Issue No.

29 April 2009

April 2009

Issue No. 29

From the Editor

E-Jets NEWS is a publication that presents EMBRAER 170/190 aircraft technical items. This newsletter, compiled by Embraer Fleet Technical Center (EFTC), brings the latest developments and shares in-service knowledge and maintenance best practices. It also provides troubleshooting tips to optimize aircraft utilization and efficiency in daily operation. E-Jets NEWS addresses the Operators concerns with maintenance support and dispatchability of EMBRAER 170/190 aircraft. It has relevant information to be shared with the technical departments, such as Engineering and Maintenance. Recipients are encouraged to distribute this newsletter to Embraer Customers. Earlier editions of E-Jets NEWS publication can be found at Flyembraer Portal at http://www.flyembraer.com - Login (enter username and password); - Select Maintenance and then Technical Support; - Select E-Jets NEWS for Operators; - Click on desired E-Jets NEWS. If any additional information regarding the in-service items covered in the E-Jets NEWS is needed, please contact the local Embraer Field Service Representative. General questions or comments about the E-Jets NEWS publication can be addressed to:

E-Jets NEWS Tel: Fax: +55 12 3927 7075 +55 12 3927 5996

E-mail: ejets.news@embraer.com.br

PROPRIETARY NOTICE The articles published in E-Jets NEWS are for information only and are an EMBRAER S/A property. This newsletter must not be reproduced or distributed in whole or in part to a third party without EMBRAERs written consent. Also, no article published should be considered authority-approved data, unless specifically stated.

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April 2009

Issue No. 29

E-Jets Technical Workshops on the Webex

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 Embraer has held workshops since May 2008. In 2009 we will hold three technical workshops using the WEBEX conference tool. The objective is to encourage regular conferences with all E-JETS customers to present and discuss the status of the technical issues that mostly affected the E-JETS dispatchability. The associated maintenance and operational costs will also be discussed during the workshops. The conferences are already scheduled for May, August, and December 2009. The detailed schedule for the next conference (May 2009) is given below:

E-JETS E-JETS E-JETS E-JETS E-JETS E-JETS E-JETS

Technology Electrical & Avionics Flight Controls & Auto Flight Systems Propulsion Landing Gear & Hydraulic Systems Interiors Environmental Structures

E-JETS Workshops Schedule AMERICAS & EMEA 11-May 12-May 13-May 18-May 19-May 20-May 25-May

E-JETS Workshops Schedule ASIA & OCEANIA 12-May 13-May 14-May 19-May 20-May 21-May 26-May

We hope you will join us on these occasions to share your experience with us. We can all learn from your best practices. We are also eager to hear your proposals and alternatives to keep the E-JETS fleet flying around the world with efficiency and profitability. Let your local customer account manager or technical representative know if you want your name included on the workshop invitation mailing list.

Ferry Flight with Slat / Flap Locked In Position 4

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 Embraer Operations Department has recently released a new procedure for FERRY FLIGHT WITH SLAT/FLAP LOCKED IN POSITION 4 on DDPM manual (revision 11) for FAA Certificated Operators.

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April 2009

Issue No. 29

Fuel Tank Flammability Requirements

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170/190 Regarding the final rule for Fuel Tank Flammability in Transport Category Airplanes, th enforced by the Certification Authorities in September 19 , 2008, Embraer would like to inform that, in compliance with the fuel tank flammability requirements set forth in Part 26, Subpart D, dedicated reports on the fuel tank flammability exposure analysis for the E-Jets have been submitted to the Certification Authorities, complying with all milestones up to now. Further information on this subject will be available upon the conclusion of the revision of these reports by the Certification Authorities.

AVNX MAU Cascading Other System Messages

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 Embraer has been receiving field reports stating that, randomly, one or more of the following CAS messages can become ACTIVE in PREFLIGHT on the EICAS: > AVNX MAU 1A FAIL > AVNX MAU 1B FAIL > AVNX MAU 2A FAIL > AVNX MAU 2B FAIL > AVNX MAU 3A FAIL > AVNX MAU 3B FAIL Additionally, as a cascade effect, other system CAS messages can also become ACTIVE such as FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH, FLT CTRL FAULT, AP FAULT and LG NO DISPATCH. These messages usually become ACTIVE and, after a few seconds, become INACTIVE without any maintenance action. Service Newsletters 170-31-0016 and 190-31-0015 have been released showing the four most usual scenarios and recommendations to prevent impacts such as flight delays and unnecessary components removals.

Flight Controls Tiger Team Meeting

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190
th During the week of March 9 , 2009 the Flight Controls Tiger Meeting was held in Phoenix /AZ, USA, to discuss the main issues impacting aircraft dispatchability.

The presentation is on the Flyembraer website (http://www.flyembraer.com) under Support Center / Download Center / Commercial Jets / Maintenance / Technical Support / Webex Conferences (Presentations) / E-jets / Flight Controls System and AFCS / Tiger Team Meeting Update.

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April 2009

Issue No. 29

AFT FLAP Rods Broken

Effectivity: EMBRAER 190 Embraer has received reports from some operators concerning broken aft flap rods, as shown in the picture below:

Rods

Figure 1 AFT Flap Broken Rods

The aft flap rods were designed to work as mechanical fuse and may brake, for example, to prevent any excessive load to the wing structure in case of jamming in the aft flap mechanism. However, the aft flap rods may also brake if the aircraft is submitted to a flap overspeed or hard landing event. In both cases, there are appropriate procedures available in the AMM. The aft flap lower rod of track #2 was reinforced and the AIPC has already been updated with the new rod (PN 190-92387-901). In addition, Embraer is also evaluating the reinforced aft flap lower rod of track #1.

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April 2009

Issue No. 29

APU FADEC Sofware 3.0 Released

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 Embraer and Hamilton Sundstrand have developed APU FADEC Software Version 3.0 that, together with other modifications, will improve APU troubleshooting capabilities and also bring several other benefits, including removal of spurious messages and improvement in APU reliability (improved APU start logic). The APU FADEC Software itself (Part Number 4505003G) with LDI 8, or above, is expected to bring approximately 80% of troubleshooting improvements. However, to achieve 100% of the improved troubleshooting capabilities, it is necessary to have APU FADEC 3.0 Software and Hardware (Part Number 4505003H), LDI 8 or above, and APU ESC2 hardware installed (Part Number 4508022). These hardware modifications have additional LRU monitoring circuits. For the installation of LDI 8, or above, it is necessary to activate the new CMC messages that improve system troubleshooting. Please contact Embraer for more details. Note: All FIM tasks have been revised to include the FADEC 3.0 SW fault isolation logic. Note: When installing LDI versions, refer to ATA 31 Service Bulletins to check if an EPIC LOAD upgrade is the necessary. Note: The FADEC NVM download from the cockpit requires EPIC LOAD 23, scheduled to be available in December 2009. Related Embraer Service Bulletins are 170-49-005, 190-49-004, 170-45-007 and 190-450003

Forward or Center Ebay Fan Fail Caused by EICC K9 Relay Failure

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 In order to support the investigation to identify the root cause of EICC K9 failures that are triggering FWD or Center Ebay Fan Fail CAS messages, Hamilton Sundstrand has requested that removed K9 contactors are shipped to ECE. When EICC K9 relay is found as root cause for FWD or CENTER EBAY FANS FAIL CAS messages, this part should be shipped to the address below: INTERTECHNIQUE ECE Repair Shop / Station de Rparation ATTN: Gerard DUPONT / Martial BUSI 271 rue du Chteau Musset B.P. 147 79005 Niort Cedex, France For tracking purposes, inform Embraer (170ams@embraer.com.br) about the shipment. AMS Fleet Technical Center

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April 2009

Issue No. 29

ACMP Service Newsletter Revision

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170/190 Instances of FLIGHT CONTROL NO DISPATCH have been reported due to high discharge pressure caused by the ALTERNATE CURRENT MOTOR PUMP (ACMP). The most occurrences happened due to hydraulic system 3 overpressure. Service Newsletters 170-27-0042 and 190-27-0034 - FLIGHT CONTROL NO DISPATCH DUE TO HYDRAULIC ACMP FAILURE - have been issued as an interim action to reduce the occurrences of the hydraulic system 3 overpressure. Those SNLs consist in the swapping of the ACMP 3A with ACMP 3B after 3000 FH has elapsed. As an interim solution, an improved housing anodize process implemented as Rev D housings was introduced on all ACMP -02 shipped after November 2006, SN K1155 and subsequent. The final solution consists of the new part number ACMP -03 introduced by SBs 170-290023 and 190-29-0019 for field retrofit. The swap of the ACMP 3A with the ACMP 3B is no longer necessary for the aircraft that already have the new hydraulic pumps -03 or the -02 Rev. D housings incorporated. In other words, all ACMP that are not in the SB 170-29-0023 and 190-29-0019 effectivity will no longer need to follow the SNL 170-27-0042 and 190-27-0034. The SNLs 170-27-0042 and 190-27-0034 are under revision to reflect this scenario.

Low Stage Bleed Check Valve Update

Applicable to EMBRAER 190 As an update to the article published in E-Jet NEWS No. 28, Embraer would like to inform that ANAC has issued a revision to the current AD (No.: 2006-11-01R4 - Effective Date: 09 Apr. 2009). This revision includes the replacement of the LH Low Pressure Check Valve and modifies the wording for the RH side, clarifying that overhauled valves are allowed to be used.

Bonding Map
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170/190 To allow Operators to dispatch the aircraft when some external redundant bonding jumper is found missing or broken, Embraer has released the AMM task 20-13-21-210-801-A describing the bonding map. The electrical bonding map study was defined according to a dedicated analysis of aircraft locations, considering lightning zoning of EMBRAER 170/190, moving surfaces and special joint locations. This means that the bonding map supports the external redundant bonding jumpers with higher probability to break, and with higher probability to be used as current path in case of lightening strike. Timely, the bonding jumpers located in the aircraft interior were not considered in the scope of that study because they are considered mandatory even if they are redundant.

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April 2009

Issue No. 29

Ramp Phone Gain Adjustment (David Clark with Mic Model M-7A)
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170/190 In-service issues have been reported of excessive noise in the communication between ramp panel and flight deck. In order to minimize this effect, Embraer suggests the adjustment of the Electret MIC gain through the small screws into the MIC boom assembly. Refer to the headset manufacturer's testing instructions (available in the David Clark's web site) for further details. The microphone sensibility will increase by rotating the screws clockwise.

Main Landing Gear Harness Rerouting

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 Embraer would like to inform that SB 170-32-0039 has been issued due to a possible incorrect installation of the MLG harnesses. MLG failed to deploy during a functional test with the aircraft on jacks during MLG sampling program. Additional investigations revealed there is a possibility of interference between the Weight-on-Wheels (WOW) and WheelSpeed-Transducer (WST) harnesses with the Locking Stay sensor target. The SB brings information to install a new harness support in the Left-Hand (LH) and RightHand (RH) MLG bay. It also provides information to replace the current WOW and WST harnesses installed in the LH and RH MLG with new improved ones, if necessary. However, it was recently found out that Harness support attachments are not applicable to be fastened on the rib as required by the SB. Therefore, Embraer has canceled the supply of the harness support in order to avoid the trouble of its installation in the worldwide fleet. The implementation of the SB to replace WOW and WST harnesses is required. However, the operator should install the harness support later on, when a new SB is available. A revision of the SB 170-32-0039 was released in April 2009 without instructions to install the harness support. A new SB is under development to improve harness support installation and is expected to be released in July 2009.

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April 2009

Issue No. 29

IEVM Retrofit Status

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 In 2007 and early 2008, IEVM faults were leading to delays and cancellations in the worldwide fleet. Investigation on the returned units led Vibrometer (IEVM card manufacturer) to identify a quality escape on a batch of IEVM cards comprising 138 units in the field. In April 2008, SBs 170-77-0003 and 190-77-0003 were issued to replace the affected units on a FOC basis. A retrofit plan was established between Embraer and Vibrometer and, as of April, the status is as follows: 100% of exchange units have been sent by Vibrometer to the operators. 79% of the affected cards have already been replaced and returned to Vibrometer.

As a consequence of the retrofit plan, field data is showing steady decrease on number of interruptions caused by IEVM faults as per the Figure 1 below. Embraer recommends that the operators complete the retrofit of the affected units in order to avoid further interruptions.

10

# of IEVM related interruptions

SBs issued

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2009 2007 Date 2008

Figure 1

GSE for Center of Gravity Calculation

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 AMM 07-10-01 (AIRCRAFT JACKING - MAINTENANCE PRACTICES) and applicable ITEM section were recently revised to introduce the GSE 444 PN AGE-05075-201. It consists of software that helps to calculate the aircraft Center of Gravity required during accomplishment of jacking procedures. The GSE will be especially useful during heavy maintenance tasks, when the aircraft is in a configuration different from regular operation (without APU, galley, seats, people on board, etc). Use of the software is interactive and quite simple. All information regarding its use can be obtained in the help section.

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April 2009

Issue No. 29

Cargo Door Latch Pin Found Lost During Inspection

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 Embraer was informed by an EMBRAER 190 Operator, during a routine inspection, of instances of failure in the washers lock tabs ref.: IPC 53-21-29 FWD Cargo Door Frame Fittings and IPC 53-23-29 AFT Cargo Door Frame Fittings. Also, in some cases the nut cover came loose leading to the loss of the nut cover and backup pin. Subsequently, discrepancies between the actual installation on aircraft and related technical documentation were reported, mainly in terms of different ways for lock washer tabs installation to the nut plate. Embraer investigation revealed that the bending of the locking washer second tab is the root cause of nut cover losses, for it compromises the structural integrity of the original tab.
Instances of Locker settings found in the field

Locker twisted

Figure 1 Lock washers reported conditions in the fleet.

Under normal conditions, one of the lock washer tabs is engaged inside the nut cover recess, preventing the nut cover from getting loose and the backup pin from being released. Embraer analysis also concluded that it is extremely remote that this situation could lead the aircraft to an unsafe condition. A World Wide Fleet Inspection Service Bulletin is being prepared, and it will show the lock tab washer correct installation and additional recommendation to avoid the bending of the second tab. The expected date for Service Bulletin issuance will be informed soon.

Pressurization MAU2 PROC3/MAU3 PROC5 (FMS) [CPCS] CMC Messages

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 This message is applicable for aircraft equipped with Load 21.4 LDI V09 and on, and represents an improvement of old MAU2 LRM9/MAU3 LRM9 [FMS] FAULT one. As recent FHDBs decoding have shown an increase in its occurrence, with no apparent impacts on the aircraft pressurization system, airlines personnel are suspecting it is spurious. The CPCS uses information from the FMS, which is set by the crew prior to flights, such as the cruise level and landing field elevation. The absence or loss of any of these values is enough to trigger MAU2 PROC3/MAU3 PROC5 (FMS) [CPCS]. So, it is difficult to determine the conditions that led to the CMC to activate them. Embraer is evaluating this logic. In order to gather material for a better analysis, an ACMF file has been developed and made available. Operators are encouraged to send a message to Embraer AMS Technical Support (170ams@embraer.com.br) asking for this ACMF installation instructions letter, in case they have affected aircraft.
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April 2009

Issue No. 29

Air Conditioning Out Temp Sensor 1(2) CMC Messages

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 This CMC message is usually present in FHDBs, and has already led to unfruitful troubleshooting services. Based on this, Embraer evaluated the air conditioning system logic and realized that Out Temp Sensor 1 (2) CMC messages may be triggered during normal operation cruise conditions. Future versions of the AMS Black Label software will change its set points. Meanwhile, events during cruise, with no correlations to Pack 1(2) Fail CAS messages, may be disregarded for troubleshooting purposes.

DVDR Download of Audio Data

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 Due to the architecture of the system, it is not possible to download audio data from the DVDR "on-wing". This is because the DVDR is always in the recording mode for audio data when power is applied and it is installed in the aircraft. See the figure below (extracted from WM 31-31-51).

The connection between pins #7 and #8 avoids the DVDR to enter in Analyze mode when it is installed in the aircraft. This is required for the DVDR to record audio all the time while the aircraft is powered. So, in order to download audio data, it is necessary to remove the DVDR from the aircraft and take it to a bench (with power supply) using a specific Honeywell GSE. Contact a local Honeywell's technical representative for further information about the ground support equipment required for downloading and decoding audio data from the DVDR.
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Issue No. 29

Frozen Brakes FAA Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190
nd On December 2 , 2008, Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA) issued Service Difficulty Advisory AV-2008-08 for owners and operators of aircraft equipped with carbon disc brakes. The purpose was to inform operators about the possibility of moisture absorption and subsequent freezing during flight. Moisture and freezing can result in tire failure and damage to the landing gear due to a locked wheel brake. In addition, AV-2008-08 informs that corrective actions may impose additional costs and presents recommendations to avoid the incident.

The FAA has issued an equivalent document: Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) NM-09-18 on December 4th, 2008. On December 19th, 2008, EASA issued Safety Information Bulletin (SIB) 2008-89 concurring with and covering TCCA AV-2008-08.
th Embraer informs that frozen brakes on carbon discs affect the E-Jets fleet. On March 26 , 2007, Embraer issued Service Newsletters (SNL) 170-32-0021 and 190-32-0016 informing operators about frozen brake events that occurred with the E-Jets fleet operating in cold weather conditions. These SNLs give maintenance and operational procedures to minimize these occurrences. In addition, recommended maintenance actions are provided in the respective AMM, while recommended operational procedures are given in AOM Section 3 Normal Procedures, Subsection 3.75 Supplemental Procedures Environmental:

Service Newsletters 170-32-0021 and 190-32-0016 will be revised to incorporate the modifications already made in the Embraer maintenance manuals. References: TCCA AV-2008-08:

http://www.tc.gc.ca/CivilAviation/certification/continuing/Advisory/2008-08.htm08.htm EASA SIB 2008-89:

http://ad.easa.eu.int/ad/2008-89 FAA SAIB NM-08-27:

http://rgl.faa.gov

MD-FAST User Access

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 Embraer received some field reports asking how to get access to MD-Fast Tool. The MD Fast Tool is a web application available through Flyembraer Site http://www.flyembraer.com Although the tool is available free for all Embraers field Customer Support Team, it is necessary to request access to MD-FAST. For this, please send an e-mail requesting access to MD-FAST Tool to support@flyembraer.com In order to verify that you already have access, just check if you got the menu MDFAST (highlighted in red in figure below) visible in the AHEAD page. If not, please send an e-mail requesting access.

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April 2009

Issue No. 29

FUEL system diagnostic page on CMC

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 Embraer received reports of unusual behavior of the following parameters on the fuel system diagnostic page on the CMC, both for FCU1 and FCU2 channels: R TANK HARNESS EXT SHORTED R TANK HARNESS SHIELD OPEN L TANK HARNESS EXT SHORTED L TANK HARNESS SHIELD OPEN These parameters are incorrectly configured in the CMC page and those readings should not be considered for troubleshooting (refer to figure 1). This is an issue exclusively related to the CMC LDI (all versions) and has no relation with FCU or Fuel System malfunction. This issue will be corrected in a future LDI release, precise version to follow.

Figure 1. Fuel System diagnostic page on CMC

APU BLEED VALVE not able to open

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 Embraer would like to inform that Service Newsletters 170-36-0018 and 190-36-0014 were issued to describe the conditions in which the APU bleed valve may not be commanded open, leading the APU bleed valve to be replaced unnecessarily.

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April 2009

Issue No. 29

Report of Escape Slide Malfunction during Test

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170/190 During some tests requested by Aviation Authority, since the problems identified of Escape Slides not unlacing and stalling the door in 2007, to evaluate the effectiveness of the modifications introduced by the EMBRAER 170 PN 4A4030-4 and 4A4011-4, one test failed due to a quality escape of the Escape Slide lacing. It was found the replaceable cord was installed upside down, causing the loops to snag and not release. Once the snag was released, the Escape Slide fully deployed on its own. The loop closing sequence was wrongly set up during the packing process at Goodrich. Goodrich will issue soon a Service Bulletin for inspection of the fleet and inventory.

SPOILER FAULT and FCND due to momentary HYD 1 LO PRESS

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 Embraer received some field reports from operators concerning the occurrence of SPOILER FAULT and FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH during control yoke deflection check. In the reports, the FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH messages can occur correlated with one or more maintenance messages on the CMC at the same time. The possible correlated maintenance messages are: L MID MFS PCU/FCM4/YOKE LVDT SNSR L INBD MFS PCU/FCM3/YOKE LVDT SNSR R MID MFS PCU/FCM4/YOKE LVDT SNSR R INBD MFS PCU/FCM3/YOKE LVDT SNSR Note that all Maintenance messages above are referred to the MFS PCUS powered by Hydraulic System 1. Before the FDE messages SPOILER FAULT and FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH are shown in CAS, the FDE message >HYD 1 LO PRESS is presented in CAS for few seconds. The FHDB extracted below shows an example of described scenario:
INHIBITED ACTIVE INACTIVE INHIBITED INHIBITED INHIBITED INHIBITED ACTIVE INHIBITED INHIBITED ACTIVE ACTIVE ACTIVE ACTIVE ACTIVE 02/07/2009 12:57:13 02/07/2009 12:57:16 02/07/2009 12:57:18 02/07/2009 12:57:19 02/07/2009 12:57:20 02/07/2009 12:57:21 02/07/2009 12:57:21 02/07/2009 12:57:21 02/07/2009 12:57:22 02/07/2009 12:57:22 02/07/2009 12:57:22 02/07/2009 12:57:22 02/07/2009 12:57:22 02/07/2009 12:57:22 02/07/2009 12:57:22 PREFLIGHT PREFLIGHT PREFLIGHT PREFLIGHT PREFLIGHT PREFLIGHT PREFLIGHT PREFLIGHT PREFLIGHT PREFLIGHT PREFLIGHT PREFLIGHT PREFLIGHT PREFLIGHT PREFLIGHT >HYD 1 LO PRESS >HYD 1 LO PRESS >HYD 1 LO PRESS SPOILER FAULT FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH SPOILER FAULT FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH CAUTION CAUTION CAUTION CAUTION CAUTION CAUTION CAUTION CAUTION CAUTION CAUTION CAUTION CAUTION CAUTION CAUTION CAUTION

R INBD MFS PCU/FCM3/YOKE LVDT SNSR R MID MFS PCU/FCM4/YOKE LVDT SNSR L INBD MFS PCU/FCM3/YOKE LVDT SNSR L MID MFS PCU/FCM4/YOKE LVDT SNSR R MID MFS PCU/FCM4/YOKE LVDT SNSR R INBD MFS PCU/FCM3/YOKE LVDT SNSR L MID MFS PCU/FCM4/YOKE LVDT SNSR L INBD MFS PCU/FCM3/YOKE LVDT SNSR

27030493FCS 27030494FCS 27030618FCS 27030619FCS 27030494FCS 27030493FCS 27030619FCS 27030618FCS

This scenario happens because the Command Response Monitor related to the MFS System trips due to continuous movement of the control yoke for both sides before the Hydraulic System 1 Reservoir provide enough hydraulic fluid to hydraulic lines 1.

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Issue No. 29

Therefore, there is a momentary pressure decrease in Hydraulic System 1 that affects the spoiler panel deflection for just a few seconds, but it is time enough to cause a miscompare in the MFS panels and trip the Command Response Monitors of the PCUs powered by Hyd System 1. Concerning this scenario, the maintenance action recommended is to do a RTS (Return to Service) (AMM Task 27-00-00-070-801-A) and follow the respective FIM Tasks in case the Maintenance message does not clear.

APU Master Switch: Worn Detents Update

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 Embraer will issue this month Service Newsletters 170-49-009 and 190-49-009 to clarify the correct procedures when operating the APU master switch.

Acronyms
ACMF = Aircraft Condition-Monitoring Function ACMP = Alternating-Current Motor-Driven Pump AD = Airworthiness Directive AIPC = Aircraft Illustrated Parts Catalog AMM = Aircraft Maintenance Manual ANAC = Agncia Nacional de Aviao Civil (Brazilian Civil Aviation Authority) AOM = Airplane Operations Manual APU = Auxiliary Power UnitCAS = Crew Alerting System CMC = Central Maintenance Computer CMM = Component Maintenance Manual CPCS = Cabin Pressure Control-System EICAS = Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System EICC = Emergency Integrated Control-Center DDPM = Dispatch-Deviation Procedures Manual DVDR = Digital Voice-Data Recorder FADEC = Full-Authority Digital Electronic-Control FCM = Flight Control Module FCU = Fuel Conditioning Unit FDE = Flight Deck Effect FHDB = Fault History Database
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FIM = Fault Isolation Manual GSE = Ground Support Equipment IEVM = Integrated Engine Vibration Monitor LDI = Loadable Diagnostic Information LRU = Line Replaceable Unit MAU = Modular Avionics Unit MFS = Multi-Function Spoiler MLG = Main Landing Gear MMEL = Master Minimum Equipment List OB = Operational Bulletins PCU = Power Control Unit PN = Part Number SB = Service Bulletin SN = Serial Number SNL = Service Newsletter WOW = Weight-on-Wheels WST = Wheel-Speed-Transducer

Issue No. 29

Note: All abbreviations used in EMBRAER Maintenance Manuals can be found in the Introduction to AMM Part II.

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