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After the Ayatollah
Shireen T. Hunter
Foreign Policy
, No. 66. (Spring, 1987), pp. 77-97.
Stable URL:http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0015-7228%28198721%290%3A66%3C77%3AATA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-S
Foreign Policy
is currently published by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available athttp://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtainedprior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content inthe JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained athttp://www.jstor.org/journals/ceip.html.Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission.The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academic journals and scholarly literature from around the world. The Archive is supported by libraries, scholarly societies, publishers,and foundations. It is an initiative of JSTOR, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community takeadvantage of advances in technology. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.http://www.jstor.orgSun Jul 1 21:21:49 2007
 
AFTERTHE 
AYATOLLAH 
by
Shireen
T.
Hunter
OnNovember
3,
1986,
a pro-Syrian Leb-anese publication,
A1
Shiraa,
reported secretcontacts over
18
months between high-levelU.S. and Iranian officials. Iran's goal \vasAmerican-made military hardware. It is nowclear that America's aim was the release of sev-eral American citizens held hostage in Leb-anon by pro-Iranian militant Shiite groups.But the administration's public justification forthe apparent change in its often declaredpolicy of not dealing lvith terrorists or lvithstates that sponsor terrorism u.as the need forthe United States to open channels of commu-nication with more moderate Iranians whomight determine the character of the regimeonce Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini passesfrom the scene.Few accepted the administration's explanation,however. Even some senior administration offi-cials dissented. Secretary of Defense CasparWeinberger argued that all moderate Iranianleaders had already been killed and that an!. re-maining were "lunatics." And many opponentsof the policy expressed concern about damage toU.S. relations with Arab states.In fact, both opponents and supporters of thepresident's approach to Iran betray a basic mis-understanding of the situation in that countryand the real threat it poses to U.S. interests.During the last 6 years U.S. policymakers havethought of Iran only in connection with develop-ments in the Iran-Iraq war and the security of thePersian GulfArab states. They have becomealarmed when Iran seems to be winning and havereturned to complacency when Iranian soldiersare no longer able to move forward. 3lost U.S.policymakers have taken for granted Iran's terri-torial and political survival and its continuationof cool-though now rapidly improving-rela-tions with the Soviet Union. They have exagger-
SHIREEN
T.
HUNTER
is de uty director
of
the MiddleEast Pro 'ect
of
Georgetown 8niversityi Center /or Stra-tegic and International Studiei,
77.
 
FOREIGN POLICY
ated Iran's ability to unleash Moslem fundamen-talist forces in the Middle East. And, blinded bytheir focus, they have been unable to recognizethat there are some positive aspects to Iran's for-eign policy: its vigorous opposition to the Sovietpresence in Afghanistan, its friendlv relationswith such U.S. allies as Pakistan and 'i'urkey, andits balanced relationship \\~ithEastern andWestern Europe. Because of this fla\\,ed ap-proach, U.S. policy toward Iran, particularly inthe\\rake of the arms-for-hostages fiasco, posesdangers for a \vide range of U.S. interests in thePersian Gulf and beyond.Iran, regardless of regime, remains of enor-mous geopolitical significance to the UnitedStates. It is the most formidable barrier betnreenthe Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf: To keepSoviet troops a\vaj from the gulf, they must bekept out of Iran.Through extensive ethnic, linguistic, religious,and cultural affinities, Iran influences all of itsneighbors. ,\lany of its ethnic and linguistic mi-norities
(4
million Kurds,
4-5
million Azerbai-janis,
1.5-2
million L\rabs,
1
million Baluch, and
1
million Turkomans) straddle the borders ofneighboring countries. Events in Iran, especiallycivil mar or dismemberment, \vould hale far-reaching implications for its neighbors. For ex-ample, successful separatist efforts among Iran'sBaluch could undermine the unity of Pakistan.And Turkej's restive
7
million Kurds-or"mountain Turks," as they are euphemisticallycalled-could
folio\\
closely the fate of IranianKurds.But Iran does not ha\ e to disintegrate or eruptinto civil \var to influence its neighbors. Iran re-mains important by virtue of its size, population,economic resources, and military potential. Solong as the United States wishes a role in thePersian Gulf area, therefore, it must try, asurithevery other important state in the area, to affectIran's political evolution in directions that arecompatible with U.S. interests. For this reason,the United States must adopt a broader perspec-tive of Iran. It should consider Iran on its ovrnterms and not just in relation to the Iran-Iraq warand the gulf Arabs' security. The United Statesshould have a clear vie\\ of its short- and long-term interests in Iran and the Persian Gulf, andof possible points of conflict between them. And
of 00

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