1

KUENZLE & STREIFF V. MACKE & CHANDLER (1909) Plaintiff-appellant: Kuenzle & Streiff Defendant-appellees: Mack & Chandler Ponente: Moreland, J. DOCTRINE:Ownership of personal property cannot be transferred to the prejudice of third persons except by delivery of the property itself; and that a sale without delivery gives the would-be purchaser no rights in those property except those of a creditor. A bill of sale of personal property, executed in a private document and unrecorded, which property described there was not delivered and remained in possession of the vendor, could have no effect against a person dealing with the property upon the faith of appearances. SHORT VERSION:A Sheriff levied on a property based on a case of Chandler v. Krippendorf. Chandler won. Kuenzle says the property is his while Chandler, who was the one who bought the property from the auction, insists that the property is Krippendorfs. Apparently, Krippendorf sold the property to Kuenzle but never delivered it. SC says Chandler has a good title to the lounge because a bill of sale of personal property, executed in a private document and unrecorded, which property described there was not delivered and remained in possession of the vendor, could have no effect against a person dealing with the property upon the faith of appearances. and fixtures worth P1 000) in Cavite and that the Sheriff levied on it. o Sheriff levied based on a judgment won by Macke & Chandler (heretofore referred to as Chandler) against Stanley & Krippendorf (heretofore referred to as e Sheriff that it was the owner of the Oregon property but Sheriff ignored and proceeded to sell the property. o Chandler was the purchaser. o Property was not Kuenzles at the time of the levy and sale. o The property was owned by Krippendorf who was in possession of the property at the time of the levy. o That in Jan 1907, Krippendorf was indebted to Kuenzle. And so, Krippendorf attempted to sell the property to Kuenzle. o It was in an instrument in writing but it was never recorded (it was a private document) o That the property was not delivered to Kuenzle so the possession of the property remained with Krippendorf. o Then, Krippendorf and Chandler conducted the sale after the execution of the transaction between Krippendorf and Kuenzle (terms and conditions exactly the same), without reference to Kuenzle ISSUE:What is the effect of the instrument of sale with regards to transferring property from Krippendorf to Kuenzle? HELD: Chandler was able to obtain a good title (this was the Courts answer. So I guess the transaction between Krippendor & Kuenzle was incomplete RATIO down a doctrine that ownership of personal property cannot be transferred to the prejudice of third persons except by delivery of the property itself; and that a sale without delivery gives the would-be purchaser no rights in those property except those of a creditor sale of personal property. A bill of sale of personal property, executed in a private document and unrecorded, which property described there was not delivered and remained in possession of the vendor, could have no effect against a person dealing with the property upon the faith of appearances. applicable. o That was a case of the sale of property upon the condition that the title should remain in the vendor until the purchase price should be fully paid o And that in case of non-payment of the debt or any instalment, the vendor would have a rights to take possession of the property and deal with it as provided for in the contract contract for the conditional sale of goods was valid also as to third persons, provided possession of the property was taken by the vendor before the rights of third persons of property so the principles in Kuenzle v. AS Watson are inapplicable. good title to the property as against Kuenzle. OCEJO, PEREZ & CO. V. THE INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORP. FACTS: 1. On March 7, 1914, one Chua Ten Chong executed and delivered to the International Banking Corp. (IBC) a promissory note for the sum of Php20,000, payable one month after date, a. Attached to said note was a private document, signed by Chua Teng Chong, which stated that he deposited with IBC 5,000 piculs of sugar as security. Said amount is stored in a warehouse in Binondo, Manila. b. This private document was never recorded in a public instrument nor does it appear from the evidence that the promissory note represents money delivered by the bank on the date of its execution. 2. It appears that IBC never took possession of the sugar when the document was executed and delivered. However, upon discovering that the amount of sugar stored in the said warehouse was less than agreed in the contract, it exercised active ownership over the same. 3. On March 24, 1914, plaintiff Ocejo, Perez and Co., entered into contract with Chua Teng Chong for the sale to him of a lot of sugar (5,000 piculs). Consequently, the sugar was delivered by herein plaintiff to Chua Teng

2
Chong (Muelle de la Industria warehouse) however the latter refused to make payment. IBC then sent an employee to Chua Ten Chongs warehouse in Calle Toneleros to check on the sugar. Upon arrival, it discovered that Chuas warehouse was barely holding 1,800 piculs. Chua then instructed IBCs representatives to go to the Muelle de la Industria warehouse. There, 3,800 piculs were found, which IBC immediately took possession of. On the same day as the seizure of the sugar, the promissory note executed on the aforementioned March 7, 1914, had fallen due and was unpaid. Herein plaintiff made a demand for recovery of possession of sugar, to which demand, IBC refused to accede. Soon after, Chua Teng Chong was judicially declared insolvent and one Francisco Chua Seco was appointed as assignee of the insolvency. A case was then filed in the trial court. The parties agreed to sell the sugar, the proceeds thereof becoming the object of the case. The lower court ruled in favour of Ocejo, Perez & Co. a. In a contract of sale, the obligation to pay the price is correlative to the obligation to deliver the thing sold. Nonperformance by one of the parties authorizes the other to exercise the right, conferred upon him by the law, to elect to specific performance or rescission. SC: This right is not absolute. The law subordinates it to the rights of third persons to whom bad faith is not imputable. i. This refers to IBCs defense alleging that the sugar in question was pledged to it, after its delivery to the buyer and before the latter was placed in default with respect to the payment of the price. 1. A majority portion of the sugar was placed in a different warehouse different from that stipulated in the promissory note, hence it could not have been part of the subject matter of the pledge. 2. NCC 1865: a pledge is without effect as against third persons if the certainty of the date does not appear by public instrument.

4.

b.

5.

ISSUES: WON title to the sugar passed on to the buyer upon its delivery to him. YES. WON the buyers failure to pay the purchase price authorizes the seller to rescind the sale. YES. HELD: SC reversed lower court decision. The assignee of the insolvency, Seco, is entitled to the product of the sale of the sugar. RATIO: 1. On the transfer of title, the sugar was delivered to Chua Teng Chong on March 16, 1914. The Seller delivered it into the buyers warehouse, leaving it entirely subject to his control. NCC 1462 provides that the thing sold is deemed to be delivered when it passes into the possession and control of the buyer. a. Manresa: the delivery of the thing signifies that tile has passed off from the seller to the buyer b. SC does not agree with petitioner contention that until payment was made, title to the sugar did not pass to the buyer. c. Ocejo, Perez & Co. calls the transaction a cash sale, wherein delivery and payment are to be made simultaneously. The SC says it is not, stating that when no term for payment is stipulated, the seller is not bound to deliver the thing sold until the buyer has paid him the price. 2. NCC 1506 provides that the contract of sale may be rescinded for the same causes as all other obligations. NCC 1124, on the other hand, establishes the principle that all reciprocal obligations are rescindable in the event that one of the parties bound should fail to perform that which is incumbent upon him.

OBAA V COURT OF APPEALS (AND SANDOVAL) - CAVESTANY MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: 1985 Contracting Parties: ANIANO OBAA, petitioner, (he bought 170 cavans of rice from CHAN LIN (trader and middle man) who bought the same from SANDOVAL, herein respondent and principal seller) SANDOVAL (SELLER) <----> CHAN LIN (TRADER- MIDDLE MAN) <---> OBAA (BUYER) Background problem: The problem of the trader- middle man (CHAN LIN) in this case is that he bought at P37.25/cavan (FROM SANDOVAL) and was selling it at a lower price of P33.00/cavan to OBAA (BUYER). Realizing a loss amounting to P722.50, he was trying to get out of his contract with SANDOVAL (FROM WHOM HE BOUGHT HIS RICE) and OBAA (BUYER). How didCHAN LIN try to get out of the contracts: 1. Contract with Sandoval by not paying for the rice he bought from Sandoval after delivering the goods, when Sandovals driver tried to collect from Chan Lin, he was nowhere to be found (Court said that the Non-payment of the purchase price by the buyer gives him a rescissible title to the goods)

3
2. Contract with OBAA (BUYER) he returned the price/money given to him by OBAA (BUYER) (Court said that because CHAN LIN returned the purchase price/money of OBAA, the sale as between them had been voluntarily rescinded.) Doctrine: Ownership of the rice that was sold is transferred to the vendee upon actual or constructive delivery (In this case, ownership of the 170 cavans of rice was transferred by the vendor SANDOVAL to the trader/middle-man CHAN LIN upon its delivery to him at San Fernando, La Union, which was the place stipulated when CHAN LIN and SANDOVAL entered into a contract of sale Nature of Petition: Petitioner seeks a review of the Decision of respondent Appellate Court (in CA-G.R. No. 44345-R) ordering him in an action for Replevin to return to Aniceto SANDOVAL, private respondent herein, 170 cavans of rice or to pay its value in the amount of P37.25 per cavan, with legal interest from the filing of the Complaint until fully paid. FACTS: 1. Chan Lin approached SANDOVAL and offered to buy from him Subject matter: 170 cavans of clean rice (wagwag variety) Price: P37.26 per cavan delivery to be made the following day at OBANAS STORE in San Fernando, La Union (Take note: OBANAs store!) payment to be made thereat by Chan Lin to SANDOVAL's representative. SANDOVAL accepted the offer as he knew petitioner and had had previous transactions with him. BTW, SANDOVAL is the owner and manager of the "Sandoval and Sons Rice Mill" located in Rosales, Pangasinan. He is engaged in the buying and selling of palay As agreed, the 170 cavans of rice were transported the following day on a truck belonging to SANDOVAL to OBANA's store in San Fernando, La Union. Chan Lin accompanied the shipment. Upon arrival thereat, the goods were unloaded but when the truck driver attempted to collect the purchase price from Chan Lin, the latter was nowhere to be found.
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PROCEDURAL: MuTC ordered Obana to pay half of cost CFI dismissed case (judgment in favor of Obana) CA ordered Obana to pay or return the 170 cavans of rice (because Chan Lin is a swindler) SC judgement of MuTC affirmed (albeit on a different premise than CA see ratio)

ISSUE: WON Obana should pay or return the 170 cavans of rice that was delivered to him by Sandoval through Chan Lin? YES RATIO: 1. We agree with petitioner-defendant that there was a perfected sale. Article 14751 of the Civil Code lays down the general rule that there is perfection when there is consent upon the subject matter and price, even if neither is delivered. Ownership of the rice, too, was transferred to the vendee, Chan Lin, upon its delivery to him at San Fernando, La Union, the place stipulated 3 and pursuant to Articles 14772 and 14963 of the same Code. Due to the the non-payment of the purchase price, after delivery, Chan Lin had a rescissible title to the goods. But the rescission didnt happen, and in fact, Chan Lin was able to sell it to Obana. As to the sale between Chan Lin and Obana, Obana admits that three days after the delivery, Chan Lin gave back the sum of P5,600.00 to Obana and

2.

3.

2.

4.

3.

Sandovals driver tried to collect from OBANA, but the latter refused stating that he had purchased the goods from Chan Lin at P33.00 per cavan and that the price therefore had already been paid to Chan Lin. Further demands having been met with refusal, SANDOVAL, as plaintiff, filed suit for replevin against Obana.

4.

NCC 1475 - The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price. 2 NCC 1477. The ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery thereof 3 NCC 1496. The ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee from the moment it is delivered to him in any of the ways specified in Articles 1497 to 1501, or in any manner signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee.

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tried to get the rice back. Reason given was that Chan Lin and Sandoval wanted to return the rice to the ricemill. Court said that because of this, the sale, as between Chan Lin and Obana had been voluntarily rescinded, and Obana was divested of any claim to the rice. Technically, therefore, he should return the rice to Chan Lin. In law and in equity, therefore, SANDOVAL is entitled to recover the rice, or the value thereof since he was not paid the price therefor. vendor. If ownership over the jewelry was not transmitted on that date, then it could have been transmitted only in December 1968, the date when the check was issued. In which case, it was a sale on approval since ownership passed to the buyer Vallarta, only when she signified her approval or acceptance to the seller, Cruz, and the price was agreed upon. Thus, when the check which later bounced was issued, it was NOT in payment of a preexisting obligation. Instead the issuance of the check was simultaneous with the transfer of ownership over the jewelry. 2. YES. RA 4885, amending Art. 315 (2) (d), RPC, establishes a prima facie evidence of deceit upon proof that the drawer of the check failed to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice of dishonor for lack or insufficiency of funds. To constitute estafa under this provision the act of post-dating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation must be the efficient cause of defraudation, and as such it should be either prior to, or simultaneous with the act of fraud. The offender must be able to obtain money or property from the offended party because of the issuance of a check whether post-dated or not. That is, the latter would not have parted with his money or other property were it not for the issuance of the check, likewise, the check should not be, issued in payment of a preexisting obligation. The petitioner was able to obtain the jewelry because she issued the check. Her failure to deposit the necessary amount to cover it within three days from notice of dishonor created the prima facie presumption which she failed to rebut. There can be no doubt that the postdating or issuing of a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check, is a false pretense or a fraudulent act.

5.

VALLARTA V. CA (CELEBRADO) En Banc | G.R. No. L-40195 | 29 May 1987 | Cortes, J. FACTS: Rosalinda Cruz and Victoria Vallarta are longtime friends and business acquaintances. Then, Cruz entrusted to Vallarta seven pieces of jewelry. Vallarta decided to buy some items, exchanged one item with another, and issued a post-dated check in the amount of P5K. Cruz deposited said check with the bank. However, upon presentment, the check was dishonored and Cruz was informed that Vallarta's account had been closed. Cruz apprised Vallarta of the dishonor and the latter promised to give another check. Later, Vallarta pleaded for more time. Still later, she started avoiding Cruz. Hence, this criminal action was instituted. Based on the foregoing facts, both RTC and CA found Vallarta guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa. ISSUE: 1. 2. HELD: 1. NO. The transaction was NOT a sale or return, rather, it was a sale on approval (also called sale on acceptance, sale on trial or sale on satisfaction [NCC Art. 1502]). In a sale or return the ownership passes to the buyer on delivery. The subsequent return of the goods reverts ownership in the seller. Delivery, or tradition as a mode of acquiring ownership must be in consequence of a contract (NCC Art. 712), e.g. sale. If there was no meeting of the minds on November 20, 1968, then, as of that date, there was yet no contract of sale which could be the basis of delivery or tradition. Thus, the delivery made on November 20, 1968 was not a delivery for purposes of transferring ownership the prestation incumbent on the WON the transaction was a sale or return, perfected and consummated when the seven pieces of jewelry were delivered. WON Vallarta is guilty of estafa.

LUZON BROKERAGE V MARITIME BUILDING CO, AND MYERS BUILDING CO GR L-25885, January 31 1972 Reyes, JBL, J.

FACTS:

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1. 2. 3. Myers Builidng Co sold 3 parcels of land to Maritime Building Co for 1M. 50K was paid upon the execution of the contract entitled Deed of Conditional Sale. The balance was to be paid in monthly installments at the rate of 10K. Maritime Co suspended payment of installments to coerce Myers Co into answering for an alleged promise based on the ff previous events: a. Award of backwages was made by the Court of Industrial Relations in favor of members of Luzon Labor Union at the instance of employer Luzon Brokerage Co b. Schedler (controlling stockholder of Maritime) purchased F.H. Myers stock in Luzon Brokerage Co c. F.H. Myers promised to indemnify Schedler for any payments made to the Union Myers Co demanded payment from Maritime Co of installments. Because of latters refusal to pay, the former cancelled the Deed of Conditional Sale. Myers Co demanded payment of rentals from Luzon Brokerage, to whom Maritime Co leased the properties. In doubt as to who was entitled to the rentals, Luzon filed action for interpleader against Myers Co and Maritime Co, and deposited the rentals in court. Trial Court: Maritime Co committed a breach by its failure to pay the installments. Myers Co became entitled to terminate the contract, forfeit the installments paid, repossess and collect rentals from Luzon Brokerage. 2. Paragraph (d) of the deed provides for automatic annulment upon failure to pay. Although paragraph (e) provides that suit is to be brought in Court by the Vendor to seek judicial declaration of rescission, this can be done only in the eventuality that the Vendee refuses to peacefully deliver the possession of properties. Judicial action for rescission is not necessary where the contract provides so. If the other party denies that the extrajudicial rescission is justified, it is free to resort to judicial action in its own behalf. Assuming arguendo that Art 1592 is applicable, the cross-claim filed by Myers against Maritime in the court below constituted a judicial demand for rescission that satisfies the requirement of said article. But even if it were not so, the contract in this case is not the ordinary sale envisaged by Art 1592 transferring ownership simultaneously with the delivery of the real property sold but one in which the vendor retained ownership of the immovable object, merely undertaking to convey it provided the buyer strictly complied with the terms of the contract. The distinction between contracts of sale and contract to sell with reserved title has been recognized in Court decisions upholding the power of promisors under contracts to sell in case of failure to complete payment, to extrajudicially terminate the contract, refuse conveyance and retain the installments already received, where such rights are expressly provided for, as in the case at bar.

3.

4. 5. 6. 7.

ISSUES/HELD:

1. WON Maritime Co committed a breach of contract with Myers. YES 2. WON Myers Co could extrajudicially rescind the contract. YES 3. WON Maritime Co is entitled to pay despite its default based on
Art 1592. NO(Art 1592. In the sale of immovable property, even though it may have been stipulated that upon failure to pay the price at the time agreed upon the rescission of the contract shall of right take place, the vendee may pay, even after the expiration of the period, as long as no demand for rescission of the contract has been made upon him either judicially or by a notarial act. After the demand, the court may not grant him a new term.) Maritime Co failed to comply with the express stipulation in the agreement that the balance of the purchase price be paid in monthly installments at the rate of 10K. Whatever obligation F.H. Myers had assumed in favor of Schedler with respect to the labor case was not, and could not have been an obligation of Myers Building Co. AZNAR V. YAPDIANGCO J. Regala Doctrine: Article 559 of the Civil Code rules that if the owner has lost a thing, or if he has been unlawfully deprived of it, he has a right to recover it, not only from the finder, thief or robber, but also from third persons who may have acquired it in good faith from such finder, thief or robber. The said article establishes two exceptions to the general rule of irrevindicability, to wit, when the owner (1) has lost the thing, or (2) has been unlawfully deprived thereof.

RATIO: 1.

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In these cases, the possessor cannot retain the thing as against the owner, who may recover it without paying any indemnity, except when the possessor acquired it in a public sale. FACTS: 1. In May 1959, Teodoro Santos advertised in two metropolitan papers the sale of his FORD FAIRLANE 500. In the afternoon of May 28, 1959, a certain L. De Dios, claiming to be a nephew of Vicente Marella, went to the Santos residence to answer the ad. Teodoro Santos instructed his son to see the said Vicente Marella. At the meeting, Marella agreed to buy the car for P14,700.00 on the understanding that the price would be paid only after the car had been registered in his name. Irineo Santos then fetched his father who, together with L. De Dios, went to the office of a certain Atty. Jose Padolina where the deed of the sale for the car was executed in Marella's favor. Up to this stage of the transaction, the purchased price had not been paid. From the Motor Vehicles Office, Teodoro Santos returned to his house. He gave the registration papers and a copy of the deed of sale to his son, Irineo, and instructed him not to part with them until Marella shall have given the full payment for the car. Irineo Santos and L. De Dios then proceeded to 1642 Crisostomo Street, Sampaloc, Manila where the former demanded the payment from Vicente Marella. Marella said that the amount he had on hand then was short by some P2,000.00 and begged off to be allowed to secure the shortage from a sister supposedly living somewhere on Azcarraga Street, also in Manila. Thereafter, he ordered L. De Dios to go to the said sister and suggested that Irineo Santos go with him. At the same time, he requested the registration papers and the deed of sale from Irineo Santos on the pretext that he would like to show them to his lawyer. Trusting the good faith of Marella, Irineo handed over the same to the latter and thereupon, in the company of L. De Dios and another unidentified person, proceeded to the alleged house of Marella's sister. At a place on Azcarraga, Irineo Santos and L. De Dios alighted from the car and entered a house while their unidentified companion remained in the car. Once inside, L. De Dios asked Irineo Santos to wait at the sala while he went inside a room. That was the last that Irineo saw of him. For, after a considerable length of time waiting in vain for De Dios to return, Irineo went down to discover that neither the car nor their unidentified companion was there anymore. Going back to the house, he inquired from a woman he saw for L. De Dios and he was told that no such name lived or was even known therein. Whereupon, Irineo Santos rushed to 1642 Crisostomo to see Marella. He found the house closed and Marella gone. Finally, he reported the matter to his father who promptly advised the police authorities. 8. That very same day, or on the afternoon of May 29, 1959 Vicente Marella was able to sell the car in question to the plaintiff-appellant herein, Jose B. Aznar, for P15,000.00. While the car in question was thus in the possession of Jose B. Aznar and while he was attending to its registration in his name, agents of the Philippine Constabulary seized and confiscated the same in consequence of the report to them by Teodoro Santos that the said car was unlawfully taken from him. In due time, Jose B. Aznar filed a complaint for replevin against Captain Rafael Yapdiangco, the head of the Philippine Constabulary unit which seized the car in question Claiming ownership of the vehicle, he prayed for its delivery to him. In the course of the litigation, however, Teodoro Santos moved and was allowed to intervene by the lower court.

2.

3. 4.

9.

5.

10. Lower court ruled in favor of Santos. 11. Aznar appeals contending that he is a buyer in good faith hence Article 1506 which provides that Where the seller of goods has a voidable title thereto, but his, title has not been voided at the time of the sale, the buyer acquires a good title to the goods, provided he buys them in good faith, for value, and without notice of the seller's defect of title.

6.

ISSUE: HELD: Teodoro Santos has a better right. He had been unlawfully deprived of his personal property by Vicente Marella, from whom the plaintiff-appellant traced his right. Consequently, although the plaintiff-appellant acquired the car in good faith and for a valuable consideration from Vicente Marella, the intervenor-appellee was entitled to its recovery on the mandate of Article 559 of the New Civil Code which provides: Who has a better right to the possession of the disputed automobile?

7.

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ART. 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to title. Nevertheless, one who lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in possession of the same. If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor. The contention of Aznar is clearly unmeritorious. Under the aforequoted provision, it is essential that the seller should have a voidable title at least. It is very clearly inapplicable where, as in this case, the seller had no title at all. Vicente Marella did not have any title to the property under litigation because the same was never delivered to him. He sought ownership or acquisition of it by virtue of the contract. Vicente Marella did not acquire ownership or title to the car for it was not delivered to him. Therefore Marella cannot transfer the Title to Aznar. 9. Juan was appointed special administrator but was replaced by Edilberto Noel as appointed regular administrator. The latter was unable to take possession since land was in the possession of Jose Deleste and some heirs of Hilaria The parties entered into an amicable settlement where Deleste agreed to relinquish his rights to of the entire parcel in favour of all the heirs Court initially approved this settlement but it was questioned, prompting it to set aside its approval. It also ordered Noel to file for action to recover the entire tract from Deleste (which he did in 1963) CFI of Lanao del Norte found for the buyer holding that: a. the action for annulment of the deed of sale had prescribed in 1958 while Gregorios heirs slept on their rights by allowing Hilaria to exercise acts of ownership over her husbands shares; b. Hilaria in effect acted as administratrix over the estate of Gregorio; c. she sold the land in order to pay the debts of the conjugal partnership; and d. that out of the purchase price of P16,000.00, P4,000.00 was in payment to Deleste for medical services rendered and medicine administered during Gregorio's ailment and P800.00 was used to pay taxes in arrears CA held that: a. there was indeed a sale and no proof on the mortgage; b. there was no basis to annul the sale since no fraud, mistake or misrepresentation attended the execution of the deed of sale; c. the prescriptive period of 10 years had not yet elapsed; d. however, Hilaria could not have sold more than of the land as it was conjugal property and thus the other half belonged to Gregorios estate; e. in the absence of proof of adverse possession by Hilaria, she should be considered as holding the property pursuant to her usufructuary rights under the Spanish Civil Code 1889, the law in force at the time of Gregorios death CA amended its decision upon Delestes MR holding that: a. Juans non-payment of real estate taxes constituted abandonment of the property; b. his non-filing of action to recover from the time that Deleste usurped the property until Noels filing of complaint in 1963 amounted to laches; c. d. prescriptive period ran from Gregorios death in 1945 Pinito Mercado, as new administrator, appealed questioning application of laches and equating such doctrine with acquisitive prescription Atty. Bonifacio Legaspi, representing the heirs of Hilaria, filed petition for certiorari to declare the sale as an equitable mortgage

10. 11. 12.

13. NOEL V. CA AND JOSE DELESTE Review on certiorari

FACTS: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Gregorio Nanaman and Hilaria Tabuclin, married and childless in their union, reared Virgilio, Gregorios son from another woman Spouses Nanaman acquired a 34.7 ha land in Tambo, Iligan City on which they planted sugarcane, corn and bananas Gregorio died in 1945, so the administration of the said property was left in the hands of Hilaria with Virgilios help For tax purposes, Virgilio declared the land under his name In 1954, entire tract was originally mortgaged to Jose Deleste, but was afterwards sold by Hilaria and Virgilio to him for 16k via notarized deed of sale which was registered. Tax declaration in Virgilios name was cancelled and a new one was issued in Delestes name. The latter likewise paid the arrears from 1952 to present Hilaria died that same year Esperanza and Caridad, Gregorios daughters by still another woman, filed intestate estate proceedings where they included the said property. Juan, the brother of Gregorio, opposed as he was not included in the list of heirs Petition was eventually amended to include the estate of Hilaria with Alejo, Hilarias brother, and Julio Tabuclin, a son of Hilarias deceased brother, as additional petitioners

14.

15. 16.

6. 7. 8.

ISSUE: 1. w/n the transaction was a sale

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2. w/n Hilaria and Virgilio could dispose of the entire property 3. w/n assuming that they did not have full ownership thereof, the right of action to recover the share of the collateral heirs of Gregorio had prescribed or been lost through laches Though the sale was without fraud, there was mistake on the part of Hilaria and Virgilio in selling an undivided interest which belonged to the collateral heirs of Gregorio.

HELD:

Under Article 14564 (old CC applies in view of 1954 sale), an implied trust was created on the one-half undivided interest over the land in favor of the real owners. (cf. Diaz v. Gorricho, Gayondato v. Insular Treasurer).

1. Yes, there was a sale. Two contracts had been executed involving said property the 1952 mortgage and the 1954 sale). In the absence of proof of gross inadequacy of the price, that the sale was made with what might appear as an inadequate consideration does not make the contract one of mortgage. 3. No, the action for recovery of title or possession had not yet prescribed when the complaint was filed in 1963. On the action to recover the undivided half-interest of the collateral heirs:

2. No, she could not alienate the whole tract but only the undivided half of the estate. A spouse like Hilaria, following the Spanish CC effective at the time of Gregorios death, who is survived by the siblings and children of the siblings of the decedent, is entitled to receive in usufruct the part of the inheritance pertaining to said heirs. The other undivided half she was free to dispose of.

cause of action: Art. 1456 which made Deleste a trustee of an implied trust in favour of said heirs prescriptive period: Art. 1144 where actions based upon an obligation created by law can be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues reckoning pt: on the registration of the sale with Register of Deeds on March 2, 1954 From march 2, 1954 to April 30, 1963, when the complaint for the recovery of the property was filed, less than ten years had elapsed. Therefore, the action had not been barred by prescription.

Under the same code, Illegitimate children who were not natural, as in the case of Virgilio, were disqualified to inherit. Article 998 (old CC), which gave an illegitimate child certain hereditary rights, could not benefit Virgilio because the right of ownership of the collateral heirs of Gregorio had become vested upon his death (Art. 2253, old CC). Therefore, Virgilio had no right at all to transfer ownership over which he did not own.

On the acquisitive prescription by Deleste:

The ten-year prescriptive period before title to real estate shall vest by adverse possession is also reckoned from March 2, 1954

On laches: Neither does the doctrine of laches apply. Noel immediately filed an action to recover possession and ownership of the property when he was ordered by the court in the
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In a contract of sale, it is essential that the seller is the owner of the property he is selling. The principal obligation of a seller is "to transfer the ownership of" the property sold (Art. 1458, old CC). This law stems from the principle that nobody can dispose of that which does not belong to him NEMO DAT QUAD NON HABET.

Art. 1456, old CC. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.

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intestate proceedings. There is no evidence showing any failure or neglect on his part, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. The doctrine of stale demands would apply only where by reason of the lapse of time, it would be inequitable to allow a party to enforce his legal rights. Moreover, this Court, except for every strong reasons, is not disposed to sanction the application of the doctrine of laches to prejudice or defeat the right of an owner or original transferee . APT was a government entity created for the purpose to conserve, to provisionally manage and to dispose assets of government institutions. It had acquired assets consisting of machinery and refrigeration equipment stored at the Golden City compound which was leased to and in the physical possession of Creative Lines, Inc., (Creative Lines). These assets were being sold on an as-is-where-is basis. Petitioner and respondent entered into an absolute deed of sale over certain machinery and refrigeration equipment wherein respondent paid the full amount as evidenced by petitioners receipt. After two (2) days, respondent demanded the delivery of the machinery it had purchased. Petitioner issued a Gate Pass to respondent to enable them to pull out from the compound the properties designated ; however, during the hauling of Lot No. 2 consisting of sixteen (16) items, only nine (9) items were pulled out by respondent. Respondent filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against petitioner and Creative Lines. Upon inspection of the remaining items, they found the machinery and equipment damaged and had missing parts. Petitioner claimed that there was already a constructive delivery of the machinery and equipment upon the execution of the deed of sale it had complied with its obligation to deliver the object of the sale since there was no stipulation to the contrary and it was the duty of respondent to take possession of the property.

OTHERS With respect to Hilaria acquiring other half of estate: Under the old CC, the surviving spouse was given the management of the conjugal property until the affairs of the conjugal partnership were terminated.

interest as owner interest as trustee for whoever is legally entitled to inherit the other portion The surviving spouse as the administrator and liquidator cannot acquire title by prescription against the persons for whom he/she was administering the conjugal estate for (with respect to the entrusted half).

With respect to Virgilio: There is no evidence to prove that Virgilio asserted an adverse claim of ownership over the property. The possession of Virgilio, his registration of the land in his name for tax purposes, his hiring of tenants to till the land, and his enjoyment of the produce of the tenants, were simply to help Hilaria in managing the conjugal property. ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST VS. T.J. ENTERPRISE G.R. No. 167195 May 8, 2009 ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST VS. T.J. ENTERPRISE G.R. No. 167195 May 8, 2009 FACTS:

The RTC ruled that petitioner is liable for breach of contract and should pay for the actual damages suffered by respondent. It found that at the time of the sale, petitioner did not have control over the machinery and equipment and, thus, could not have transferred ownership by constructive delivery. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment; hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner had complied with its obligations to make delivery of the properties Whether or not the failure to make actual delivery of the properties was beyond the control of petitioner HELD: Whether or not the petitioner had complied with its obligations to make delivery of the properties

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NO. There was no constructive delivery of the machinery and equipment upon the execution of the deed of absolute sale or upon the issuance of the gate pass since it was not the petitioner but Creative Lines which had actual possession of the property. The presumption of constructive delivery is not applicable as it has to yield to the reality that the purchaser was not placed in possession and control of the property. In order for the execution of a public instrument to effect tradition, the purchaser must be placed in control of the thing sold. The ownership of a thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery thereof. The thing sold shall be understood as delivered when it is placed in the control and possession of the vendee. As a general rule, when the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred. And with regard to movable property, its delivery may also be made by the delivery of the keys of the place or depository where it is stored or kept. whole occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules applicable to a fortuitous event. Thus, the risk of loss or deterioration of property is borne by petitioner. Thus, it should be liable for the damages that may arise from the delay. HERNAEZ VS HERNAEZ FACTS: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. The spouses, Pedro Hernaez and Juana Espinosa, died, Their son, Domingo Hernaez y Espinosa, sold all his interest in both his father's and mother's estate to his son, Vicente Hernaez y Tuason, on November 6, 1901. However, Domingo Hernaez executed a document of sale in favor of Alejandro Montelibano y Ramos on February 27, 1907, in which he convey all his undivided interest in his mother's estate. On the same date he executed another document of sale in which he purported to convey to Jose Montelibano Uy-Cana four-eighteenths of his interest in his mother's estate. Both of these sales were made with the connivance of his son, Vicente On August 19, 1912, Jose Montelibano Uy-Cana sold his interest in the estate to Alejandro Montelibano y Ramos. By this transfer, the latter stood owner of all the interest of Domingo Hernaez y Espinosa in the estate of Pedro Hernaez, and five-eighteenths of his interest in the estate of Juana Espinosa as against Vicente Hernaez y Espinosa.

However, the execution of a public instrument only gives rise to a prima facie presumption of delivery. Such presumption is destroyed when the delivery is not effected because of a legal impediment. It is necessary that the vendor shall have control over the thing sold that, at the moment of sale, its material delivery could have been made. Thus, a person who does not have actual possession of the thing sold cannot transfer constructive possession by the execution and delivery of a public instrument.

Whether or not the failure to make actual delivery of the properties was beyond the control of petitioner YES. Petitioner also claims that its failure to make actual delivery was beyond its control. It posits that the refusal of Creative Lines to allow the hauling of the machinery and equipment was unforeseen and constituted a fortuitous event. The matter of fortuitous events is governed by Art. 1174 of the Civil Code which provides that except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which though foreseen, were inevitable. A fortuitous event may either be an act of God, or natural occurrences such as floods or typhoons, or an act of man such as riots, strikes or wars. However, when the loss is found to be partly the result of a persons participation whether by active intervention, neglect or failure to act, the

ISSUE: 3. HELD: No, although Vicente Hernaez y Tuason had actually purchased all of his father's interests in the estates of Pedro Hernaez and Juana Espinosa as early as November 6, 1901, and was, on February 27, 1907, the undoubted owner thereof, he is effectually estopped from asserting his title as against either of the vendees mentioned in the documents of sale dated February 27, 1907 WON Vincente has title

SIY CONG BIENG & CO. INC. V. HSBC

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By CarlosThe Fierce Doctrine: A person who clothed another with all the attributes of ownership is estopped to deny the fact of the latters ownership of the thing upon which an affected third party relied. HELD: NO. SBC IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE RECOVERY OF QUEDANS. IT IS BARRED BY ESTOPPEL.

RATIO: Quick Facts: Siy Cong Bieng (SCB) issued unpaid quedans (warehouse receipts) to Ranft who in turn delivered the quedans to HSBC. Ranft died in the night of the same day. HELD: SBC is estopped to deny Ranfts ownership of the quedans. HSB is not obliged to return the quedans or pay their value to SCB. FACTS: 1. On June 25, 1926, Otto Ranft called at the office of Siy Cong Bieng & Co. Inc. (SCB for short) to purchase hemp (abaca), and he was offered bales of hemp. Ranft and SCB agreed to the price, and on the same date, SCB sent the quedans (warehouse receipts), together with the covering invoice, to Ranft. The quedans were not yet paid by Ranft. On the same day, Ranft pledged the quedans (worth PhP31,635 baled hemp) to HSBC to secure his pre-existing debts with the bank. But Ranft died in the night of the same day. SCB immediately demanded the return of the quedans or the payment of their value, first from the estate of Ranft, and then from HSBC. HSBC refused to return the quedans or pay their value on the ground that it was a holder of the quedans in due course. In its first complaint, SCB alleged that it has "sold" the quedans in question to the deceased O. Ranft for cash, but that the said O. Ranft had not fulfilled the conditions of the sale. Later on, SCB filed an amended complaint, wherein they changed the word "sold" referred to in the first complaint to the words "attempted to sell". Trial Court ruled in favor of SCB: HSBC knew that the quedans was not yet as paid when the same was endorsed to it by Ranft; the bank knew, or should have known, that Ranft had not yet acquired the ownership of the said quedans and that it therefore could not invoke the presumption that it was acting in good faith and without negligence on its part". SCB is estopped to deny that HSBC had a valid title to the quedans for the reason that it (SCB) had voluntarily clothed Ranft with all the attributes of ownership and upon which the defendant bank relied. Where one of two innocent persons must suffer a loss he who by his conduct made the loss possible must bear it. It is true that SCB had suffered a loss of the quedans, but there is now no remedy available to it. HSBC is not responsible for the loss because the negotiable quedans were duly negotiated to it, and as far as the record shows, there has been no fraud on the part of HSBC. DICTA: First, the quedans in question were negotiable in form; second, that they were pledged by Otto Ranft to the defendant bank to secure the payment of his preexisting debts to said bank (paragraph 3 of the Stipulation of Facts); third, that such of the quedans as were issued in the name of the plaintiff were duly endorsed in blank by the plaintiff and by Otto Ranft; and fourth, that the two remaining quedans which were issued directly in the name of Otto Ranft were also duly endorsed in blank by him. On the delivery of the qeudans to the bank they were no longer the property of the indorser unless he liquidated his debt with the bank. They become property of the bank. SEC. 47. When negotiation not impaired by fraud, mistake, or duress. The validity of the negotiation of a receipt is not impaired by the fact that such negotiation was a breach of duty on the part of the person making the negotiation, or by the fact that the owner of the receipt was induced by fraud, mistake, or duress to intrust the possession or custody of the receipt was negotiated, or a person to whom the receipt was subsequent negotiated, paid value therefor, without notice of the breach of duty, or fraud, mistake, or duress. A person to whom a negotiable receipt has been duly negotiated acquires thereby such title to the goods.

2.

3.

4.

5.

ISSUE: Whether or not Siy Cong Bieng (SCB) is entitled to the recovery of the quedans or payment of their value?

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SEC. 41. Rights of person to whom a receipt has been negotiated. A person to whom a negotiable receipt has been duly negotiated acquires thereby: (a) Such title to the goods as the person negotiating the receipt to him had or had ability to convey to a purchaser in good faith for value, and also such title to the goods as the depositor of person to whose order the goods were to be delivered by the terms of the receipt had or had ability to convey to a purchaser in good faith for value, and. Ariston vs. Cea - likewise a claim made upon the sheriff for the release of the property before it was sold under execution Bonzon vs. Standard Oil Co. and Osorio - "In this jurisdiction, under the general principle that one person may not enrich himself at the expense of another, a judgment creditor would not be permitted to retain the purchase price of land sold as the property of a judgment debtor after it has been made to appear that the judgment debtor had no title to the land and that the purchaser had failed to secure title thereto, and we find no difficulty, therefore, in accepting a liberal construction of the statute which arrives at the same equitable result." -SC: correct but nothing to do with question of estoppel! -"When a person having title to or an interest in property knowingly stands by and suffers it to be sold under judgment or decree, without asserting his title or right or making it known to the bidders, he cannot afterward set up his claim." -Bigelow on estoppel: "... it is now a well-established principle that where the true owner of property, for however short a time, holds out another, or, with knowledge of his own right, allows another to appear, as the owner of or as having full power of disposition over the property, the same being in the latter's actual possession, and innocent third parties are thus led into dealing with some [such] apparent owner, they will be protected." (Hernaez vs. Hernaez) No. 1 of section 333 of the Code of Civil Procedure: "Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he can not, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act, or omission, be permitted to falsify it." -"stood by" does not import an actual presence, but implies knowledge under such circumstances as to render it the duty of the possessor to communicate it --herein plaintiff had full knowledge of the fact that the property was going to be sold to pay the debts of her husband. She did not communicate her claim to the purchaser, and it is now too late to assert such a claim BUCTON VS GABAR For brevity, Petitioners Nicanora Gabar Bucton (and Felix Bucton) Defendants Josefina Gabar (and spouse Zosimo) FACTS: 1. Defendant bought a piece of land (subject property) from the spouses Villarin. 2. Thereafter, defendant entered in to an oralcontract with petitioner to sell of the subject property in an installment basis for of the original purchase price (1946).

JALBUENA V LIZARRAGA (YESHADARLING) December 24, 1915 VICENTA JALBUENA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. SALVADOR LIZARRAGA, et al., defendants-appellees. TRENT, J.: FACTS: 1. -defendant Salvador Lizarraga as judgment creditor, caused the sheriff of the Province of Iloilo to levy upon an old sugar-mill as the property of Ildefonso Doronila 2. -at time of levy, Doronila stated mill belonged to him 3. -sale took place July 1913; purchaser (was not named) sold mill to Lopez 4. -present action instituted on November 26, 1913, by plaintiff for the purpose of recovering the mill of its value upon the ground that mill was her exclusive property and that her husband had no interest therein 5. -trial court dismissed ISSUE: WoN trial court erred in ruling that plaintiff was estopped from asserting her claim of ownership against the defendants (NO) HELD: trial court affirmed; costs against appellant RATIO: -The plaintiff knew that the old sugar-mill had been levied upon at the time the levy was made and also knew that it would be sold as the property of her husband --Notwithstanding these facts, she stood by and permitted the sale to go forward without making the slightest protest or claim until the property had passed into the hands of Lopez -plaintiff cites and relies upon the doctrine enunciated by this court in various cases; SC held such do not support plaintiff's contention: Waite vs. Peterson - interested party made a demand upon the sheriff for the return of the property levied upon Lopez vs. Alvarez - question of preferred creditors Uy Piaoco vs. Osmea - there was also a claim made upon the sheriff for the return of the property soon after it was attached

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3. Petitioner gave downpayment of 1k (1946) and instalment of 4h (1948). They also gave a sum of 1k which was marked as a loan. 4. Upon payment of 1k initial downpayment, petitioners took possession of their portion of the subject property and built a nipa hut. Two years after, they built a house for rent behind the said hut. Subsequently, they demolished the nipa hut and built house made of strong materials lower portion for rental purposes + took residence in the upper portion before they decided to convert and lease it a dormitory. 5. A year after the oral contract between the petitioners and defendants, the spouses Villarin executed the Deed of Sale in favor of the defendants (1947). 6. Petitioners sought to obtain a separate title for their portion of the subject property which defendants refused their excuse was that the entire subject property was still mortgaged with PNB for security of a 35k loan. 7. While all this was happening, petitioners were enjoying their portion of the subject property and even erected a fence to mark their share. 8. Petitioners again insisted on obtaining their separate title which was again denied, this time saying that the sums obtained (1k and 4h) were for a loan devoid of merit as the receipts explicitly provide that it was for payment. 9. Petitioners filed an action for specific performance. TC rules in their favor. 10. CA reversed a. Action has prescribed, 10 years only as per NCC 1144. 22 years has already passed. b. Ownership may not be acquired by prescription or adverse possession c. If eternal vigilance is the price of safety, one cannot sleep on one's right and expect it to be preserved in its pristine purity. ISSUE: W/N defendants may be compelled to execute a deed of sale in favor of petitioners Yes W/N contract was valid Yes W/N sale was valid Yes W/N action has prescribed No RATIO: As to the validity of the verbal contract oral contracts are binding upon the parties to it. It was also proved by documentary (receipts) and parole evidence. As to the validity of the sale although at the time they entered into the contract the defendants were still not the owners (title was acquired only a year after), NCC 1434 which provides that "when a person who is not the owner of a thing sells or alienates and delivers it, and later the seller or grantor acquires title thereto, such title passes by operation of law to the buyer or grantee applies. Thus when petitioners payment of the 1k downpayment and 4h installment (and the 100h compensation from the 1k loan), resulted in full payment of the purchase price, which in turn lead to the acquisition of the ownership over of the subject property. As to the issue of prescription Basis of action (for specific performance) is not the receipts evidencing payments but petitioners ownership and possession thereof. From this set of circumstances, enforcement of the contract is no longer required as delivery of the possession of land has already consummated the sale. The action is, in fact, one to quiet title (yay Property) which does not prescribe. o Basis one seeking to quiet title has a continuing right to the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature an adverse claim to his title or to assert a superior equity in his favor. (not sure if I got this correctly, too many appositives) In Gallar vs Husain delivery of the possession of the land consummates the sale and transfers the title to the buyer. Action is not one of specific performance but one to quiet title as well which is imprescriptible.