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Theocracy or Democracy? The Critics of 'Westoxification' and the Politics of Fundamentalism in Iran
Homa Omid
Third World Quarterly
, Vol. 13, No. 4. (1992), pp. 675-690.
Third World Quarterly
is currently published by Taylor & Francis, Ltd..Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available athttp://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtainedprior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content inthe JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained athttp://www.jstor.org/journals/taylorfrancis.html.Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission.The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academic journals and scholarly literature from around the world. The Archive is supported by libraries, scholarly societies, publishers,and foundations. It is an initiative of JSTOR, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community takeadvantage of advances in technology. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.http://www.jstor.orgThu Jan 24 17:35:32 2008
 
Third World Quarterly, Vol.
13,
No.
4,
1992
Theocracy or democracy? the criticsof 'westoxification' and the politics offundamentalism in Iran
HOMA OMID
The recent history of Iran provides an interesting example of the struggles betweenthe two political perspectives of Islam and secularism that have haunted the MiddleEast in the course of the 20th century. Islam, unlike other religions, aims to provideboth a political framework and a spiritual solace for its adherent. So long as thecaliphate continued, albeit in its diluted Ottoman style, there was an Islamic ruleprevailing in the region.Islamic politics had of its nature proved to be both sufficiently flexible toaccomodate the vast and varied countries and cultures that it ruled and sufficientlycohesive to create a sense of identity and a semblance of unity for the people ofIslam, the umma. But the advent of colonialism seeping through the region fromthe Mediterranean borders gradually, but irrevocably, eroded the rule of Islamand
in
the 20th century secularism became the hallmark of modernism, independenceand statehood for the old and new nations in the region.In Iran, as elsewhere, secularism was viewed with scepticism, and often openhostility. This was all the more intense since Shiism has from its inception disputedthe right of any caliph, other than the righteous imam, a direct descendant of theProphet, to govern over Muslims. Since the occultation of the twelfth Shiia imamin 941 the clergy,' ulama, have emerged as the defenders of the laws of God andthe protectors of the people against injustice by the ruler. Thus the clergy havenever been subject to the state; the very basis of the Shiia belief is the illegitimacyof any government which is not headed by a Shiia imam. The clergy are thereto ensure that the rulers do not abuse their power and exceed their authority. SinceMuslims believe that God alone is entitled to legislate, the government must dono more than implement the laws of Islam. That is why even at the height ofsecularism in Iran the shahs had to pay lip-service to the Islamic doctrine and avoidlegislation that blatantly contradicted Islam.Throughout the 20th century, there has been a struggle between the increas-ingly secular state and the ulama and many Muslim intellectuals who sought toreverse the tide of materialism, immorality and its attendant anomie that wassweeping over the country in the wake of modernisation.Reza Shah, who cameto power with a military coup in 1921, rapidly dismantled the ulama
S
controlover the education and judiciary and some aspects of sexual segregation. In lessthan two decades Iran was in all but name a secular nation. Although article 2of the constitution proclaimed the nation to be an ithna ashari twelver Shiia, inpractice, with few exceptions concerning personal and family laws, the countryhad espoused secular criminal and constitutional codes. Though many of these
 
HOMA OMID
reforms enjoyed the support of some of the intelligentsia and much of the middleclass to begin with, the process of secularisation in Iran was accompanied by theestablishment of a strong state and a near absolutist rule by Reza Shah. Deposedin 1941 by the allies, the fall of Reza Shah'ended the politics of state control; [but] it
.
.
.
also began the politics of socialconflict.
'2
For the next 30 years the Iranian religious institutions moved from a quietist phaseduring the 1950s to a rebellious one in the 1960s and formed a revolutionaryorganisation in the 1970s. Throughout this period, secularism in general, and theerosion of the Islamic content of family and personal as well as property laws inparticular, remained focal points of resistance. In the context of political discoursesecularism was defined as the paramount expression of dependent capitalism andimperialist penetration into the country.Gradually, from the 1960s onward, young people and members of the Iranianintelligentsia began to echo anti-Western views. Secularism was associated withever-increasing state control and the failures of the state were explained in termsof the failure of modernist anti-religious policies. The return to Islam was madeall the easier because of the flexibility of Shiism; not only were the ulama indepen-dent of the state, but also the intellectuals began reverting to the pre-19th centuryideas of Shiism which provided room for individuals to draw their own conclu-sions and provide their own interpretations of the holy text and the teachings ofIslam. These moves culminated in an apparent collaboration between intellectualsand the religious establishment during the course of the Iranian revolution.The coalition of the clergy and the intelligentsia during the revolution was, asever, an uneasy alliance, formed to oppose an enemy, shah and dictatorship, ratherthan to propose a path to follow. Although Khomeini had described his blueprintfor an Islamic government, Valayateh Faqih, rule by a wise religious leader, in1971, in fact it was little more than a criticism of the status quo and promisesof a better form of government under the guidance of the clergy. The religiousestablishment was of central importance inorganising demonstrations, orchestratinggrievances and publishing and distributing pamphlets and speeches. But the ularna,religious leaders, were themselves divided both in their criticism of the regimeand in the kind of government that they wished to see as a replacement. As forthe secular supporters of the revolution, their political allegiances stretched acrossthe spectrum from the Communist Tudeh party and the Marxist Fadayan, to theIslamic Mojahedin and the secular National Front. All united to topple the shah,but each expected a different form of post revolutionary State to follow. Thus,at the end of a year-long struggle, there were a number of competing models ofgovernment presented by the wide spectrum of pro-Islamic groups, many of whomwere deeply weary of the clergy.But, with the exception of Khomeini, none advocated a theocratic rule. Mostwere as weary of the ulama as they were of the shah and his modernisation drive.This paper will focus on the critiques of theocracy and the defence offered byAyatollah Mottahari of the subsequent theocratic rule.
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