MEALEY’S LITIGATION REPORT: Class Actions
Vol. 9, #14 September 17, 2009
1
Commentary
[Editor’s Note: Matt C. Bailey is a senior associate withLos Angeles-based Khorrami Pollard & Abir LLP and serves as co-chair o the frm’s Class Action Practice Group. He may be reached at MBailey@kpalawyers.com. Copyright 2009 by Matt Bailey.]
Are class members who are potentially uninjuredentitled to restitution under the UCL in light o theCaliornia Supreme Court’s decision in
In re TobaccoII Case
s, 46 Cal. 4th 298 (2009)? In its decision, theCaliornia Supreme Court reused to extend Proposi-tion 64 standing and causation requirements to puta-tive class members, reasoning that doing so wouldrustrate Business & Proessions Code Section 17203’sentitlement to restitution — an entitlement that is“patently less stringent” than the standing requirementor the class representative codied under Section17204.
See
In re Tobacco II Cases
, 46 Cal. 4th at 320.In practical terms, only the named class representativein a UCL action is required to establish that he or sheactually suered “injury in act and has lost money orproperty as a result o the unair competition”, whereasputative class members would be entitled to restitutiono money or property “which
may
have been acquired’[] by means o the unair practice.”
See id
. (italics inoriginal). Tis distinction has been the subject o sig-nicant debate, leading some to claim that the Court’sanalysis would improperly permit a certied UCLrestitution class to include putative class members whomay not have actually been injured. As an initial point, the core premise o this criticismignores
Tobacco II’s
reairmation o undamentalUCL tenants that eectively return the gravamen o a UCL claim to the
status quo
, pre-Proposition 64.Historically, whether class members were actually damaged has played absolutely no part in the UCLcalculus. Rather, “the UCL’s ocus [is] on
the deen-dant’s conduct, rather than the plainti’s damages, inservice o the statute’s larger purpose o protecting thegeneral public against unscrupulous business practic-es.”
Id.
, at 312. In urtherance o this policy, relie isavailable “without individualized proo o deception,reliance and injury” [
id.
at 320], upon the minimalshowing that “‘members o the public are likely to bedeceived….’”
See
Id.
, at 312. Tese standards denea completely dierent remedial paradigm that is moreexpansive than traditional tort law causes o action.Tis eature o the UCL was underscored by the
To-bacco II
Court, who reasoned that “to hold that theabsent class members on whose behal a private UCLaction is prosecuted must show …that they have ‘lostmoney or property as a result o the unair competi-tion’ (§ 17204) would confict with the language insection 17203 authorizing broader relie.’”
See id.
,at 320.However, the act that the UCL’s more expansive reme-dial paradigm may include class members who did notact in reliance on the challenged practice does not meanthat the class includes members who were not injured.Such a conclusion disregards the act that the globalimpact o a deceptive business practice, rom the de-endant’s perspective, will always be distributed in someorm to the entire consumer base. For example, even when only a handul o consumers purchase a productbased on a deceptive advertising campaign, the cost o the deceptive advertising campaign itsel is passed on
The Scope Of Class Restitution In The Wake OfIn Re Tobacco II Cases
ByMatt C. Bailey