Building Bridges Not Walls: Engaging With Political Islamists in The Middle East and North Africa

WWW.IPPR.
ORG
BuildingBridges,
NotWalls
EngagingwithpoliticalIslamistsintheMiddleEastand
NorthAfrica
ByAlexGlennie
September2009
©ippr2009
InstituteforPublicPolicyResearch
Challengingideas– Changingpolicy
2 ippr|BuildingBridges,NotWalls:EngagingwithpoliticalIslamistsintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica
Contents
Aboutippr ............................................................................................................................. 3
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................... 3
Abbreviationsanddefinitions................................................................................................ 4
Executivesummaryandrecommendations ........................................................................... 6
1.Introduction....................................................................................................................... 8
2.PoliticalIslaminEgypt .................................................................................................... 12
3.PoliticalIslaminMorocco ............................................................................................... 18
4.PoliticalIslaminJordan .................................................................................................. 22
5.WesternpolicyintheMENAregion................................................................................ 26
6.WesternengagementwithIslamistmovementsintheMENAregion ............................ 35
7.Conclusions ..................................................................................................................... 40
Referencesandrecommendations ...................................................................................... 49
Appendix:Projectmethodology ........................................................................................ 50
Aboutippr
TheInstituteforPublicPolicyResearch(ippr)istheUK’sleadingprogressivethinktank,
producingcutting-edgeresearchandinnovativepolicyideasforajust,democraticand
sustainableworld.
Since1988,wehavebeenattheforefrontofprogressivedebateandpolicymakinginthe
UK.Throughourindependentresearchandanalysiswedefinenewagendasforchangeand
providepracticalsolutionstochallengesacrossthefullrangeofpublicpolicyissues.
WithofficesinbothLondonandNewcastle,weensureouroutlookisasbroad-basedas
possible,whileourGlobalChangeprogrammeextendsourpartnershipsandinfluence
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ippr,30-32SouthamptonStreet,LondonWC2E7RA.Tel:+44(0)2074706100E:info@ippr.org
www.ippr.org.RegisteredCharityNo.800065
ThispaperwasfirstpublishedinSeptember2009.©ippr2009
Acknowledgements
Thisreportistheoutcomeofalengthyresearchproject,andwouldnothavebeenpossible
withoutthesupportofanumberofcolleagues.Atippr,thankstoAndyHull,KatiePaintin,
IanKearnsandCareyOppenheimfortheircommentsandtoGeorginaKyriacouforediting
andproduction.ThanksalsotoNathalieTocci(ItalianInstituteforInternationalAffairs)for
hercommentsonanearlydraft,andtoresearchpartnersintheMENAregionfortheirinput
tothecasestudiesonMorocco,JordanandEgypt.Finally,manythankstotheindividuals
whohavespokenatorparticipatedinconferencesorganisedinRabat,Amman,Brusselsand
London.
ThisworkwascarriedoutwiththegeneroussupportoftheUKForeignandCommonwealth
Office,theDanishMinistryofForeignAffairs,andtheMiddleEastGoodGovernanceFund
oftheInternationalDevelopmentResearchCentreinCanada.
Theviewsexpressedinthispaperarethoseoftheauthoralone,andarenotattributableto
anysponsoringorganisation.
Abbreviationsanddefinitions
AKP AdaletveKalkinmaPartisi[Turkey]
BMENA BroaderMiddleEastandNorthAfricaInitiative
CONTEST UKStrategyforCounteringInternationalTerrorism
CFSP CommonForeignandSecurityPolicy
CTD CounterTerrorismDepartment
DFID DepartmentforInternationalDevelopment[UK]
DPA DevelopmentPartnershipArrangement
EC EuropeanCommission
EIWG EngagingwiththeIslamicWorldGroup[UKForeignandCommonwealth
Office]
EMP Euro-MediterraneanPartnership
ENP EuropeanNeighbourhoodPolicy
ENPI EuropeanNeighbourhoodPartnershipInstrument
EP EuropeanParliament
EU EuropeanUnion
FCO ForeignandCommonwealthOffice[UK]
G8 GroupofEight
IAF IslamicActionFront[Jordan]
ICM IslamicConstitutionalMovement[Kuwait]
IRI InternationalRepublicanInstitute
MENA MiddleEastandNorthAfrica
MEPI MiddleEastPartnershipInitiative
MSP MovementfortheSocietyofPeace(Algeria)
NATO NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganisation
NDI NationalDemocraticInstituteforInternationalAffairs
NDP NationalDemocraticParty[Egypt]
NED NationalEndowmentforDemocracy
NGO Non-governmentalorganisation
ODA OverseasDevelopmentAssistance
OPT OccupiedPalestinianTerritories
PA PalestinianAuthority
PJD PartyofJusticeandDevelopment[Morocco]
PLO PalestineLiberationOrganisation
UN UnitedNations
UNDP UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme
USAID USAgencyforInternationalDevelopment
WTO WorldTradeOrganisation
MENA: ThispaperfollowstheWorldBankdefinitionoftheMENA(MiddleEast
andNorthAfrica)region,whichincludes:Algeria,Bahrain,Djibouti,Egypt,
Iran,Iraq,Israel,Jordan,Kuwait,Lebanon,Libya,Morocco,Oman,the
Palestinianterritories(theWestBankandGazaStrip),Qatar,SaudiArabia,
Syria,Tunisia,theUnitedArabEmiratesandYemen.(SeeWorldBank2009)
Arabicterms
Fatwa: AscholarlyopiniononamatterofIslamiclaw,issuedbyarecognised
Islamicreligiousauthority
Hadith: Acollectionofsayingsandactions,attributedtotheprophetMohammed,
whichformthebasisofIslamicjurisprudenceorShari’a law
Jahiliyya: Apre-Islamicstateofpaganignorance
Jihad: Usedinthiscontext,aformofIslamicarmedstrugglethatmaybeinternal
(combatingMuslimregimesconsideredtobeimpious),irredentist(fighting
toredeemlandruledbynon-Muslimsorunderoccupation),orglobal
(combatingtheWest)
Salafism: ASunnimovementthatseekstoreturnIslamtoitspurestrootsthrough
closeadherencetotheteachingsandpracticesoftheProphetandother
forefathersoftheIslamicfaith.SalafistIslamiststendtofocusonthe
missionaryactivityofda’wa (preaching)andonreinforcingthemoralvalues
oftheumma(communityofbelievers)ratherthanexplicitpoliticalactivism
orthepursuitofpoliticalpower.However,therearethosewhohave
abandonedthisnon-violentapproachandwhoseektoachievetheir
objectivesthrougharmed jihad
Shari’a: ThebodyofIslamiclawthatgovernspubliclifeandcertainaspectsof
privatelifeforallMuslims.Ratherthanasetofcodifiedlaws,Shari’a law
isbasedontheinterpretationofanumberofsources,includingthe
Qur’an,traditionsandsayingsattributedtotheProphetMohammedand
religiousfatwas
Takfiri: RadicalIslamistswhorejectcomponentsofsociety,cultureandlawin
Muslimcountriesthattheyconsidertohaveslippedbackintoastateof
jahiliyya.Takfiris oftensupportmilitancyagainstMuslimregimesthatthey
considertobejahiliyya
Ulema: ThehighestclassofMuslimlegalscholars.Theulema engageinmany
fieldsofIslamicstudyandareusuallyreferredtoasthearbitersof
Shari’alaw
Executivesummaryandrecommendations
Sincetheterrorattacksof11September2001therehasbeenanexplosionofinterestin
politicalIslamismintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica(MENA)region.Untilfairlyrecently,
analystshaveunderstandablyfocusedonthoseactorsthatoperateattheviolentendofthe
Islamistspectrum,includingAl-Qaeda,theTaliban,someofthesectarianpartiesinIraqand
politicalgroupswitharmedwingslikeHamasintheOccupiedPalestinianTerritories(OPT)
andHezbollahinLebanon.
However,thishasobscuredthefactthatacrosstheMENAregioncontemporarypoliticsare
beingdrivenandshapedbyamuchmorediversecollectionof‘mainstream’Islamist
movements.Wedefinetheseas
groupsthatengageorseektoengageinthelegalpoliticalprocessesof
theircountriesandthathavepubliclyeschewedtheuseofviolenceto
helprealisetheirobjectivesatthenationallevel,evenwheretheyare
discriminatedagainstorrepressed.
ThisdefinitionwouldencompassgroupsliketheMuslimBrotherhoodinEgypt,thePartyof
JusticeandDevelopment(PJD)inMoroccoandtheIslamicActionFront(IAF)inJordan.
Thesenon-violentIslamistmovementsorpartiesoftenrepresentthebestorganisedand
mostpopularelementoftheoppositiontotheexistingregimesineachcountry,andassuch
therehasbeenincreasinginterestonthepartofwesternpolicymakersintherolethatthey
mightplayindemocracypromotionintheregion.Yetdiscussionsonthisissueappearto
havestalledonthequestionofwhetheritwouldbeappropriatetoengagewiththesegroups
onamoresystematicandformalbasis,ratherthanonthepracticalitiesofactuallydoingso.
Thisattitudeispartlylinkedtoajustifiableunwillingnesstolegitimisegroupsthatmight
holdanti-democraticviewsonwomen’srights,politicalpluralismandarangeofotherissues.
Italsoreflectspragmaticconsiderationsaboutthestrategicinterestsofwesternpowersin
theMENAregionthatareperceivedtobethreatenedbytherisingpopularityandinfluence
ofIslamists.Fortheirpart,Islamistpartiesandmovementshaveshownaclearreluctanceto
forgeclosertieswiththosewesternpowerswhosepoliciesintheregiontheystrongly
oppose,notleastforfearofhowtherepressiveregimestheyoperatewithinmightreact.
Thisproject’sfocusonnon-violentpoliticalIslamistmovementsshouldnotbemisinterpreted
asimplicitsupportfortheirpoliticalagendas.Committingtoastrategyofmoredeliberate
engagementwithmainstreamIslamistpartieswouldinvolvesignificantrisksandtradeoffsfor
NorthAmericanandEuropeanpolicymakers.However,wedotakethepositionthatthe
tendencyofbothsidestoviewengagementasazerosum‘allornothing’gamehasbeen
unhelpful,andneedstochangeifamoreconstructivedialoguearoundreformintheMiddle
EastandNorthAfricaistoemerge.
Summaryofrecommendations
Anumberofspecificrecommendationsflowfromthisanalysis:
1.Westernpolicymakersneedtofundamentallyrethinktheirpoliticalstrategyfor
engagingwithIslamistpartiesandmovements
Policymakersmustfaceuptothedifficultrealitythatinorderforprogresstobemade
towardsdemocratisationintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica,therewillhavetobedialogue
withsomeoftheexistingmainstreamIslamistmovementsthere.Progressivewesternleaders
mustcontinuetovoicetheirconcernsaboutpoliticalandsocialissueswherethereare
substantivedisagreements,butwillalsohavetobepreparedtoopenupchannelsof
communicationwiththemiftheyareseriousaboutsupportingpoliticalreformandconflict
resolutionintheMENAregion.
2.Westernpolicymakersandnon-governmentalinstitutionsshouldbemore
proactiveincreatingchannelsforseriousandsustaineddialoguewithIslamists
ByshuttingmainstreamIslamistmovementsoutofthedialogueaboutpoliticalreform,
EuropeanandNorthAmericanpoliticiansaremissingimportantopportunitiestostart
buildingtrustandovercomingthehostilityandmisunderstandingsthathavecharacterised
relationsinthepast.Withoutgivingthempreferentialtreatment,thereisscopeformore
consistentlyinvolvingIslamistsinconferencesanddebatesaboutrelationsbetweentheWest
andtheMiddleEastandNorthAfricaalongsideothernon-governmentalactors,including
secularoppositionpoliticians.
3.Thisdialogueshouldengagewiththepoliticalaswellasthereligiousvaluesof
Islamistpartiesandmovements
Crucially,westernpolicymakersshouldmoveawayfromthefixationon‘testing’the
democraticcredentialsofIslamistmovements,andfocusinsteadondiscussionoftherange
ofpolitical,economicandsocialissuesthatconcernthesegroups,manyofwhichareshared
bytheirwesterncounterparts.Thisdoesnotmeanthatdifficultissuesshouldbeavoided,
butitdoesrecognisethatasolidbasisforengagementcannotbebuiltwithoutsome
attempttofindcommonpoliticalground.
4.Westernleadersshouldbemoreeven-handedincondemningallhumanrights
abusesinauthoritarianregimesintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica,including
againstIslamists
Thefailureofmanywesternpolicymakerstobeconsistentintheircriticismofhumanrights
abusesintheMENAregionhasdamagedtheircredibility,andhasledmanypoliticalandcivil
societygroupsintheregiontocomplainthatinternationalpartnerssimplyturnablindeye
whenhumanrightsviolationsarecommittedbyauthoritariangovernments.Avisiblechange
inapproachcouldreducesomeofthesetensionsandgosomewaytowardsrepairingthe
West’starnishedimageintheregion.Again,whileIslamistsdonotneedtobesingledoutfor
specialtreatment,westernleadersneedtobemuchmorevocalintheircondemnationofall
humanrightsabusesintheregion,includingwhentheyaredirectedagainstnon-violent
Islamistpoliticiansandactivists.
5.Westerngovernmentsmustdisplaygreaterconsistencyinpressingauthoritarian
governmentsintheMENAregiontoopenuptheirpoliticalsystems
IfIslamistpartiesandmovementsbenefitfromopeningsinrestrictivepoliticalstructures,this
willundoubtedlyposeuncomfortabledilemmasforwesterngovernments.Butanapproach
thatseekstoignorethesepoliticalcurrentsisneithermorallynorstrategicallydefensible.
Decadesofpayinglipservicetotheideaofpoliticalfreedomswhilesimultaneouslypropping
upauthoritarianleaderswholackdemocraticlegitimacyhavehelpedtocreatean
environmentthatisnotconducivetostabilityordevelopment–yetbothareneededinorder
forwesternpowerstoprotecttheirconsiderableinterestsintheregion,whilealsosupporting
indigenousreformprocesses.
1.Introduction
AlthoughpoliticalIslamismhaslongbeenofinteresttoacademicsthinkingandwriting
aboutMuslim-majoritycountries,itssignificancehasonlybeenrecognisedmorewidelyby
westernpolicymakersinthelastdecade.Therewassomeawarenessofthephenomenon
previously,particularlyfollowingtheIranianrevolutionin1979andduringtheterrorist
attacksofthe1990scarriedoutbytheviolentEgyptianal-JihadandJamaatal-Islamiyya
groups.However,itonlybecamethesubjectofsustainedattentionafterthedramaticevents
of11September2001,whennearly3,000peoplediedintheattacksonNewYorkCityand
WashingtonDCthatwereorchestratedbytheradicalIslamistAl-Qaedamovement.Since
then,terrorstrikesagainstwesterngovernmentsandciviliansinSpainandtheUnited
Kingdom,andagainstwestern-linkedtargetsinSaudiArabia,Jordan,BaliandEgypt,have
servedtoreinforceabeliefthatthestruggleagainstradicalIslamisfastbecomingoneofthe
definingforeignpolicychallengesofthetwenty-firstcentury(Satloff2004).
Whiletheprofoundlyshockingandhighlyvisiblenatureofthisnewterroristthreathasled
manytofocusprimarilyontheorganisationsthatoperateattheradicalandviolentendof
theIslamistcontinuum,thishasobscuredthefactthatacrosstheMiddleEastandNorth
Africa,contemporarypoliticsarebeingdrivenandshapedbyamuchmorediversegroupof
‘mainstream’Islamistmovements.Asmanyanalystsnote,itistheseIslamistsandnotthe
radicaljihadistgroups‘thatwillhavethegreatestimpactonthefuturepoliticalevolutionof
theMiddleEast’(Brownetal 2006:3).
Definitionsarecriticalwhendealingwithasubjectofthiskind,soitisimportanttobeclear
fromtheoutsetwhatthisreportmeansinitsuseoftheterm‘mainstreampoliticalIslamism’.
Evenamongandwithinpoliticalmovementsandpartiesthatconsiderthemselvestobe
Islamist,therearecleardifferencesofopinionaboutthisconcept.MembersofthePartyof
JusticeandDevelopment(PJD)inMoroccodescribetheirorganisationasapoliticalparty
withanIslamicframeofreference,whileleadersofTurkey’sJusticeandDevelopment
(AdaletveKalkinmaorAKP)partyfrequentlycharacterisethemselvesas‘conservative
democrats’(Kristianasen2003).OtherIslamistparties,includingtheMovementforthe
SocietyofPeace(MSP)inAlgeriaandtheWasat(Centre)partyinEgypt,presentthemselves
asdefendersofIslamicvaluesandculturalpracticeswithintheirrespectivesocieties.Thesesit
incontrasttomovementslikeHamasandHezbollah,whichlinktheirIslamicbeliefsmuch
morecloselytotheideaofviolentresistanceagainstexternalenemies.TheCovenantof
HamasexplicitlyidentifiesitsmembersasMuslimswho‘fearGodandraisethebannerof
Jihadinthefaceoftheoppressors’(Hamas1988).
CharacterisationsofpoliticalIslamismhavealsovariedsubstantiallyamongexternal
commentators.SomedefineIslamistsasindividualswhobelievethat‘Islamasabodyoffaith
hassomethingimportanttosayabouthowpoliticsandsocietyshouldbeorderedinthe
contemporaryMuslimWorldandwhoseektoimplementthisinsomefashion’(inthewords
ofGrahamFuller;Fuller2003:xi).Otherssuggesttheyshouldbedescribedasthosewho
subscribeto‘anIslamicvarietyofreligiousfundamentalism’(inthewordsofBassamTibi;
Tibi2005:ix).AbdelwahabEl-AffendioftheUniversityofWestminsterdefinesIslamist
groupsmorepreciselyasthosethatare‘activeinthepoliticalarenaandcallforthe
applicationofvaluesandlawsinthepublicandprivatesphere’andthat‘opposetheir
governmentsandotherpoliticalandsocialmovementswhichtheyregardaseithernot
followingoropposingtheteachingsofIslam’(El-Affendi2003:7).
However,evenEl-Affendi’sdescriptiondoesnotapplyneatlyandconsistentlytoallIslamist
movementsatalltimes.Inrecentyears,movementssuchasthePJDhavemadeastrategic
decisiontoavoidgovernmentcrackdownsbytoningdowntheircriticismofpoliciesthatthey
considertobeun-Islamic(forexample,revisionsmadetotheconservativeMoroccanfamily
codein2004).Otherparties,includingtheIslamicConstitutionalMovement(ICM)inKuwait
andtheJordanianIslamicActionFront(IAF),havedemonstratedawillingnesstoform
allianceswithsecularpoliticalpartiesthatdonotnecessarilysharetheirinterpretationsof
Islamicteachings,inordertopresentamoreeffectiveunitedfrontagainstoppressive
regimes.
Thisresearchprojecthasthereforetakenadeliberatelyneutralapproach,usingtheterm
‘mainstream’toreferto:
thoseIslamistmovementsthatengageorseektoengageinthelegal
politicalprocessesoftheircountriesandthathavepubliclyeschewed
theuseofviolencetohelprealisetheirobjectivesatthenationallevel,
evenwheretheyarediscriminatedagainstorrepressed.
Thisdefinitiondoesnotmakeanyassumptionsaboutthecontentofthepoliticalplatforms
ofsuchmovements,butisausefulwayofdifferentiatingmovementslikethePJD,theIAF
andtheMuslimBrotherhoodfromthosesuchasHamasintheOccupiedPalestinian
Territories(OPT)andHezbollahinLebanon.1
Todate,westernpolicymakershavedisplayedamarkedreluctancetoengagewitheven
thoseIslamistgroupsthathavecommittedthemselvestoastrategyofpeacefulparticipation
indomesticpolitics,althoughdevelopmentsintheregionhavenecessitatedsomechanges
tothisapproachinrecentyears.Forinstance,westerngovernmentshavenormaldiplomatic
relationswiththeIslamistAKPgovernmentthatcametopowerinTurkeyin2002.The
UnitedStates,UnitedKingdomandothershavealsobeendrawnintoextensivedealingswith
politicalIslamistmovementsinIraq,particularlytheShiaparties,whocurrentlyrepresentthe
largestblocofelectedrepresentativesintheIraqiparliament.Andsincetheelectionof
PresidentObama,therehaveevenbeensignsthatwesterngovernmentsarenowtakingcalls
toengagewiththepoliticalwingsofmilitantgroupslikeHamasandHezbollahmore
seriously,withtheUKgovernmenthavingannounceditsintentiontotalktomembersof
Hezbollah’spoliticalbranchinMarch2009.
However,acrosstheMENAregionasawhole,formalengagementremainstheexception
ratherthantherule.ToparaphraseEdwardDjerejian,formerUSAssistantSecretaryofState
forNearEasternAffairs,wearestillbuildingmorewallsthanbridgesinourpoliciestowards
politicalIslamists(Djerejian1995).
Thisispartlyduetothelong-standingrelationshipsbetweenwesterngovernmentsand
manyoftheregimesintheregion,whichtendtobevehementlyopposedtoexternal
interferenceintheirdomesticpoliticalaffairs.Indiscussionswiththeirwesterncounterparts,
MENArulersfrequentlyinvokethethreatofanIslamisttakeover,particularlywhentheyare
beingpressedtoundertakepoliticalliberalisationandreformmeasuresthatwouldlimittheir
ownpower.Forexample,EgyptianPresidentHosniMubarakhaslongarguedthatthe
bannedMuslimBrotherhood’sreligiousviewsrepresentacleardangertothecountry’s
security.Hehaswarnedthatshouldthismovementgainamonopolyonpower,‘manywill
taketheirmoneyandfleethecountry;investment…willcometoahalt;unemploymentwill
increase;and,worseyet,Egyptwillbeirrevocablyisolatedfromtheworld’(Mubarak2007).
Otherleadersintheregionhaveofferedsimilarcautions,statingthatanyIslamistpartythat
comestopowerwillimplementdomesticandforeignpoliciesinimicaltotheinterestsof
westerngovernments.
1.Thisresearchprojectandthis,itsfinalreportdonotseektoaddressthequestionofwesternpolicy
towardsHamasandHezbollah.Althoughbothmovementspursuegoalsthatareessentiallypoliticaland
territoriallyboundinnatureunliketheglobalneo-jihadimovementtypifiedbygroupslikeAl-Qaeda,their
useofviolenceagainstexternalandinternalopponentsmeansthattheydonotfallwithinourclassification
ofmainstreampoliticalIslamism.
Inmakingthisargument,authoritarianrulersareundoubtedlythinkingabouthowthey
mightlimitchallengestotheirownpowerandauthority.Islamistpartiesgenerallyrepresent
thebestorganisedandmostpopularoppositionmovementsthroughouttheMENAregion,
anditisreasonabletoassumethatanyexpansionoftheirformalpoliticalrepresentation
wouldcreatedifficultiesforleadersthatdonothaveastrongbaseofdomesticpopular
supportandrelyonintrusivesecurityservicesorelaboratesystemsofpatronagetomaintain
theirstanding.
Theseulteriormotivesnotwithstanding,thepointtheyaremakingdeservesserious
consideration.TherearelegitimateconcernsaboutthesocialagendasofIslamistparties,and
asignificantincreaseintheirinfluencewouldlikelyaffectwesterneconomicandsecurity
interestsintheregion,whichinclude:
•Ensuringthecooperationofgoverningregimesincounterterrorismactivities
•Preventingfurtherregionalnuclearproliferation
•Engaginginconflictresolutionactivities(particularlyinIraqandIsrael-Palestine)
•Securingstableandreliableaccesstoenergysupplies
•Developingtradelinks
•Promotingthespreadofdemocracyandgoodgovernance(inprincipleifnotalwaysin
practice).
However,therearefewsignsthatacontinuationofcurrentwesternstrategieswillsucceedin
protectingtheseinterestsinthelongterm.
TheMENAregionisenormouslydiverseandsomeofitscountriesaremakingsignificant
progresstowardseconomicmodernisationbutasaregionitperformspoorlyonmany
internationalindicatorsofdevelopment,democracyandhumanrights.Italsosuffersfroma
widespreadandentrenchedauthoritarianism.Thedangersofthispoliticalmodelhavebeen
highlightedinaseriesofinfluentialArabHumanDevelopmentReportspublishedbythe
UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme(UNDP),whichidentifythechronicdeficitin
politicalfreedomandgoodgovernanceasoneofthekeybarrierstotheemergenceofa
‘renaissance’thatissoughtbysomanybothinsidetheregionandoutside(UNDP2005).
Inthiscontext,thetendencyoftheUSandtheUKandotherEuropeanpowerstocallfor
greaterdemocratisationwhilesimultaneouslyproppingupsupportivebutdespoticleadersis
patentlycounterproductive,andhascausedwesternstandingintheregiontoplummetover
thelastdecade.Evidenceofthiscanbefoundinanumberofglobalopinionpollsthatshow
declininglevelsofMuslimapprovalfortheactionsandvaluesofkeywesternpowers(see
EspositoandMogahed2008,PewGlobalAttitudesProject2006,2008).
ThearrivalofanewandmoreprogressiveUSadministrationpresentsavaluableopportunity
forchange,butrhetoricalpromisesofadifferentandmoreprincipledapproachto
engagementwiththegovernmentsandpeopleoftheMiddleEastandNorthAfricawillneed
tobefollowedthroughoniftheyaretohaveanypracticaleffect.Analterationinpolicies
mustoccuratthreedifferentlevels,intermsof:
•StrategytowardstheMENAregionasawhole
•Amoredifferentiatedandthoughtfulapproachtorelationswitheachcountryinthe
region
•PolicytowardssomeofthemainstreamIslamistmovementsthatoperatewithinthem.
Itisthelastofthesepolicyshiftswithwhichthispaperisparticularlyconcerned.
Purposeandstructureofthereport
Thisreportmarkstheculminationofatwo-yearipprresearchprojectonpoliticalIslaminthe
MiddleEastandNorthAfrica,whichhasdrawnondesk-basedresearch,reviewsofrelevant
English,FrenchandArabicliterature,discussionswithMiddleEastern,EuropeanandNorth
Americanexperts,semi-structuredinterviewswithmembersofmainstreamIslamistpartiesin
theregionandhigh-levelseminarsandconferencesheldinRabat,Amman,Brusselsand
London.(SeetheAppendixforfurtherdetails.)
ippranalysedandproducedcasestudiesontheMuslimBrotherhoodinEgypt,thePartyof
JusticeandDevelopmentinMoroccoandtheIslamicActionFrontinJordan–allofwhich
fallintothecategoryof‘mainstream’politicalIslamistmovementasdefinedabove(see
Stacher2008,GlennieandMepham2007andGlennie2007respectively).
BecauseEgypt,MoroccoandJordanarenotdemocraciesandbecausefreedomof
expressionandorganisationarecurtailedineachofthem,itisdifficulttomeasurewith
precisionthepopularityofthesemovements.Nevertheless,itseemsclearthattheyrepresent
thebestorganisedelementoftheoppositiontotheexistingregimesineachcountry.For
westernpolicymakerswhoarecalling,publiclyatleast,fortheregimesintheregiontomove
towardsgreaterpoliticalpluralism,democracy,theruleoflawandrespectforhumanrights,
thisraisesobviousquestions,namely:
•Whatwouldbetheeffectonthedomesticandforeignpoliciesofthesecountriesif
mainstreampoliticalIslamistsweretoobtainagreatershareofpoliticalpoweranda
largersayoverthegovernanceoftheirsocieties?
•Howshouldwesternpolicyadaptaccordingly?
Toaddressthesequestions,thisreporthasbeenstructuredinthefollowingway:
•Chapters2,3and4revisitandupdateourthreecasestudies,providinganoverview
oftheMuslimBrotherhood,thePJDandtheIAFandthepoliticalenvironmentsthey
operatewithin,asummaryoftheirpolicypositionsonkeyissues,andanaccountof
theirbehaviouraspoliticalactorsinrecentyears.
•Chapters5and6considerrecentwesternpolicytowardstheMENAregioningeneral
andIslamistpartiesinparticular,identifyingwhathasandhasnotworked,andwhat
someoftherealbarrierstodialogueandengagementare.
•Aconcludingchapter7drawstogetherthisanalysis,andofferssomepolicy
recommendationsforhowastrategicrethinkofwesternpolicytowardsmainstream
Islamistmovementsandpartiesmightlookinpractice.
2.PoliticalIslaminEgypt
ThetrajectoryofEgypt’spoliticalreformprogrammehasbeenhighlyerraticoverthecourse
ofthelastcentury.AlthoughBritaingrantedEgyptformalindependencein1922,it
continuedtoexertagreatdealofinfluenceoverthecountry’sdomesticaffairsforthenext
threedecades,withpowerstrugglesbetweenBritishgovernmentofficials,KingFuad(and
hissuccessorKingFarouk)andaParliamentdominatedbytheliberalWafdpartypreventing
theemergenceofastrongindigenouspoliticalsystem.Duringthe1930sand1940s,
ParliamentwasfrequentlydissolvedbytheKing,whiletheConstitutionwassuspended
entirelybetween1930and1936.InstabilitypersistedinthewakeoftheSecondWorldWar
asamilitaryoppositionmovementcoalescedaroundthefigureofGamalAbdelNasser,and
in1952theseso-called‘FreeOfficers’carriedoutacoupthatresultedintheabolitionofthe
monarchyandthepermanentexpulsionofBritishforces.
Althoughnewconstitutionswerepromulgatedin1956and1964,thesedidlittleto
encouragethegrowthofanindependentanddemocraticpoliticalsystem(Dunne2006).
Oppositionpartieswereabolished,andEgyptwasruledasaone-partystatewithNasser
firmlyincontroluntilhisdeathin1970.Someliberalisationoccurredduringthe1970sunder
PresidentAnwarSadat,whosoughttoempowertheIslamistMuslimBrotherhoodsothatit
mightactasaneffectivecounterbalancetoleftistforces,butthisbriefopeningwasrolled
backagainasunpopulareconomicandforeignpoliciesledtoanincreaseindissatisfaction
withtheregimeand,ultimately,totheassassinationofSadatin1981(byamilitantcellwith
linkstoradicalIslamists).
Politicalactivityresumedduringthe1980s,andoppositionpartieswereallowedto
participateinparliamentaryelectionsduringthisperiod.However,Sadat’ssuccessor,
PresidentHosniMubarak,restoredmanyoftheemergencylawsbywhichEgypthadbeen
intermittentlygovernedsincethe1950sandwhichplacedsubstantiallimitsontheexercise
ofcivilandpoliticalliberties.Duringthe1990shealsointroducedaseriesoflawsthat
curbedfreedomsofexpressionandassociation.Thesewerepartlydesignedtocementthe
regime’sauthority,butwerealsoareactiontotheemergenceofextremistIslamicgroupslike
al-Jama’aal-Islamiyya,al-Jihad andAl-Takfirwa’l-Hijra,whichusedactsofterrorismto
expresstheirhostilitytowardstheregime.Theviolentactivismofthesegroupshashada
clearknock-oneffectonEgypt’smoremainstreampoliticalIslamistmovements,particularly
theMuslimBrotherhood.
Despiteabriefperiodoftoleranceduringthe1970s,theEgyptianregimehasconsistently
soughttoportraytheBrotherhoodasadangerousmovementthatissimplybidingitstime
untilitisinapositiontoimposeitsdogmaticreligiousconvictionsontherestofthe
population.Inearly2007,MubarakarguedthattheBrotherhood’sreligiousviewsposeda
significantthreattostatesecurity.Hecautionedthatifthemovementevercametopower,
overseasinvestmentinEgyptwouldcease,unemploymentwouldriseandthecountryasa
wholewouldbecomeirrevocablyisolatedfromtherestoftheworld.Buthowvalidarethese
accusations?
TheMuslimBrotherhood
TheMuslimBrotherhoodistheoldestofthepoliticalIslamistmovementsestablishedinthe
twentiethcentury,foundedbyHassanAl-Bannain1928inresponsetothedifficultpolitical
andeconomicconditionsfacingEgyptatthattime.Al-Bannalookedtoreligiontofillthe
politicalvacuumcreatedbythestrugglebetweenforeignandEgyptianrulingelites,although
itisnotablethathiswritingsdevotelessattentiontodiscussionofhowtounitetheumma
(IslamicNation)andmoretimeonconsiderationofhowtosolveEgypt’simmediatedomestic
political,socialandeconomictroubles.
DespitetheMuslimBrotherhood’shighlypoliticisedorigins,ittookmanydecadesto
transformitselffromalooselyorganisedandpersonality-drivenmovementintoacoherent
andnon-violentpoliticalinstitution.Earlyon,Al-Bannacreatedanumberofcouncilsand
committeestofacilitateeffectiveself-governanceandpeacefulpoliticalorganisation,but
manyamongitsleadershipstillfeltthatitwasnecessarytomaintainaparamilitarywingto
trytoinfluencedomesticpolitics.TheBrotherhood’sTanzimal-Khas– SpecialOrganisations
– wereactiveinthe1940sasEgypt’spoliticalandeconomicsituationdeteriorated,and
carriedoutanumberofbombingsandassassinationattempts.Al-Bannalostcontrolofthese
factionsin1948whenaBrotherhoodmemberassassinatedthesittingPrimeMinisteral-
Naqrashi.Despitehisappealsforcalmandaccommodation,stateordersweregivento
retaliateagainsttheorganisation,andAl-BannahimselfwasassassinatedinJanuary1949.
BythetimetheFreeOfficersMovementoverthrewthemonarchyin1952,the
Brotherhood’smembersandoperationswerehighlyfragmented.Relationsbetweenthenew
militaryregimeandtheBrotherhoodwereinitiallypeaceful,ifwary,untilanapparent
assassinationattemptbytheorganisationonNasserinOctober1954.AlthoughNasser
escapedunharmed,heusedthiseventasanopportunitytocrackdownontheorganisation
aswellasotherpotentialoppositiongroupsinthecountry.Manyofthegroup’smostsenior
leadersspentnearlytwodecadesinNasser’sjailsandwereroutinelyexposedtoinhumane
treatmentandharshconditions.
Duringthisperiodanumberofideologicaldisagreementsbegantoemergewithinthe
movement,andmanyofthoseespousingmoreextremeideassplitawayfromthe
Brotherhoodtoformtheirownpoliticalgroups.Thebestknownofthesedissidentswas
SayidQutb,whosetouthisradicalviewsinthe1964book Mu’alimfil-Tariq(Signposts).
Qutb’sphilosophiesreflectedhisexperienceofrepressioninNasser’sprisons.Hedrewon
theworkoffourteenthcenturythinkerIbnTaymiyatojustifytheuseofviolenceto
overthrowgovernmentsthatdidnotproperlyapplythetenetsofShari’a andcould
thereforebeconsideredtohaverevertedto jahiliyya (astateofpre-Islamicignorance)
(Qutb1964).IntheEgyptiancontext,Nasser’storturoustreatmentofMuslimprisoners
qualifiedhisregimeas jahiliyya,andundeservingofpowerorauthority.Qutbsawitas
incumbenton‘proper’Muslimstofreethemselvesoftheseun-Islamicpoliticalsystems,
throughpreachingandproselytisingwherepossible,butthroughphysicalpowerand
jihad wherenot.
AlthoughQutbwashangedin1966beforehavingthechancetodescribeexactlywhat
methodsthisresistancemovementshouldemploy,hisphilosophiesstruckaresounding
chordamongmanyIslamistgroups,andhehascontinuedtoserveasaninspirationforthose
organisationsthatemployterroristtactics,includingAl-Qaeda.
Sincethe1970s,theMuslimBrotherhoodhastakenpainstodistanceitselffromQutb’s
writingsontheuseofviolenceandhastransformeditselfintoamorepragmaticpolitical
force.ChangestoEgypt’sconstitutionthathavemadeShari’a the‘mainsource’of
legislationhaveenabledtheBrotherhoodtoretractitsclaimthattheEgyptiangovernmentis
apostate.LeadingmoderatefigureswithinthemovementsuchasDrAbdulMonemAbul-
FutouhhaveoftenassertedthattheEgyptianstateisnowIslamicandnotkufr (impious),
eventhoughitdoesnotfullyapplytheIslamicprinciplesofhurriyya(freedom)andadâla
(justice)(InternationalCrisisGroup2004).
However,Qutb’slegacyremainsathornyissueforthecontemporaryBrotherhood.Heis
reveredasoneoftheleadingfiguresofthemovement,andascommentatorshave
observed,hisviewscannotbereducedtothesimpleadvocacyofarmedjihad (Leikenand
Brooke2007).TheBrotherhood’sargumentthatQutb’sviewsontheuseofviolence
shouldnotbetakenoutofcontexthasnotbeenunequivocalenoughtoreassuresome
observers,manyofwhomclaimthatthegrouphasadaptedtodemocracyonatemporary
basisandmayreverttoviolenceinthefuture(AzarvaandTadros2007).Butthe
Brotherhood’smodeofpoliticalengagementoverthepastfewdecadesthrowssome
doubtontheseassertions.
TheMuslimBrotherhoodasapoliticalactor
ThepoliticalspacethatEgyptianIslamistsoperatewithinisheavilycircumscribedbythe
government.WhiletheregimesinMoroccoandJordanhavelongsoughttomarginaliseand
underminetheirIslamistoppositionmovements,theyhavestoppedshortofbanning
legitimatepoliticalpartiessuchasthePJDandtheIAF.However,theMuslimBrotherhoodis
designatedasanillegalorganisationunderEgyptianlaw,whichprohibitstheformationof
politicalpartiesonthebasisofreligion.
Duringthe1980sand1990stheBrotherhoodfoundanumberofwaystocircumventthese
rules.Membersofthemovementcampaignedinnationalelections–usuallyinpartnership
withotherlegalpoliticalparties–andwerealsoactiveintheprofessionalsyndicatesand
unions.Butitdeliberatelylimiteditsattemptstoentertheformalpoliticalsysteminorderto
avoidunnecessaryclasheswiththegovernment.
Thisuneasystatusquochangedattheendofthe1990s,asanerosionofthegovernment’s
popularlegitimacyforcedittoreformsomeofEgypt’smoribundpoliticalstructures.In1999
PresidentMubarakpledgedtosupportaSupremeConstitutionalCourtrulingthatcalledfor
judicialsupervisionofelections.Healsopromisedtooverseeafreeandfairparliamentary
electoralprocessin2000.ThesedevelopmentswerebeneficialfortheMuslimBrotherhood,
whichhadalreadycometotheconclusionthatitshouldadoptamoreproactivepolitical
strategyifithopedtohaveanykindofinfluenceonthedirectionofpolicy(El-DinShahin
2007).Tothisend,itfieldedanumberofindependentcandidatesinthe2000parliamentary
elections,winning17seats.Buildingonthissuccess,itranmorecandidatesinthe2005
elections,winninganunprecedented88outof444seats,or20percentofthevote.
ThishasnotsignificantlyaugmentedtheMuslimBrotherhood’spoliticalpower.Witha
majorityof73percent,therulingNationalDemocraticParty(NDP)hasmaintainedits
strangleholdontheparliamentarysystemandremainsabletocontrolthepassageor
rejectionoflegislation.TheBrotherhood’sunexpectedgainsinthe2005electionshavealso
ledtheregimetoreversesomeofitsearlierliberalisationmeasures,andin2007aseriesof
constitutionalamendmentswerepassedthatoutlawedallpoliticalactivitybygroupswith
anykindofreligiousframeofreference.ThishasgiventheEgyptiangovernmentgreater
freedomtoarrestanddetainBrotherhoodmembersonthechargeofbelongingtoabanned
group.
However,themovement’sinclusioninparliamentsince2005hasgivenitusefulexperience
ofdirectpoliticalparticipation.Ithasalsoallowedexternalobserverstolearnmoreaboutthe
Brotherhood’spolicypositions,andtogaugehowitmightactintheunlikelyeventof
gainingamonopolyonparliamentarypower.
ContrarytoMubarak’sgrimpredictions,theBrotherhood’sparliamentaryblochasnot
focuseditseffortsonpushingthroughconservativereligiouslegislation,buthasmanagedto
coordinateeffectivelywithotheroppositiongroupstotackleamuchbroaderrangeof
challengesfacingEgypt.Theseincludeaweakparliamentthatexistsprimarilyto
rubberstampexecutivedecisions,deeply-rootedeconomicproblemsandaninsufficiently
independentjudiciary.Forexample,inJune2006anumberofBrotherhoodMPsworked
closelywiththeEgyptianJudgesClubinanefforttoachievethepassageoflegislationthat
wouldincreasethejudiciary’sautonomyfromtheexecutivebranch.
Since2004theMuslimBrotherhoodhasissuedanumberofgeneralstatementsthat
emphasisethegroup’scommitmenttoademocratic,constitutional,parliamentarianand
presidentialregime‘intheframeworkofIslamicprinciples’,reaffirmitssupportforthe
freedomsofexpressionandreligionandargueinfavourofthepracticeofholdingregular
elections(SocietyofMuslimBrothers2004:12).Ithasalsomadespecificsuggestionsabout
howpoliticalfreedominEgyptmightbeenhanced,suchasgrantingcitizenstherightto
demonstrateandassemble,removingrestrictionsontheformationofpoliticalpartiesand
limitingtheauthoritarianpowersofthePresident.Inshort,theBrotherhoodhastakena
muchmorepositivestanceinpromotingpoliticalopennessanddemocratisationthanmost
ofthesecularoppositionpartiesinEgypt.
Nevertheless,thereremainanumberofambiguitiesintheBrotherhood’spositionsonother
issues,notleastonthequestionofwhetherthemovementshouldestablishaformalpolitical
partywiththecapacitytocompetemoreopenlyintheelectoralprocess.Somebelievethatit
wouldbewisetoseparatethepoliticalandtheproselytisingactivitiesofthemovement,
followingtheexampleofIslamistpartiesinMorocco,Jordan,YemenandKuwait.Othersfear
thatimposingthiskindofdistinctionbetweenpoliticalandreligiousvalueswilldilutethe
moralauthorityandrelevanceofthemovementasawhole.Thisdilemmaremains
unresolved,althoughtheMuslimBrotherhoodhasrecentlyshownsignsofwantingto
engageinamorepublicdebateabouttherelativemeritsofdifferentmodesofpolitical
engagement.
InAugust2007theBrotherhoodreleasedadraftversionofacomprehensivepolicyplatform,
thefirstofitskindinthegroup’seighty-yearhistory.Thiswaswidelyviewedasanattempt
toaddressthecriticismthatthemovementtendstofallbackonvagueideological
proclamations,andat128pagesinlengththedocumentofferedconsiderabledetailonthe
Brotherhood’sideasabouteconomicdevelopment,politicalreformandthevalueof
promotingcivilsocietyinitiatives.
Unfortunately,thisdidnotgeneratethewiderpolicydebatethattheBrotherhoodhad
hopedfor.Instead,itpromptedare-emergenceofconcernsabouttheBrotherhood’sstance
onequalitiesandhumanrights,particularlyasaresultofthedocument’sassertionthatnon-
Muslimsandwomenshouldnotbeallowedtoholdseniorleadershiproleswithinthestate.
ThiswasadeparturefromtheBrotherhood’searlierstatementsonminorityrights,whichhad
beenrelativelyliberal,ifrathervague.Forexample,apolicydocumentreleasedin2004
observedthat‘CoptsarepartofthefabricoftheEgyptiansociety.Theyarepartnersofthe
nationanddestiny.Ourrightsaretheirs,andourdutiestheirs’(SocietyofMuslimBrothers
2004:32).2 ItalsostressedtheBrotherhood’srespectforthefreedomofbeliefandworship,
anditsconvictionthatreligiouscooperationandco-existenceareparamountformaintaining
nationalunity.
Conservativefigureswithinthemovementjustifiedthisapparentvolte-faceinpolicywiththe
observationthatothersocietieshaveplacedrestrictionsonwhocanandcannotbeheadof
state(forinstance,thefactthatanaturalisedcitizencannotbecomePresidentintheUS)
andthatEgyptshouldhavethesameright.Theyalsoreiteratedtheircommitmenttothe
protectionofminorityrightsunderShari’a law,andtheimprovementofthepositionof
womenwithinEgyptiansociety.Butthesestatementshavefailedtoassuagetheconcernsof
thosewhobelievethattheBrotherhood’srhetoricalcommitmenttoequalcitizenshipislikely
tofallbythewaysideifthemovementeversucceedsincomingtopower.
Equallycontentiouswasthe2007platform’ssuggestionthatadherencetoShari’a lawmight
bestbeensuredthroughthecreationofanulemacouncilofreligiousscholarsthatwouldbe
abletohavethefinalwordoverthelegislativeandexecutivebranchesinmattersofreligious
law.Thisproclamationalarmedmanyexternalcommentators,whoregardeditasevidenceof
themovementtakingaregressivestepinatheocraticdirection(BrownandHamzawy2008).
ItalsosurprisedmoremoderatemembersoftheBrotherhood’sguidancecouncil,who
2.WhiletheEgyptianconstitutionofficiallyrecognisesandguaranteesthefreedomofreligion,this
principleisnotalwaysupheldinpractice.Inparticular,Egypt’slargecommunityofCopticChristianshave
frequentlycomplainedabouttheirexperienceofdiscriminationandharassmentatthehandsofthestate
andofradicalIslamicgroups(althoughnottheMuslimBrotherhoodspecifically).Analystshave
suggestedthatalthoughtheyconstituteapproximately10percentofthepopulation,Coptsremain
underrepresentedinboththepublicandprivatesectorsinEgypt(FreedomHouse2007).
claimedthattheyhadnotbeenconsultedaboutthislast-minuteinsertion.Afiercepublic
debateonthispointsubsequentlybrokeoutamongdifferentwingsoftheparty,whichwas
highlyunusualforagroupthatpridesitselfonpresentingaunifiedfacetotheoutsideworld
eveniftherearedifferencesofopinionbehindthescenes.
Since2007,theBrotherhoodhasretreatedsomewhatfromthesecontroversialpositions.The
conservativewingofthepartyhasconcededthatanyfutureulema councilwillnotbegiven
bindingauthorityonquestionsofShari’a law.Ithasalsosofteneditslineonthequestionof
equalpoliticalrightsfornon-Muslimsandwomen,suggestingthatthesegroupsshouldonly
bebarredfromassumingtheEgyptianpresidency.However,thepublicairingofdisputes
overtheseissueshasnegativelyimpactedontheBrotherhood’sinternalcohesivenessand
hasdamageditsreputationasadeliberativeanddemocraticmovement.
ThesepersistentambiguitiesaroundtheBrotherhood’spolicypositionshavealso
strengthenedthehandoftheregimeinitseffortstocrackdownonthemovement.Priorto
localcouncilelectionsinApril2008,aroundathousandmembersoftheMuslimBrotherhood
wereroundedupandarrested,andthousandsmorewerepreventedfromsubmittingtheir
candidacypapers.Themovementultimatelydecidedtoboycotttheelections,butthishas
nothadthedesiredimpactofenhancingitslegitimacyamongtheEgyptianpublic:if
anything,ithasshownthegovernmentthatitcanforceitsmostorganisedopposition
movementintosubmissionthroughtheuseofviolenceandpoliticalpersecution(Herzallah
andHamzawy2008).Ofcourse,thisapproachholdsitsownrisks,forthereisapossibility
thatiftheMuslimBrotherhoodgainslittlefromengagementintheformalpoliticalprocess,
themoderateswithinthemovementwhoadvocateonbehalfofpeacefulparticipationmay
losegroundtothosewhodonotbelievethatthisisanappropriatepathforthe
Brotherhood.
OtherIslamistmovementsinEgypt
AlthoughtheMuslimBrotherhoodrepresentsmostofthosewhobelongtotheIslamist-
sympathisingsectionoftheEgyptianpopulation,thereareanumberofotherpoliticised
IslamistgroupsinEgyptthatofferdifferentvisionsofreform.ToonesideoftheBrotherhood
sitmoremoderatecentristmovementssuchastheunlicensedWasat(Centre)party,whileon
theotheritisflankedbyradicalgroupswillingtoengageinviolencetoachievetheirgoals.
Wasatwasfoundedin1995byahandfulofformerMuslimBrothers,includingAbuAlaMadi,
SalahAbdal-KarimandEssamSultan,duringaperiodofintensestatepersecutionofthe
Brotherhood.Paradoxically,itseemsthatthisrepressivepoliticalenvironmentactually
promptedmanyoftheBrotherhood’smoreliberalmemberstomoderatetheiragendas,‘not
onlytoseizenewpoliticalopportunitiesbutalsotoevadenewpoliticalconstraints’
(Rosefsky-Wickham2004:213).TheemergenceofWasatalsorepresentedthedissatisfaction
ofthosewithintheBrotherhoodwhowerechafingunderaconservativeleadershipand
wantedtospeeduptheprocessofcreatingaformalpoliticalparty.
TheWasatisoneofthemostprogressiveIslamistgroupsintheregion,andithastakena
relativelyliberalapproachonanumberofissues.Forexample,ithasallowedwomentojoin
theorganisation,andithasbeenopentotheideaofworkingwithnon-Muslims.Foratime,
anevangelicalChristianevenservedonitsfive-personboard.Initspolicyplatforms,it
advocatesthecreationofanEgyptiandemocracybasedonequalcitizenship,thepromotion
ofcivilsocietyandneo-liberaleconomicreformsagainstthebackdropofIslamicheritage
andvalues.Inthissense,WasatbearsacloseresemblancetoothermainstreamIslamist
partiesintheregionlikethePartyofJusticeandDevelopment(PJD)inMorocco,which
portraysitselfasapoliticalpartywithanIslamic‘frameofreference’ratherthanareligious
party.Indeed,AbuAlaMadihasstressedthattheWasat‘doesnotputforwardtheocratic
ideas,norenvisagetheocraticgovernment[butrather]presentsacivicdiscourse’
(InternationalCrisisGroup2004:17).
Unfortunately,theWasatmovementhasnotsucceededingeneratingmuchenthusiasmfor
itsprogramme.Thelasttimethatitsleadersappliedforapoliticalpartylicence,in2006,just
over100peoplesignedthegroup’sfoundingdocuments.Meanwhile,theregimeroutinely
deniesitsstatusasalegalpoliticalparty,claimingthatitsplatformfailstoaddanything
noveltoEgyptianpoliticallife.
ItisperhapssurprisingthattheWasathasnotattractedmoreofafollowing,giventhatithas
explicitlydistanceditselffromtheMuslimBrotherhoodbybeingmoreinclusiveand
politicallypalatabletonon-MuslimsandChristians,andthatitseemstobedevelopinga
clearpoliticalandeconomicplatform.Buttheinstitutionalinfrastructurethatenablesthe
Brotherhoodtooperatesmoothlyintimesofpoliticalrepressionandseizeopportunitiesin
timesofregimetoleranceisabsentfromtheWasat’s11-yearexperiment.Atpresent,it
remainsunclearwhethertheWasatwillreconstituteitselfforafourthattempttoobtaina
licence,orwhetheritwilltransformitselfintoanorganisationwithsocialratherthanpolitical
objectives.
RadicalIslamisminEgypt
Betweenthe1970sandthe1990s,EgyptexperiencedawaveofQutbist-inspiredviolence
perpetratedbyradicalIslamicmovements.Qutbhaddiedbeforesettingoutacomprehensive
accountofhow‘true’MuslimsshouldopposethesupposedlyillegitimateEgyptianstate.
However,hisideasaboutthepracticeoftakfir (thedenunciationof‘infidel’or‘impious’
individualsorpoliticalsystems)weretakenupandexpressedbyagenerationofyoung
IslamistswhohadbeenradicalisedbythePalestinianconflictandtheSadatgovernment’s
movestowardsrapprochementwithIsraelinthelatterhalfofthe1970s(InternationalCrisis
Group2004).
Thisradicalismmanifesteditselfthroughtheactivitiesofthreemaingroups:theextremist
butinitiallyapoliticalAl-Takfirwa-Hajra(ExcommunicationandExodus),andthemore
militantAl-Jihad (JihadOrganisation)anditsoffshoot,Al-Jama’aal-Islamiyya (Islamic
Group).3 Al-Jama’a wasparticularlyactiveinthelate1980sandearly90s,frequently
engaginginarmedclasheswithEgyptiansecurityforcesandCopticChristianminoritygroups
andcarryingoutanumberofhigh-profileassassinations,includingthemurderofanotable
secularistintellectual,FaragFoda,in1992.Italsomadeapointoftargetingtouristsasa
meansofinflictingdamageonEgypt’stouristtradeandwidereconomy.Thisculminatedin
themassacreof58touristsandfourEgyptiansatLuxorinNovember1997,whichinturn
promptedahugegovernmentcrackdown.
ViolentactivisminEgypthasbeenonthewanesincethispoint,withmanyimprisoned
jihadistshavingnowrenouncedtheirearlierviewsandapologisedfortheircrimes.However,
Egyptremainsaprimetargetforterroristgroups,asindicatedbyanumberofseriousattacks
overthelastfiveyears.TheseincludethebombingsofthreehotelsintheSinaiPeninsulain
2004andaseriesofcoordinatedattacksintheEgyptianresortcityofSharmel-Sheikhin
2005,whichresultedinthedeathof88peopleandthewoundingofover150more.Thisis
aworryingindicationofthecontinuingappealofradicalideologiesamongcertainelements
ofEgypt’spopulation.
3.Formoreontheemergenceandideologiesofthesemovements,seeInternationalCrisisGroup2004.
3.PoliticalIslaminMorocco
Comparativelyspeaking,Morocco’spoliticalsystemisfreerthanmanyothersintheMENA
region.Sinceinheritingthethronein1999,KingMohammedVIhasimplementedaseriesof
modernisingreformsintermsofpoliticalandhumanrights.Hehasreleasedalargenumber
ofpoliticalprisoners,amendedthepenalcodetoformallyabolishtortureandstrengthened
theConsultativeCouncilonHumanRightsthatwasestablishedbyhisfather,KingHassanII,
toinvestigateclaimsofstate-sanctionedhumanrightsabuses.Hehastakentheunusual
stepofacknowledgingthegovernment’sresponsibilityforforceddisappearancesandtorture
thattookplaceunderhisfatherandgrandfather.Someofthespecificdetailsofthese
abusescameoutduringtheproceedingsofanEquityandReconciliationCommission.
MohammedVIhasalsopushedthroughprogressivechangestothecountry’spatriarchal
mudawana– familycode– andloosenedsomeoftherestrictionsonpressandpoliticalparty
freedom.
WhilethesereformmeasureshavehadsomesuccessinmakingMoroccomoreopenandless
authoritarian,theyhavefailedtodismantletheessentialstructuresofpowerthathavebeen
inplacesincethecountrybecameindependentin1956.TheMoroccanrulerisconsideredto
beadirectdescendantoftheprophetand,asAmiralMu-minin(Commanderofthe
Faithful),thesupremereligiousauthorityinthecountry.Themonarchalsoexertsinfluence
andpowerthroughanetworkoftraditionalinstitutionscalledthemakhzan.4 Theseopaque
networksoftenenjoymorepowerandaccessthantheelectedParliament,whoseactivities
areheavilycircumscribed.In2002,forexample,MohamedVIrevertedtotheoldpracticeof
namingaPrimeMinisterwithoutanyreferencetotheelectionresults,choosingapremier
notfromthelargestparty,butatechnocratwithoutanypoliticalaffiliation.
Moroccostandsapartfrommanyofitsneighboursinthatithasarelativelywell-established
historyofmulti-partypolitics,datingbacktothe1940s.Intheyearssinceindependencethe
palacehasoftencrackeddownonpoliticalparties,butunlikeotherauthoritarian
governmentsintheregion,ithasneverbannedthemoutrightorattemptedtocreatea
singlepartysystem(OttawayandHamzawy2007).However,althoughanumberof
Morocco’spartieshavebecomeentrenchedinthepoliticallandscape,notablytheIstiqlal
(Independence)partyandthesocialistUnionSocialistedesForcesPopulaires (USFP),fewof
thesecurrentlyofferawell-organisedchallengetotheregime.Byaligningthemselveswith
themonarchy,thesepartieshaveguaranteedtheircontinuedinclusioningovernment.But
thetrade-offhasbeenasignificantlossofpopularlegitimacyandsupporttotheIslamist
parties,whicharewidelyacknowledgedashavinggreatercredibilityasopposition
movementsandasbeingmuchmoreeffectiveatdeliveringsocialservicesonalocallevel.
PoliticalIslamistmovementsgainedsupportinMoroccofromthelate1960s,bothasan
alternativetonationalist,leftistandsecularpartiesandinresponsetothefailuresofthe
regimetodeliverdevelopment,jobsandjusticetothepopulation.Thiscontextcreateda
favourablerecruitinggroundforthoseespousingmoreovertlyreligiousratherthansecular
solutionstothecountry’sproblems.Toshoreuphisownpositionandtoweakenhissecular
opponents,thegrowthofpoliticalIslamistmovementswasactuallyencouragedbyKing
HassanIIinthe1960s.LikeotherrulersintheMENAregion,hejudged–erroneously,asit
turnedout–thatIslamistforceswouldbeeasiertoco-optandthattheywouldserveasa
usefulcounterweighttotheNasseritesandtheleftistparties.Thesecombinedfactorshave
contributedtothegrowthofpoliticalIslaminMoroccooverthelastfewdecades,although
someoftheimplicationsofthesedevelopmentswerenotfullymanifestuntilthe1990s.
4.Thisisaratherimprecisetermthatisoftenusedtodescribe‘aneliteofpalaceretainers,regionaland
provincialadministrators,andmilitaryofficers,connectedto[theregime]byentrenchedpatronage
networks’(OttawayandRiley2006:4).
ThePartyofJusticeandDevelopment
ThefirstorganisedpoliticalIslamistgroupinMoroccowastheal-Shabibaal-Islamiyya
(IslamicYouthAssociation),whichwasfoundedin1969byAbdelkrimMoutti,aleaderofthe
NationalTeachersUnion.Thismovementattractedalargefollowingintheearly1970s,
particularlyamongteachersandstudents.Thegroup’sstatedaimsincludedthe
‘moralisation’ofsociety,the‘Arabisation’ofeducationandtheimplementationofIslamic
law(Howe2005).Butinthemid-1970sthemovementsplitafteritsleaderwasimplicatedin
theassassinationofahigh-profilepoliticianandwasforcedintoexileabroad.
WeakenedbyMoutti’sdeparture,byaregimeclampdownandbyinternalconflicts,the
Associationbrokeupintoseveralfactions.Fromtheearly1980sthemainsuccessorgroup
chosetoadoptalessconfrontationalapproachtowardsthegovernment.Thisgroup,theAl-
Jama’aAlIslamiyya(adifferentgroupfromtheEgyptiansofthesamename),soughtto
becomealegitimateparticipantinMoroccanpolitics.However,ittookafurthertenyears
andachangeinnamethatomittedanyreferencetoIslam(AlIslahwalTajdid)beforethe
kingchosetorecognisethegroupasalegitimateassociation.Themovementtriedavariety
ofwaystoengageinthepoliticalprocess,includinganunsuccessfulattempttojointhe
secular Istiqlal party.
In1996,AlIslahwalTajdidjoinedasmallparty,theMouvementPopulaireDémocratiqueet
Constitutionnel(MPDC).Throughthis,AlIslahwasabletotakeoverthepartyandput
forwardcandidatesinthe1997elections,winningnineseatsintheParliament.In1998,the
MPDCchangeditsname,becomingthePartyofJusticeandDevelopment.AlIslah,
followingamergerwithanothersmallerIslamistparty,alsochangeditsnametoAlTawhid
walIslah(UnityandReform).
Today,thesenamesandtheformalseparationpersist.ThePJDactsasapoliticalpartythat
standsinlocalandnationalelectionswhileAlTawhidservesasthereligiousmovementthat
engagesinbroadersocialandproselytisingactivities(Tamam2007).Inthisemphasison
achievingchangethroughpoliticalparticipation,thePJDisquitedifferentfromMorocco’s
othermajorIslamistmovement,AlAdlwalIhsan.
AlAdlwalIhsan
AlAdlwalIhsanisthoughttohavearound30,000registeredmembersandafurther
140,000followers,butdespiteitspopularityitisstillformallybannedasapoliticalparty.The
charismaticSheikhAbdessalamYassinelaunchedthemovementin1974bysendinganopen
lettertoHassanIIthatcondemnedhisarrogationofreligiousauthorityinMorocco.Since
thistime,hehaspreachedamessageofnon-violentoppositiontotheking,undeterredby
prolongedperiodsofimprisonmentandhousearrest.WhileMohammedVIfreedYassinein
2000,hecontinuestocriticisethekingandtocallforfar-reachingchangesinMoroccan
society.HisdaughterNadiaalsoservesasanunofficialspokespersonforthemovement,and
frequentlycommentsontheillegitimacyoftheMoroccanpoliticalsystematdomesticrallies
andinternationalconferences.
AlthoughAlAdlwalIhsanandthePJDaresometimesgroupedtogetherunderthelabelof
‘Islamistopposition’inMorocco,thetwomovementsareorganisationallyandideologically
distinctinanumberofimportantways.
First,whilethePJDhasacceptedtheking’sauthorityasthespiritualandtemporalheadof
thecountryasapreconditionforgainingaccesstothepoliticalprocess,AlAdlrejectsthis
position.SheikhYassinehasconsistentlyarguedthatIslamshoulddefinethepowersand
prerogativesofthemonarchandassuchhasrefusedtoparticipateinelectionsorthe
government.ThemovementhasalsostronglycensuredthekingforusingIslamtoservehis
owninterestsandmaintainmonarchicalcontrolratherthanforthebenefitofMorocco’s
people.
Second,asnotedinthecontextofreformstothemudawana,thePJDhasdemonstrateda
willingnesstocompromisewhenfacedwithpoliticalissuesthatmightappeartoconflictwith
itsinterpretationofIslamicvalues.Bycontrast,AlAdl condemnsanysecularinitiativeaimed
atseparatingreligionandpolitics,andadvocatesthecreationofan‘Islamicdemocracy’.
Third,whilethePJDhasadoptedthecharacteristicsandlanguageofamodernpolitical
party, AlAdl isbuiltaroundthecentralfigureofSheikhYassineanditsdoctrinedraws
heavilyonmysticalSufiinfluences.Thisoftenmakesitdifficultforoutsiderstogetaclear
senseofwhatthemovementstandsforandwhatithopestoachieve.
ThePJDasapoliticalactor
Inpoliticalstatements,thePJDhasaffirmeditsacceptanceofthedoctrinaland
constitutionallegitimacyofthemonarchy’sreligiousauthority.Itdoesnotcallforthe
creationofanIslamicstate,butdescribesitselfinsteadasanationalpoliticalpartywithan
‘Islamicframeofreference’.Thisvagueterminologyconcernssomecritics,whoarguethat
manyIslamistpartieshaveadoptedthelanguageofdemocracyinabidforlegitimacy,but
thattheirideologicalpositionsareultimatelyincompatiblewiththepracticesofdemocracy
(Pipes2000).
ItistruethatthePJDhasoftenprioritisedconservativereligiousissuesinitspublicactivism.
In2004,thepartyinitiallycampaignedagainstMohammedVI’sproposedchangestothe
mudawana,whichwouldraisethemarriageagefrom15to18,givewomentherightto
divorcebymutualconsent,putcurbsonthepracticeofpolygamy,limittheabilityofmento
askfordivorceunilaterallyandsubstituteawife’sdutyofobediencewiththeconceptof
jointresponsibility(OttawayandRiley2006).Hardlinemembersofthepartywereunhappy
withthesereforms,whichtheybelievedwouldbeharmfultotraditionalconceptsoffamily
life.However,thePJDultimatelyacceptedtherevisionstothesocialcodeonthegrounds
thattheyweretheoutcomeofademocraticprocess,indicatingitswillingnesstoaccepteven
thosecompromisesthatmightappeartoconflictwithitsvaluesasanIslamicmovement.
ThePJDhasfurtherdemonstrateditscommitmenttodemocraticproceduresinthewaythat
itorganisesitselfasaparty.Incontrasttoits‘secular’counterparts,whohavebeenco-opted
bytheregimeandareabletobenefitfromthepatronagesysteminplaceinMorocco,it
mustrelyonthestrengthofitsideologicalmessageandpoliticalplatformtoattractvotes.As
aresult,thepartyhasprioritisedinternalaccountabilityandefficiency,andPJDdeputies
mustadheretoaninternalcodeofethicsthatrequiresthemtoattendplenaryand
committeesessions,draftamendments,makelegislativeproposalsandseektohold
parliamenttoaccountbyaskingoralquestions.Thisapproachhasenabledthepartytobuild
upastrongorganisationalbaseandconsiderablepopularsupportacrossthecountry.Ithas
alsobenefitedfromitsdecisiontofocusonmorepopularandlessovertlyreligiousissues
suchasanti-corruption,judicialreformandpoliticalrenewal(seeHamzawy2008).
Thevalueofthisstrategywasapparentduringthe2002parliamentaryelections,whenthe
PJDlimitedthenumberofdistrictsinwhichitstood(adecisionthatthepartywaspressured
tomakebythepalace),butwhereitstillmanagedtowin42ofthe325seats,establishing
itselfasthethirdlargestnationalpartyafterIstiqlalandtheUSFP.
TherewasawidespreadexpectationthatthePJDwouldmakesimilarlystronggainsinthe
2007parliamentaryelections,withsomeobserverspredictingthatitwouldwinenoughseats
toeffectivelycontroltheparliament.Intheevent,thepartyonlymanagedtoaddfourseats
toitsprevioustally,winning46toIstiqlal’s52.
AlAdlwalIhsan,whichhaslongcriticisedthePJDforitsdecisiontoparticipateintheflawed
politicalsystem,suggestedthatitsfailuretoreceiveahigherproportionofthe2007vote
reflectedtheparty’slackoflegitimacyamongthecountry’sdisenfranchisedIslamist
constituencies–achargewhichmaywellhavesomevalidity(Hamzawy2008).ButthePJD’s
surprisingdefeatwasalsoaverdictonthegeneralstateofMoroccanpolitics.Despite
MohammedVI’searlypromisestoworktowardsdemocratisationandsocialandeconomic
reform,Moroccoremainsplaguedbyunderemploymentandpersistentpoverty.Increasingly
disillusionedbythefailureofsuccessivegovernmentstoinfluencethedirectionorcontentof
policy,theMoroccanpublicappearstohavelostfaithintheballotboxasaninstrumentof
politicalchange.Voterturnoutwasapaltry37percentinthe2007elections,comparedwith
51percentin2002and58percentin1997.
Encouragingly,thePJDdoesnotseemtohavegivenuponitsstrategyofpolitical
participationinreactiontothisdefeat.Instead,ithasintensifieditsfocusondemandingreal
constitutionalreformsandputtinganendtoelectoralcorruption(Al-Khalfi2008).Andin
July2008,AbdelillahBenkiranewaselectedasthenewSecretary-Generaloftheparty,
replacingSaadEddineEl-Othmani,whohadbeenexpectedtowinanothertermcomfortably.
Thisexampleofatransparentandpeacefultransferofpowerhaschallengedthosewho
believethatIslamistpartiesonlypaylipservicetodemocracyasameansofachievingpower,
andreflectsthePJD’sambitiontoserveasa‘modelforrespectableIslamism’(Economist
IntelligenceUnit2008).
RadicalIslamisminMorocco
ThereareotherpoliticisedIslamicforcesinMorocco:radicalIslamiststhatadvocateand
practiseviolenceandterror.Fromtheearly1990sonwards,anumberofradicalimamstook
advantageofthemoreliberalatmosphereinthecountrytoespousehard-lineandoften
anti-Semiticviews.Aparticularlyaggressivefatwa wasissuedjustoneweekaftertheattack
ontheWorldTradeTowersandthePentagoninSeptember2001.
Inthisperiodanumberofviolentattackswerealsolinkedtoreligiousextremists.In2002,
theMoroccansecurityforcesuncoveredanAl-QaedanetworkinCasablanca.Thisgroupwas
allegedtohavebeenplanningattacksagainstAmericannavalvesselsintheStraitsof
Gibraltar,andonpopularMoroccantouristdestinations.Afewweekslater,theauthorities
alsomadepublictheirdiscoveryofaclandestinenetworkofIslamicextremistswhowere
implicatedinviolenceandkillings.
Butitwastheeventsof16May2003thatshatteredthenotionthatMoroccowasimmune
totheviolencethataffectsotherpartsoftheregion:14Moroccansuicidebombersattacked
foreignandJewishtargetsinCasablanca,killing45people.Thisexperiencewasprofoundly
shockingformostordinaryMoroccans.Itwascompoundedayearlaterwhenamajor
terroristattacktookplaceinMadrid,killing191peopleandwounding1,800.The
investigationbytheSpanishpoliceandintelligenceagenciesrevealedthatitwasprimarily
Moroccansthatwereimplicatedintheplanningandexecutionofthebombings(Howe
2005).
Despitethegovernmentcrackdownthatfollowedtheseevents,radicalIslamismcontinuesto
findanoutletinMorocco.InMarch2007,asuicidebomberblewhimselfupinaCasablanca
Internetcaféinwhatappearedtobeanisolatedincident.Yetinvestigationsuncovereda
largerallegedterroristoperationtotargettouristsitesacrossthecountry.InApril2007,four
suspectsinthisplotwereconfrontedbythepolice.Onewasshotdeadandtheremaining
threedetonatedexplosivebeltstoavoidcapture,killingapolicemanandinjuring21civilians.
Afortnightlater,anothertwoindividualsblewthemselvesupoutsidetheUSConsulateand
LanguageCenterinCasablanca.
Thesesporadicactsofterrorismhaveimpactednegativelyonmoremoderategroupslikethe
PJD,whofearbeingtarredwiththesamebrushastheradicals.Indeed,thousandsof
IslamistswereroundedupandarrestedintheaftermathoftheCasablancabombings,anda
numberofpoliticiansfromthepro-governmentpartiescalledforthePJDtobedismantled
(Hamzawy2008).Thepartysurvivedthispublicsmearcampaign,butitwasforcedtotone
downitsreligiousrhetoricandacceptthepassageofdraconiananti-terrorismlawsthat
greatlyrolledbackcivillibertiesandpoliticalfreedoms.
4.PoliticalIslaminJordan
JordanisoftenheldupbywesternleadersasanexampleofacountryintheMENAregion
thatissuccessfullymovingtowardsdemocraticreform.However,whilethecurrentking,
AbdullahII,hascertainlydemonstratedanenthusiasmformodernisation,hehasfollowedin
hisfather’sfootstepsbyprioritisingeconomicliberalisationovermoredeep-seatedpolitical
change.Somemodeststepshavebeentakeninthisdirection,suchastheestablishmentin
2002ofthequasi-independentNationalCentreforHumanRightsandthecreationin2003
ofaMinistryforPoliticalDevelopment.Butthevalueofthesemeasureshasbeenlimitedby
aseriesoflawsanddecreesthathavefurthershrunkthepoliticalspaceopentoopposition
parties,thepress,non-governmentalorganisationsandprofessionalassociations.
Since1947,Jordanhashadabicamerallegislature,withadirectlyelectedlowerhouse(the
Majlisal-Nuwwab,orChamberofDeputies)andaroyallyappointedupperhouse(theMajlis
al-A’yan,orSenate).Butthesestructureshavedonelittletochecktheabsoluteauthorityof
theking.The1952constitutionestablishedthemonarch’simmunityfromanyliabilityor
responsibility,andgavehimsweepingrightstopromulgateandratifylawsandtoappoint
anddismisstheprimeminister,thecabinetandthesenateatwill.Italsoallowedthekingto
dissolveparliament,tovetolegislationandtoissue‘temporarylaws’intimesofemergency
withouttheapprovalofthegovernment.
KingHussein(1952–1999)madeliberaluseofthesepowersthroughouthisreign,often
resortingtomartiallawtoquellviolentpopularuprisingsandpreservethestabilityof
Jordan’sfragilepoliticalsystem.Between1957and1992,politicalpartieswerebanned,full
electionsweresuspended,andthelegislativefunctionsofthelowerhouseofparliament
wereseverelycircumscribed,withasuccessionofappointedgovernmentsexistingprimarily
togiveaveneerofdemocraticlegitimacytodecisionsmadebytheking.
Electionshavebeenheldonasporadicbasissincetheearly1990sbutarenotgenerally
consideredtohavebeenfreeorfair.Therehasalsobeensomecontroversyoverthe
impositionofthe‘oneperson,onevote’lawin1993.Previously,votershadbeenableto
castasmanyvotesastherewerecandidatesintheirconstituency,therebyallowingthemto
votealongtribalorfamilylinesaswellasformore‘ideological’candidatessuchasthe
Islamists(George2005).However,underthenewsystemeachindividualcouldonlycastone
vote.Whilenotundemocratic,thesechangesensuredthatruralandtraditionallypro-regime
constituentswhocouldcountonsupportfromextensivefamilynetworksdid
disproportionatelywell,largelyattheexpenseofIslamistandother,secular,partiesbasedin
urbanareas.
Morethan30partieshavebeencreatedsinceKingHussein’sdecisiontolegalisepolitical
partiesin1992,butmostoftheselackdynamismandpopularappealandhavefailedto
significantlyinfluencethedirectionofpolicy.Anexceptiontothisgeneralpictureofmalaise
comesfromJordan’spoliticalIslamists,whoaremuchbetterorganisedthantheirsecular
counterparts.Ofthesegroups,theJordanianMuslimBrotherhoodanditspoliticalwing,the
IslamicActionFront,arethemostprominentexamplesofnon-violentIslamisminJordan.
TheMuslimBrotherhood
ThefirstorganisedIslamistgroupinJordanwastheMuslimBrotherhood–anoffshootof
thereligiousreformmovementthatemergedinEgyptundertheleadershipofHassanal-
Bannainthelate1920s.Thepoliticalinfluenceofthisorganisationquicklyspreadbeyond
Egypt,withbranchesbeingsetupinotherMuslimcountries,includingJordan,Syria,Saudi
ArabiaandKuwait.Althoughthesegroupsshareanumberofideologicalsimilarities,theyare
organisationallydistinct,andhavetakendifferentapproachestoissuesofpoliticalandsocial
reform.
InJordan,theinteractionbetweentheregimeandtheMuslimBrotherhoodhasbeen
relativelycivil,withbothsidesrecognisingthemutualadvantagestobederivedfrom
cultivatingacooperativerelationship.Althoughthegovernmenthasoftentakenaction
againstindividualBrotherhoodmembers,ithasneverattemptedtobanthegroupoutright
(ashasbeenthecaseinEgyptandSyria),judgingthatitspopularityhasservedtocheckthe
powerofmoreradicalandconfrontationalmovements.Foritspart,althoughtheMuslim
Brotherhoodhasoftendisagreedwithgovernmentpolicies,ithasrefrainedfromchallenging
thelegitimacyoftheHashemitemonarchyandhaschosentoexpressitsdissatisfaction
throughpoliticaloppositionratherthanviolentactivism.
Sinceobtaininglegalstatusasacharityin1945,theBrotherhoodhasplayedanimportant
roleinJordan’ssocialandpoliticaldevelopment.Anumberofitsmemberswereoffered
ministerialpositionsinthefirstpost-independencegovernment,andin1953,themovement
wassuccessfulinitsapplicationtoassumeaquasi-politicalroleasa‘comprehensiveand
generalIslamiccommittee’(Wiktorowicz2001:96).Thisallowedthemovementtospreadits
messageofIslamicrenewalandsocialmoralityinmosquesandpublicplaceswithouttoo
muchinterferencefromtheauthorities,evenduringageneralcrackdownonpoliticalactivity
thattookplaceinthe1950sand60s.
ThroughoutthisperiodtheMuslimBrotherhoodconsolidateditspositionthrougharangeof
socialandcharitableactivities,andparticularlythroughthecreationofanextensivecivil
societynetwork.Themostprominentofthesenon-governmentalorganisationswasthe
IslamicCenterSociety,whichwasestablishedin1965andhassinceservedasthemain
charitablearmoftheMuslimBrotherhood.
However,theBrotherhoodhasnotlimiteditselftocharitableactivism.Duringthebrief
politicalopeninginJordanattheendofthe1980s,itbegantoengagemuchmoredirectly
informalpolitics.Individualmembersoftheorganisationcampaignedinthe1989elections,
runningontheslogan‘Islamisthesolution’.TwentyBrotherhoodofficialsandafurther12
independentIslamistcandidateswonparliamentaryseats,gainingcontrolofnearlyhalfof
thelowerhouse.Butitsshiftintotheformalpoliticalarenapromptedagreatdealofinternal
discussionaboutwhatthemostappropriategoalsandactivitiesofthemovementshouldbe.
Somemembersfearedthatparticipationinpoliticallifewouldforcethemtomake
compromisesontheirIslamicvaluesandgoals.Butthedebatewaswonbythosewho
believedthatthecreationofapoliticalpartywouldallowtheBrotherhoodtosignificantly
expanditsinfluenceinsociety.In1992,thisledtotheestablishmentoftheIslamicAction
Frontparty.
TheIslamicActionFront
AlthoughtheIslamicActionFrontwassupposedtoactasan‘umbrella’partythatwould
includeMuslimBrotherhoodmembersandindependentIslamistsalike,ithasessentially
becomethepoliticalwingoftheBrotherhood.Mostmembersofthefoundingcommitteeof
theIAFweredrawnfromtheBrotherhood,andtheirideashaveprofoundlyinfluencedthe
structureandbehaviouroftheparty.Evennow,theMuslimBrotherhoodcontinuestobe
informallyinvolvedindeterminingtheleaderoftheparty,andtheIAFoftendeferstoits
parentorganisationonimportantpoliticalquestions.
TheIslamicActionFrontdiffersfromanumberofotherIslamistpartiesintheregioninthatit
doesnotalwaysspeakwithacommonpoliticalvoice(eventhoughmembersultimately
respectthedecisionsreachedbytheparty’sleadership).Thereisabroadconsensuswithinthe
IAFthattheparty’spriorityshouldbetopromotethe‘Islamicisation’ofJordaniansociety.
However,therearesubstantialdisagreementsbetweendifferentideologicalgroupingsabout
howthisgoalshouldbeachieved.Therearealsothosewhoremainambivalentabouttheidea
ofparticipatinginpoliticsatall,andwouldprefertheIAFtoconcentrateitseffortson
questionsofreligiouseducationandfurtherapplicationofShari’a law.
Differencesofopinionwithinthepartytendtofocusonthreekeypoliticalissues:
cooperationwiththeJordanianregime,theroleofIslaminpoliticsandthePalestinian
question.Thesefactionshaveusuallybeenclassifiedaseither‘hawkish’or‘dovish’butas
NathanBrownnotes,thepartydoesnotdivideeasilyintotwodistinctcamps.Rather,‘there
areavarietyofintermediatepositionsandsignificantdifferencesevenamonglike-minded
groupsabouthowsalienteachissueis’(Brown2006:8).Thoseonthemoremoderateend
ofthespectrumtendtofavourworkingpragmaticallywithinandalongsidethegovernment
topromotetheirvisionofpoliticalreform,evenifthismeanssettlingforaslowerpaceof
change.Dovishgroupsarealsowillingtoacceptagradualmovetowardsthefurther
implementationofIslamicvaluesinJordaniansociety.However,theyareopposedbymore
hard-lineindividualswhorefusetocompromiseonanyoftheirIslamicprinciplesforthesake
ofbuildingagoodrelationshipwiththeregime.
GiventheoverrepresentationofJordanianPalestiniansintheparty,mostmembersofthe
IAFareunitedintheirsupportforthePalestiniancauseandintheirrejectionofthepeace
treatywithIsrael.Butagain,thereisadivergencebetweenmoderateandconservative
groupsabouthowthisissueshouldbeaddressed.Forexample,aformerleaderoftheIAF,
ZakiSaid,claimedthatalthoughhedidnotbelievethatthepeacetreatywithIsraelwasin
Jordan’sinterests,iftheIAFeverwonamajorityingovernmentthepartywould‘move
cautiously’beforeoverturningitoutright,andwouldputthequestiontoareferendum
(Williams2006).OtherprominentIAFmembersarelessflexibleonthispoint.Manyofthese
workinclosecoordinationwithHamas,andsupportmoreextremeformsofresistance
againsttheIsraelioccupationofPalestinianterritories.Itisimportanttonoteinthiscontext
thattheIAFhasconsistentlyrejectedtheuseofviolencetoachieveitsdomesticpolitical
goals,althoughcriticsworrythatthegrowinginfluenceoftheparty’sradicalwingmight
changethissituationinthefuture.
TheIAFasapoliticalactor
Toacertainextent,thestrugglesbetweendifferentwingsoftheIslamicActionFrontover
ideologyandstrategyhavelimiteditsabilitytodevelopacoherentpoliticalprogrammewith
appealtoabroadcross-sectionofJordaniansociety.However,itisnotjustinternal
weaknessesthathavepreventedtheIAFfromincreasingitsrepresentationwithinthe
Jordanianpoliticalsystem.Asdiscussedabove,electoralrulesinJordanaredesignedtolimit
Islamistgainsinparliamentaryelections.KingAbdullahIIhasalsomadeclearhisbeliefthat
theIslamistsdonotsharehisvisionofJordan’sdevelopmentpath,andhisreluctancetogive
themalargerstakeinpoliticaldecision-making.ThishasgiventheIAFlittleincentiveto
resolvetheambiguitiesinitspoliticalplatform.
AlthoughtheIAFjoinedmanyotherpartiesinboycottingthe1997parliamentaryelections
asaprotestagainstthe‘oneperson,onevote’electoralsystemandtheseriesofrestrictive
‘temporarylaws’issuedbythegovernmentinthemid-1990s,mostmembersofthe
organisationappeartohavereachedtheconclusionthatthebenefitsofparticipatingin
politicsoutweighthecosts.Butthepartyhashadtobeextremelypragmaticandcalculated
initsapproachinordertoavoidfurthercrackdownsbytheregime.Tothisend,theIAFhas
deliberatelylimitedthenumberofcandidatesthatithasputforwardforparliamentaryand
municipalelections,judgingthatthisstrategywillgiveitsomeseatsanddisplayits
popularitywithoutsplittingitsvoteorincurringthehostilityoftheregime.Duringthe2003
electionsfortheChamberofDeputies,itranjust30candidates,winning17outof110
seats.
AlthoughtheIAFisunabletoexertmuchinfluenceonJordan’spolicymakingstructures,it
hasuseditspositionasthelargestsingleblocinparliamenttoraisetheprofileofanumber
ofissuesthatitjudgestobeparticularlyimportant.Giventhecloselinksofmanyofits
memberstoHamas,thePalestinianquestionhasinevitablybeenafocalpointofitsplatform.
Religiousandculturalissueshavealsofeaturedprominentlyintheparty’spublicrhetoric.
ButIAFdeputieshavemountedrobustchallengestothegovernmentonmoregenerallocal
andnationalconcerns,suchascorruption,poverty,widespreadunemploymentandtheneed
tomakethepoliticalsystemmorerepresentativeandaccountable(Brown2006).
TheJordanianregime’slackofprogressontheseissueshasbeenasourceofconsiderable
frustrationfortheIslamicActionFront,andinJuly2007thepartymadealast-minute
withdrawalfrommunicipalelections,accusingthegovernmentoffraudandelection-rigging.
ItwaswidelyexpectedthatitwouldalsoboycottparliamentaryelectionsinNovember2007,
butafteraperiodofheateddebatethepartydecidedtofield22candidates.Onlysixof
thesewonparliamentaryseats,representingtheIAF’sworstelectoralperformancesincethe
legalisationofpoliticsintheearly1990s.Thispromptedasignificantrealignmentofinternal
partypoliticsandinMay2008ahardlinefigurewithinthemovement,HammamSa’id,was
electedastheIAF’sGeneralGuide.
Unexpectedly,thishasnotledtoasignificantbreakdowninrelationsbetweentheIAFand
thegovernment.Onthecontrary,Sa’idhasprovedwillingtotonedowntherecentstridency
intheparty’sstatementsandtoworkmoreconstructivelywiththegovernmentonarange
ofdomesticpoliticalissues.Therehasalsobeenagreaterconvergencebetweenbothsides
onthequestionofengagementwithHamas,withtheIAFhavinghelpedtofacilitatean
openingofcontactsbetweentheJordaniangovernmentandthePalestinianresistance
movementinGaza(Hamid2008).
Thisrecentrapprochementmaybeatemporarymarriageofconvenience,andtheregime
remainskeentolimitthelong-terminvolvementoftheIAFingovernmentandin
governance.Butitwoulddowelltofurtheropenupthespaceforparticipationavailableto
themainstreamIslamistparties,whicharethemostpopularorganisedoppositionforcesin
Jordan.Thereisariskthatifitdoesnot,individualsandgroupsespousingmoreradical
solutionstoJordan’sproblemswillbecomeincreasinglyattractivetothosemembersofthe
populationwhoaredisillusionedwithpoliticsandangryaboutdomesticeconomicconditions
andregionalcrises.
RadicalIslamisminJordan
AlthoughtheIslamicActionFrontandothernon-violentIslamistparties,suchasthe
JordanianWasat(Centre)Party,havestatedtheircommitmenttoworkingwithinexisting
institutionalstructurestoachievetheirgoals,thereareotherpoliticisedIslamicforcesin
Jordanthathavenotbeenpreparedtotakesuchanaccommodatingapproach.These
includeSalafiactivists,whorefusetoparticipateinformalpolitics,aswellasmoreradical
jihadistswhocondemntheIAFforitswillingnesstocompromisewithanon-Islamicregime
andwhoadvocatetheuseofviolencetoachievetheirgoals(Brown2006).
Oppositiontothemonarchy’spolicyofnormalisationwithIsraelanditscloserelationship
withtheWesthasintensifiedoverthepastfewyears,exacerbatedbytheworsening
situationsinIraqandPalestine.Until2005,Jordanwassparedthekindofjihadiactivismand
bombingsseensofrequentlyinthesestatesandotherssuchasEgypt.However,horrific
suicideattacksinthreehotelsinAmmaninNovember2005thatappearedtohavebeen
orchestratedbyAbuMus’abalZarqawi(aJordanian-bornmilitantwhoactedasa
commanderofAl-QaedainIraquntilhisdeathin2006)demonstratedthatJordanwasnot
immunefromextremism.
TosuppressthegrowthoftheseradicalideologiesinJordan,thegovernmenthasadopted
anincreasinglysecurity-basedapproachtodissent.Aftertheterroristattacksof11
September2001andtheoutbreakofwarinIraq,theGeneralIntelligenceDepartment(GID)
arrestedhundredsofIslamistsonthesuspicionofcollaborationwithAl-Qaeda,anda
numberofthosetakenintocustodyreportedtheirexperiencesofbeatingsandtorture.A
similarcrackdownfollowedtheAmmanhotelbombings.Buttheseheavy-handedtacticsare
unlikelytodiscouragepopularprotest,andmayservetoundercuttheappealofmore
moderateIslamistforcesinJordan.
5.WesternpolicyintheMENAregion
Beforedrawinganyconclusionsaboutwhattherisingpopularityandinfluenceofnon-
violentIslamistpartiesmightmeanforwesternpolicymakers,itisnecessarytoassessthe
legacyofpastpoliciestowardstheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica.Thescopeofthispaper
doesnotpermitacomprehensiveanalysisofallwesternpoliciesintheMENAregionbutit
doesseektohighlightsomeofthemostrelevantinitiatives,includingpoliciesonpromoting
politicalreform,economicdevelopmentandtheMiddleEastPeaceProcess.Italsotouches
brieflyonEuropeanandNorthAmericanpoliciestowardsIraqandIran,recognisingthat
thesehaveprofoundlyshapedthecurrentregionalpoliticalcontext.
ThischapterlooksatthebroadMENAstrategiespursuedbytheEuropeanUnion,theUK
andtheUS,whileChapter6considerstheextenttowhichtheseactorshaveengagedwith
Islamists,eitherformallyorinformally.
EuropeanUnionpolicy
TheEUhasaclearinterestinhelpingtofostersecurityandprosperityintheMiddleEastand
NorthAfrica.ConflictinthisregionhasseveraldirectconsequencesforEuropeanstatesand
societies,includingincreasedflowsofpoliticalrefugees,theproliferationoftransnational
criminalnetworks,aheightenedriskofterroristattacksandthedisruptionofcriticalenergy
supplies.Yetifmanagedwell,cooperationbetweenEuropeandMENAcountriespromises
considerableeconomicandsocialbenefitsforbothregions.Recognitionofthishasledthe
EUtostriveforgreaterpolicycoherencetowardstheMiddleEastinrecentyears.
Onthesecurityfront,theCommonForeignandSecurityPolicy(CFSP)pillaroftheEUhas
contributedtopeacebuildinginitiativesintheregion,forexample,throughtheUNIFILII
missioninLebanonandtheEUPoliceMissionforthePalestinianTerritories(EUPOLCOPPS)
(seeCounciloftheEuropeanUnion2009).TheEUalsoactsinconcertwithother
internationalorganisationsandstatesoncertainissues,mostnotablythroughits
participationintheMiddleEast‘Quartet’oftheEU,UN,RussiaandtheUSthatexiststo
addresstheIsraeli-Palestinianconflict.Meanwhile,economicandpoliticaldevelopmentand
cooperationintheMENAregionhasbeenpromotedthroughtheestablishmentofthe
‘UnionfortheMediterranean’(formerlytheEuro-MediterraneanPartnershiporEMP)and
theEuropeanNeighbourhoodPolicy(ENP).
However,theEUhashaddifficultydeliveringonmanyoftheseobjectives.Inpart,thisisa
reflectionofthedifficultiesinvolvedinachievingconsensusbetweenEUmemberstateson
controversialpoliticalissues.The27statesthatmakeupthenewlyenlargedEUhave
competinginterestsandattitudesinrelationtotheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica,whichhas
oftenresultedinpolicybeingreducedtothe‘lowestcommondenominator’ofwhatcanbe
agreedon.Effortstodesignacoherentsetofpoliciestowardstheregionhavealsobeen
complicatedbythestructureoftheEU,whichhasasix-monthrotatingpresidency.Whilethe
challengesandopportunitiesintheMENAregionarehighontheprioritylistofmostEU
states,therearedifferencesofopinionabouthowtoapproachquestionsofcooperation,
conflictresolutionandpoliticalandeconomicdevelopment,withtherecenthagglingover
thequestionofreplacingtheEuro-MediterraneanPartnershipwithanew‘Mediterranean
Union’beingjustoneexampleofthis(TheEconomist2008).
Euro-MediterraneanPartnership
TheEuro-MediterraneanPartnership(EMP),otherwiseknownastheBarcelonaProcess,was
borneofanambitiousobjectivetotransformtheMediterraneanregionthroughthe
developmentofarangeofpolitical,economic,socialandculturalpartnerships.Concerned
aboutoverwhelmingEuropeanfocusonthenewly-liberatedstatesofCentralandEastern
EuropefollowingtheendoftheColdWar,FranceandSpainwerebothparticularlykeento
rebalanceattentiononachievingcloserintegrationoftheMediterraneanregion,keytoboth
oftheireconomicandforeignpolicyinterests.OnthepartoftheMiddleEasternandNorth
AfricanstatesaroundtheMediterraneanSea,therewasalsoastronginterestinconcluding
agreementsthatwouldgivethempreferentialaccesstocovetedEuropeanmarkets.
Tothisend,theEMPwaslaunchedatameetingofEuro-MediterraneanForeignMinistersin
Barcelonain1995.5 Theobjectivesofthisprogrammewerethreefold:
•Enhancingpoliticalandsecuritydialoguesoastoestablishacommonareaofpeace
andstability
•Expandingeconomicandfinancialcooperationandworkingtowardsthecreationofa
regionalfreetradearea
•Strengtheningdialogueandexchangeinordertopromoteunderstandingbetween
differentcultures.(EuropeanUnion1995)
Thesegoalsweretobeachievedthroughamixtureofregionalsummitsandactivity
programmes,andmoretargetedbilateralagreementsbetweentheEUanditsMediterranean
partnerstates.
Inspiteofitsadmirableintentions,commentatorsgenerallyagreethattheEMPhas
struggledtomakegoodonitspromisesofregionalregenerationandreform.Strategic
developmentsbeyondtheEU’scontrolarepartiallyresponsibleforthis.TheEMPwas
launchedduringararemomentofpoliticaloptimismintheMENAregion–shortlyafterthe
conclusionoftheOsloAccordsbetweenIsraelandthePalestinianAuthority(PA)–andwas
thereforegreatlyweakenedbythesubsequentstagnationandcollapseoftheMiddleEast
PeaceProcessinthelate1990s(Edwards2008).TheeventsofSeptember2001andterrorist
attacksinMadridandLondonhavealsohadtheunfortunateeffectofsecuritisingthe
debateaboutEurope’srelationshipwithitsneighbours,forcingtheEUtocallforgreater
opennessandcooperationwhilesimultaneouslyattemptingtostrengthenitsbordersand
protectitselffromterrorism.
However,theEMP’sfailuretopromoteclosercooperationbetweenstatestothenorthand
southoftheMediterraneanSeaalsoreflectsfundamentaldifferencesofopinionboth
betweenandwithinitsmemberstatesaboutthepurposeoftheinitiativethathavebeen
presentsinceitscreation.Althoughdesignedasanassociationofequals,someEUstates
clearlywantedtoplayindependentleadershiprolesintheirownright.Forexample,then-
PresidentJacquesChiraccommentedatthetimethatFrancedidnotwanttoleavethe
directionofEMPpolicyinthehandsofEuropeasawhole,butratherwaskeentoserveas
‘theprincipalarchitectofthis“bridge”betweentheoppositeshoresoftheMediterranean’
(referencedinEdwards2008:57).TheUK’shistoricaltiestotheregionhavealsomadeit
reluctanttorelinquishitsindependentpoliciesinrelationtoparticularMiddleEasternand
NorthAfricanstatesandadoptapan-Europeanapproach.
Meanwhile,theattitudeofsomeofthemoreauthoritarianMENAregimesoverthepast
decadehassignificantlyunderminedtheEMP’scredibilityandeffectiveness.Manyhavepaid
lipservicetotheBarcelonaDeclaration’srequirementthatStatesPartiesworktodevelopthe
ruleoflawanddemocracyintheirpoliticalsystemsandrespecthumanrightsand
fundamentalfreedoms,butfewhavemadegenuineorconsistenteffortsonthisfront.
Indeed,somestateshaveusedthedeterioratingsecuritysituationintheregionasapretext
forcrackingdownoninternaldissentwhilesimultaneouslyrequestingmoresupportfromthe
EU.Forexample,TunisiaandEgyptweregrantedconsiderableincreasesinMEDAaid6
duringthelatterhalfofthe1990s,evenastheauthoritiesinbothcountrieswerebusy
limitingwhatpoliticallibertiesdidexist(Youngs2005).
5.Attheoutset,theEMPincludedthe15(pre-enlargement)EUmemberstatesandAlgeria,Cyprus,
Egypt,Israel,Jordan,Lebanon,Malta,Morocco,thePalestinianAuthority,Syria,TunisiaandTurkey.
6.TheMEDAprogrammeisthemainfinancialinstrumentoftheEUfortheimplementationoftheEMP.
TheEMPshouldnotberegardedasanunmitigateddisaster.Itdidmakeprogressonmany
ofitscommitmentsconcerningthepromotionofculturalunderstandingbetweenEUstates
andnon-EUMediterraneanstates,notablyinthecreationofforumsliketheAnaLindh
EuromedFoundationandtheDialogueonCulturesandCivilizations.Nevertheless,itwas
clearbythetimeoftheEMP’stenthanniversaryin2005thatthese‘softer’activities,
intendingtocreateaconduciveenvironmentforthespreadofdemocracyandeconomic
growththroughouttheregion,hadnotgonefarenough,andthatanewapproachwas
required.
UnionfortheMediterranean
AtameetingoftheHeadsofStateandGovernmentattheSummitfortheMediterranean
heldinParison13July2008,theEMPwasofficiallyre-launchedasthe‘BarcelonaProcess:
UnionfortheMediterranean’.ThisdevelopmentwastheoutcomeofintensiveFrench
diplomacyoverthecourseof2007and2008,fuelledbyPresidentNicolasSarkozy’s
convictionthattheMediterraneanwastheregion‘whereeverythingisbeingplayedout’and
whereitwasthereforeimperativeforpersistenthatredstobeovercomeinorder‘tomake
spaceforagreatdreamofpeaceandcivilization’(Bennhold2007).Yetthisgrandrhetoric
alsoconcealedmoreopportunisticpoliticalconsiderationsonthepartofthenewFrench
president,whohasbeenconsistentlyopposedtotheideaoffullTurkishmembershipofthe
EUandmayhavecalculatedthatgivingTurkeyaprominentroleinanewMediterranean
Unionwouldsatisfyitsdemandsforinclusion.
AsoriginallyenvisagedbySarkozy,theMediterraneanUnionwastoincludeonlythosestates
withaMediterraneancoastline,namely:Portugal,Spain,France,Italy,Greece,Cyprus,Malta,
Turkey,Lebanon,Israel,Egypt,Libya,Tunisia,AlgeriaandMorocco.Acouncilofmember
stateswouldholdregularsummitmeetingsunderarotatingco-presidency,andthefocusof
activitieswouldbedevelopingstrongerregionalcooperationmechanismsinthefieldsof
security,energy,counter-terrorismandimmigration,allunderpinnedbyanewtrade
agreementandthecreationofaMediterraneanInvestmentBank.
WhilemostEUmembersandnon-EUMediterraneanpartnerstateswereinbroadagreement
withthestatedaimsandrationaleofsuchanorganisation,theearlyproposalsfaced
considerableoppositionfromthosewhofearedthatthisapparently‘newandimprovedEMP’
woulddomuchtoadvanceFrenchinterests,butratherlesstodeveloptherelationship
betweenEuropeanditsMediterraneanneighbours.GermanChancellorAngelaMerkelwas
particularlyoutspokeninhercriticism,arguingthatanyconsortiumthatdidnotincludeall
EUcountrieswouldruntheriskofunderminingEuropeanidealsofacommonforeignpolicy.
Implicitinthiscensurewasastrongaversiontotheideaofusingfundingfromthecommon
EUpool–towhichGermanyisthelargestsinglecontributor–forprojectswhichwouldonly
benefitsomememberstates.TurkishForeignMinisterAbdullahGulwasequallydismissiveof
Sarkozy’splans,emphasisingthatTurkishinvolvementinaMediterraneanUnioncouldnot
beregardedasasubstituteforthecontinuationofaccessiontalks.
ThescopeoftheUnionfortheMediterraneanthathasemergedfromthisnegotiation
processisthereforemuchlessambitiousthanitsarchitectshadhopedfor.7 Itsprovisionsfor
arotatingco-presidencyandapermanentsecretariatstaffedbyofficialsfromallofits
membercountriesdosetitapartfromtheEMP(seeEuropeanCommission2008)butit
remainsunclearwhetherthisnewinitiativewillbesignificantlymoreeffectivethanits
predecessor,especiallysincethesixareasidentifiedasimmediateprioritiesfortheUnionare
largelytechnicalinnature.
7.TheUnionfortheMediterraneannowincludesall27EUmemberstates,16partnerstatesfromthe
SouthernMediterraneanandtheMiddleEast(Albania,Algeria,BosniaandHerzegovina,Croatia,Egypt,
Israel,Jordan,Lebanon,Mauritania,Monaco,Montenegro,Morocco,thePalestinianAuthority,Syria,
TunisiaandTurkey)andoneobserverstate(Libya).
Initialprojectsinclude:
•CleaningupoftheMediterraneanSea
•Creationofmaritimeandlandhighways
•Initiativestocombatnaturalandman-madedisasters
•AMediterraneansolarenergyplan
•InaugurationoftheEuro-MediterraneanUniversityinSlovenia
•AMediterraneanBusinessDevelopmentInitiativethatfocusesonmicro,smalland
medium-sizedenterprises.(EuropeanCommission2009a)
Theseareworthyprojects,tobesure,buthardlyboldenoughintermsofdrivingforward
politicalreformprocessesintheregion.
ThecohesionoftheUnionfortheMediterraneanhasalsobeencalledintoseriousquestion
asaresultoftheGaza-IsraelwarinDecember2008andJanuary2009.Followingtheendof
hostilities,EgyptreportedlycalledforasuspensionofallfuturemeetingsoftheUnionin
lightofwidespreadunwillingnessonthepartofregimesintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica
toparticipateinanyforumthatincludedIsrael.ConcertedFrenchdiplomacyappearstohave
smoothedoverthisearlycrisis,buttheepisodeindicatesthefaultlinesthatwillcontinueto
plagueeffortstounitetheEUanditspartnersintheMENAregioniftheyarenotaddressed
asamatterofurgency.
EuropeanNeighbourhoodPolicy
FollowingtheenlargementoftheEUin2004,theEuropeanNeighbourhoodPolicywas
establishedasacomplementtotheBarcelonaProcess.Althoughthepolicywasintendedto
buildstrongerpoliticalandeconomicrelationshipswiththeEU’snewneighbours,itwasalso
drivenbythestrongsenseonthepartofsomememberstatesthatfurtherarrangements
wereneededtostrengthenandsecuretheEU’svastlyexpandedborders.
WhilesharingmanyoftheEMP’sguidingprinciplesandobjectives,theENPwasdesignedto
offerEUpartnercountriesmoretailoredincentivestoimplementpolitical,economicand
socialreformsthroughthenegotiationofbilateralAssociationAgreementsandActionPlans.
AccordingtoBenitaFerrero-Waldner,EuropeanCommissionerforExternalRelations,the
ENPwouldgiveeachneighbourcountrythechancetochooseitsownpathtowards
engagementwithEurope(EuropeanCommission2009b).
Since2004,theEUhasconcludedENPActionPlanswith12ofitsneighboursthatare
ineligibleforfullmembership:Armenia,Azerbaijan,Egypt,Georgia,Israel,Jordan,Lebanon,
Moldova,Morocco,theoccupiedPalestinianterritories,TunisiaandUkraine.Backedby
approximately12billioninEuropeanCommissionfundingfortheperiod2007–2013,each
ActionPlanoutlinesasetofreformsthatthepartnercountryagreestoworktowardsin
returnforavarietyofinducements,includingfinancialandtechnicalsupport,theprospectof
participatingmorefullyinarangeofEUinstitutionsandprogrammes,andenhancedaccess
totheEU’ssinglemarket.
Theexactreformprogrammeforeachpartnercountryvariesinresponsetothespecific
challengestheyface.However,commonthemesdorunacrossanumberoftheActionPlans,
includingcooperationinthefightagainstterrorism,actiontopreventtheproliferationof
weaponsofmassdestructionandjointeffortstocombatillegalmigrationflows.
ObjectivesrelatingtodemocratisationandpoliticalreformarealsoincludedineachAction
Plan,althoughthesearefrequentlydescribedinunhelpfullyvagueterms.Forexample,
Jordan’sENPActionPlanrequiresthecountryto‘takeforwardanationaldialogueon
democracyandpoliticallifewithintheframeworkofthenationalpoliticaldevelopmentplan’,
butfailstoprovideaclearexplanationofwhatthismeansinpractice(EuropeanCommission
2005).Fundingfordemocracyandgovernance-relatedreformprojectshastendedto
accountforaverysmallpercentageofENPaid,withthebalanceoffinancialresourcesbeing
directedintoprogrammesrelatingtoeconomicinfrastructureandinstitutions.
Todate,theEUhasprovedreluctanttowithholdfundsfromcountriesthatrenegeontheir
obligationsrelatingtopoliticalreform,preferringinsteadtorelyonasystemof‘positive
conditionality’andreward.ThislikelyaccountsforthefactthatMoroccoandEgyptaretwo
ofthelargestbeneficiariesofthefundingthatischannelledthroughtheEuropean
NeighbourhoodPartnershipInstrument(ENPI),eventhoughbothcountriescontinuetoface
significantchallengesintermsoftheirlevelsofpoliticalfreedomandopennessandtheir
respectforhumanrights(forinformationontheallocationofENPIfunds,seeEuropean
Commission2007a).
However,thisapproachdoesnotseemtohavebeenparticularlysuccessfulinachievingits
desiredgoals.WithouttheprospectoffullEUmembershiporsignificantfinancial
compensationtomotivatethem,fewoftheMENAcountriesinvolvedintheENPprogramme
havedemonstratedmuchenthusiasmforengaginginmeaningfulreformoftheirpolitical
systems.
TheEUhasrecognisedsomeoftheENP’sshortcomingsonthisfront.InApril2008afirst
setofreportsontheperformanceofeachENPpartnercountryconcededthatnotenough
progresshadbeenmadeacrosstheboardinrelationtopoliticalgovernanceandidentified
thisasapriorityforthefuture.However,manycommentatorsstilltakearatherdimviewof
theEU’scommitmenttopromotingdemocracyinitsneighbourhood,notingthatthe
expansionofsecurityandeconomicrelationscontinuestotakeprecedenceoversupportfor
genuinepoliticalreform(Youngs2008).
TheEUandtheMiddleEastPeaceProcess
Europeanstateshavebecomeincreasinglyengagedinconflictresolutioneffortsinthe
MiddleEastinrecentyears,asthedirectsecurityandeconomicimplicationsofregional
conflagrationforEuropehavebecomemoreapparent.SofartheEUhasfocusedon
achievingatwo-statesolutiontotheIsraeli-Palestinianconflict,whichitviewsasbeing
criticaltothestabilityoftheMENAregionasawhole.Tothisendithasprovided
supportforPalestinianinstitutionsandstate-buildingprojects,attemptedtoaddressthe
widerconflictbetweenIsraelanditsneighboursandworkedtocreateamorepeaceful
andprosperousregionalenvironmentthroughtheaforementionedEuro-Mediterranean
PartnershipandEuropeanNeighbourhoodPolicy(Asseburg2009).However,itisonly
veryrecentlythatEuropehasmovedawayfromitstraditionalroleastheUnitedStates’
juniorpartnerinthisfield.
AftertheMadridpeacetalksin1991,theEUbecameheavilyinvolvedintheMiddleEast
PeaceProcess,providingconsiderablemonetaryandtechnicalsupporttoboththeRegional
EconomicDevelopmentWorkingGroup8 andtotheUnitedNationsRefugeeandWorks
AgencyforPalestinianRefugeesintheNearEast(UNWRA).Ithasalsosupportedavariety
ofconfidence-buildingcivilsocietyinitiativesbetweenIsraeliandPalestiniancitizens.Yet
whiletheseactivitiesareinherentlypoliticalinnature,predicatedastheyareonthegoalof
developingaviablePalestinianstatethatcantakeitsplaceintheinternationalcommunity
alongsideIsrael,theEUhasbeensurprisinglyreluctanttoinvolveitselfatthesharpendof
peacenegotiations,preferringtoleavethistotheUnitedStates(Asseburg2009).
8.TheRegionalEconomicDevelopmentWorkingGroupwasestablishedin1992toaddresstheissuesof
infrastructure,trade,financeandtourismdevelopmentintheMiddleEast,includingtheWestBankand
Gaza(IsraelMinistryofForeignAffairs2000).
ThisattitudehasalsobeenvisibleinrelationtoEurope’sparticipationintheso-called
QuartetontheMiddleEast,whichcoordinatesUN,EU,USandRussianpolicyonthepeace
processandwasresponsiblefordevelopingthe2003‘roadmap’thathasservedasaplanfor
Palestiniansovereignty.Since2007,theQuartet’sprimaryobjectivehasbeentobuttressthe
US-initiated‘AnnapolisProcess’,whichseekstolaythegroundworkforatwo-statesolution
totheIsraeli-Palestinianconflictthroughasustainedprocessofpoliticaldialogueand
economicsupportforPalestinianstate-building.
Again,theEUhasbeenparticularlyactiveonthefinancialfront,andinDecember2007
theEuropeanCommissionco-chairedadonors’conferenceinParisthatgeneratedover
5billioninpledgestosupportthePalestinianReformandDevelopmentPlanmanaged
bythePalestinianAuthority.Europeanassistanceaccountedforalmostafifthofthis
total(includingECandbilateralmemberstatecontributions).Followingtheexpirationof
theceasefirebetweenHamasandIsraelinlate2008andthesubsequentwarinGaza,the
EUannouncedafurtherpledgeof440millioninsupportofthePalestinianeconomy
andthereconstructionofGazaataconferenceinSharmEl-SheikhinMarch2009
(EuropeanCommission2009c).Intheory,thiseconomiccloutgivestheEUagooddeal
ofleveragetobringtobearonthepeaceprocess.However,ithasnotmadethemostof
thisinfluence,deferringinsteadtotheambitiousbutflawedpoliticalstrategypursuedby
theUS.
TheconflictinGazaduringDecember2008andJanuary2009exposedtheserious
limitationsoftheAnnapolisframeworkasatoolcapableofdeliveringasustainablepeace
settlementintheregion(Hanelt2008).Toomanykeyplayerswereleftoutofthepolitical
dialoguefromtheoutset,whileeconomicaidchannelledthroughthePalestinianAuthorityin
theWestBankhasfailedtoaddressthedirelivingconditionsexperiencedbyPalestinians
livinginGaza.Anewapproachthattakesintoaccounttherealitiesofpowerstructuresin
theregionisthereforeurgentlyneeded.TherecentchangeofleadershipintheUSoffersa
valuableopportunityforafundamentalchangeinpolicies,anditmustbehopedthatthe
EU,workingthroughtheQuartetandtheotherregionalcooperationmechanismsdescribed
above,willadoptamoreproactivepoliticalstrategythatmakesbetteruseofitsconsiderable
diplomaticandeconomicassets.
UKpolicy
CurrentUKpolicytowardstheMiddleEastandNorthAfricahasbeendecisivelyshapedby
itscolonialhistoryandbyits‘specialrelationship’withtheUS,withtheformeraccounting
forthepersistenceofclosetiesbetweentheUKgovernmentandanumberofauthoritarian
regimesintheregion,andthelatterhavingdrawntheBritishmilitaryintotheUS-led
coalitionoperationinIraq.Untilveryrecently,thisconflictwasthefocusofUKpolicy
attentionintheMiddleEast.9 However,thegovernmenthasanumberofotherstrategic
prioritiesintheregion,includingsupportforpoliticalandeconomicdevelopmentand
resolutionoftheIsraeli-Palestinianconflict.
Asoneofthelargestdonornationsintheworld,theUKhasbeenaconsistentsupporterof
developmentintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica,anddeliversasignificantamountof
fundingtothisregionthroughtheDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment(DFID)and
otherofficialgovernmentsourcesandthroughcontributionstomultilateralorganisations
suchastheUNandtheEU.Table1belowshowstheUK’soverseasdevelopmentassistance
(ODA)expenditureintheMENAregionoverthepastfewyears.
9.TheUKofficiallywithdrewitsmilitaryforcesfromIraqinMay2009,althoughitwillcontinueto
supportandtrainIraqisecurityforcesinBasra.
Table1.OverseasdevelopmentassistancespentbytheUKintheMENAregion,2003–2008
Years TotalDFIDbilateral AidfromotherUK Totalbilateralgrosspublic
programme(£000) officialsources(£000) expenditure(£000)
2003/04 241,187 39,760 280,947
2004/05 84,113 384,010 468,123
2005/06 118,896 355,436 474,332
2006/07 104,638 42,536 147,174
2007/08 100,196 5,724 105,920
Note:ThesefiguresrepresentthesumtotalofUKaidtoAlgeria,Egypt,Libya,Morocco,Tunisia,Iran,Iraq,Jordan,Lebanon,
Oman,SaudiArabia,Syria,UnitedArabEmirates,theWestBankandGaza(theOccupiedPalestinianTerritories)andYemen.
Source:DepartmentforInternationalDevelopment2008
ReconstructioninIraqaccountsforaconsiderableproportionofthisfunding,particularly
duringtheyears2004to2006.ButDFIDisalsoheavilyengagedinYemen,whereitrecently
signedaDevelopmentPartnershipArrangement(DPA):thefirst10-yearDPAintheMiddle
East.AndmorethanhalfofDFID’stotalprogrammefundingintheMENAregionisnow
concentratedintheOccupiedPalestinianTerritories,whereitisworkingwiththePalestinian
Authoritytoimprovethedeliveryofpublicservices,tosupportrefugeesandtopromote
securitysectorreformandeconomicgrowth(DFID2009).
Thishumanitariananddevelopmentassistancesitsalongsidethegovernment’ssupportfor
thepoliticaltrackofthepeaceprocess,whereitsstatedpositionisthatitfavoursa‘two
statesolution’totheconflict(basedon1967borders),withJerusalemservingasthejoint
capitalof‘anIsraelthatissecurefromattackandrecognisedbyandatpeacewithits
neighbours’and‘ademocratic,viableandcontiguousstateofPalestinecommittedtolive
peacefullyalongsideIsrael’(ForeignandCommonwealthOffice2009).
However,thisstancehasnotalwayspreventedthegovernmentfrombeingaccusedof
partisanshipinitsapproachtotheIsraeli-Palestinianconflict,withcriticssuggestingthatUK
leadersshouldhavebeenmuchmorevocalincriticisingIsraelduringitssummerwarwith
Lebanonin2006anditsoffensiveinGazainlate2008andearly2009(King2006,Rayner
2009).ThegovernmenthasalsocomeunderfireforitscloseadherencetounpopularUS
policesintheMENAregionsince2003,andforitsreluctancetoaccepttheideathatthere
maybecausallinksbetweenUKforeignpolicyintheMiddleEastandradicalisationand
terrorismbothathomeandabroad.In2006,thenPrimeMinisterTonyBlairarguedina
speechtotheLosAngelesWorldAffairsCouncilthatan‘arcofextremism’wasstretching
acrosstheMiddleEastandimpactingwithincreasingforceoncountriesfaroutsidethe
region,butrefutedclaimsthatthisdevelopmentwasrelatedtowesternactionsinIraq(Blair
2006).
Thereareencouragingsignsthatthisofficialstanceischanging.Indeed,themostrecentUK
counter-terrorismstrategyexplicitlyacknowledgedthefactthattheperceptionofBritish
foreignpolicyisoneofthefactorsdrivingviolentextremism(HomeOffice2009b).Butthere
isstillaconsiderableamountofworktobedonetorepairtheUK’simageintheMiddleEast
andNorthAfrica.
USpolicy
ThroughouttheColdWar,supportforIsrael,theprotectionofstableenergysuppliesandthe
maintenanceofgoodrelationshipswithauthoritarianregimesfriendlytotheWestand
hostiletotheSovietUnionservedasthebroadobjectivesofUSpolicyintheMENAregion.
ThefirsttwogoalswereunaffectedbythecollapseofSovietcommunismattheendofthe
1980s.Butthealteredregionalpoliticalcontextinthepost-ColdWarenvironmentdidopen
upmorespaceforUSinitiativesaimedatamelioratingtheArab-Israeliconflict.Diplomatic
achievementsofthisperiodincludedthetwin-trackMadridPeaceProcesslaunchedin1991,
andtheOsloAccordsof1993,whichestablishedaframeworkfordirectnegotiations
betweenIsraelandthePalestineLiberationOrganisation(PLO).
DuringthepresidencyofGeorgeW.Bush,coreUSinterestsintheMENAregiondidnot
change.However,thepoliciestodeliverthesegoalsandthepoliticalnarrativethat
underpinnedthemdidundergoafundamentalreorientation,particularlyaftertheshocking
eventsof11September2001.WhilePresidentsBushSeniorandClintonhadbothregarded
resolutionoftheArab-IsraeliconflictasthekeytocreatingastableandpeacefulMiddle
East,manyinthe2001–08Bushadministrationfeltthatthisapproachdidnotgofar
enough.Inthepost-9/11periodinfluentialvoicescallingforaconcertedefforttodisrupt
theactivitiesof‘spoiler’stateslikeIraq,IranandSyriafoundareceptiveaudience.
TheoutcomeofthisshiftinthinkingwasthepublicationofanewNationalSecurityStrategy
in2002,whichputforwardadoctrineofpre-emptivemilitaryactionagainstterroristsand
roguestatesthatwerebelievedtopossessweaponsofmassdestruction(Dunne2008).To
mitigatethestarkmessagesentbythischangeinpolicy,emphasiswassimultaneously
placedonsupportingthespreadofdemocracyandfreedomaroundtheworld,and
particularlyintheMiddleEast.
This‘FreedomAgenda’,asitcametobeknown,critiquedthewillingnessofwesternpowers
toignorethepervasivepoliticalcultureofauthoritarianismandrepressionintheMiddleEast,
andcommittedtheUStomainstreamingpromotionofdemocracythroughallofitsactivities
intheregion.Undoubtedly,thisdoctrinaljustificationaimedtomaketheAmerican-led
invasionofIraqmorepalatabletocoalitionpartnersanddomesticconstituencies,particularly
afterthefailuretofindevidenceofanIraqiprogrammeofWeaponsofMassDestruction.
ButitdidpromptasignificantintensificationofUSdemocracypromotioneffortsinthe
regionbetween2003and2006,includingtheexpansionofexistingaidprogrammes
supportingpolitical,economicandsocialreform10,aswellasthecreationoftwonew
programmes:theMiddleEastPartnershipInitiative(MEPI)andtheBroaderMiddleEastand
NorthAfricaInitiative(BMENA).
MEPIwasestablishedin2002asanalternativetolarge-scalegovernment-to-governmentaid
policies.Takingonboardtherecommendationsofthatyear’sArabHumanDevelopment
Report,itaimedtosupportnon-governmental,academicandprivatesectorgroupsworking
topromotepoliticalfreedom,economicdevelopment,knowledgeandcapacity-buildingand
women’sempowerment.MEPIhasdisbursedUS$530milliontomorethan600projectssince
itsinceptionanddespiteashakystartnowstandsoutasoneofthefewsuccessstoriesof
USengagementondemocracypromotionissues.Withitsfocusondevelopingstronglinks
betweenUSembassiesandcivilsociety,itsresponsivenesstotheneedsandinterestsof
citizensintheregionthroughaprogrammeofgrant-tenderinganditsintegrationintopolicy
planningmechanismsinWashington,ithasbecomeaneffectivetoolofAmericanforeignaid
anddiplomacyintheregion(seeWittesandMasloski2009).
Comparativelyspeaking,theBMENAprogrammehashadfarlessofanimpact.Itwas
createdunderG-8auspicesin2004attheinitiativeoftheUS,andwasintendedtoserveas
abridgingmechanismforclosertransatlanticcooperationonthequestionofMENAreform.
However,itseffectivenesswasweakenedfromtheoutsetbytheoppositionofMiddle
EasternandNorthAfricanleaders,manyofwhombelievedthatitwasacovertattemptto
imposeforeignpoliticalmodelsontheregionbyforce.AlackofconsensusbetweentheEU
andtheUSonBMENA’sstructureandobjectiveshasalsodiminisheditsstanding,anditis
10.IntheUSdemocracypromotionassistanceischannelledprimarilythroughtheUSAgencyfor
InternationalDevelopment(USAID),anindependentfederalgovernmentagencythatreceivesoverall
foreignpolicyguidancefromtheSecretaryofState,aswellasquasi-independentnon-profit
organisationsliketheNationalEndowmentforDemocracy(NED)andtheInternationalRepublican
Institute(IRI).
nowregardedasmoreofatalkingshopthanaprocessofdialoguecapableofimproving
coordinationofdemocracypromotionbetweenwesternpartners.
Policyinapost-Bushera
AlthoughUSpolicytowardstheMiddleEastandNorthAfricaoverthepasteightyearshas
beencouchedintermsofspreadingdemocracyandprosperity,theoutcomescouldhardlybe
furtherfromthestatedintentions.Theprotractedanddeeplydivisivenatureoftheconflict
inIraq,thereviledrhetoricofthe‘waronterror’andthehumanrightsabusesperpetratedby
membersoftheUSmilitaryagainstcaptivesintheAbuGhraibandGuantanamoprisons
havegreatlydamagedtheUnitedStates’standingintheregion.Emboldenedbythecollapse
ofIraq,Iranhasmovedclosertoachievingitsgoalofbecomingtheregion’shegemon
throughexpansionofitsnuclearprogrammeanditssupportforHamas,Hezbollah,the
TalibanandinsurgentIraqiShi’amovements.Meanwhile,theIsraeli-Palestiniancrisishas
worsenedsignificantly,despiteattemptstorevivenegotiationsthroughtheAnnapolis
process,andtherehavebeenfewsignsofgenuinedemocratisationanywhereintheregion.
TherecentchangeinAmericanleadershiphasraisedhopesthatthissituationwillimprove,
andwhileitisstilltooearlytoevaluatethelong-termimplicationsofPresidentObama’s
earlyactionsinofficewithrespecttotheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica,aclearshiftin
strategyhasalreadybeenobserved.DuringherfirstvisittotheMENAregionasSecretaryof
StateinMarch2009,HillaryClintonspokeofthegovernment’s‘unshakable,durable,
fundamentalrelationshipandsupportfortheStateofIsrael’,suggestingthattheUS’s
traditionalpolicyofunswervingsupportforIsraelmightnotchange(Clinton2009).
However,Obama’spolicystatementsinsubsequentmonthshavedemonstratedhisresolve
tobecomealessuncriticalfriendtoIsrael.InakeypolicyspeechdeliveredinCairothisJune,
heaffirmedhissupportforatwo-statesolutiontotheIsraeli-Palestinianconflict,demanding
thatallparties,includingtheUS,makegoodontheirpromisesinrespecttodeliveringa
sustainablepeace.Unexpectedly,healsoexpressedclearoppositiontothecontroversial
IsraelisettlementprocessintheWestBank,andcalledonIsraelto‘liveuptoitsobligationto
ensurethatPalestinianscanlive,andwork,anddeveloptheirsociety’(BBC2009d).
Morebroadly,thisspeechwasanattempttorecalibraterelationsbetweentheUSandthe
MuslimworldandtodispelthenotionthatthereissomekindofManichean‘clashof
civilisations’betweenthetwo.Itbuiltonearlierstatementsabouttheneedtotalktoall
leadersintheregion,whethertheyarefriendsorfoes,andindeedObamahasalready
offeredolivebranchestoIranandSyriabyassertingthatifthesecountries‘arewillingto
unclenchtheirfists,theywillfindanextendedhand’fromtheUS(BBC2009b).Diplomatic
contactswithSyriahavesubsequentlybeenincreasedandinMarch2009Obamasurprised
manyobserversbybroadcastingarecordedmessagefortheIranianpeopleandleadership
thatcalledfor‘newbeginnings’intherelationshipbetweentheUSandIran,andclaimed
thattheUSAdministrationwas‘nowcommittedtodiplomacythataddressesthefullrange
ofissuesbeforeus’(Reid2009).
ThepoliticalturmoilinIranfollowingthedisputedpresidentialelectionsinJunehasnot
beenconducivetothiskindofdialogue,anditisclearthattherearemanywithintheUS
policymakingestablishmentwhocontinuetoshareneoconservativeconcernsaboutregimes
inDamascusandTehran.Nevertheless,thisrenewedfocusonimprovingUSrelationswith
traditionaladversariesthroughdiplomaticengagementisapositivedevelopmentthatshould
notbedismissed.Thenextchapterconsiderstheprospectsforasimilarchangeinpolicy
towardsIslamistoppositionmovementsintheregion.
6.WesternengagementwithIslamistmovementsintheMENAregion
NorthAmericanandEuropeanpolicymakershaveoftenbeencriticisedfortheirtendencyto
treatpoliticalIslamasamonolithicanduniformlynegativephenomenon,andfortheirfailure
toappreciatetherolethatnon-violentIslamistpartiesmightplayinaddressingpolitical
stagnationintheregion.Thischargeisperhapsnolongerasfairasitusedtobe.More
robustresearchonbothsidesoftheAtlanticandintheMENAregionhasledtoincreasing
recognitionofthefactthatpoliticalIslamisnotafixedideologywithaclearlyidentifiable
setofvaluesandobjectives,butratherafluidphenomenonthatencompassesarangeof
movementswithdifferentphilosophies,principlesandagendas.
However,animprovedunderstandingofthesegroupshasnotyetproducedacoherent
accountofhowwesternpolicymakersmightengagewiththempolitically.Asnotedinthe
previouschapter,economicandsecurityinterestsintheMiddleEastandNorthAfricahave
ledwesterngovernmentstoplaceahighpremiumonregionalstability,whichhasmeant
offeringfairlyuncriticalsupporttoautocraticregimesandfailingtobuildstrategic
relationshipswithotherpotentialreformactors,includingnon-violentIslamistmovements.
ThischapterconsidersrecentEU,UKandUSpolicytowardstherangeofIslamistpartiesand
movementsintheregion,lookingatofficialpoliciesorstatementswheretheyexistaswellas
moreinformalattemptstoengageindialogue.
EuropeanUnionpolicy
OfficialEUpolicystatementsacknowledgethepotentialsignificanceofnon-violentIslamist
partiesasaforceforchange.TheEuropeanCommission’smostrecentstrategypaperforthe
EuropeanNeighbourhoodandPartnershipInstrumentnotedthe‘rapidriseofmoderateand
reformistpoliticalIslammovements’anddescribedthemasafactorputtingpressureon
politicalregimesintheregion(EuropeanCommission2007b:7).Meanwhile,the2005
EuropeanUnionStrategyforCombatingRadicalisationandRecruitmenttoTerrorismasserted
thattheEUneeded‘toempowermoderatevoicesbyengagingwithMuslimorganisations
andfaithgroupsthatrejectthedistortedversionofIslamputforwardby[Al-Qaeda]and
others’andtoensurethatitsownpoliciesdidnotexacerbateexistingtensions(Councilof
theEuropeanUnion2005:4).Itmighthavebeenexpectedthattheseconclusionswould
haveledtheEUtodevelopastrategicplanfordrawingnon-violentIslamistsintomore
structuredframeworksofdialogueandcooperation,butthishasnotyetmaterialised.
Lessconstrainedbytheneedtoachieveconsensus,theEuropeanParliamenthasbeenmore
forthrightinitsstatementsaboutengagingwithIslamists.InaMay2007‘Resolutionon
ReformsintheArabWorld’draftedbyMichelRocard,formerFrenchPrimeMinster,EU
parliamentarianscalledexplicitlyforEuropetoprovidevisiblepoliticalsupportto‘those
politicalorganisationswhichpromotedemocracybynon-violentmeans,excludingsectarian,
fundamentalistandextremistnationalistforcesbutincluding,whereappropriate,secular
actorsandmoderateIslamists’(EuropeanParliament2007).
Europeanparliamentarianshavealsobeenoutspokenintheircondemnationofgovernments
intheMENAregimethatusearbitraryarrestsandforcetolimitthefreedomoflegitimate
oppositionmovements,whichwouldpresumablyincludenon-violentIslamists.Forexample,
inJanuary2008,aEuropeanParliamentresolutionwaspassedurgingEgypt‘toendallforms
ofharassment,includingjudicialmeasures,detentionofmediaprofessionalsand,more
generally,humanrightsdefendersandactivists’andcallingforachangeinthelawon
militarycourts,whichcriticssaythatEgyptianauthoritieshavesometimesusedagainst
politicalopponents(EuropeanParliament2008).Thismorepositiveapproachtothequestion
ofengagementbetweenwesterngovernmentsandpoliticalIslamistshasgonelargely
unnoticedbythewiderEUpolicymakingcommunity(Kausch2009).
InternaldisagreementsamongEUmemberstatesarepartiallyresponsibleforthis
policymakingparalysis.SomeEUdiplomatsthinkthatitisunnecessarytocreateaspecial
policyforengagingwithIslamists,believingthattheyshouldbeincludedindialogue
alongsideotherrepresentativesocietalgroupsratherthanbeingsingledoutandgiven
disproportionateprominence.Othersbelievethatthisissueismoreappropriatelyhandled
throughbilateraldiplomacywiththeMENAcountriesinquestion,andindeedmany
Europeanstateshavecreatedspecificdepartmentsorpoststhataretaskedwithimproving
relationswiththeIslamicworld(Kausch2009).TheseincludetheGermanFederalForeign
Office’sDialoguewiththeIslamicWorldunitandtheAdviserforRelationswiththeIslamic
WorldintheDutchForeignMinistry.
However,thesetentativestepsonthepartofindividualEUmemberstatesareunlikelytobe
matchedattheinstitutionallevel,giventheabsenceofasharedEuropeanviewonwhether
itisdesirabletopromotedirectengagementwithmainstreamIslamistpartiessuchasthe
PJDinMoroccoortheIAFinJordan,letalonegroupslikeHezbollahandHamasthat
commandreasonablyhighlevelsofpopularandelectorallegitimacy,butthatcontinueto
retainarmedwings.
ThisambivalenceaboutengagementisnotlimitedtoEUpolicymakers.Assurveysconducted
forthisresearchprojectandotherstudieshaveshown,alackofunderstandingandsuspicion
alsoexistsamongmanyIslamistsaboutwhattheEMPandtheENPaimtoachieveandhow
theyarerelevanttotheconcernsoractionsofIslamistpoliticalparties(seeEmersonand
Youngs2007).AmemberoftheIAFinterviewedforippr’scasestudyexpressedhis
misgivingsaboutmeetingsorganisedundertherubricof‘Mediterraneancooperation’,
viewingtheseasanunderhandwayof‘normalisingrelationsbetweenIsraelandtheArab
countries’(Glennie2007:15).Othershavecriticisedtheperceiveddoublestandardsinherent
inEurope’sdeclaredsupportforthespreadofdemocracyintheregionandtherefusalofthe
EUandthemajorityofitsmemberstatestoengageindialoguewithHamaswhenitcameto
powerfollowingelectionsthatweregenerallyconsideredtobefreeandfair.
ThismayreflectafailureonthepartofIslamistpoliticianstomakeaconcertedeffortto
understandthenuancesofEuropeanforeignpolicy.However,italsosuggeststhattheEU
hasalongwaytogoifithopestoclarifyitspositiononengagingwithpoliticalopposition
forcesintheregion,includingnon-violentIslamists.
UKpolicy
WhiletheUKgovernmenthasbeenmoreexercisedbythequestionofengagingwith
IslamiststhanmanyofitsEuropeancounterparts,thishasnotyettranslatedintothe
formulationofaconsistentstanceonthisissue.OfficialcontactwithsomeoftheIslamist
movementsconsideredinthisproject,specificallythePJDinMoroccoandtheIAFinJordan,
hasbeenrelativelyunproblematic,ifnotparticularlyextensive.Forinstance,representatives
ofthesemovementshaveoftenbeengrantedvisastoattendandspeakatconferencesand
seminarsintheUK(includingatanipprsymposiumonpoliticalIslamheldinLondonin
November2008).Somecontactalsooccursintheregion,withmembersoftheUK’s
diplomaticservicetakingpartineventswhereparliamentariansfromthesemovementsare
expectedtobepresent.
However,theUKgovernmenthassentmixedmessagesaboutitspositiononengagement
throughitsofficialpolicies.In2004,theForeignandCommonwealthOfficeestablishedan
EngagingwiththeIslamicWorldGroup(EIWG)toenabletheUKtoenhanceits
‘understandingandengagementwithMuslimcountriesandcommunities’(FCO2006).
Initiallythisinvolvedthedisbursementoftargetedfundingforprojectsthatsoughtto
promotegoodgovernance,theruleoflawandgenderequalityintheMENAregion.
However,thefocusoftheprogrammeshiftedaftertheJuly2005bombingsinLondon,with
moreattentionbeingpaidtoaddressingtherootcausesofradicalisationandcounteringthe
narrativeofterrorismintheUKandabroad.
Thegovernment’snewprioritiesonthisfrontwereformalisedinDecember2007,whenthe
EIWGwasmergedwiththeFCO’sCounterTerrorismPolicyDepartmenttoformanew
CounterTerrorismDepartment(CTD).11 Officialsclaimthatthenewdepartmentwillcontinue
tobuildonearlierworktocounterthefrustrationsthatleaveMuslimindividualsand
communitiessusceptibletotheappealofviolentideologies.However,whilethismaywellbe
thecase,thedecisiontofoldinitiativesdesignedtopromoteengagementwiththeMuslim
worldintocounter-terrorismprogrammesdoesnotsendapositivesignaltopopularbutnon-
violentIslamistgroups,whichmightserveaspartnersinaddressingthedemocraticdeficitsin
theMENAregion.
In2006,aseriesofinternaldocumentsleakedbyaForeignOfficeofficialandpublishedin
theNewStatesman revealedtheextentofdisagreementsamongseniorUKpolicymakers
aboutthepotentialbenefitsandcostsofdevelopingcloserrelationshipswithmainstream
Islamistparties.Inparticular,thesememosadvocatedthestrengtheningoftiesbetweenthe
UKandtheMuslimBrotherhoodinEgypt,observingthatitwouldbesensibletolookfor
waystoinfluencethisgroupgiventheextentofitsgrassrootssupportinEgypt.Itwas
furthersuggestedthatengagingwiththeBrotherhoodwouldprovideanopportunity‘to
challengetheirperceptionoftheWest,includingoftheUK,andtheirprescriptionsfor
solvingthechallengesfacingEgyptandtheregion’(Bright2006).
ThisoptimisticreadingofdomesticcurrentsintheMENAregionwasnotsharedbyall.One
formerUKambassadortoEgyptwasparticularlyscathinginhiscritiqueofthepro-
engagementlobby,arguingthat‘engagingwiththeIslamicworld’shouldnotbeconfused
with‘engagingwithIslamism’,andwarningagainstplayingdown‘theveryrealdownsides
for[theUK]intermsoftheIslamists’likelyforeignandsocialpolicies,shouldtheyactually
achievepowerincountriessuchasEgypt’(ibid).
Atthetime,thispublicairingofinternaldebatesappearedtosapofficialenthusiasmfor
engagementwithIslamistgroups,despiteoccasionalstatementstothecontraryby
influentialindividuals.In2008forexample,then-DefenceSecretaryDesBrowne
suggestedthatitmightbenecessarytotalktosomeelementsoftheTalibanand
HezbollahinordertoreachpoliticalsettlementsinAfghanistanandLebanon(Sylvester
2008).InalettertoTheTimes inFebruary2009severalrespectedanalystscalledon
westernpolicymakerstoinvolveHamasinMiddleEastpeacetalks(TheTimes 2009).
DrawingparallelswiththesituationinNorthernIreland,JonathanPowell(formerChiefof
StafftoTonyBlair)andSirHughOrde(ChiefConstableofthePoliceServiceofNorthern
Ireland)havegoneevenfurtherbyassertingthatitmightbeworthopeningsome
channelsofcommunicationwithAl-Qaeda(Katz2008,BBC2008).Thislineofargument
hashadlittletractionamongthewiderforeignpolicymakingcommunityintheUK,
however.
InMarch2009,theForeignOfficeannounceditsintentiontostartengagingindialogue
withmembersofthepoliticalbranchofHezbollahinastatementtotheForeignAffairs
SelectCommittee(Black2009).FCOMinisterBillRammellattributedthisdecisionto
‘positivedevelopmentsinLebanon,includingtheformationofthenationalunity
governmentinwhichHezbollahareparticipating’andindicatedthattheUKwould
explorethepotentialtoexpandcertaincontactsatanofficiallevel(ForeignAffairsSelect
Committee2009).ThisstatementwasfollowedupwithaninvitationtoaHezbollahMP
toparticipateinameetingofUKparliamentariansorganisedtodiscussregionalissues.
TheForeignOffice’sapparentreversalinpolicyonthisissueisacontentiousmove,but
onethathasthepotentialtosetinmotionawiderstrategicreorientationintheUK’s
approachtoengagingwithpoliticalIslamistsacrosstheMENAregion.
11.TheCTDhasbeentaskedwithtakingforwardtheUKgovernment’scounter-terrorismstrategy
(CONTEST),whichencompassespreventionactivities(stoppingpeoplefrombecomingterroristsor
supportingviolentextremism),pursuitofterroristsuspects,protectionagainstterroristattacks,and
preparation(tomitigatetheimpactsofattacksthatcannotbeprevented).Formoreinformation,see
HomeOffice2009a.
USpolicy
Insomerespects,theUShasgonefurtherthantheUKandotherEuropeanstatesinterms
ofitsengagementwithpoliticalIslamistpartiesandmovements.Itwasdrawnintothe
morassofsectarianpoliticsinIraqfollowingthe2003invasionandhashadextensive
dealingswiththerangeofpoliticalIslamistgroupscompetingforinfluencethere,particularly
theShi’aparties.Ithasalsopursuedmoreinformalcontactswithsomeofthenon-violent
Islamistpartiesdescribedinthispaperthroughthedemocracypromotioneffortsofquasi-
governmentalbodiesliketheNationalDemocraticInstitute(NDI)andtheInternational
RepublicanInstitute(IRI).However,theUSStateDepartmentcontinuestoplacerestrictions
onofficialcontactswithIslamistoppositionmovements,andhasconsistentlyrefusedto
engagepubliclywitheitherHamasorHezbollah,whicharebothincludedonitslistof
foreignterroristorganisations(USDepartmentofState2005).
TheveryrealideologicalandpoliticaldifferencesbetweenthevariousIslamistgroupsinthe
MENAregiondefiedtheattemptsoftheBushadministrationtodevelopa‘onesizefitsall’
approachtoengagement(AsseburgandBrumberg2007).Asaresult,theintensityofUS
relationswithmainstreamIslamistpartiesoverthepasteightyearshastendedtovary
considerablyfromcountrytocountry,fluctuatinginlinewithwiderpoliticaldevelopmentsin
theregion.Forexample,USdesiretomaintaingoodrelationswiththeregimesinJordanand
EgypthaslimiteditswillingnesstoengagewithIslamistpartiesinbothofthesecountries.
Indeed,theStateDepartmenthasdecreedthatnoformalcontactcanbemadewith
membersofEgypt’sMuslimBrotherhood,giventhattheorganisationisbannedunder
Egyptianlaw.ThishasnotalwayspreventedUSofficialsfromtakingpartinmeetingswhere
membersoftheBrotherhoodorIAFparliamentaryblocsarepresent(Sharp2006).Butitis
verydifferentfromthesituationinothercountries,wheredialoguewithIslamistopposition
groupsislessproblematic.
InYemen,theNationalDemocraticInstitutehashadfrequentdiscussionswithmoderate
representativesoftheIslahparty,involvingtheminitspoliticaltrainingprogrammes
alongsideotheroppositiongroups(Yacoubian2007).AndinMorocco,PJDleadershavehad
fairlyregularcontactwithUSembassyofficialsandexperiencefewdifficultiesinobtaining
visastotheUnitedStates(OttawayandRiley2006).InMay2006thePJD’sthen-General
Secretary,SaadEddineEl-Othmani,spokeataneventinWashingtonorganisedbythe
CarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeace.ThisfollowedaPJDconferenceinRabatin
March2006onAmericandecision-makinganditsimpactonMoroccan-Americanrelations,
towhichAmericangovernmentandacademicrepresentativeswereinvited.ThePJD’s
apparententhusiasmforengagingwiththeUScooledoverthecourseof2007and2008in
responsetoAmericansupportforIsrael’swarwithLebanoninthesummerof2006,butmay
berenewedbythechangeofleadershipintheWhiteHouse.
Asdiscussedinthepreviouschapter,PresidentObamaappearsfarmorewillingthanhis
predecessortoengageindialoguewithstatesorpoliticaloppositiongroupsthatholdviews
thatareantitheticaltoUSinterests.HistentativestepstowardsrestartingdialoguewithIran
andSyriaalreadysuggestthelikelycontoursofanewUSpolicyintheMiddleEast,one
whichpubliclyemphasisesdialogueandconciliationanddownplaysthethreatoftheuseof
force.However,thisdoesnotimplythatpreviousthresholdsforengagementwithIslamist
oppositiongroupshavebeencompletelyjettisoned.
SpeakingaboutHamasandHezbollahduringaninterviewinearly2008,Obamarejected
theiruseofviolenceasatoolofpoliticalchangealthoughheacknowledgedtheir‘legitimate
claims’andassertedthat‘iftheydecidetoshift,[theUSis]goingtorecognizethat’(Brooks
2008).ButUSforeignpolicyofficialshavereactedangrilytotheUK’sdecisiontoreopen
channelsofcommunicationwithHezbollah’spoliticalwing,andinarecentvisittoLebanon,
Vice-PresidentJoeBidenissuedaveiledwarningtothoseamongthepopulationconsidering
votingforHezbollahinparliamentaryelectionsinJune(BBC2009c).
Similarly,itseemsclearthatdialoguewithHamaswillonlyoccurifpoliticallydifficult
preconditionsaremetbytheIslamistmovement.CriticisingformerPresidentJimmyCarter’s
decisiontomeetwithHamasin2008,ObamadeclaredatthetimethattheUS‘mustnot
negotiatewithaterroristgroupintentonIsrael’sdestruction[and]shouldonlysitdownwith
Hamasiftheyrenounceterrorism,recognizeIsrael’srighttoexistandabidebypast
agreements’(Wulfhorst2008).DespitereportsinJanuary2009thatadvisersclosetothe
newpresidentwereurginghimtoinitiatelowlevelcontactswithHamas,therearefewpublic
signsthathispositionhaschangedsignificantlyoverthepastyear.Itthereforeremainstobe
seenwhetherdevelopmentsonthegroundwillpromptare-evaluationofthisstance.
IntheUSandacrossEurope,therearemanyinfluentialcommentatorswhobelievethat
engagementwithanyIslamistmovementintheMiddleEastandNorthAfricawouldbea
catastrophicmisstep(seeMaherandFrampton2009andSimonandTakeyh2007).But
withoutdrawingtheseactorsintoadialogueaboutreformandpeace-buildingitisunlikely
thattherewillbemuchmovementintermsofaddressingmanyoftheseriouspolitical
challengesfacingtheregion.Thenextandfinalchapterconsiderswhatthismightmeanfor
policy,andoffersrecommendationsfortheUKandotherwesternstates.
7.Conclusionsandrecommendations
Asarguedinthispaperandinippr’sthreecasestudyreportsonEgypt,MoroccoandJordan,
non-violentIslamistpartiesarenowplayingasignificantroleinmanystatesintheMiddle
EastandNorthAfrica.Occupyingamiddlegroundbetweenauthoritarianregimesand
violentjihadists,theyrepresentapoliticalforcethatEuropeanandNorthAmerican
governmentscannolongeraffordtoignore.However,whilethereisevidenceofamore
thoughtfulandnuanceddiscussiononthisissuetakingplaceinwesternpolicycircles,there
remainsafundamentaldisconnectbetweenrhetoricandpoliticalaction.Ratherthanasking
howwemightengagewiththesemovementsmoreeffectively,manyarestillaskingwhether
thisiseitherfeasibleordesirable.
ThisattitudeispartlylinkedtoconcernsabouttheideologicalpositionsofIslamistpartiesor
movementsandanunwillingnesstolegitimisegroupsthatmightholdanti-democraticviews
onwomen’srights,politicalpluralism,andarangeofotherissues.Italsoreflectspragmatic
considerationsaboutthestrategicsecurityandeconomicinterestsofwesternpowersinthe
MENAregionthatareperceivedtobethreatenedbytherisingpopularityandinfluenceof
Islamists.Fortheirpart,Islamistgroupshavedisplayedamarkedreluctancetoenterinto
dialoguewiththosewesternpowerswhosepoliciesintheregiontheyoppose(particularly
theUnitedStatesandtheUnitedKingdom).However,whilebothsideshavelegitimate
concernsabouttheimplicationsofforgingcloserties,afailuretoevendiscusstheissuesthat
dividethemwilldolittletomovethedebateforward.
Asafirststep,westernpolicymakersmustnowbeclearerabouttheircriteriaforengagement
withIslamists,andfrankerabouttheirmotivesfordoingso.Thisisnottosuggestthatthere
issomekindofobjective‘test’thatIslamistsmustbeexpectedtopassbeforebeingdeemed
worthyaspartnersindialogue.Islamistpartiesandmovementsrarelyoperateindemocratic
politicalsystems,anditwouldbebothunfairandunhelpfultojudgethemagainststandards
thatwedonotalwaysapplytogoverningregimesorotherpoliticalactorsintheregion.
However,intheabsenceofamoreprincipledapproachtoengagement,itseemslikelythat
thecurrentstateofpoliticalinertiaontheissuewillpersist,andwillpreventEuropeanand
NorthAmericangovernmentsfromdevelopingamoreconsistentstrategytowardspolitical
Islamists.
Mainissueswesternpolicymakersneedtotakeintoaccount
Beforeofferingsomerecommendationsabouthowsuchastrategymightbeachieved,this
concludingchapterassessessomeofthedifficultissuesandtradeoffsthatwillneedtobe
consideredaswesternpolicymakersmakechoicesaboutwhichIslamistpartiesand
movementstoengagewith,andwhatformsthisengagementshouldtake.
Politicalpluralism
WhenchallengedabouttheirreluctancetodevelopmoreformalcontactswithIslamist
partiesandmovements,manywesternpolicymakersexpresstheirconcernthatopeningthe
doortoIslamistparticipationinpoliticsmightresultinasituationof‘oneperson,onevote,
onetime’.SomemaketheargumentthatwhilemainstreamIslamistgroupsclaimtoaccept
theideaofdemocraticparticipation,thisstancecouldquicklychangeiftheywereeverto
gainamonopolyonpower(PipesandFuller2003).
PrevailingpoliticalconditionsinmostMENAcountriesmakeitdifficulttogaugethestrength
ofIslamistparties’commitmenttotheprincipleofpoliticalpluralism.Mostofthesegroups
arethetargetsoforganisedrepressionandareunlikelytogainparliamentarymajorities
throughlegalpoliticalprocessesanytimesoon.ThebehaviouroftheAKPinTurkeymay
offerausefulinsightintohowIslamistpartieswillactwhenfacedwithelectoralcompetition,
althoughpolicymakersshouldbewaryofextrapolatingtoomuchfromoneexample.
IndeterminingwhichIslamistpartiestoengagewith,EuropeanandNorthAmerican
governmentsshouldofcoursebelookingformovementsthatbelieveintheconceptsoffree
andfairelectionsandrotationofpower.Buttheyshouldbecarefulnottoassumethat
Islamistsaresimplybidingtheirtimeuntiltheyareinapositiontoestablishasystemofone-
partyrule.ThisignoresthefactthatacrosstheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica,Islamistparties
arefrequentlymorevocalintheirsupportfordemocracythantheirsecularcounterparts.
Forexample,ashighlightedinChapter3,theIslamistPartyofJusticeandDevelopmentin
Moroccoexperiencedanunexpectedreversaloffortuneintheparliamentaryelectionsof
2007,failingtosecureenoughseatstoguaranteeinclusioninthegovernment.Atthetime,
therewasagreatdealofspeculationaboutwhetherthismightleadthePJDtoboycott
electionsandwithdrawfrompolitics,oreventurntolesspeacefulmethodsofeffecting
politicalchange.However,theoppositehasoccurred.Thepartyhasreaffirmedits
commitmenttofollowingademocraticpath,andhasembarkedonaprocessofinternal
dialoguetorevisesomeofitspositionsoncontentiouspoliticalissues(al-Khalfi2008).
EvenIslamistmovementsthatdonotenjoylegalrecognition,suchastheIslamic
ConstitutionalMovement(ICM)inKuwaitandtheMuslimBrotherhoodinEgypt,havetacitly
agreedtoabidebythearbitraryrulesonpoliticalparticipationthatareimposedby
authoritarianregimes,andhaveconsistentlymadethemostofanyopportunitiestheyare
giventoparticipateinnationalorlocallegislatures.Othergroups,includingtheIslamic
ActionFrontinJordanandtheIslahpartyinYemen,havedemonstratedtheirwillingnessto
sharepoliticalpowerbyenteringintoallianceswithother–oftensecular–opposition
groupsinanefforttoachievetheirgoals.Westernpolicymakersshouldtakethiskindof
politicalbehaviourintoaccountastheydecidewhichIslamistgroupstheyfeelableto
engagewith.
Genderandminorityrights
WhilemembersofIslamistpartiesfrequentlyprofesstheirsupportfortheideaofuniversal
citizenship,thereremainanumberofinconsistenciesbetweentheirrhetoricandactions.For
example,thePJDinMoroccowereinitiallyresistanttoproposedchangestothecountry’s
socialcode,whichaimedtorevisesomeofthemostconservativestructuresgoverningfamily
life.AndwhiletheEgyptianMuslimBrotherhoodclaimstobelieveinequalrightsforwomen
andforEgypt’sminoritypopulationofChristianCopts,itusuallyaddsthevaguedisclaimer
thattheserightsshouldbeexercised‘withinanIslamicframework’.Inrecentpolicy
documentstheBrotherhoodhasalsoindicatedthatitwouldnotaccepttheelectionofa
womanoraCopttothepositionofthecountry’spresident.
Progressivepolicymakersandcivilsocietyorganisationsconcernedaboutthepromotionof
equalityandhumanrightsintheMENAregionmayfindtheseambiguitiesdifficultto
square.Butthisonlymakesthecaseforengagementstronger,bothasameansofadvancing
thedebateabouthowtoreformsomeofthemorerepressivepoliticalandsocialstructuresin
theregion,andinordertobetterunderstandthevariouscurrentsofthoughtwithinIslamist
movementsontheseissues.
Forexample,interviewscarriedoutforthisprojectwithmembersoftheJordanianIslamic
ActionFrontrevealedinterestingdifferencesofopinionwithinthepartyonthequestionof
women’srights.SomeIAFdeputiesassertedthatthepositionofwomeninsocietywasinno
needoffurtherenhancement,abeliefclearlyatoddswiththerealityofthelegal,political
andphysicaldiscriminationthatisfacedbymanywomeninJordan.Conservative
respondentsalsostressedtheneedforwomentobecomemoreawareoftheirShari’a rights
andduties.However,anumberofrespondentssuggestedthattherewasconsiderableroom
forimprovementofwomen’srightsinsocialandpoliticallife,withonearguingthat,
‘women’srightstoholdpublicpostsinthevariousdepartmentsofthestate,including
education,healthandthejudiciary,shouldbesecured’(Glennie2007:13).
Thisdiversityofopinionindicatesthatthereisroomforamoreconstructivedebatebetween
westernpolicymakersandIslamistsaroundtheseissues.Manyofthepartiesdiscussedinthis
reportarestillfindingtheirwayintermsofdevelopingclearandconsistentpolicyplatforms,
andaredoingsowithinsocietiesthatarehighlyunequalandpatriarchal.Whilesensitivity
towardsculturalnormswillbenecessary,dialoguearoundthepromotionofhumanrights
maybeafruitfulavenueforengagement.
Therelationshipbetweenstateandreligion
Formanywesternpolicymakers,oneofthemosttroublingaspectsofthepoliticalplatforms
ofIslamistoppositionpartiesistheirlackofclarityontherelationshipbetweenreligionand
politics.Fordecades,‘Islamisthesolution’hasservedasthecampaignsloganformany
Islamistgroupsintheregion,includingtheIslamicActionFrontinJordanandtheMuslim
BrotherhoodinEgypt.Similarly,thePJDinMorocco,whichisoneofthemostmoderate
Islamistmovementsintheregion,describesitselfasapoliticalpartywithan‘Islamicframeof
reference’.ButneitherofthesestatementsshedsmuchlightonhowIslamicvalueswould
applytopracticalpolicyproblems,shouldthesepartieseverachieveapoliticalmajorityin
theirrespectivecountries.
Thereareafewnotableexceptionstothewidespreadreluctancetodiscussdifficult
questionsaroundthepoliticalapplicationofreligiousvalues.Forexample,ateamof
reformistscholarsatAnkaraUniversityinTurkey,actingwiththesupportoftheruling
IslamistAKPpartyandtheDiyanet(thegovernment’sDirectorateofReligiousAffairswhich
overseesthecountry's8,000mosquesandappointsimams),hasbeenundertakingan
ambitiousprojectthataimstoreinterpretpartsoftheHadith (oneofthekeysourcesof
Islamiclaw).Whilethe‘Hadith Project’hasyettoissueafinalreport,itsintentionisto
contextualiseorexcisesomeofthemorecontentiousaspectsofIslamicteachings,andto
offerarevisedapproachtoissueslikethetreatmentofwomenandtheuseofthedeath
penalty(Traynor2008).Ifrealised,thisinitiativecouldserveasamodelforhowamodern
andprogressiveinterpretationofIslamcouldpotentiallybeincorporatedintothepublic
politicalsphere.
Unfortunately,oppositeforcesseemtobeatworkinEgyptatpresent,withtheMuslim
BrotherhoodhavingreleasedadraftpartyplatforminAugust2007thatcalledforthe
establishmentofanulemacouncilofreligiousscholarswiththepowertooverrulelegislation
notdeemedtobesufficientlyIslamicinnature.Thedocumentalsoindicatedthatthe
BrotherhoodwouldnotaccepttheelectionofawomanoraChristianastheEgyptianhead
ofstate.
Inararedisplayofdivisionfromamovementthatpridesitselfonpresentingaunited
fronttotheoutsideworld,thismovedrewcriticismfromfactionsofmoderateindividuals
withintheMuslimBrotherhooditself,whoclaimedthattheyhadnotbeenconsulted
abouttheseideasinadvance.ThisgrouparguedthattheSupremeConstitutionalCourt
wasthemostappropriatebodytodecideonmattersoflegislation,andthatthe
Brotherhoodwasrequiredtoadheretoconstitutionalguaranteesofpoliticalequalityfor
womenandminorities.
Thereleaseofthisplatformwasintendedtoreassurethemovement’scritics,butinsteadit
hasrevealedthesharpdifferencesofopinionandambiguitiesabouttherelationship
betweenreligionandstatethatcontinuetoplaguenotonlytheMuslimBrotherhoodbut
manyotherIslamistpartiesandmovementsacrosstheMENAregiontoo.However,thisis
notareasontoabandontheideaofdeepeningdialoguewithpoliticalIslamists.Onthe
contrary,itsuggeststhatthereisvalueinpushingthemtobemoreexplicitabouttheirviews
onthissubject.Butitdoesindicatethatthereisaneedforcautiononthepartofthose
westernpolicymakersandindividualswholooktopoliticalIslamistsaspotential
counterweightstoauthoritarianregimes(BrownandHamzawy2008).
Theuseofviolence
MostIslamistpartiesthatengageinformalpoliticalprocesseshavenowrenouncedthe
useofviolenceasameansofachievingdomesticpoliticalchange.Thenotable
exceptionsareHamasandHezbollah,whichmaintainarmedparamilitarywings,and
whichhavebothbeeninvolvedininternalstrugglesforpoweroverthepastfewyears.
However,thereremainsadeeplyentrenchedbeliefamongIslamiststhroughoutthe
regionthatviolenceislegitimatewhendirectedagainstan‘externaloccupier’,particularly
inthecontextofthePalestinianstruggleforindependencefromIsrael.Sowhilethe
IslamicActionFrontinJordanhasadoptedareasonablyclearstanceagainstresponding
tostaterepressionwithaggression,thereisasignificantfactionwithinitsranksthat
identifiesverycloselywithHamas,andbacksthemostextremeformsofPalestinian
resistanceagainstIsrael(Brown2006).
Thisposesaseriousdilemmaforwesternpolicymakers.Refusingtoengageindialogue
withanygroupthatdoesnotunequivocallyrejecttheuseofviolenceinallcircumstances
wouldleavethemwithfewoptions,giventhepersistentstateofconflictbetweenIsrael
andbothPalestinianandLebaneseoppositionmovements.Butagreeingtoenterinto
relationswithpoliticalIslamistpartiesthatarewillingtotacitlysupportarmedresistance,
includingagainstinnocentcivilians,isalsoproblematic.
Thekeyheremaybetodevelopcontactswithmoremoderateindividualswithinthese
groups,asameansofholdingamoreconstructivedebateaboutdifficultforeignpolicy
issues,withoutlegitimisingtheviewsofthoseonthemoreextremeendofthepolitical
spectrum.ItalsoreinforcestheurgencyoffindingaresolutiontotheIsraeli-Palestinian
conflict,notleastsoastoremoveongoingsourcesofgrievanceamongIslamistsand
Muslimpopulationsmorebroadly.
Foreignrelations
FewIslamistpartiesormovementshavecomprehensivepolicystatementsdetailingtheir
positionsonforeignrelations.Thereisanunderstandableworrythatthesegroupswould
withdrawfromeconomicorpoliticalarrangementsdeemedessentialtowesternstrategic
interestsintheregionshouldtheycometopowerandindeed,seniormembersofthe
MuslimBrotherhoodhaveindicatedthattheywouldfavourputtingthe1979peace
treatybetweenIsraelandEgypt(whichremainscontroversialwithinthecountrytothis
day)toapopularreferendumintheunlikelyeventofthemovementgaininga
parliamentarymajority(Eltahawy2007).
TheinterviewsconductedforourcasestudieshighlightthewidespreadoppositiontoUS
andEuropeanpoliciesintheMENAregionthatexistsamongdifferentIslamistparties.
Respondingtoanipprquestionnaire,representativesofthePJDandtheIAFwerecritical
oftheWest’sperceiveddoublestandardsintheirapproachtodemocraticreforminthe
region,notinginparticulartheirdecisiontoostraciseandunderminetheHamas
governmentthatcametopowerintheOccupiedPalestinianTerritoriesinJanuary2006.
InitiativesliketheEuropeanNeighbourhoodPolicyandthethenEuro-Mediterranean
Partnershipwerealsoviewedastoolstoenableexploitationoftheregion’sresources
ratherthanasprogrammesdesignedtosupportpoliticalandeconomicdevelopment.
Encouragingly,though,manyrespondentsexpressedawishtoseeanimprovementin
relationsbetweenIslamistpartiesandwesterngovernmentsandindicatedthatapolicyof
morestrategicdialoguewouldbeofconsiderablevalue,particularlyaroundquestionsof
economicanddevelopmentcooperation.ItwasalsosuggestedthattheEUcouldplaya
morepositiveroleinpromotingpoliticalreforminauthoritarianstatesintheMiddleEast
andNorthAfrica(seeGlennieandMepham2007andGlennie2007).
Recommendations
Recognisingthatanysuchengagementwillneedtotakeplaceonacase-by-casebasisand
berootedinacarefulunderstandingofthepoliticalandsocialdynamicsofdifferent
countriesintheMENAregion,ippr’sanalysissuggeststhefollowing:
1.Westernpolicymakersneedtofundamentallyrethinktheirpoliticalstrategyfor
engagingwithIslamistpartiesandmovements
Despiterecentimprovementsinthetoneofrelationsbetweenwesterngovernmentsand
Islamists,particularlysincetheelectionofPresidentObama,thereisstillalongwaytogoin
termsofaddressingthemisperceptionsandantagonismsthatexistbetweenthem.As
discussedinChapter6,thereisalackofconsensusamongEUmemberstatesandbetween
theUSandtheEUonthequestionofengagingwithIslamistoppositionmovementsand
parties.Thishasbeencompoundedbythefactthatuntilnow,relativelyfewIslamist
movementshavebeenpreparedtoworkopenlywithwesternorganisationsand
governments,partlyforfearofexperiencingfurthergovernmentcrackdownsontheir
activities,andpartlybecauseoftheirstrongoppositiontowardswesternforeignpoliciesin
theMiddleEastandNorthAfrica.
Itisnotunreasonableforpolicymakerstobecautiousintheirapproachtoengagingwith
mainstreampoliticalIslamistmovements.EuropeanandNorthAmericangovernmentshave
significantpolitical,economicandsecurityinterestsintheMENAregionwhichtheybelieve
couldbethreatenedifIslamistpartiesweretogainagreatershareofpoliticalpowerinkey
statesintheregion.
InthepasttheseinterestshavebeenrelativelywellservedbyapolicyofencouragingMENA
regimestopromotedemocratisationandgoodgovernance,whilesimultaneouslyproviding
themwitheconomicandpoliticalsupportandtacitlyacceptingtheircontainmentand
repressionofIslamistoppositiongroups.Buttheweaknessofthisstrategyhasbeenexposed
bythecontinuedfailureofmostoftheseregimestodeliveronpromisesofengagingin
meaningfulreformoftheirundemocraticpoliticalstructures.PublicopinionintheMiddle
EastandNorthAfricahasbecomehighlycriticaloftheseapparentdoublestandardsonthe
partoftheWest.Thisapproachisalsoatoddswiththechangingpoliticalcontextinthe
region;asOttawayandcolleaguesstate,‘almostbydefault,Islamistpartieshaveemergedas
thecoreoftheoppositioninmostArabcountries.Paradoxically,thepossibilityofdemocratic
reformnowdependstoagreatextentonIslamistpartiesandmovements’(Ottawayetal
2008:24).
Westernpolicymakersmustfaceuptothedifficultrealitythatinorderforprogresstobe
madeonthemostintractableconflictsintheMiddleEast,therewillhavetobedialogue
withsomeofthemainstreamIslamistmovementsdiscussedinthispaper.
TheUKGovernmentfinallyappearstobegraspingthenettlehere,afteraperiodofextreme
cautioninitspolicytowardspoliticalIslamistpartiesandmovements.InMarch2009,David
Miliband,thecurrentForeignSecretary,arguedinaspeechonrelationsbetweentheWest
andtheIslamicworldthatpeaceandsecuritywillonlybeachievedthroughanemphasison
buildingthebroadestpoliticalcoalitionspossible,whichwillsometimesinclude‘groups
whoseaimswedonotshare,whosevalueswefinddeplorable,whosemethodswethink
dubious’(Miliband2009).AndwhiletheUShasbeenlessenthusiasticabouttheideaof
directpublicengagementwithIslamists,PresidentObamahasalsospokenoftheurgent
needtorecalibraterelationswiththeMuslimworld,whichwillnecessarilyinvolvetalkingtoa
rangeofactorswhosepoliticalvaluesdiffersubstantiallyfromthoseoftheUS.
However,thesestatementsofintentwillonlyleadtoapositivechangeinthewaythat
westernpowersrelatetoIslamistpartiesandmovementsiftheyarebackedupbya
measurablecommitmenttoseekoutandfacilitateopportunitiesformutuallearningand
dialogue.
2.Westernpolicymakersandnon-governmentalinstitutionsshouldbemore
proactiveincreatingchannelsforseriousandsustaineddialoguewithIslamists
Themethodologicalapproachofthisresearchprojecthasindicatedtheimportantrole
that‘tracktwo’orinformaldialoguecanplayasalower-riskformofengagementand
confidencebuildingbetweenwesternpolicymakersandIslamists.Whilerepresentativesof
EuropeanandNorthAmericangovernmentsareoftenunwillingtoengageinpublic
exchangeswithmembersofIslamistparties,mutualdistrustwillnotbeovercomewithout
aprocessofdialogue.Non-governmentalthinktanksorresearchorganisationslikeippr
arewell-placedtoplayabridgingrolehere,byenablingrepresentativesofwestern
governmentsandIslamistmovementstomeetinahigh-levelbutlessformalsetting.If
managedskilfully,suchforumscouldgiveIslamistpoliticiansandactiviststhe
opportunitytovoicetheirownconcernsaboutwesternpolicyintheMENAregion,while
alsoallowingwesternpolicymakerstochallengethemonissueswheretheirposition
remainsoverlyvagueorinconsistent.
Inpracticalpolicyterms,thismightrequireNorthAmericanandEuropeanofficialsto
makeagreaterefforttofacilitateexchangesorvisitswithrepresentativesofIslamist
movements,sincetheseareregularlyblockedbyauthoritarianregimes.Forexample,in
2008theEgyptiangovernmentbannedDrAbdelMoneimAbulFotouh,aprominent
memberofthemoremoderatewingoftheMuslimBrotherhood,fromacceptingan
invitationtothefifthsummitoftheUS-IslamicWorldForum(Ismail2008).Thiswasa
missedopportunitytobringoneofthevoicesofmainstreampoliticalIslamtothe
internationalpoliticaltabletodiscussthefutureofrelationsbetweenIslamistsandthe
West.
AlthoughtheEuropeanCommissionhasrunanumberofinternaltrainingcourseson
politicalIslamisminthepast,thesehavetendednottoinvolvedialoguewithIslamists
themselves,focusinginsteadonattemptstoassesshowdemocraticthesemovements
andpartiesare.Thishasdonelittletoovercomethestrongresistanceofmanywithinthe
EUtotheideaofstrengtheningengagementwithmainstreamIslamistmovements,who
fearthatbysinglingthemoutforspecialattentiontheywilldamagetheirrelationswith
governmentsintheMENAregion.ButbyshuttingIslamistsoutofthepoliticaldialogue,
Europeanpoliticiansaremissingimportantopportunitiestostartbuildingtrustand
overcomingthehostilityandmisunderstandingsthathavecharacterisedrelationsinthe
past.
Onewaytostartovercomingthistensionwouldbetoreframetheprocessof
engagement,sothatrepresentativesofIslamistmovementsandpartiesaremore
consistentlyinvolvedinconferencesanddebatesaboutbroaderrelationsbetweenEurope
andtheMiddleEastandNorthAfricaalongsideothernon-governmentalactors,
includingsecularoppositionpoliticians.Inclusionwithouttheappearanceofpreferential
treatmentwouldsendaclearmessagethatwesterngovernmentsarechangingtheir
approachtotheideaofdialoguewithIslamists,andwouldgivebothpartiesmoreregular
opportunitiestodiscussimportantissuesaroundpoliticalreform.Onlysustaineddialogue
ofthiskindwillhelpcounteractthenegativeimpressionsthatwesternpolicymakersand
Islamistscurrentlyhaveofeachother,andallowamorenuancedandhonestdebate
aboutwhytheseimpressionsexist.
3.ThedialoguebetweenwesternpolicymakersandIslamistsshould,crucially,
engagewiththepoliticalaswellasthereligiousvaluesofIslamistpartiesand
movements
WhentheEgyptianMuslimBrotherhoodreleaseditsfirstcomprehensivestatementofpolicy
inAugust2007,commentatorsfocusedalmostexclusivelyonitsproposaltocreateanulema
councilwithbindingadvisorypowers,anditssuggestionthatwomenandCopticChristians
couldnotserveasheadofstate.Thesewerecertainlycontroversialideas.Butinreducingthe
debatetoanalysisofthereligiouscontentoftheBrotherhood’spolicyprogramme,an
importantopportunitytodiscussthemovement’spoliticalobjectiveswasmissed.As
MikhelidzeandToccihavenoted,thisreflectsawidertendencyonthepartofwestern
policymakerstoviewpoliticalIslamas‘adifferent,ifnotunique,phenomenon,whose
uniquenessdefiesconventionalpoliticalanalysis’(MikhelidzeandTocci2009:151).
ThisattitudewillneedtochangeifEuropeanandNorthAmericangovernmentsareserious
aboutsupportingdemocratisationintheMENAregion,giventhatmanyIslamistpartiesand
movementsnowofferthemostviablealternativetoexistingauthoritarianregimesand
secularoppositionpartiesalike.Agoodplacetostartwouldbetomoveawayfromthe
fixationon‘testing’thedemocraticcredentialsofIslamistmovements,andfocusinginstead
onpromotingdiscussionoftherangeofpolitical,economicandsocialissuesthatconcern
thesegroups,manyofwhicharesharedbytheirwesterncounterparts.Thisdoesnotmean
thatdifficultissuesshouldbesweptunderthecarpet,butitdoesrecognisethatasolidbasis
forengagementcannotbebuiltwithoutsomeattempttofindcommonpoliticalground.
4.Westernleadersshouldbemoreeven-handedincondemningallhumanrights
abusesinauthoritarianregimesintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica,including
againstIslamists
Ultimately,anychangeinpolicytowardsmainstreampoliticalIslamistpartiesintheMiddle
EastandNorthAfricawillneedtobesetwithinabroaderrethinkofrelationswiththe
region’sgoverningregimes.Inthepast,westernofficialshaveoftenbeenreluctanttoovertly
criticisethedemocraticdeficitinmanyofthesecountries,loathtoputtheirstrategic
interestsintheregionatriskbycensuringimportantallies.
Forexample,onavisittoEgyptinearly2008,formerPresidentGeorgeBushfailedto
commentontheunjustimprisonmentofAymanNour(asecularoppositionpresidential
candidate)andofscoresofBrotherhoodmembers,choosinginsteadtopraiseMubarak’s
regimeforhavingmadeprogresstowards‘greaterpoliticalopenness’.Onthisoccasionthe
EuropeanParliamentwasuncharacteristicallyvocalinitscondemnationoftherepressive
Egyptianpoliticalsystem,passingadraftresolutionurgingEgypt‘toendallformsof
harassment,includingjudicialmeasures,detentionofmediaprofessionalsand,more
generally,humanrightsdefendersandactivists’(Shahine2008).However,itstoppedshort
ofcommentingonthearbitraryarrestofrepresentativesofMuslimBrotherhood,thereby
underminingthelegitimacyofanotherwiseimportantstatement.
Theserhetoricalinconsistencieshavedamagedwesterncredibility,andhaveledmany
politicalandcivilsocietygroupsintheregiontocomplainthatinternationalpartnersturna
blindeyewhenhumanrightsviolationsarecommittedbyauthoritariangovernments.A
significantchangeinapproachcouldhelpfullyreducesomeofthesetensions,andEuropean
andNorthAmericangovernmentsshouldbemoreassiduousinraisingtheirconcerns,bothin
privateandinpublic.Again,whileIslamistsdonotneedtobesingledoutforspecial
treatmenthere,westernleadersneedtobemuchmoreeven-handedintheircondemnation
ofallhumanrightsabusesintheregion,includingwhentheyaredirectedagainstnon-
violentIslamistpoliticiansandactivists.
Moregenerally,policymakersshouldalsoworkwithalliesintheregiontoaddressproblems
aroundtheadoptionandenforcementofinternationallyrecognisedhumanrightsstandards
andlegalframeworks.Inthiscontext,anumberofwesterngovernmentswillneedtolook
hardattheirownadherencetosuchstandards.Asdiscussedabove,theUSgovernment’s
policyofextraordinaryrenditionanditsuseofexcessiveforceattheGuantanamoandAbu
Ghraibprisonshavegreatlyundermineditscapacitytoleadbyexample.
TheUSneedstodecisivelyclosethedooronthesepractices,andtosignuptomanyofthe
internationalhumanrightslaws,treatiesandcovenantsithasabstainedfrominthepast,
includingthoseontheRightsoftheChild(ratifiedbyallUNmemberstatesexcepttheUS
andSomalia),theEliminationofAllFormsofDiscriminationAgainstWomen,Forced
Disappearances,Protocol1totheGenevaConventions,andtheRomeStatuteofthe
InternationalCriminalCourt(ippr2009).Onlythenwillitstarttorebuildthelegitimacyitso
desperatelyrequiresifitistoexertapositiveinfluenceonleadersintheMENAregionwith
respecttotheprotectionofhumanrights.
5.Westerngovernmentsmustdisplaygreaterconsistencyinpressingauthoritarian
governmentsintheMENAregiontoopenuptheirpoliticalsystems
Inhisinauguralspeech,PresidentObamaissuedastarkmessagetoauthoritarianregimes
aroundtheworldrelianton‘corruptionanddeceitandthesilencingofdissent’asameansof
stayinginpower,warningthattheywereonthewrongsideofhistorybutofferingtoextend
ahandtoanywhowerewillingtounclenchtheirfists(BBC2009a).Thiswasapowerful
address,andonewiththepotentialtopavethewayforadramaticimprovementinrelations
betweentheWestandthepeopleoftheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica.Butthischangewill
onlycomeaboutifwesterngovernmentsarewillingtomakegoodontheirpromisesto
supportreformersandreformprocesses.Whileitisprimarilyfortheleadersandthepeoples
oftheregiontotackletheentrenchedstructuresofauthoritarianismthatareholdingback
developmentandcreatingareceptiveaudienceforthesirencallofthejihadists,thereis
clearlyamoreconstructiveroleforEuropeanandNorthAmericanpolicymakerstoplayhere.
Inparticular,abetterbalanceneedstobestruckbetweenmaintainingcooperative
relationshipswithgoverningregimesaroundquestionsofinternationalsecurityand
economicdevelopment,whilealsopressingthemtomovefastertowardspoliticalreform
pledgesthathavealreadybeenmade.Thedependenceofmanyregimesintheregionon
foreignpoliticalandeconomicassistanceprovideswesterngovernmentswithformsof
leveragethatshouldbeusedmorecreatively.Makingaidconditionalontheprogressof
reformisasubjectthatdonorgovernmentsareoftenunwillingtodiscuss.Butthisprinciple
alreadyformsthebasisofcooperationagreementsbetweentheEUandMENAcountries
thatarepartoftheENP,andoffersaframeworkforthedevelopmentofamoreconstructive
dialogueontheseissues.
Itshouldbeemphasisedthatwesternpowersdonotneedtoworktowardsactively
destabilisingexistingordersandgovernments,thelimitsofsuchaheavy-handedapproach
havebeenamplyrevealedbyfailuresinIraqandAfghanistan.YetasDavidGardnerobserves,
‘ArabsandMuslims,attheveryleast,havetherighttoexpectthattheUSAanditsalliesdo
notactivelysupportthosewhodenythemtheirfreedoms’(Gardner2009:18).
Realdemocratisation,onascalethatwillleadtosignificantchangeintheregionalpolitical
statusquo,willbeamessybusiness.Islamistpartiesandmovementsmaywellbethe
beneficiaryofanyopeningsinrestrictivepoliticalstructures,whichwillundoubtedlypose
uncomfortabledilemmasforwesterngovernments,anditwouldbenaïvetosuggestthat
agreementwithmainstreamIslamistmovementsintheMENAregiononkeypoliticalissuesis
withineasyreach.
However,anapproachthatseekstoignorethesepoliticalcurrentsisnolongermorallyor
strategicallydefensible.Decadesofpayinglipservicetotheideaofpoliticalfreedomswhile
simultaneouslyproppingupauthoritarianleaderswholackdemocraticlegitimacyhave
helpedtocreateanenvironmentthatisnotconducivetostabilityordevelopment,yetboth
areneededinorderforwesternpowerstoprotecttheirconsiderableinterestsintheregion,
particularlythosethatrelatetocounter-terrorismandenergysecurity.Areorientationof
policyalongthelinesdiscussedaboveisalsourgentlyrequiredifwesternpowershopeto
improvetheirtarnishedimageacrosstheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica.
Ofcourse,adecisiontoengageindialoguewithmainstreamIslamistmovementswhere
appropriateandalongsideotherpoliticalactors,willnotbeapanaceafortheproblemsthat
besetcurrentwesternpolicytowardstheregion.Butitwillsignalamoregenuine
commitmenttotheideaofmutuallearningandexchangethanhasbeenevidentinrecent
years,andwillsendastrongmessagecounteringtheargumentofthosewhoclaimthata
‘clashofcivilisations’betweentheWestandtheMuslimworldissomekindofinevitability.
Atatimewhentherearesomanywalls–bothpoliticalandphysical–dividingpeoplewithin
theregionandseparatingthemfrompartnersintheWest,surelyitistimetostartbuildinga
fewmorebridges.
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Appendix:Projectmethodology
Arangeofmethodologieshavebeenusedduringthisproject,includingdesk-based
research,reviewsofrelevantEnglish,FrenchandArabicliterature,informaldiscussionswith
MiddleEastern,EuropeanandNorthAmericanexperts,high-levelseminarsandsemi-
structuredinterviewswithmembersofIslamistpartiesintheregion.
Casestudiesandcommissionedresearch
Theprojecthastakenacasestudyapproach,lookingatthemainstreampoliticalIslamist
partiesinthreecountriesintheregion:thePartyofJusticeandDevelopment(PJD)in
Morocco,theIslamicActionFront(IAF)inJordan,andtheMuslimBrotherhoodinEgypt.
Publishedaswebpapers,thesecasestudiesgiveanoverviewoftherecentpoliticalhistoryin
eachcountry,withaparticularfocusontheemergenceofpoliticalIslamistpartiesand
movements.ThroughanalysisofpublicstatementsmadebythePJD,theIAFandtheMuslim
Brotherhood,aswellasippr-commissionedinterviewdata,theyalsoprovideaninsightinto
thepositionsheldbythesegroupsacrossarangeofimportantpoliticalissues.Finally,they
assesscurrentEuropeanandNorthAmericanpoliciestowardspoliticalIslamistsinMorocco,
JordanandEgypt,andrecommendwaysinwhichtheycouldbestrengthened,inthecontext
ofwesternsupportforpoliticalreformintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica.
Allthreepapersareavailablefordownloadat:www.ippr.org/publicationsandreports
Partnerorganisations
Thisresearchprojecthasbeengreatlyenhancedbycollaborationwithlocalpartnersinthe
MENAregion:theCentreforConstitutionalandPoliticalStudiesattheUniversityof
MarrakechinMoroccoandtheAmmanCentreforHumanRightsStudiesinJordan.These
organisationsproducedbackgroundbriefingpapersonpoliticalIslamistmovementsin
MoroccoandJordan,andconductedaseriesofsemi-structuredinterviewswithkey
individualsfromthePartyofJusticeandDevelopmentandtheIslamicActionFrontandwith
observerswhostudythemclosely.
Intervieweeswereaskedabouttheirattitudestowardspoliticalpluralism,humanrights,the
relationshipbetweenpoliticsandIslamicvaluesandforeignrelationswithEuropeanand
NorthAmericanstates,basedonanippr-designedquestionnaire.
High-levelseminars
Foureventswereheldaspartofthisproject:
PoliticalreforminMorocco:theroleofinternationalpartners
Rabat,Morocco,April2007.ThiseventwasorganisedwiththeassistanceoftheCentrefor
ConstitutionalandPoliticalStudies,andinvolvedmembersofIslamistandotherpolitical
parties,alongsidelocalcivilsocietygroupsandrepresentativesoftheinternational
communityinMorocco.
PoliticalreforminJordan:theroleofinternationalpartners
Amman,Jordan,September2007.ThiseventwasfacilitatedbytheAmmanCentrefor
HumanRightsStudies,andfollowedasimilarstructuretotheseminarinMorocco.
PoliticalIslamintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica:Theimplicationsfor
internationalpolicymakers
Brussels,Belgium,February2008.Thisone-dayexpertsymposiumwasorganisedwiththe
EuropeanCommission,andinvolvedpresentationsfromMiddleEasternandEuropean
specialistsaroundthegeneralthemeofrelationsbetweenIslamistmovementsandtheEU.
PoliticalIslamintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica:Anexpertsymposium
London,UK,November2008.Bringingtogethergovernmentofficials,representativesof
NGOsandthinktanks,academicsandthemedia,thissymposiumprovidedanopportunity
fordiscussionoftheinterestsandobjectivesofvariousIslamistgroupsintheregion,and
howtheseinteractwiththeinterestsofwesterngovernments.Critically,thiseventalso
servedtofacilitatedirectdiscussionbetweenmembersofIslamistmovementsandwestern
policymakersonchallengingpoliticalissues.

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