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Armed Struggle and State Formation
Yezid Sayigh
 Journal of Palestine Studies
, Vol. 26, No. 4. (Summer, 1997), pp. 17-32.
 Journal of Palestine Studies
is currently published by University of California Press.Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available athttp://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtainedprior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content inthe JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained athttp://www.jstor.org/journals/ucal.html.Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission.The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academic journals and scholarly literature from around the world. The Archive is supported by libraries, scholarly societies, publishers,and foundations. It is an initiative of JSTOR, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community takeadvantage of advances in technology. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.http://www.jstor.orgSun Jul 22 01:08:32 2007
 
Awned struggle for the liberation of Palestine has been a rallying clyof the Palestinian national movement since its emergence in the1960s, but its results have never been more than marginal. Instead,milita ry groups have served a primarily political function, offeringPalestinians in the diaspora organizational structures orpolitical ex-pression and state building. However, the nature of the PLO as anexile entity attempting to unite a disparate diaspora has necessarilyresulted in an authoritarian leadership wary of the administrative,civilian, and social organizations needed to form a state. Ultimately,the political patterns that developed during the armed struggle im-pede as much as aid the realization of an independent Palestinianstate.
WHEN
HE
PLO
AND
ISRAEL
IGNED
the Declaration of Principles on
13
Septem-ber 1993, an entire era in modern Palestinian history came to an end.Thousands on both sides died since the war that had led to the creation ofthe Jewish state in Palestine and to the mass exodus of the Arab populationin 1948. The Palestinian national movement, established with the expressaim of liberating Palestine through armed struggle, had proved unable in theintervening years to liberate any part of its national soil by force and hadfinally accepted the Oslo negotiated compromise, whose terms ran counterto virtually all the principles and aims it had espoused for so long. What role,then, did the much-vaunted armed struggle play in contemporary Palestinianhistory, and what factors determined its course and outcome?Throughout their evolution, the guerrilla groups composing the PLO con-sistently described armed struggle as the principal, even the exclusive,means of liberating Palestine. Yet their military effort never exceeded a cer-tain level in terms of scale and impact and certainly failed to approach theChinese and Vietnamese models of people's war frequently cited. Whateverthe individual sacrifices of the Palestinian rank and file or the strength oftheir convictions, the movement as a whole lacked the single-minded deter-mination to take the practice of armed struggle to the elevated position itoccupied in formal ideology. Eclecticism and improvization became con-
YEZID
SAYIGH
s assistant director of studies at the Centre of International Studies, CambridgeUniversity. This article is an abbreviated version of the concluding chapter of his book,
Armed Struggle and the Search for State: RePalestinian National Movement,
1949-93,
which will be published by Oxford University Press and the Institute for Palestine Studiesin fall
1997.
Iournal
of
Palestine Studies
XXVI,
no.
4
(Summer
1997),
pp.
17-32.
 
firmed parts of the political and organizational culture. Despite the move-ment's extensive bureaucratization, frequent usage of the term
intifada
todescribe mass actions revealed the enduring strength of traditional forms ofnonorganized participation, such as the village
faz'a,
and exposed the lead-ership's disinclination to incorporate the mass constituency into structuredpolitical organizations. The fact that the Palestinian movement was able forso long to accommodate such a marked discrepancy between rhetoric andreality, between slogans and capabilities, and between nationalist myth andsocial requirement suggests that performance was not measured in conven-tional military terms and that armed struggle served other primary functions.Above all, the armed struggle provided the central theme and practicearound which Palestinian nation building took place. The establishment ofIsrael in most of Palestine in 1948 deprived the Palestinians of the nationalbase in which territory, economy, and society met.
Al-nakba
(the catastro-phe) decisively ended any hope for the emergence of a Palestinian nation-state. The loss of land and other means of production undermined the senseof identity in what was a predominantly agrarian society and removed itssources of autonomous wealth and economic reproduction. The impact wascompounded by the physical dispersal of the population and its subjectionto separate, often rival, Arab authorities in its various places of refuge.National politics could not reappear under these circumstances. The ab-sence of a single territorial, economic, and social base meant that there wasno longer the basis for a common political "arena," with agreed modes ofcompetition and structured means for the selection of a new generation ofleadership. Besides, commonality with other Arabs of language, culture, andreligion blunted any tendency to revive a Palestinian agenda distinct fromthat of the Arab host societies. The experience of
al-nakba
made for a dis-tinct Palestinianness, but not necessarily for Palestinianism. Palestinianssought national salvation by joining Arab opposition parties or hoped thatnew Arab leaders would come to power and launch their armies to destroyIsrael and liberate Palestine. This explains the enduring strength of the pan-Arab appeal among Palestinians in the 1950s and early 1960s, reflectedabove all in widespread support for Egyptian president Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir.The reverse side of the coin was the extreme sensitivity of the Arab statestoward political activity among the Palestinian refugees who came into theirmidst in 1948. The host governments responded either by isolating the Pales-tinian refugees from their own populations through physical and legal barri-ers or by inhibiting the emergence of social and political organizations withan explicitly Palestinian character. For all these reasons Palestinian politicalactivism after 1948 was unfocused, operated at the grass-roots level, and wasoften channelled into Arab parties espousing radical national, social, or reli-gious agendas. The reemergence of distinctly Palestinian nationalist politics
of 00

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