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Redefining the Basics: Sovereignty and Security of the Palestinian State
Yezid Sayigh
 Journal of Palestine Studies
, Vol. 24, No. 4. (Summer, 1995), pp. 5-19.
 Journal of Palestine Studies
is currently published by University of California Press.Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available athttp://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtainedprior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content inthe JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained athttp://www.jstor.org/journals/ucal.html.Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission.The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academic journals and scholarly literature from around the world. The Archive is supported by libraries, scholarly societies, publishers,and foundations. It is an initiative of JSTOR, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community takeadvantage of advances in technology. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.http://www.jstor.orgSun Jul 22 01:08:18 2007
 
REDEFINING THE BASICS: SOVEREIGNTY
AND 
SECURITY OF THE PALESTINIAN STATE
YEZID
SAYIGH
With the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) in Washing-ton on 13 September 1993, the prospect of eventual Palestinian state-hood became probable, if not virtually inevitable. Just what form aPalestinian state, if established, would take is another matter. The con-straints from the Israeli side-for example, demilitarization, detennina-tion to retain greater Jerusalem and substantial areas of the West Bank,and to deny a Palestinian refugee return-and the broad consensus sup-porting these constraints are well known, as is the fact that only themost dovish Israeli government is likely to relax them more than mar-ginally, if that. Nor do any illusions remain concerning a change in thestrategic balance with Israel, or support for Palestinian core concernsfrom the Arab states or the international community. Still, despite thefact that Israeli preconditions are well known and their implicationsrealized, few, if any, Palestinian policymakers have dispassionately and
Yezid
Sayigh
is assistant director, Centre of International Relations,University of Cambridge. In 1991-94, he was an advisor and negotiatorin the peace talks with Israel and headed the Palestinian delegation tothe multilateral working group on arms control and regional security.The views expressed here are his own.
journal of Palestine
Studies
XXIV,
no.
4
(Summer
1995),
pp.
5-19.
 
6
JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES
systematically considered the full "package" that will accompany state-hood, let alone drawn up a coherent strategy in response.Yet to maximize their capabilities and preempt (or ameliorate) theoutcome, it is essential that the Palestinians anticipate what the sub-stance of such a package might actually be, and then structure theirdemands and strategies accordingly. In other words, the Palestiniansmust examine carefully what sovereignty means, not only in the inter-dependent modern world into which they will, willy-nilly, be integrated,but also in the specific context of the contractual arrangements withboth Israel and Jordan that will inevitably accompany Palestinian state-hood and that will impinge heavily on major aspects of Palestinian life.
Conceptualizing the Problem
Three principal problems threaten meaningful Palestinian statehood.First is a severely reduced territory that may also be fragmented intononcontiguous pockets. Second is the possibility of residual intermesh-ing of Israeli (settler) and Palestinian population concentrations, rais-ing the prospect of mixed or overlapping jurisdictions, with attendantadministrative, security, and political complications. Third are the limi-tations on the return of Palestinian refugees and the ceding of East Jeru-salem to Palestinian sovereignty, without which the new state will losemuch of its national identity and political legitimacy.In each of these cases the question is: Can the Palestinians live withstatehood as it is likely to be structured, and how might they do so?Will this require a fundamental redefinition of the meaning of sover-eignty in the Palestinian context, and can this be done without simplytranslating sovereignty into nonexistence?
A
useful way of approaching the question is to think in terms of se-curity. Security has two distinct meanings in this context. In the narrowsense it means military defense against direct, physical threats to thepopulation, vital economic installations or resources, and agencies ofthe state. In the second, broader sense it means the ability to protect"national values," identified broadly as safeguarding the political andterritorial integrity of the state, ensuring the physical well-being andsurvival of the population, promoting economic welfare, and preservingsocial harmony.'Defined in this way, security depends on the attainment and subse-quent maintenance of "stateness." This may be measured in terms ofmaterial capabilities (military and economic, but also organizationallinstitutional), political legitimacy, autonomy (with regard to domesticand external forces), and the functional differentiation and coordina-tion of state agen~ies.~he specific sources of each element and theoverall balance between them vary from state to state. So does thestate's capacity to regulate domestic life, extract and appropriate re-
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