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Britain, the Berlin Blockade and the Cold War
Avi Shlaim
 International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)
, Vol. 60, No. 1. (Winter,1983-1984), pp. 1-14.
 International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)
is currently published by Royal Institute of InternationalAffairs.Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available athttp://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtainedprior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content inthe JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained athttp://www.jstor.org/journals/riia.html.Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission.The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academic journals and scholarly literature from around the world. The Archive is supported by libraries, scholarly societies, publishers,and foundations. It is an initiative of JSTOR, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community takeadvantage of advances in technology. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.http://www.jstor.orgMon Jun 25 18:45:11 2007
 
Britain,
the
Berlin
blockade
and
the
cold
war
The role played by Britain in the conduct of East-West relations during the formativeperiod of the cold war, from
1945
to
1950,
is only now beginning to receive thedetailed scholarly attention which the subject merits by virtue of its importance andwhich the release of the official papers makes possible. In the vast and still rapidlygrowing literature on the origins of the cold war, attention is focussed on theprincipal protagonists, the United States and the Soviet Union, virtually to theexclusion of all other actors. To the extent that Britain doesfeat1.1i-e n accounts of thecold war, it is usually treated not so much as an actor in its own righr but as anappendage to the United States. Thus it is generally recognized that the withdrawalby Britain of aid to Greece and Turkey in the early weeks of
1947
forced America toassume the lead in the containment of the Soviet Union, but the co:itinuing Britishimpact on Western policy is all too frequently underrated. The tenc!cncy to minimizethe part played by Britain in the containment of the Soviet Union bt=comes muchmore pronounced in respect of the period following America's assumption
of
theleadership of the free world with the enunciarion of the Truman Doctrine and thelaunching of the Marshall Plan.It is my view, elaborated elsewhere,' that Britain under the leadership of ErnestBevin played a much more significant and decisive role in organizing :he Westernworld for the postwar struggle for power in Europe than is commonly believed. Theaim of the present article is to highlight the fiat-ure of that role by focussiilg on asingle cold war crisis, the crisis precipitated by the Soviet blockade of che Westernsectors of Berlin in
1948-9.
In retrospect it is clear beyond any shadow of doubt thatthis was the most critical crisis of the cold war. The stakes could hardly have beengreater. As Bevin perceived at the time, the future of Germany, the future of WesternEurope and the future of the precarious postwar international order all hung in
the
balance.The Berlin crisis was not only critical,
it
was also an unusually l.or~g risis, lastingeleven months,and a highly complex one, requiring actions at the political,diplomatic, legal, military logistical and propaganda levels. As one of the fouroccupying powers of Germany, with its own sector in Berlin, Britain activelyparticipated, alongside America and France, at all these different levels. ThatAmerica was the leading acror in management of the crisis on the Western side is norin question.2 All that is argued here is that for good or bad Britain played
a
significant role, far more significant than is usually recognized, in forging the overallWestern policy of firmness in dealing wirh the Soviet challenge and that this role cannow be usefully re-examined with the help of the documentary recorci made availab!eby both the British and the American governments.' Four aspects of thr Berlin crisis
*
Dr Shlairn is Lecturer In Polltics at the llniveraity of Read~ng.
I.
See the author's chapter on Bevin in Avl Shla~rn, eter Junes and Keith Sainsbury,
Rnti\/r
i.,rc:gn
iecvrtaries rinie
1945
(London: David and Charles, 1977).2. For a detailed account of Arnericzn perceptions and policy, see Avi Shlaim,
7'be
L'riited Statti titid the Be&cbloriiide.
1948-1949;
cr
rtr/ffj
in
cvisir ilecision-r}/nfi/ng
(Bcrkeiey, London. University of Cal~forn~a'ress, 1983),revlevied on
p,
127
of this Issue.
3.
For an excellent review of the documents puSlished in the
Fovr~gnRelations
o
the
LI~zitedSlntei
series, see GeoffreyWarner, "The division of Getinany,
194G-1948'.
!r!tarnatzo~~ai?filzi,?,
Jan. 1975,
Val.
51, No
1.
 
2 BRITAIN.
THE
BERLIN
BLOCKADE
AND
THE
COLD
WAR
are particularly relevant to an understanding of Britain's role and an assessment ofBritain's influence: the circumstances surrounding the imposition of the blockade bythe USSR; the basic Western decision to stay in Berlin; the mounting of the airlift tosupply the Western sectors of the city; the resort to nuclear deterrence and theconsideration of other military measures for resolving the conflict.
Britain and the German problem
The Berlin blockade was the climax of the struggle for power over Germany and in abroader sense over Europe in which the wartime allies became engaged in theaftermath of the Second World War. The German problem continued to dominateinter-allied relations in peace as it had done during the war. But instead of treatingGermany as a single econolnic unit to be governed by four-power collaborationthrough the Allied Control Council as envisaged in the Potsdam agreements, theoccupying powers began to impose in their respective zones their own social,economic and political systems. Each was driven by hard necessity to pursue policieswhich, as a resuit of their incompatibility, produced a frustrating impasse.Britain bund itself in the most acute predicament. The British zone was capable ofp~od;,:cing oniy
40
per cent of its fcod requirements. Given the parlous state of theDriris"iconomy, not ro mention popular feelings tcwards the German nation,Britain strongly resented having to expend its scarce dollar resources, at a time of foodrationing at home, on feeding its populous zone in Germany. The Britishgovernment therefore insisted that ways be found to make Germany pay its own way.Gerrnany's recovery was all the more urgent because it was considered indispensable
to
the recovery of Western Europe as
a
whole. Therefore, in the second half of
1946,
the Writis1.1 government
negotiated
i-he fusion of its zone with the American zone ofoccupation in Germany, also a deficit area, to form 'Bizonia'.On the diplomatic plane, the respecrive positions of the three Western powers aridofthe Soviet Union on Germany's future grew further and further apart. The meetingof the Council of Foreign Ministers in ivloscow in March
1947
revealed no possibilityof a settlement based on four-power agreement. Bevin and Marshall concluded thatsomething musr: be done, even if it meant a final break with Russia, to arrest the drifttowards economic chaos which could only pave the way to the spread of communism
in
Germany and the rest of Europe. Marshall made his famous offer while Bevinorganized the West European response and German recovery got under way withinche framework of the European Recovery Programme. Political considerations thusconverged with economic necessity to bring about a shift in Anglo-American policyaway from the Porsdam agreeinenr- which envisaged rhe creation of centralizedagencies for Germany as a whole. The thrtut of the new policy was to endeavour torescue the Western zones of Germally
by
walling them off against Eastern penetrationand integrating them into the incernationa! partern of Westerni Europe rather thaninto a united Germany.
The
London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, in November-December
1947,
proved iiecisive pxecisely bccause
it
decided nothing. The basic question beforethe conferenc.2, as in Moscow in previous spring, was whether or not the alliescould agree among themselves to reunite Germany. And the unequivocal answer wasthat they could not. Following the anticipated failure of the conferer~ce,British andAmerican delegates met co coordinate their next move in whar was by now a definitepolicy of moving cowards the creatio:? of a separate West Gerrnan scare. Bevin and
of 00

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