76 911 298 8 USC 10(a)(48)() We must rst ascertain whether the above quoted anguage is plain and unbiguous This is determined by rerence to the language itself, the specic context in which that language is used, ad the broader context of the statute as a whole"
Shell Oil Co,
519 US 33, 340 (1997) Section 10(a)(48)(a) can be satised in two ways The rst is a rmal judgmet of guilt entered by a co The second is where adjudication of guit is wited, a judge or j has ud the aie guily (or the aien has entered a guilty plea) and the judge has ordered some of pushent, penaty, or resaint In this case, we are deaing with the rst deition of conviction Moreover, because a dendant cannot appea a conviction until aer the entry of a judgment of guit," it ows that a conviction' exists once the disict cour enters the judgment, notwithstanding the avaiabiity of a appea as of rght"
652 F3d 991, 994 (9th Cir 2011) s the Cou points out in
there is near unanimiy amog the couts of appeas that the rst deition of conviction' in§ 10(a)(48)() reuires only that the tral cout enter a a judent of gilt, without any requirement that a direct appeas be exhausted or waved"
652 F3d at 991
Bureau of Citizenship
511 F3d 324 (2d Cir 2007)
171F3d994 ( 5th Cir 1999)
355 F3d 1035, 1037 (7th Cir 2004)
472 F3d 91 ( 0th Cir 2007)
243 F3d 45 (1st Cir 2001) Therere, the plain anguage of the state meas that the respondent is removabe because he has a conviction and that conviction is covered by sections 237(a)(2)()(iii) and 237(a)(2)(B)(i) The respondent, on the other hand, essentiay ass that we not apply the pain language of the statute There are situations where a court w not apply the pai anguage of a statute, but those situations are rare
See eg In re Trans Alas Pipeline Rate Cases,
436 S 631, 643 (1978) (This Cout, n intereting the words of a statute, has some scope r adopting a resicted rather than a itera or usua meaning ofits words where acceptance of that meaning woud ead to absurd resuts or woud thwart the obvious purpose of the statute
ut it is otheise where no such consequences woud ow and where t appears to be consonant with the purposes of the ct ") It is difcult, if not impossibe, to fashion a compeling argument that application of the pain language in section 101(a)(48)() wi ead to absurd resuts
See Matter/Cardenas Abreu, supra,
at 803-809 (concuing opinion) t is reasonabe to concude that Coness wated a crmina aien subject to removal proceedings as soon as he was convicted, even if the conviction was not na
Mattr of arenas Abreu
&N ec 5 (B 2009), we stated that we dd not need to resolve the nali issue because the case bere us involves a latereinstated appeal, not a direct appea" The Cou of ppeas r the Second Circuit, in an unpubished decision, disagreed with our characteization of a atereinstated appea and remanded the case
378 Fed ppx 59 (2d Cir 2010) The case subseuently became moot because the respondent's conviction was aed 2
Cite as: Sallahadin Birhan, A076 911 298 (BIA Apr. 23, 2012)