Sociotechnics: Basic Concepts and Issues

A d a m Podgorecki

The article draws the links between social engineering and sociotechnics (and its various forms). It introduces and gives examples of the concepts of sociotechnical duels, social warpiness, and maneuverability of social factors. Also an attempt is made to describe links among various types of social systems and types of sociotechnical activities. Finally, the concept of sociotechnical paradigm (teleological scheme of efficient social activity) is developed.

Whether we like it or not, we are living in the era of social engineering. Sociotechnical projects, in fact, are typically devised by those in power. Intellectuals, w h e n they recognized this situation, undertook the task of unmasking the hidden assumptions of those who dominate others. In 1936 Merton formulated an idea of the unanticipated consequences of conscious social action, which he later presented in his fundamental 1949 book Social Theory and Social Structure, and thus opened t h e door for speculations pertaining to the problem of social engineering. In connection with this problem, several questions emerged. Can social engineering exist without or despite conscious intention? Does social engineering always involve the context in which social action takes place? If so, are there not more social engineering contextual factors present and operative on some occasions than can have been consciously planned? And if this is so, then why should there not be a conceptually separate class of, say, serendipitous social engineering? Social engineering has persistently aroused negative attitudes because of associations with such notions as the reification of h u m a n beings, manipulation, exploitation, or "activities from behind." The neutral term "sociotechnics" was coined to avoid this sort of labeling. According to presently accepted understanding, sociotechnics deals with matters of just and rational social changes. Adam Podgorecki is professor of sociology at Cafleton and Warsaw Universities. He is the author of numerous works, including Law in Socie~; Practical Social Sciences, Story of a Polish Thinker, and 25 volumes of Si-tien's fiction.
Knowledge in Socie~: The lnternaUonalJournal of Knowledge Transfer, Spring 1990, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 62-84

Podgorecki

63

The first conscientious formulation of s o c i o t e c h n i c s - t h e n as a theory of legal p o l i t i c s - w a s p r e s e n t e d by L. Petrazycki: It deals with the complicated matter of changing social motivation9It concerns the gradual transformation of the human race through elimination of thousands of dissonances and disharmonies. It intends to do so by adjusting the transformation to a new rational basis. This should be done with the utilization of a scientific approach and with an understanding of casual relationships. Rational human pedagogics and policy, instead of traditional adaptation processes, should be employed. Existing processes of adjustment are quite naive and often unconscious, thus being less effective, slow, painful and connected with unnecessarily used atrocities, tears etc. (Petrazycki, 1925; in 1986 edition: 163 [Translation--A.P.]). A n e w idea is g e n e r a t e d by a social situation w h e n the situation is ripe. Such an idea, as Merton clearly d e m o n s t r a t e d , m a y a p p e a r as a sparkling m u l t i d i s c o v e r y - a t the s a m e time in various settings. It is not the external manifestation of an idea that is of importance; w h a t is relevant is the systematic, logical, and c o m p r e h e n s i v e d e m o n s t r a t i o n of its originality. The concept of sociotechnics w a s first introduced to the Western scientific c o m m u n i t y by K. Mannheim. In 1940 he wrote: I have ventured to suggest three hypotheses for diagnosing the course of events and have applied them to several different spheres.

(1) Most of the symptoms of our time are due to the transition form laissez-faire to a planned society.
(2) The transition from the democracy of a few to a mass society explains another set of changes. (3) The changes in social technique account for yet a third group of changes, which has profoundly modified our social life (Mannheim, 1940, p. 250). His u n d e r s t a n d i n g of sociotechnics w a s that "These practices a n d agencies which have as their ultimate aim the m o u l d i n g of h u m a n behavior a n d of social relationships I shall describe in their entirety as social techniques" (Mannheim, 1940, p. 247). He clarified this u n d e r s t a n d i n g in the following way: And yet progress in the technique of organization is nothing but the application of technical conceptions to the forms of human cooperation.., but what we have to consider in discussing these social techniques is not social organization in the narrow sense such as taylorization and business administration9 9 Any deliberate rebuilding of human groups in terms of more elastic organizations represents another chapter in the development of social techniques (Mannheim, 1940, p. 244; based on Mensch und Gesellschafl im Zeitalter in des Umbaus, 1935).

64

Knowledge in Society/Spring 1990

These ideas appeared in the larger Western scientific community as social engineering. They w e r e introduced by G. Myrdal, R. Steiner, and A. Rose. They maintained: There is a common belief that the type of practical research which involves rational planning-what we have ventured to call "social engineering"-is likely to be emotional. This is a mistake. If the value premises are sufficiently, fully, and rationally introduced, the planning of induced social change is no more emotional by itself than the planning of a bridge or taking a census. Even prior to the state of proper social engineering, the research technique of accounting openly for one's value premises actually de-emotionalizes research. Emotion and irrationality in science, on the contrary, acquire their high potency precisely when valuations are kept suppressed or remain concealed in the so-called "facts." And again: From the point of social sciences, this means, among other things, that social engineering will increasingly be demanded. Many things that for a long period have been predominantly a matter of individual adjustment; this will become more and more determined by political decision and by public regulation. We are entering an era where fact-finding will be seen as instrumental in planning controlled social change (Myrdal, Sterner, & Rose, 1944, p. 104). Karl Popper developed similar ideas, almost at the s a m e time. He wrote: The Platonic approach ... can be described as that of utopian en~neering, as opposed to another kind of social engineering which I consider the only rational one and which may be described by the name of piecemeal engineenng. 9 Accordingly, the piecemeal engineer will adopt the method of searching for and fighting against the greatest and most urgent evils of society, rather than searching and fighting for its greatest ultimate good (Popper, 1950, introduction written in April 1944, pp. 154-5). H. Zetterberg accepts Popper's understanding of sociotechnics. In Social Theory and Social Practice (1962), he singles out the following procedure which, according to his judgment, is unique for rational social practice. The proposed procedure consists of the following steps: (a) an explanatory inquiry (the expert tries to specify the client's problem, mainly on the basis of an informal approach; (b) scholarly understanding (the expert undertakes the task of translating the problem into a scientific language); (c) scholarly confrontation (the expert presents to the client the general overview of the client's problem as perceived; (d) discovery of the solution (the

Podgorecki

65

expert utilizes knowledge of social sciences and applies it to the client's problem and formulates a solution to the problem); and (e) scientific advice (the expert suggests a solution, which is then formulated in the client's language). At this stage, the client also is informed about possible unintended consequences of the proposed solution. Although the question of who first formulated the idea of scientific social engineering may be fascinating, for it traces rules governing the invention and traveling of ideas, a more important task is addressing the problem of differentiating among various types of social engineering. These types include: (a) sociotechnics proper, (b) self-made social engineering, (c) quackish social engineering, and (d) "dark" social engineering. Sociotechnics proper may be defined as the theory of efficient social action or, more concretely, as an applied social science. Sociotechnics provides the potential practitioner with a method to seek effective (ade~ quate to expected goals) ways and means to realize aims provided there is a given accepted system of values, as well as a usable set of verified propositions describing and explaining human behavior (Podgorecki & Los, 1979, p. 273). This understanding of sociotechnics assumes that there is a body of scientifically verified theses which creates a sufficient basis for formulating teleological recommendations. It assumes as well that there exist various methods to trace results triggered by activities which follow these recommendations. Additionally, sociotechnics uses a consistent methodological s c h e m e - a paradigm of efficient social action. As descriptive and explanatory reasoning have their own logic, so does practical reasoning. Self-made social engineering presents a different approach. It presupposes the existence of verified knowledge concerning effectiveness of social activities, but understands this knowledge as an accumulated and generalized professional experience. Although this experience in some instances may be translated into testifiable propositions, it really constitutes nothing more than a pool of directives generated by various types of social or bureaucratic agencies. What is characteristic about these directives is that they are regarded as valid in similar circumstances; however, the concept of similarity could be treated loosely. It is not a scientific control, but rather a bureaucratic one, that is employed to check whether the application process or, generally speaking, the utilization of these directives is proper. Quackish social engineering differs from the self-made model in that it only pretends its competence in formulating practical recommendations, when in fact, this sort of social engineering is not familiar with the real, tested, and relevant theoretical framework. Social practice of "scientific Marxism" in countries governed by the "real" socialism evidently shows that Marxism, presenting itself as a scientifically proven social philosophy, in practice is nothing else but a social failure on the macroscale. The difference between self-made social engineering and quackish social

66

Knowledge in Society/Spring 1990

engineering is not always sharp. The former relies mainly on the experi ence collected through effective "trial and error" analysis of various types of social practices; the latter is based on myths or ideologies that appeal to emotions. "Dark" social engineering, meaning sociotechnics proper or self-made social engineering, is consciously used to produce harm. It is not technique, but rather goals that constitute the difference. Nazi techniques that employed the "Judenrads" to destroy the solidarity of Jewish people, or PRON organizations created by the Jurazelski regime to do the same against the outlawed Solidarity, are examples of the practices used by totalitarian regimes during the Second World War and afterward. Some historians go so far as to state: "Hitler appears to have approached politics in terms of visual images. Like Lenin and still more like Stalin, he was an outstanding practitioner of the century's most radical voice: social engineering-the notion that human beings can be shovelled around like concrete'" (Johnson,1983, p. 130). When analyzing specifics for sociotechnics and self-made social engineering activities, one notes they present two distinctive positions. The first is based on the consistent body of methodologically tested propositions or hypotheses. It articulates the requirements set by sociotechnics proper. The second is represented by the traditional stance that predominantly takes into consideration the accumulated wisdom of the given profession or the certain agency. Although this distinction appears to be simple, it bears numerous far-reaching consequences. Thus, one may claim that Mannheim's perspective on rational social changes is associated with the self-made social engineering, and the sociotechnical proper perspective is represented by Myrdal and his associates, Popper and Zettelberg. Although Lazarfeld and Reitz's point of view could be located somewhere in between, it is indeed heavily influenced by the self-made social engineering perception. This distinction may be demonstrated easily by outlining the paradigm of efficient social action elaborated by them. Lazerfeld and Reitz singled out the following consecutive steps characteristic of this type of paradigm: (1) identify the problem, (2) set up staff, (3) search for knowledge, (4) follow the road to recommendations, (5) implement, and (6) assess (Lazerfeld & Reitz, 1975, p. 48). This paradigm is rather simplistic, however. It deals properly with the crucial steps of efficient social action, yet it injects into the logico-methodological chain of considerations pertaining to the prospective actions something methodologically alien; that is, an element based on accidental factors, personal preferences, or emotional choices. Thus, "setting up staff" is an organizational activity that is not necessarily regulated by the logical requirements. Blassi's statement, despite his intentions, fully reveals this point. He says:

Podgorecki

67

The most powerful generalization I can offer from this experience [consultative service in Congress] is that the chemistry of personality between individuals, the cooperative style of collaboration in a group, and the degree of trust between team members, are of paramount importance in ensuring a successful consultation role once agreement is reached on the sphere or topic of influence. He adds: Therefore the social scientist interested in public involvement considers an informal contact to a legislator more valuable than many public seminars and mailing lists. A fortuitous "in" can replace months of such leg work (Blassi in Freeman et al., 1983, pp. 138-139, 143). In short, w h e n a paradigm of efficient social action is based mainly on professional and organizational experience, it represents the model of self-made social engineering; the more a paradigm of efficient social action is based on methodologically tested empirical propositions, the more it resembles the model of sociotechnics proper.

Selected Examples--Macro-Sociotechnical Duels

Although Popper limits the scope of reasonable sociotechnics only to the micro- and mezzo-levels, several recent inquiries show that the concept of macro-sociotechnics may not be so easily discarded. These studies indicate that the usage of rational sociotechnics is not only possible, but may evoke, on the macrolevel, some corresponding and counteracting self-made sociotechnical activities. It emerges as a complicated, "dialectical" process of a sociotechnical duel. An illuminative study of G. Massell (1968) summarized below, is a good introductory example of this. Law as an Instrument o f Sociotechnical Activi~ Soviet authorities, in the 1920s, faced a formidable task of introducing an alien Soviet socioeconomic system to Muslim Central Asian republics. The experiment was located perfectly. Neighboring states were unable or unwilling to intervene; targets of activities did not present strong resistance centers: they were deprived of their traditional ruling elites; the sociotechnical "authority" had at its disposal undisputed and centralized political power; and the sociotechnical elite was radical and rational and not bound by any democratic constraints. The sociotechnical idea w a s that the main vehicle responsible for introducing a Soviet sociopolitical system and the Soviet w a y of life to these republics would be a mobilization of w o m e n ' s "surrogate proletariat." In order to achieve that end, Soviet authorities abolished in 1927 the tradi-

68

Knowledge in Society/Spring 1990

tional court system, thus eliminating long-lasting customs supported by the Muslim religion. They introduced new laws proscribing wellestablished customs such as: bride-price, child-marriage, forced marriage, marriage by abduction, rape, polygamy, levirate, the mistreatment and killing of wives, and, above all, the usage of veils. These liberating measures, in the beginning, brought about only a meager response. The traditional family structure was so strong that these arrangements were treated skeptically by the population. As a rule, women were unable to enjoy these new opportunities under the influence of a "false consciousness" or intimidation. When more informative activities and administrative pressures were exerted, some women became selectively involved through official action. In various urbanized centers, these women (especially divorced wives of polygamous husbands, maltreated wives, orphans, manual workers in well-to-do households, recent childbrides) utilized their new rights and demonstrated their right to vote. When the administrative pressures became more penetrating, those women who did not have previous experience in dealings with men, sometimes became involved in various disreputable relations with men. The strategy of the male response was entirely different. In the beginning they utilized the technique of evasion-declaring ignorance to the newly introduced laws. The second phase, selective accommodation, was exemplified by Moslem clergymen's organizational effort to make life for women easier. It was an attempt to add some flexibility to the traditional Moslem way of life and to the relations between men and women. The next stage in men's responses was limited retribution. This stage included heavy persuasion; forcible restriction of women's freedom to attend schools, clubs or to vote; privately arranged beatings; or even expulsion from home. The final phase of the counter-strategy used by Moslem men was massive backlash. This strategy attacked both the women who were interested in new opportunities, and the rights of the husbands of those women who participated in liberalizing policies. Women, at this stage, often were shamed, raped, lynched, or killed. Sociotechnical agents, the native activists, and the Soviet functionaries acting behind the "cultural revolution," also faced difficulties when introducing the liberalization program. These agents became the targets of escalated abuse. This vigorously launched and self-generated, successful counter-strategy compelled the central Soviet authorities to abruptly halt the whole macro-sociotechincal experiment in 1929. In some instances the possibility of a mobilization of civil society (an independent society living under the state's pressure) could be sociotechnically blocked in advance. A successful social engineering example of the "dark" type aimed against the Polish Independent Trade Unions' Solidarity in December 1981, exemplifies this thesis. An action to discredit Solidarity by false rumors was undertaken in advance. Later a very unusual operation was launched: food was hoarded by the

Podgorecki

69

army (since all other institutions were transparent to the scrutiny of Solidarity) adding to the already existing market difficulties. Various parts of the army units were sent around the country: (1) to collect "spying" information, (b) to create an impression of the army's omnipotence, (c) to help the elderly peasants and flood victims, and (d) to keep the army ready for an immediate action. The army's historical prestige was engaged to create an additional confusion since, according to the research conducted before the imposition of martial law, even the Communist army enjoyed considerable trust among the population (it was ranked third after Solidarity and the Church). When martial law was introduced (December 13, 1981 --only a few days before Christmas, so much celebrated in Catholic Poland) all types of communication were mechanically cut; telephones went dead; public transportation was halted; gasoline was not sold; and a curfew was introduced. The army surrounded important public places, factories, and schools. Each institution (including universities) received a military "commissar" who supervised both the administrative work and the political atmosphere in the institutions. Especially trained (including in brutality) police dealt with all strikes, and the army, with its iron ring, surrounded the premises of the striking factory or institution. These measures created an overwhelming feeling of intimidation that paralyzed immediate attempts for planned counter-activities. Leading Solidarity activists, based on precise police records, were arrested even before martial law was declared. This action was taken to control the first echelon of the Solidarity officials and to block any attempt to establish the second Solidarity organizational line of defense. The TV news programs were conducted by the military personnel in a dull, uncivilized manner (all professional actors immediately and spontaneously refused to cooperate in other programs). Assault on the leaders of the civil society was coupled with the reappearance of an additional t h r e a t the "ghost" of Big Brother in case of a mass revolt. A sociotechnical interpretation of these events is complicated. One must be able to comprehend the state of Polish society before the emergence of Solidarity. The society was in a state of social warpiness. Stimuli, able to awake responses in the population, generated unexpected results. Different hierarchies of official, traditional, and church values, conflicting information (official, and coming from nonofficial sources: travel abroad, outside mass-media), and contrary demands (official and traditionally significant authorities) led to a state of information chaos, cynicism, and above all to the almost complete disappearance of trust. In this situation the response giw..n to a stimulus was unpredictable, whimsical, or accidental. Usual social relations changed their character: the relation between the cause and Ehe result became optional. The Solidarity period, to a certain degree, was able to restore a social atmosphere of mutual (albeit not official) trust. Sixteen months of a Solidarity regime

70

Knowledge in Society/Spring 1990

evidently was still too short a time to rebuild the reliable criteria needed to select sociopolitical leaders, test them, and give them proper time to gain social visibility. In consequence, the existing residue of the phenomenon of warpiness was reinforced strongly by the feeling of impotence in face of the danger of a Soviet invasion (a possibility of an intervention by an alien metaforce) and did not generate the counter-sociotechnical action. A sociotechnical duel is not likely to be successful when it faces a double-fight: a counter-force existing in the given system and a force of a meta-system, such as the USSR. The macro-sociotechnical dueI may be contained within the boundaries of one social system or it may overstep it. Shakeri's illuminative outline of social engineering and the Islamic revolution, showed that the Kennedy and post-Kennedy teleological reform program for Iran included, among others, economic and political reforms initiated in 1961, activization of the role of the Shah, and American military presence in Iran. This program was defeated by the exceptional type of theological social engineering of " . . . a relatively unknown, not quite top-ranking theologian, with limited financial means and confined to a Holy City in the grip of harsh political repression" (Shakeri, 1989). This paradoxial sociotechnical duel between a superpower and an idea based on religious fundamental/fanatic convictions, far overstepped the original boundaries of the duel's field and, in its consequences, had enormous repercussions around the world. Examples of this include: the humiliation that lowered American prestige, a change of the party controlling the American presidency, the oil crisis, and the rise of Islamic insurgency. This spectacular self-made sociotechnical duel on the macroscale, sharply contrasts with another duel dealing with the problem of potentialities of societal revolution. Originally, the so-called "Camelot Project" was supposed to deal with the following countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Columbia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, E1 Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela. According to Horowitz, "Project Camelot" "came into being in 1964 as an offspring of the Army's [the U.S. Army] Special Operation Research Office (SORO), with a fanfare befitting the largest single grant ever provided for a social science project" (Horowitz, 1967, p. 4). The official document describing the basic features of this project said, Project Camelot was a study whose objective was to determine the feasibility of developing a general social system model which would make it possible to predict and influence politically significant aspects Of social change in the developing nations of the world. Somewhat more specifically, its objectives were: First, to devise procedures for assessing the potential war within national societies; second, to identify with increased degrees of confidence, those actions which a government might take to relieve conditions which were as-

Podgorecki

71

sessed as giving rise to a potential for internal war; and finally, to assess the feasibility of prescribing the characteristics of a system able to obtain and use the essential information needed for doing the above two things (Document of December 4, 1964). According to Horowitz, This perspective [of the staff] was the Enlightenment Syndrome. Likethe eighteenth century philosophers, many members of the "Camelot" staff shared a belief in the worth of personal persuasion . . . . They sought to correct the intellectual paternalism and parochialism under which the Pentagon Generals, State Department diplomats, and Defense Department planners seemed to operate" (Horowitz, 1967, p. 7). The whole project came to an abrupt halt when a European professor announced that he could not join the "Project" because he did not share the values of the sponsor. He claimed that the army was involved in promoting conflicts as well. He criticized the "imperialistic features" of the "Project" and its lack of symmetry and the lack of study of corresponding problems concerning the United States. Of course, it was not just the statement of this professor which stopped the" Project," it was cancelled mainly due to the sociopolitical consequences of the scandal generated by this statement. The intervention model (described later) seems to be more successful in fighting with dark sociotechnics than in pursuing its own programs. In 1971 the Polish Ministry of Justice promulgated a law to punish those persons over age 18, who did not attend schools, did not work, depended for livelihood on other persons, and violated the "basic social norms." According to the official record of that Ministry there were about 50,000 "social parasites" who were said to be responsible for some acute social and economic problems. The Ministry proposed that "social parasites," after two unsuccessful administrative warnings, should be sent to "semilabor camps." A countrywide campaign was undertaken to convince the population that such a law was needed. A sample survey of 3,000 persons showed that the overwhelming majority of the population supported this proposal. Then, an additional sample survey was conducted. It indicated that the average citizen was inclined to say decisively: "Indeed, I condemn social parasites, especially those who are seemingly neutral bureaucrats-these persons are especially dangerous!" At the meeting of members of the Polish social sciences, experts who were alerted to this law-proposal determined that the alleged "army" of social parasites could be broken down into three separate categories: (1) black marketeers (who already were criminalized), (b) prostitutes (who according to Polish law operated as they wished), and (c) alcoholics (who

72

Knowledgein Society/Spring 1990

needed different, mainly medical, but not penal, treatment). It also was pointed out that Poland was a signatory of the International Convention prohibiting compulsory work. And finally, it was argued that if such a law was to be based on Soviet experience, empirical data that justified proposed solutions should be revealed. A memorandum based on these considerations was prepared; it was protected from leaks (especially to foreign press), and was sent to the Parliament (Sejm). One of the factions of the Communist Party engaged in the internal Party-war was looking for suitable ammunition. It grabbed the memorandum and, using argumentation prepared there, killed the bill. Later, after the introduction of martial law in 1981, this law was enacted. The preceding examples illustrate the following generalizations: macrosociotechnical duels take place, as a rule, between different: types of selfmade sociotechnics; sociotechnics proper, which is not developed by governments at the present moment, supports the underdogs or serves as an intervention tool of an unmasking character; sociotechnicians, as those who do not have a direct access to power, are unable to show the positive usefulness of sociotechnics proper on the macroscale; dark sociotechnics uses both the resources of self-made and sociotechnics proper.
9 Five M o d e l s o f S o c i o t e c h n i c s

In various social settings, under pressure of different political systems and the influence of different scientific patterns, five models of sociotechnics, with distinctly different features, are evident. There are: (a) classical, (b) clinical, (c) intervention, (d) solicitant, and (e) articulative models. The classical model overlaps with that of H. Zetterberg (1962). It consists of arranging and synthesizing various general regularities discovered in the area of social sciences and fashioning them into an integrated body of directives. In other words, a cohesive set of directives, put into a united order, constitutes a translation of relevant theoretical propositions into a normative language of pragmatic and utilitarian notions (i.e., in a language of recommendations indicating certain directions of guided action). Adherents to this conception of sociotechnics submit prepared expertise to their sponsors, disregarding its later practical fate. At this point they understand their role as terminated, with the exception of authorship regarding various issues of the methodology conceived for this particular project or pertaining to a potential publication of a final report summarizing these points. This type of sociotechnics may flourish in the following situations: (a) when scholars are eager to develop a new methodological-theoreticalapproach in social sciences; when they are so interested in developing a new scheme of thinking that they forget or pretend to forget the significance of the sociopolitical effects of their own practical activities; and (b) when sociopolitical settings do not allow room for involvement in observing the results of their own recommendations, thus treating scholars as mere hired servants.

Podgorecki

73

The clinical model was advocated originally by A. Gouldner and S. Miller (1965). This model, independently of the requested diagnosis, produces a set of normative directives designed to achieve prescribed ends. It stresses the need of cooperation between experts and sponsors who have commissioned the expertise in question. It is designed to gain sponsors' acceptance of the proposed recommendations. In this sense, sociotechnical activity is concerned with the task of describing the desired social changes and their fulfillment. This activity also is expected to prepare the very sponsors with a better comprehension of their own goals; and in the case of their resistance, it presses them to realize these goals. In short, this sociotechnical model is expected to provide sponsors with the ability to overcome their own noncooperation. This model appears in social settings such as: (a) when cross-currents exist that represent contradictory interests, when the need for research is imposed on sponsors who initially were not interested in the implementation of any ameliorative recommendations, and (b) w h e n s c h o l a r s / sociotechnicians press for, even as the by-product of the consultativeresearch in progress, changes in the existing social structure (and consequently the existing power structure); these pressures also may take place as a result of the recognition of the experts' "higher" degree of insight and knowledge. The intervention model of sociotechnics consists of unsolicited formulating receipts of practical social activities, thus presenting them as a well elaborated, coherent project. This task not only exerts clinical influence on decision makers but also influences social changes as the main objectives of teleological activities. This model's primary task is direct intervention into relationships within various social groups, organizations, or institutions. This is done to fulfill the urgent need of changing the existing state of affairs. Thus, according to this model, sociotechnicians undertake the role of independent agents and promoters of a new social order or a social change. This model has been articulated by A. Podgorecki (Podgorecki & Los, 1979, p. 280). The described model may be generated by: (a) an independent social force based on experts who are not only professional scholars, but who also represent a certain type of sociopolitical attitude and consciously take the sides of "underdogs"; (b) some authoritarian regimes that are inclined to utilize social sciences findings and capitalize on achievements of the respected sciences in order to manipulate and eventually subjugate their subjects. These regimes may misuse the intervention model with the aid of "dark" sociotechnicians, acting as agents of these regimes. In certain situations an intervention model may adopt an unmasking form. An unmasking submodel of sociotechnics consists of an attempt to show that those seemingly beneficial goals stated by the powerful organizations (e.g., government) are only apparent aims. Behind these mani~ fest aims are hidden, latent goals that are difficult to detect but can be quite harmful for the targets of the intended sociotechnical action. In this

74

Knowledge in Society/Spring 1990

case, the role of a sociotechnician would be to reveal the true nature of a proclaimed social program, actions, or policies. This sociotechnical unmasking model is used especially in autocratic sociopolitical systems that cover their activities with ideological phraseology that is easy to sell (Marxism, for example), but in fact, is injurious to the population. In these situations, a sociotechnician should have a civil courage to disclose the real goals of those who have power. In liberal social systems where the power centers may attempt to hide their real interests behind a vague language, the sociotechnician has to undertake a content analysis of this language and above all, has to prove the true intentions behind this jargon. The solicitant model has been developed by experts who prepare a noncommissioned expertise on how to change social reality. They are seeking a willing sponsor to buy (or support financially) the application of this expertise. The expert (or group of experts) is not guided by the motivation of "social service" (as it may be in the case of the intervention model) but is merely seeking a profit based on monopolistic knowledge. This model is not elaborated in the existing literature. This expertise-for-sale model may be developed: (a) with the gradual recognition of sociotechnical potentials in liberal societies; and (b) within totalitarian societies when the power centers recognize the advantages of using competition among experts. If experts have direct access to these power centers, they could offer their eager services to help keep the citizenry under their control. The articulation model combines various features of the clinical model with some additional elements. It is designed to bring to the surface those values which are vital for the clients but have not been articulated by them. This situation may occur for several reasons. For example, the clients may not be aware of certain "deep bottom" values; clients may not have the skill to weigh these values according to hidden interests; or they may not be able to integrate values surfaced by the expert within a more or less conscious hierarchy of other values. It is necessary to point out that this model additionally reveals that clients may be easily misled by the hired experts. During the process of the articulation of the clients' preferences, the experts may inject their own values, alien to those of the clients. For example, the sociotechnician, whether aware of it or not, may infuse into the client's "Weltanschauung" some elements of "false consciousness." It may happen, for example, when a culture, based on values established by the neighborly reciprocal help and cooperation, clashes with the culture that stresses the significance of a pragmatically perceived individual, material success. Experts belonging to the latter culture may analyze the substance belonging to the former one. This model operates primarily when: (a) experts attempt to articulate and defend those interests of their clients which are not fully articulated or recognized so that experts belong to the category of hired and trusted

Podgorecki

75

specialists; (b) experts are consciously commissioned to suppress interests of their prospective clients-this happens usually in totalitarian countries where experts are called upon to develop, spread, and reinforce "false consciousness" and dump citizens' legitimate demands; and (c) power centers use the prestige of science to conduct research in order to claim later that this research substantiated policy decisions already reached. Three Levels of Sociotechnical Operations The microlevel use of sociotechnics is the simplest level, but also the least inspiring. There are many studies in this area. For example, one study showed it is not too difficult to satisfy employees concerned with the loss of time waiting for elevators in an office building. Architects proposed three solutions: install more elevators, install faster ones, or "bank" t h e m having the existing elevators stop on different floors. The first two solutions were rejected due to cost, and the third, after some trials, did not reduce the waiting time. When consulted, a psychologist came up with the following observation. Clerks wasting time in their offices were doing something that, although not productive, was pleasant for them. But when waiting for the elevator they became evidently frustrated. Therefore he proposed to install large mirrors in the elevator lobbies. These mirrors would occupy the women while providing the opportunity for men to gaze at them without appearing to do so (Lazarsfeld & Reitz, 1975, p. 56). Notwithstanding the sexism of this proposal, one may say that in this particular case, the framework of social interaction was changed on the basis of the employment of relatively simple regularities. A reasonable sociotechnician traditionally would not proceed further than the mezzolevel. If the sociotechnician were given, for example, the task of dealing with discrimination against the female workforce, a multidimensional analysis could be initiated. A recommendation may be made to influence, or even punish, those men who would sexually or otherwise, harass women; to raise women's salaries to introduce parity with men; to propose starting an educational, antidiscriminatory concentrated action; or to alert supervisors to possible situations that typically give rise to forms of discrimination. In sum, a conscientious sociotechnician would be looking for ways to use the maneuverable vanables to influence those factors that are not directly maneuverable. Thus, if a set of sufficiently maneuverable factors could not be found in the existing "pool" of variables a switch to the metalevel of interaction may be made in an attempt to change social frames of reference. Nonetheless, at the present stage of developing a paradigm of effective social action in accord with K. Popper's requirement, a m e t h odologically reasonable sociotechnician would be reluctant to be involved with macro-sociotechnical activities; such activities would seem to overstep the maneuverable framework of existing and accessible operational variables.

76

Knowledge in Society/Spring 1990

At this point, another unfortunate intervention of state-guided Marxism may be detected, Marxist theoretical propositions based on normative intentions tend to explain phenomena that are not evidenced by direct observations; such propositions are difficult to grasp by empirical analyses. They are claimed to have a unique validity since they purportedly constitute factors of a strategic importance in promoting the desired social changes. Their identification thus is crucial since it is assumed that only knowledge of these variables can lead to deep and comprehensive diagnosis, and consequently to extrapolations pertaining to the planned transformation of the existing society. The propositions generated in this manner are then applicable to various societies taken as wholes. In contrast, hypotheses elaborated by "rival" social theories appear as fragmented generalizations based on dispersed data formulated by various branches of social sciences that have not been united Since they do not seem to have an empirically reliable frame of reference, these hypotheses do not provide a structurally consistent picture of a given society. Marxism hence aspires to apprehend diffused propositions in a systematically ordered whole, thus allowing them to be potentialb~ ready to give recommendations of the global societal change. This readiness to help introduce social change, to fight social evils and injustice, appeals more to emotions than to the methodological mind. Feelings are more influential than logic, and in consequence, acceptance of diagnostic or practical error prevails. This error, multiplied by its beholders, introduces an enormous amount of negative and practical consequences in the countries of "real" a socialism and in countries that dream of attaining real socialism. Consequently, it monopolizes macrosociotechnics for Marxism. The holistic perception of Marxism is misleading because it perpetuates the negative economic and sociopolitical consequences and reinforces the theoretical convictions that Marxism has a synthetic potential. It also discourages or even blocks possible attempts to build a reliable (testable) macro-sociotechnics. In the concluding chapter of his recent book, The Grand Failure, The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century, Z. Brzezinski offers a somewhat similar opinion. He points out: Humanity's catastrophic encounter with communism during the twentieth century has thus provided a painful but critically important lesson: Utopian social engineering is fundamentally in conflict with the complexity of the human condition, and social creativity blossoms best when political power is restrained. That basic lesson makes it all the more likely that democracy-and not communism-will dominate the twenty-first century (Brzezinski, 1989, p. 258). Nonetheless, macro-sociotechnics is methodoligically possible and perhaps unavoidable. At least two conditions need to be fulfilled to achieve it.

Podgorecki

77

First, a sociology of humankind must be developed. On the basis of sociologies of different societies and their conglomerates, a global comprehensive metasociology should be elaborated. It would explain social processes and movements that would take place in particular societies, in their segments, and in society as a whole. Second, various self-made macrosociotechnics, when scrutinized or analyzed from the point of view of their tested adequacy and treated as revealing sources for the understanding of those rationalization strategies unique to societies which generated them, may be gradually transformed by experts from macro-self-made social engineering into macro-sociotechnics proper. Values Versus Action In practical social sciences values can appear as an object of study, as (data), or as values per se. The first type of values (data) appears when values are analyzed as expressions of opinions, beliefs, evaluations, or attitudes of several segments of the population involved in the given sociotechnical activity. From this point of view, values are not treated as an obligatory basis for recommendations directed toward the public, the sociotechnicians, or their sponsors. They are regarded as data indicating what course of actions respective segments of the relevant population are inclined to undertake and how strongly these segments of the population may pursue their actions. They are perceived as Durkheim's "facts." Knowledge of these values helps to prepare an adequate diagnosis of the types of forces that can motivate people for action and indicate what forms of actions one may expect from the population. The second type of values (operatives) is connected with the inherent logic of the sociotechnical paradigm (see discussion below). Values that have been adopted as basic references for this paradigm become the "given" elements of sociotechnical equations, since they become valid not due to their normative character, but because they start to be treated as necessary elements of the internal logic of this paradigm. They become transformed into the elements of practical logic: they are now necessities and guardians of obligatory steps that must be performed if one is to proceed from one stage to the next. Without these operative values the machinery of the sociotechnical paradigm would be stagnant. If a certain immigration policy is accepted then the guiding reference principles should tell the immigration officials how to recruit people, screen them, accept or reject the applications, or proceed with appeals. The third type of values (values proper) is directly connected with the essence of values. In this case values serve as estimators of various forms of behavior, and constitute normative guides to indicate behavior that is proper or improper. In this version they are regarded as norms applicable to effects of various procedures of sociotechnical activities and their results. To grasp the intrinsic complexity of practical social sciences, 2 it is

78

Knowledge in Society/Spring 1990

necessary to distinguish the three indicated functions of values. Practical social sciences are based on values, utilize values, and are evaluated by values. The fact that practical social sciences (policy research) enjoy a relatively low respect inside the community of social scientists seems to be connected with the fact that it is easier to downgrade new methodological problems than to try to understand something that is difficult to comprehend.

The Sociotechnical Paradigm

The heart of sociotechnics exists within the sociotechnical paradigm. This paradigm should be understood here as a matrix or a general undertaking for all practical social activities. Without is, sociotechnics would be reduced to a new interesting perspective in social sciences. Then it would be only a point of view that would be rendered untestable, thus requiring replicable measures to control an already intersubjectively controlled activity. This paradigm tries to fill the gap pointed out by Coleman, "The rapid growth of policy research and its increasing importance for social policy have begun in recent years to push social scientists and social philosophers toward what both the classical and the modern theorists have neglected: the development of a theory of purposive or directed social change" (Coleman, 1968, p. 700). The sociotechnical paradigm was first formulated in 1962 (Podgorecki, 1962, an English version in 1975). The essence of this paradigm consisted of a scheme of logical sequential steps prescribing a coherent process of a compact practical action. This paradigm has two essential requirements. The first is to clarify values that may (could) enter (or develop) into subjective intrusions. Although values are necessary elements of practical logic, they must be treated as operational data; therefore, the presence of values per se in this paradigm, is excluded as a rule. The second requirement of this paradigm is to put all psychological and behavioral, nonlogical elements under methodological control. Thus the logic of practical action must be separated from all quasilogical activities. The second requirement may be accomplished with a lesser degree of precision than the first since it appears to be impossible to eliminate all nonlogical elements from the logic of practical action. They are intrinsic to it. Some ingredients of action must be treated as inherent elements of this paradigm, thus constituting the differencia specifica between cognitive and practical logic. A psychological decision to begin with a certain type of practical activity, or perhaps a decision to abstain from action, as implementations of the accepted program of action must be regarded as distinguishing features separating cognitive from practical logic. The refined version of this paradigm was formulated by Podgorecki and Shields (1986). The first methodological stage of the paradigm of efficient social action consists of an examination of the social problem. The question at hand is

Podgorecki

79

whether the state of affairs which is regarded as difficult, creating tension, close to explosion, or potentially dangerous should be sociotechnically investigated or whether the perception of this state of social affairs, as questionable, is the result of a biased comprehension of the existing situation. The reflection on this subject should result in a psychological decision that takes this problem under investigation or rejects it as a spurious, exaggerated social question. (For a more detailed discussion on social problems see Henschel, 1976; and Kubin, 1979). The second methodological stage of this paradigm of purposeful social action, involves fixing the hierarchical order of social priorities and ideological values deemed appropriate to the means and ends of the sociotechnical activity. In this stage those values which seemed important to the potential activity should be assembled, clarified, set into a hierarchical order, and analyzed for possible vagueness or contradiction. At this stage a diagnosis of the social situation causing the problem is made. The diagnosis is thus understood as a comprehensive and systematic description in empirical terms of the existing situation. Both a broader and narrower meaning of the diagnosis must then be presented. In the narrower sense, the diagnosis must cover a description of the situation, a classification of collected facts, and a translation of the collected data into scientifically operational terms. In a broader sense, the diagnosis also must attempt to present an explanation of the given situation. It must attempt to specify the causes which shaped the given situation and, if possible, present a picture of the mutual interplay of the specified causes. The third stage of the paradigm is an evaluationof the situation that was the subject of the diagnosis. It must provide an answer to the question of whether the acknowledged values, when applied to the existing situation, may dictate efforts aimed at changing this situation, or whether the costs, including the cost of acquiring the information of such a change, would be greater than the toleration of the existing liability. If the answer is deemed positive and change is recommended, the proper procedure of sociotechnics may then be applied. If the answer is negative and change is not recommended, the procedure of sociotechnical action should not be applied. Both of these situations represent univocal evaluations. An evaluation is equivocal when a negative evaluation of the given situation, assumed from the given set of values, is reached. At the same time, a positive evaluation of the given situation must be reached from the viewpoint of different, but also accepted, values. The suspension of the teleological course until a final evaluation is reached thus becomes necessary (Podgorecki, 1975). In connection with an equivocal evaluation, three basic possibilities also must be considered. The first possibility exists when a higher, complete, and noncontradictory system of values is available as the result of an analytic-normative reasoning process (e.g., a social contract). The second is when an incomplete system of values turns out, after completion, to

80

Knowledge in Society/Spring 1990

be noncontradictory and thus a spuriously contradictory set of values appears as a part of this larger system (e.g., expansion of already established values into new areas, for example, euthanasia). The third is when there is a completely incompatible system of values (e.g., Western civilization and values versus Islamic values). Normative-evaluative reasoning (which in addition to the first stage clarifies the priorities inside of the given hierarchy of values) can be applied in the first and in the second possibilities, but not in the last one (Podgorecki, 1975). Here values are derived from a complete and closed system of values. As a rule, such institutions as voting, referendum, arbitration, or mediation, serve as useful tools to find a solution in the first and second possibility. It must be emphasized that it is necessary to make very clear that the entire procedure of efficient social action should be put to a halt if the values involved are not reconciled. Only consistent and unified values may set in motion the paradigm of efficient social action. The fourth stage of teleological activi(v makes available theoretical hypotheses which rest on previous investigations or research conducted for the purpose of solving the given problem. These hypotheses are then chosen as the most convenient foundations for the appropriate strategy of social change. They are chosen according to the prognosis of different configurations of the possible consequences. In theoretical sciences (including more developed branches of social sciences) the existing state of affairs is given; thus the search for a hypotheses is conducted in order to find why "X" is what it is. In practical social sciences, an imaginary state of affairs provides the point of departure. Various hypotheses (or combinations of them) which may lead to the creation of this imaginary state of affairs are taken into consideration. These imagined states are treated like independent variables causing dependent variables. This stage of the sociotechnical paradigm links the strategy of practical action with the theoretical knowledge contained in sociological theories. During World War II, approximately four million people were murdered in Auschwitz. The genocide machinery designated by Nazis in this camp worked quite "efficiently" (dark social-engineering). Nevertheless, deathtechnicians occasionally faced some "inefficiency" problems. Despite all possible precautionary measures (barbed, electrified wires; towers with reflectors and machine guns; ditches; guard dogs; and constant vigilance) several prisoners still were able to escape. To counteract this problem, the Nazis added purely social means to the existing technical ones. They began to decimate those who occupied the same barracks as fugitives. This was a skillful use of reference group theory: people side with members of their groups and tend to regard them as significant others. Nevertheless, escapes continued to take place. The "technicians" then turned to different reference groups; they began to arrest and transport to Auschwitz whole families of fugitives (Poles were among those who escaped most frequently). This new sociotechnical "in-

Podgorecki

81

strument" stopped the "leaks" almost completely. Application of reference group theory, of course, does not imply a conscious use of this theory; nevertheless, it does illustrate that the theory, when perceived in an intuitive manner, may be efficiently utilized in a diabolical way. This is because sociotechnics as a method, and as a paradigm, is neutral~ Like a knife it may wound, but it may also be used to cure. In thefiflh stage, a plan of action is prepared on the basis of the accumulated theoretical knowledge. This stage is often defined as one of social planning. However, social planning, to be more precise, may be perceived as a means of projection, correction, or prevention. From the purely theoretical standpoint, there is no difference between the projective and corrective procedures. It is almost impossible to create something absolutely novel: it is almost impossible to create a new entity completely unrelated to its constituents. If any new realization of a project is a transformation of what exists, it is almost impossible to devise something completely unrelated to what already exists. Thus, there is little difference between pro ~ jecting and correcting-in both cases only the presentation is changed. R could be said that all project making is a correction, or improvement, of that which already exists. It could also be said that all corrective actions in project-making toward change of an existing State of affairs. The image is similar if we look at the projective and corrective procedures from the point of view of the objectives of the practical action. Both of these procedures aim at the realization of the projected state of affairs (e.g., both pursue the objectives of the paradigm of practical action). A preventive procedure may be indicated in two types of conditions: (1) a negative state of affairs when present in a germinal stage, or (2) when it is not yet present but will appear without any doubt. Both the-germinal negative state of affairs and the possibility of its appearance are evaluated negatively. A germinal negative situation inherent in a positive state of affairs may ultimately lead to a negative conclusion. Some negative states of affairs may develop dynamically and are able to change the actual pattern and its evaluation quite rapidly. Even when no negative state of affairs is actually present, the chances are very high that one could arise; this situation must be evaluated negatively. We should not construe too narrowly the potential of a purposive action. A potential situation must be anticipated even if all is well for the time being, but it may be reasonably predicted that untoward events may occur unless preventive action is taken. The mental exploration and investigation of all eventually arising effects of the purposeful paradigm of social action constitutes a n additional phase of this (fifth) stage. A cognitive projection of expected results takes place at this point. Thus an evaluation of the overall results of the purposive procedure should not be based only on judgment accepted in the initial diagnosis and evaluation phase. It also must consider supplementary judgments that may arise during subsequent phases of the procedure. The overall evaluation-negative or positive-depends on the prognosis for the realization of the required change. It is then necessary to decide the

82

Knowledge in Society/Spring

1990

limits of tolerance for the failure of some of the intended results, and to define the limits of tolerance for negatively appreciated unexpected effects, provided that other positive unexpected effects also may appear. When the final calculus of all possible results is made, the decision takes place. This decision is not based on this calculus alone, but also is related to the original hierarchy of values, earlier articulated (and organized into a consistent system). The very implementation of this decision, as it transpires in practical activities, does not belong to the methodological realm of the paradigm of efficient social action. It should be regarded as the second methodological break of the whole procedure. Nevertheless, this implementation gives rise to the sixth stage of the paradigm. This is the investigation of all the effects generated by the implementation of the plan. These effects may appear more or less simultaneously or in sequence. This sequence may be quite extensive. At this phase, an evaluation is made as to whether the results produced by the implementation are adequate from the point of view of the whole plan, or whether a general corrective course of action (or several more specific corrective courses of action) should be set into motion. If it was established that the results of the implemented plan did not produce any negative results (or if the corrective procedure was successfully accomplished), the final, seventh stage of the paradigm of efficient social action, with its closing decision, completes the whole procedure. Hence the circle of methodological canons of practical social sciences opens and closes with the notion of values.
Conclusion

The preceding considerations attempted to demonstrate that sociotechnics is not a possibility, but a social reality. The following conclusions areregarded as the central points of the previous discussion: (1) The paradigm of efficient social action, which differs from the canons of logic per se, is unique for practical activity. Consequently it should be followed if this activity is to secure the accomplishment of its goals, and is to be open for intersubjective scrutiny. (2) Practical social sciences, with sociotechnics as their branch, have the same scientific status as theoretical sciences because they have their own intersubjectively controlled methodology. (3) Sociotechnics may operate as self-made sociotechnics, but it also may work as sociotechnics proper (based on a paradigm of efficient social action). The more sociotechnics is supported by professional and organizational experience, the more it is based on the conception of a self-made model in operation. The more sociotechnics is supported by the reliance on a body of tested empirical propositions, the closer it is to the conception of sociotechnics proper. In the latter case, the tendency to support underdogs, seems to be prevalent. (4) Although sociotechnics usually operates on the macro- and mezzo-

Podgorecki

83

levels in the social sciences, and although there are serious arguments that limit the potentialities of sociotechnics to these two areas, macrosociotechnics rapidly emerges as an entirely new entity: in its self-made version, as a form of sociotechnics proper, and also as dark sociotechnics. (5) Not only average people, but scholars also, with their tendency to follow meanings conceived by stereotypes, perceive social engineering as something bad, dirty, and deserving condemnation. They recall the primitive sentence of Stalin, when he compared writers to the engineers of "human souls." This understanding gives them an excuse not to enter into the complicated world of practical logic, and imbues them with the spurious authority to reject social engineering as something wrong. In addition this comprehension tends to legitimize their haphazard rules of semiefficient behavior. But those who are stubbornly and narrow-mindedly creating problems for others build problems for themselves as well. (6) Finally, a general conclusion can be drawn. While the self-made type of sociotechnics is increasingly used in social systems of all types; the dark sociotechnics flourishes, as a rule, in autocratic and totalitarian states. In the latter, the sociotechnics proper presently plays only a limited role, mainly of an unmasking nature. In democratic, sociopolitical systems, the sociotechnics proper is not sufficiently recognized as a useful instrument of social change. Within democratic societies the methodology and potential of the sociotechnics proper are underestimated and often confused with the dark sociotechnics, with all its negative consequences.
Notes
The author would like to thank Jon Alexander for his criticism of an earlier draR and for permission to incorporate some of his ideas into the final version of this article. 1. These ideas Petrazycki formulated as early as 1893. See Die Lehre yore Einkommen, Berlin, Verlag H.W. Mfiller, especially, Anhang: Civilpolitik und politische (~konomie (pp. 437-628). 2. Sciences that not only describe and explain social reality but that additionally formulate teleological recommendations how to change this reality.

References
Brzezinski, Z. (1989). The grand failure. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. Caro, F.G. (Ed.). (1971). Readings in evaluating research. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Coleman, J. (1968). Sociological analysis and social policy. In T. Bottomore and R. Nisbet, (Eds.), A history of sociological analysis. London: Heinemann. Etzioni, A. (I968). The active socie~/. New York: The Free Press. Freeman, H., Dynes, Rossi, R., & White, W. (Eds.). (1983). Applied sociolo~. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Henshel, R.L. (1976). Reacting to social problems. Don Mills: Longman. Horowitz, 1.L. (1967). The rise and fall of Project Camelot. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press. Johnson, P. (1983). A history of the modem world. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Kubin, J. (1979). A methodology for social problems' solving. Bulletin of Research Committee on Sociotechnics, 4, 12-22.

84

Knowledge in Society/Spring 1990

Lazarsfeld, P., & Reitz, J. (I 975). An introduction to applied sociology. New York: Elsevier. Lazarsfeld, P., Sewell, W.H., & Wilensky, H. (1967). The uses ofsodotogy. New York: Basic Books. Mannheim, K. (1940). Man and societv. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Massell, G.J. (1968). Law as an instrument of revolutionary change in a traditional milieu. Law and Societv Review, 2(2), 179-228. Merton, R.K. (1949). Social theory and social structure. New York: Free Press. Myrdal, G., Sterner, R., & Rose, A. (1944). An American dilemma. New Jersey: Harpers Press. Petrazycki, L. (1985). 0 nauceprav~e i moralnosci (On science, law and morality). Warsaw: PWN. Podgorecki, A. (1962). Characterystyka nauk prak{vcznych (Characteristics of practical sciences). Warsaw: PWN. Podgorecki, A., & Los, M. (1979). Multidimensionalsociology. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Podgorecki, A., & Shields, R. (I 986). Research on sociotechnics: A guide to understanding planned social change. Working Paper, Department of Scoiology, Carleton University. Popper, K. (1950). Open sociely and its enemies. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Shakeri, K. (1989). Social engineering and the Islamic revolution in Iran. (unpublished paper). Zetterberg, H. (I 962). Social theory and social practice. New York: Bedminster Press.