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Increases in Measures to Expel the Jews

Increases in Measures to Expel the Jews

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Published by bellumletale
Increases in Measures to Expel the Jews from Germany.
Increases in Measures to Expel the Jews from Germany.

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Published by: bellumletale on Jan 31, 2014
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07/27/2014

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Increases in Measures to Expel the Jews
With its efforts in the latter half of 
 1936
 to expel the Jews from the economicsphere, the National Socialist regime was pursuing two main goals: the financing of rearmament and the expulsion of the Jewish minority from Germany. Eco-nomic pressure was intended to increase the Jewish population
s willingness toemigrate and to improve the incoming flow of capital for the state.After the first wave of emigration in
 1933
, when some
 37
,
000
 people of Jewishorigin left Germany,
 1934
 saw approximately 
 23
,
000
 leave; in
 1935
 there were
21
,
000
 and in
 1936
 some
 25
,
000
.
79
In the latter half of 
 1937
 it became more andmore difficult for German Jews to find a place that would take them. On the onehand, after the announcement of British plans to divide Palestine and, after theArab revolts of April
 1936
8
, the number of Jews leaving for the British Mandatewent down; on the other, there were increasing signs that countries that had so farbeen willing to accept Jews who wished to emigrate were becoming more restrict-ive in their immigration policies, as South Africa and Brazil had already shown in
1937
. Whilst itis true that some
 23
,
000
 Jews left Germany in
 1937
, the reports of theJewish Reich National Association indicate that the numbers emigrating began tostagnate in the third quarter of 
 1937
.
80
During the whole of 
 1937
, representatives of the National Socialist regime wereoccupied with the question of whether increased emigration to Palestine wasdesirable from a German perspective if this were to improve chances for thefoundation of a Jewish state. The regime had to decide whether it wished tocontinue its policies intended to drive out the Jews without taking account of theinternational situation or of their consequences for German foreign policy.At the beginning of the year the Reich government
s policy on the Palestinequestion seemed clear: on
 16
 January 
 1937
, the Reich Minister of the Interiorinformed the German Foreign Office that it was planning to continue to supportthe policy of Jewish emigration regardless of the destination countries.
81
But afterit began to emerge in early 
 1937
 that Britain
s Peel Commission might opt for aJewish state in Palestine, on
 1
 June the Foreign Minister, Neurath, sent guidelinesto the embassies in London and Baghdad and to the Consul General in Jerusalemin which he made it crystal clear that he was against the formation of a Jewish stateor
 
anything resembling a state
. Such a state would not be sufficient, he said, toreceive all the Jews, and like the Vatican for the Catholic Church or Moscow forthe Komintern, it would serve as an internationally recognized power base forworld Jewry.
82
As formulated in a general order sent to all German consulates by the Foreign Office on
 22
 June, in contrast to the expected recommendations of thePeel Commission, there was
 
significant German interest in making sure that thefragmented condition of the Jews was preserved
.
83
Segregation and Discrimination, 1935–7
 67
 
However, at an inter-ministerial meeting on
 29
 July the representative from theReich Ministry of the Interior announced that Hitler was in favour of emigrationto Palestine and thus of 
 
concentrating 
 the Jews in that area
in direct contra-diction of the idea of 
 
fragmenting 
 Jewish emigration put forward in the ForeignOffice order the previous month. On
 21
 September, however, this was modified by a representative from the Reich Ministry of the Interior to clarify that the
 
Führer
was clearly in favour of the emigration of the Jews, but that he had not made any specific comments on Palestine.
84
Another declaration of principle on Hitler
spart has been preserved from January 
 1938
, and from that it is clear that he waspositive about emigration to Palestine.
85
This established that the continuedexpulsion of German Jews, using all available means, took priority over any foreign-policy reservations.
The
 Judenpolitik 
 of the Security Service
In addition to the state administration, the Party, the Four-Year Plan, andthe Gestapo, in sprin
 1937
 the division of the Party 
s Security Service (SD)responsible for Jewish affairs increased its involvement in anti-Semitic persecu-tion. Previously this division
which, as a part of the Party organization, had noclaim to any official state executive functions
had concentrated mainly on thecollection and analysis of information, but this situation changed when DieterWisliceny took over its running in April
 1937
. At this point a group of relatively young, self-confident activists, including Herbert Hagen, Theodor Dannecker,and Adolf Eichmann, set about reforming the activities of the division.This group very quickly claimed to be a
 
brains trust
 endowed with exceptionalexpertise, and its first task was to develop a consistent conception for future
Jewish policy 
. The self-appointed
 
intellectuals
 of the Division responsible forJewish affairs designated the prime goal of 
 
Jewish policy 
 as the
 
removal
(
Entfernung 
) of the Jews from Germany and in this respect they were to allappearances working in line with the various official authorities working on
Jewish policy 
. However, the SD specialists were unusually consistent in theirstress on the priority of 
 
Zionist emigration
 and all other main elements of future
Jewish policy 
 were subordinated to this main aim, including the
 
crushing 
 of German-Jewish organizations that promoted assimilation, the
 
exclusion
 of Jewsfrom the economic life of the country, and limited support for (or rather manipu-lation of) Zionist activities.
86
In order to assume the leading role they wanted to occupy in the area of 
 
Jewishpolicy 
, this Division
s tactics included muscling in on the executive functions of the Gestapo, via which, as Dannecker noted,
 
the struggle was being carried out onan exclusively administrative level and [which] for the most part lacked high-levelunderstanding of the subject matter
.
87
These tactics were very much in the spirit
68
 Racial Persecution, 1933–1939

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