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US Daily: Have Foreclosure Policies Helped Home Prices? (Phillips)
The Case-Shiller Index showed strong gains in the latest report released yesterday, and the increase inrecent months suggests a bottom in house prices. However, there are several unusual factors that maybe influencing the data apart from normal seasonal patterns. Among them are the foreclosure moratoriaimplemented in late 2008 and early 2009, and mortgage modification efforts, which put some foreclosureactivity on hold.
 
How much these initiatives might have supported prices isn’t clear, but it
seems likely that they had amodest positive effect.
 
The moratorium on foreclosure sales implemented by most banks and the GSEsmay have temporarily reduced foreclosure supply by a few hundred thousand units. The implementationof the Obama administratio
n’s mortgage modification program may have also had an effect in delaying
some foreclosure sales, though it is less evident in the data.
 
Regardless, unless further policies are implemented by the government or lenders, it is unlikely thatthese issues could explain further strength in upcoming price reports; the moratoria mostly expired byApril, though the modification program is likely to grow in size at least through the end of the year.
Have Foreclosure Policies Helped Home Prices?
 
The 1.6% increase in the n.s.a Case-Shiller Index (1.1% seasonally adjusted by our estimates)represented the second month-to-month gain in a row in seasonally adjusted terms, and might indicatethat home prices are bottoming. One factor that makes us wary of coming to such a conclusion tooquickly is the unreliability of seasonal adjustment in light of the current downturn, which may havechanged the seasonal pattern. A second factor, and the focus of this comment, is the set of policymeasures put in place over the last year, which temporarily reduced the supply of foreclosed homesentering the market.
 
Currently, the following general trends stand out with regard to foreclosure activity:
 
1. Foreclosure starts are still increasing, though at a slightly slower pace.
 
There are severaldifferent sources of foreclosure data, some of them contradictory. A report released today by the Office ofthe Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) indicates roughly unchanged foreclosure activity in Q2 2009 overQ1, but the more granular (but less reliable) data from RealtyTrac shows a nearly 12% increase in noticeof defaults (NODs). That report, which includes July and August data, indicates that Q3 will be 7-8%higher than Q2, if foreclosures in September match the levels reported for July and August.
 
2. Non prime foreclosures are slowing, prime foreclosures are increasing.
 
The OCC report releasedindicates that in the second quarter, foreclosures initiated on prime mortgages rose by 6%, whileforeclosures started on Alt-A, subp
rime, and “other” mortgages dropped between 4% and 8%.
 
3. Non-foreclosure forefeitures are increasing, but are still small.
 
Short sales and deed-in-lieu offoreclosure actions still make up only a small share of foreclosure resolutions (between 5% and 10% oftotal foreclosures started).
 
4. The foreclosure pipeline is swollen.
 
The Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) delinquency reportindicates an inventory of 1.9 million foreclosures in process at the end of Q2 2009. Moreover, thatinventory increased more rapidly in Q1 and Q2, presumably because of the backlog created by variousforeclosure moratoria, discussed below.
 
A number of exogenous factors have influenced the supply of foreclosed property over the last fewquarters, and probably will continue to do so for at least a few more months. One significant issue is theextent to which foreclosure moratoria have depressed the number of properties coming onto the marketover the last few months. There have been three types of moratoria put in place recently that could beaffecting the supply of foreclosed property:
 
 
 
1. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
 
On November 26, 2008, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac announced thatthey would suspend foreclosure sales through early January 2009. This policy was extended twice butfinally expired at the end of March. The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) issues monthly reportsto Congress on GSE foreclosure activity, and these show two things: (1) foreclosure sales essentiallystopped in December and January of 2009, surged in Feburary, and were depressed again in March.April and May sales were back to normal levels, with little sign of deferred foreclosures.
(2) “Retentionactions” as a share of seriously delinquent loans declined slightly during the moratorium, and have
dropped off more significantly since it ended, implying that foreclosures may increase more significantly inthe months ahead. In all, foreclosure sales during the moratorium were probably depressed by arelatively small number
perhaps as little as 30,000 units
compared with what they should have beenbased on foreclosures started several months earlier.
 
2. State legislation.
 
Since 2008, several states have enacted legislation to extend the foreclosureprocess, which would have the same effect as a temporary moratorium: the number of foreclosure saleswould temporarily decrease, a backlog would build, and then sales would presumably rebound to theirprior level and then some in order to clear the backlog.
 
Selected state foreclosure laws 2008-2009
 
NormalForeclosurePeriod(Days)
 
Effect ofLaw (Days)
 
TotalForeclosurePeriod(Days)
 
EffectiveDate
 
End Datefor FirstMortgagesAffected
 
Maryland
 
60
 
90
 
150
 
4/4/2008
 
7/3/2008
 
Connecticut
 
180
 
70
 
250
 
7/10/2008
 
9/18/2008
 
Ohio
 
210
 
Mediation*
 
270
 
9/10/2008
 
11/9/2008
 
New York
 
240
 
150
 
390
 
9/1/2008
 
1/29/2009
 
New Jersey
 
300
 
60
 
360
 
4/1/2009
 
5/31/2009
 
Iowa
 
180
 
60
 
240
 
5/1/2009
 
6/30/2009
 
Indiana
 
210
 
Settlement*
 
270
 
7/1/2009
 
8/30/2009
 
California
 
135
 
90
 
225
 
6/15/2009
 
9/13/2009
 
Michigan
 
60
 
90
 
150
 
7/5/2009
 
10/3/2009
 
Minnesota
 
90
 
150
 
240
 
6/14/2009
 
11/11/2009
 
Oregon
 
150
 
45
 
195
 
9/30/2009
 
11/14/2009
 
* For laws that require an unspecified period of mediation, we assume 60 days
 
3. Voluntary bank moratoria.
 
When the administration announced its Making Home Affordable (MHA)initiatives, most banks postponed foreclosure actions until the details were resolved. For the most part,these voluntary moratoria should have been lifted by April 2009, but only few continued them past thatpoint. This actually may have been the dominant factor in reducing foreclosure sales in early 2009. Datareleased by the Hope Now alliance, which covers a broad group of servicers, indicates that the magnitudeof this effect is probably
in the range of 300k to 400k properties. (see “House Prices—
Is the Stabilization
For Real?,”
 
US Daily Comment 
, April 27, 2009).
 
The result of these policies has been to add foreclosure supply to the pipeline of potential distressedsales. The moratoria are probably relevant over two periods:
 
(1) December 2008 to April 2009, when theGSE and bank moratoria were in effect, and (2) June 2009 to November 2009, when several statemoratoria and/or foreclosure law changes may have pushed back foreclosure sales. The set of policies inthe latter period is likely to have a much less pronounced effect than the former, since they were limited tocertain states, and did not include some of the very high foreclosure areas such as Arizona, Florida andNevada. Assuming the GSE/bank moratorium is the most relevant, any residual effect on home pricesshould have worn off within a few months of its April expiration.
 
 
 
Mortgage modification plans.
 
The administration’s Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), one
of the initiatives under the MHA program, has started roughly 120,000 trial modifications per month sinceJune. These last three months, after which the homeowner generally transitions to a long-termmodification, or moves into the foreclosure process. These efforts follow more than a year of private-sector modification initiatives, which have generally provided less generous relief to borrowers
oftenthese were simply repayment plans, in which a borrower was put on track to repay past due amounts butdid not receive a concession on the monthly payment. Importantly, the brunt of the federal modificationeffort did not start until shortly after the GSE and bank-led moratoria expired.
 
New data released today by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency shows that a greater number ofmodifications include an extension of the loan term (46%) or a rate reduction (70%) than did previously.Principal reduction is still uncommon, however; it was used in only 10% of modifications in the secondquarter, and it was used almost exclusively to modify loans held in portfolio (30% of portfolio loanmodifications involved principal reductions).
 
Greater use of significant rate reductions and principalreductions should result in greater success in modifying mortgages; since the OCC began tracking post-modification default in Q12008, over half of modified loans have defaulted again within a year (with regard
to principal reductions, see Jan Hatzius and Michael A. Marschoun, “Home Prices and Credit Losses:Projections and Policy Options,”
 
Global Economics Paper 177 
, January 13, 2009). Not surprisingly, banksthat modify loans held in their portfolios have tended to have better success rates than those modified byservicers, whether they are government-guaranteed or private-label mortgages.
 
Additional forthcoming policies.
 
A number of initiatives have either been announced or look at leastpossible in the near future that could reduce the number of foreclosed properties coming onto the market:
 
1. Legislative and judicial changes in the states.
 
States are apt to make additional changes like theones noted above, with the effect of lengthening the foreclosure process. In addition, courts in some jurisdictions have begun to block foreclosure actions due to inadequate evidence of claim to the property,most notably involving the Mortgage Electronic Registration Service (MERS), which is a widely usedregistry covering roughly 60 million mortgages. It is difficult to know how widespread of a hurdle toforeclosure this could become, but if it has at least the potential to significantly
albeit temporarily
slowforeclosure initiations.
 
2. Additional action from the Obama administration.
 
The administration will reportedly announce twoadditional actions to aid borrowers: (1) the first is to purchase up to $35 billion in municipal debt issued bystate Housing Finance Agencies (HFAs). This would be accomplished mostly through Fannie Mae andFreddie Mac, which would purchase HFA-issued debt and resell it to the Treasury (the Treasury isauthorized to buy securities from the GSEs in unlimited quantities through the end of 2009 as part of last
year’s legislation to backstop
Fannie and Freddie). An additional liquidity program would be establishedfor HFA-issued variable rate obligations. HFAs typically serve first-time homebuyers but also play aforeclosure prevention role.
 
(2) The Treasury and Housing Departments are likely to announce details ofa program to facilitate short sales and deed-in-lieu transactions, which would address borrowers who donot qualify for the HAMP program due to significant negative equity or other issues.
 
This would probablynot substantially reduce the number of properties coming onto market and would probably accelerate thetimeline for these properties to come up for sale. The benefit of such a program would be to reduce
transaction costs and to preserve a greater amount of the property’s value
.
 
3. A few long shots.
 
Two issues that continue to come up in the debate over how to reduce the number
of foreclosures are: (1) bankruptcy “cram
-
down” legislation, which would allow a court to modify a primary
residence mortgage to reduce the balance to the value of the property, and (2) more significant resourcesflowing into the HAMP program, possibly to reduce negative equity or make more substantial monthlypayment reductions, particularly for those who have lost their jobs.
 
Bankruptcy reform seems likely tocontinue to cast a shadow on the housing debate through next year, but the odds of enactment seemlow.
 
HAMP changes are clearly possible
assuming that the administration extends TARP until October2009, additional resources will be available for the program until then
but the administration appearsunlikely to take such aggressive steps given concerns about the moral hazard such programs would
of 00

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