergency/ parking brake cable (EPBC) being stiff or broken. Investigation on removed units has indicated two distinct failure modes: The first detected failure mode is a manufacturing process control issue related to the length of the internal ball cage component. The second detected failure mode concerns cable installation and handling. 1. Ball cage length: A review of the EPBC manufacturers process and of the returned units examined in a laboratory have indicated that some cables may have had ball cage fabricated to a length below the normal tolerance range. As a corrective action, the manufacturing process has been amended to include a specific inspection to verify the dimension of the cut length. There was no part number change. The parts manufactured under new inspection measures are: For EMBRAER 170: PN 745736-1 SN 0197 and on. For EMBRAER 175: PN 745827-1 SN 0108 and on. For EMBRAER 190: PN 745851-1 SN 0193 and on. For EMBRAER 195: PN 745794-1 SN 0038 and on.

2. Handling, installation and damage in service: Embraer has issued SNLs 170-25-0030 and 190-25-0023 recommending that, during routine inspection, the condition of the safety tie of the parachute pin is checked and, if an abnormal condition is found, to restore it as per Goodrich SNL 25-202 instructions. Evaluation on returned units has exhibited indications of damage due to improper handling and/or installation problems. The nature of observed damage, such as kinks, deformations, and others, results in a control having rough operation, high operation loads and potential cable failure. Embraer modified aircraft assembly process in
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November 2008
order to reduce the emergency/parking brake cable exposure to external damage. 3. Conclusion Corrective measures have already taken by Embraer and Triumph Controls. There is no proactive action to be taken by the operators. Defective cables must be removed and sent to Triumph Controls. Any defects that are the result of out-of-specification conditions will be repaired in accordance with the warranty, free of charge. SNL's 170-32-0026 and 190-32-0024 were released in November 2008 to address this subject.

Issue No. 24

CMC Slow Navigation FHDB Erasing Password Change

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 EMBRAER informs that the interim solution for CMC slow navigation issue (erasing FHDB data) has been affected by change in the new LDI versions. For EMBRAER 170 family, the new LDI versions V09 and V09.1 had the password to erase FHDB files changed to ERJ190. SNL 170-45-006 and AMM TASK 45-4500-970-807-A will be revised with that information to reflect the change: Password for erasing the FHDB files on EMBRAER 170 and 175 aircraft with LDI up to V08.3 ==> ERJ170 Password for erasing the FHDB files on EMBRAER 170 and 175 aircraft with LDI V09 and on ==> ERJ190 For EMBRAER 190 family, the password remains the same.

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November 2008

Issue No. 24

Engine No-Rotation upon Start Command

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 Embraer is aware of some unsuccessful commanded engine starts. Such events have usually been reported as "ENG X NO ROTATION" or "ENG X NO START". The analysis performed found no unexpected behavior or evidence of malfunction in the FHDB. Additionally, DVDR data shows no start signal recorded: this led Embraer to conclude that no Engine Start signal was available, probably due to insufficient time the StartStop switch was held in the "START" position. So, in fact, the engine did not rotate as expected. In order to eliminate the possibility of such events, AOM section 3-11 is being revised to provide instruction for holding the Engine Start-Stop Switch for 2 seconds in the "START" position. Revision is scheduled for December 2008.

Low-Stage Bleed Check Valve

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 Low-Stage Bleed Check Valve (LSCV) PN 1001447-4 was introduced by means of SB 170-36-0006 and SB 190-36-0011, and considered the final fix for PN suffix 3 issues. This new PN had to pass through periodic dimensional inspections, every 3000 FH, as per the Maintenance Review Board (MRB). In September 2008, one LSCV PN 1001447-4 removed from an EMBRAER 190 and logging approximately 2,500 FH, was received by Hamilton Sundstrand (HS) with a crack on one of its petals. Since then, all the returned valves were inspected for their dimensions, presence of cracks and subjected to inspection by dye-penetrant liquid. A few other EMBRAER 190 valves were found in the same situation. No EMBRAER 170 LSCV has failed the HS shop inspections so far. Embraer and HS are still analyzing LSCV PN 1001447-4 cases mentioned above. Meanwhile, operators are still required to accomplish maintenance task 36-11-02002 (Functional Check Low-Stage Bleed Check Valve, Category 8), as per MRB Revision 4, or the latest ANACapproved revision. LSCV PN 1001447-4 that passes the MRB test may be reinstalled in the same engine. Otherwise, the check valve should be replaced with a new one. Also, EMBRAER would like to emphasize the following items: - SB 190-36-0014 Rev.0 was issued in October 30, 2008. - The Brazilian Civil Aviation Authority (ANAC) has already released AD 200611-01R3, effective from Nov 25th, 2008. - It is very important to emphasize that compliance with the AD is based on the valve's replacement log. - SNL 190-36-0013 Rev.1 was issued to give further information on the valve's history. - Operators are encouraged to contact their closest assigned Hamilton
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2008 WINTER TIME SNL

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 Embraer informs operators of the release this month of the COLD WEATHER OPERATION SNLs 170-30-0002R11 and 190-30-0002R07. The revision brings new improvements for important wintertime difficulties. The main ones are shown in the table below.

New Software SPDA Block 11.1 Load 21.4 FADEC 5.32

Issue Fuel Feed Fault CAS Message Flight Ctrl No Dispatch CAS Messages Engines on-ground start difficulties

November 2008
Sundstrand representative for the valve's planning and logistic details.1

Issue No. 24

ACMP Overpressure
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 Some reports of FLIGHT CONTROL NO DISPATCH have been reported due to high discharge pressure caused by the ALTERNATE CURRENT MOTOR PUMP (ACMP). Further investigation on returned units has reveled excessive wear of the hard anodize coating in the stroke piston bore, resulting in high internal leakage that causes loss of the variable displacement control function and consequently a high discharge pressure by the ACMP. This high pressure is not detrimental to the hydraulic system operation. As an interim solution, an improved housing anodize process was introduced, implemented as Rev D housings, on all ACMPs shipped after Nov/2006, S/N K1155 and on. Some modifications on the ACMP were introduced to solve the high discharge pressure, such as new stainless steel sleeve to eliminate the hard anodize process, increase the stroking piston engagement and replace the chamfer at the end of the stroking piston with a radius.

The new ACMP design has the new Part Number 51166-03 and the Service Bulletin 170-29-0023 and 190-29-0019 were issued for field retrofit. There will be a proactive retrofit campaign FOC, for those pumps without Rev. D housings. The Service Bulletin for replacing the ACMP from different positions is divided into 4 different parts. Nearly all FLIGHT CONTROL NO DISPATCH messages due to ACMP overpressure occurred in the No. 3 Hydraulic System. Thus, EMBRAER recommends the replacement of just ACMP 3A at the beginning of the retrofit because of the number of rotable units available. PART I of the Service Bulletin provides the procedure for the replacement of ACMP 3A.

AMM Tasks for RUDDER DEFLECTION

Effectivity: EMBRAER 190 Embraer has received some field reports from operators concerning the rudder deflection values when using FCS synoptic page without rudder deflection device GSE272 to accomplish the AMM Tasks. Currently the applicable AMM is referring to values between 30.81 to 31.39 degrees for full rudder deflection when using FCS synoptic page without rudder deflection device GSE272. An additional AMM revision will be released introducing the new values for full deflection with synoptic page. The new values are
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November 2008
between 30.0 to 31.39 degrees when using FCS synoptic page without rudder deflection device GSE272. The affected AMM tasks that will be revised and released in December 2008 are: AMM task 27-03-03-820-801A PACE rigging (when rigging PACE 1 and/or 3); AMM task 27-20-00-820-801A Rudder surface rigging; AMM task 27-22-01-820-801A Rudder PCU Quick rigging. already

Issue No. 24

CF34-8E Thrust Reverser (T/R) Actuation System Synchronization Flexible Tube Quality Escape
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 GE Aviation has reported to Embraer that a flexible hose tube (P/N 7U7946-1, EIPC 78-32-11) failed on a production acceptance test at their facility due to a product quality escape. So far there have not been any failures reported for EMBRAER 170 fleet regarding that failure mode. Investigation has been conducted and the root cause was identified as an incorrect tube crimping process. The suspected population is restricted to 15 (fifteen) thrust reversers installed on 10 (ten) aircraft. After identification of that issue, communication from EMBRAER and GE were released to the field to inform the operators. Besides, Service Letter CF348E MHD 78-32-614 was issued with recommendations for affected aircraft, especially during maintenance procedures using the GMO switch. Embraer recommends that operators follow the instructions provided in that Service Letter. Finally, GE CF34-8E-AL SB 78-0054 was issued on October 29th, 2008 as category 2 to be implemented over the next 600 FH after the SB releasing date. The Service Letter and Bulletin referred to above should be requested from GE Technical Representative.

The IC2008-190/08161 is available addressing this issue.

Overwing Emergency Exit Door Opening Inspection

Effectivity: EMBRAER 195 Instances have been reported concerning the possibility of insufficient clearance between the LH/RH light deflector and the top of the over wing emergency exit door, located at zones 813 and 825. This can make the LH/ RH overwing emergency exit door difficult to open in an emergency evacuation.

Embraer has recently issued Service Bulletin 190-25-0092 (OVERWING EMERGENCY EXIT DOOR OPENING INSPECTION) in order to inspect the clearance and, if necessary, replace the LH/RH lens cover and light deflector. Refer to the Service Bulletin mentioned above for detailed instructions and effectivity.

Alternate Procedure to Simulate Aircraft Air/Ground

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 AMM tasks 32-62-00-860-801-A and 3262-00-860-802-A give respectively the procedures to simulate AIR condition when the aircraft is on the ground (Weight-On-Wheels) or GROUND condition when the aircraft is on the jacks
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November 2008
(Weight-Off-Wheels). These tasks are called out in different maintenance procedures for several systems. Currently, these tasks require the use of GSE 164, which consists of an electronic box comprised of the box itself and six two-position switches, one for each WOW proximity sensor of Nose and Main Landing Gears. Harnesses from this GSE are connected to the Landing Gear WOW circuit and send the signals that simulate the required Air/Ground configuration to the aircraft.

Issue No. 24
To simulate GROUND condition when the aircraft is on the jacks (Weight-OffWheels), it is necessary to use the aluminum-made plates. Embraer will revise applicable tasks for the next scheduled revision (March 2009) in order to reflect the alternative procedure with the GSE280.

FADEC 8Ev5.41 software

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 175 EMBRAER has issued the Service Bulletin 170-73-0006 related to the new FADEC software version 8Ev5.41 comprising EMBRAER 170/175 aircraft in operation under ANAC, FAA and TCCA certification. This new software version incorporates improved application software for the CF34-8E engine models, intended to avoid In Flight Shut Downs (IFSDs) events reported with the installation of software version 8Ev5.40 (associated with VG DUAL CMD-CURRENT DISAG CMC faults). FADEC software 8Ev5.41 also includes improvements in reliability and dispatchability, originally introduced in FADEC SW 8Ev5.40 like an improved FMU LVDT fault accommodation logic to minimize occurrence of LOTC (Loss of Thrust Control) events, among others. The Service Bulletin for aircraft in operation under EASA certification is in approval process at the Certification Authority. A new revision of the Service Bulletin referred hereto will be issued upon EASA approval. EMBRAER and GE recommend that this bulletin be accomplished within the next 1200 Flight Hour(s) or in the second scheduled maintenance interval, whichever occurs first.

As an alternative way to simulate the aircraft Air/Ground configuration, Embraer will include in the mentioned tasks the possibility to use the GSE 280.

GSE 280 is a set of plates with warning flags to be fitted in front of the proximity sensors targets. There are six steel-made plates and six aluminum-made plates. With the purpose of simulating the aircraft AIR/GROUND configuration, the plates of GSE 280 are fitted in front of the Nose or Main Landing Gears WOW proximity sensors targets. In order to simulate AIR condition when the aircraft is on the ground (Weight-On-Wheels), it is necessary to use the steel-made plates.

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Issue No. 24

Discrete Message

INPUT

CMC

Escape Check

Slide

Operational

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 EMBRAER has identified, during FHDB analysis, the FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH CAS message correlated with HSACE X /WRG[DISCR INPUT] FAULT maintenance message and the latter has not been the root cause for the former. The Discrete Input Monitors are tripped due to a five-second disagreement between any pair of discrete signal (Ref A), A and B inputs, in the same HSACE channel. Ref.: A: Discrete input signals: Pilot and copilot Pitch Trim Switches; o PILOT PITCH TRIM SW FAIL CH X/WRG COPILOT PITCH FAIL CH X/WRG TRIM SW

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170/190 Embraer 170 Interiors Structures Group and Product Safety Monitoring Group requests our Operators to report to Embraers field support team or to EFTC 170 Interiors Structure the accomplishing of the MRB Task 25-65-01-002 Operational Check of Emergency Evacuation Slides whenever it is performed being the result either passed or failed. The information required is the P/N and S/N of the Escape Slide and which door was used for the test. It is of the same importance that all events with Evacuation Slides are reported in details and if possible with pictures. For some times the events are reported in delay (Service Difficulties Reports) to our Safety Group by authorities and the opportunity to get accurate and timely information for investigation and further shop finding is missed. This information will support the monitoring of the Escape Slide configurations in service for their reliability.

Back-up Pitch Trim switches; o BACK-UP PITCH TRIM SW FAIL CH X/WRG

Pilot and copilot Quick disc Switches; o PILOT QUICK DISC SW FAIL CH X/WRG COPILOT QUICK DISC SW FAIL CH X/WRG

* X=Channel 1or 2 Once one of these discrete inputs become active, it is necessary to perform a Return-to-Service test according to AMM 27-00-00-070-801-A to clear the FCM NVM; otherwise every time any FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH is active (see Ref.: B) on the CAS display, the HSACE X /WRG[DISCR INPUT] FAULT message will appear as well. This scenario will be addressed in the new LDI V09. Ref.: B FHDB Readout shown below.

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Issue No. 24

Acronyms
ACMF = Aircraft Condition-Monitoring Function ACMP = Alternate Current Motor Pump AD = Airworthiness Directive AIPC = Aircraft Illustrated Parts Catalog AMM = Aircraft Maintenance Manual AMS = Air Management System ANAC = Agncia Nacional de Aviao Civil (Brazilian Civil Aviation Authority) AOM = Airplane Operations Manual APU = Auxiliary Power Unit BCM = Brake Control Module CAS = Crew Alerting System CMC = Central Maintenance Computer CMM = Component Maintenance Manual DLS = Data Load System DVDR = Digital Voice-Data Recorder EICAS = Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System EPBC = Emergency/ Parking Brake Cable EMM = Engine Maintenance Manual FADEC = Full-Authority Electronic-Control FCM = Flight Controls Module FHDB = Fault History Database FIM = Fault Isolation Manual FOD = Foreign Object Damage FOL = Flight Operations Letter LDI = Loadable Diagnostic Information LRU = Line Replaceable Unit LVDT = Linear Variable DifferentialTransducer
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LSCV = Low-Stage Bleed Check Valve MMEL = Master Minimum Equipment List NVM = Non-Volatile Memory OB = Operational Bulletins PIL = Parts Information Letters PN = Part Number PSEM = Proximity Sensor Electronic Module SB = Service Bulletin SN = Serial Number SNL = Service Newsletter SPDA = Secondary Power Distribution Assembly T/R = Thrust Reverser Note: All abbreviations used in EMBRAER Maintenance Manuals can be found in the Introduction to AMM Part II.

Digital