• Embed Doc
  • Copy Link
  • Readcast
  • Collections
  • CommentGo Back
Download
 
The Impact of U.S. Policy in the Middle East
Avi Shlaim
 Journal of Palestine Studies
, Vol. 17, No. 2. (Winter, 1988), pp. 15-28.
Stable URL:http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0377-919X%28198824%2917%3A2%3C15%3ATIOUPI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-S
 Journal of Palestine Studies
is currently published by University of California Press.Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available athttp://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtainedprior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content inthe JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained athttp://www.jstor.org/journals/ucal.html.Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission.The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academic journals and scholarly literature from around the world. The Archive is supported by libraries, scholarly societies, publishers,and foundations. It is an initiative of JSTOR, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community takeadvantage of advances in technology. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.http://www.jstor.orgMon Jun 25 18:47:56 2007
 
The Impact
of
U4S4
Policy inthe Middle East
Avi
Shlaim*
One of the distinguishing characteristics of a superpower is that itsperspective, policy, and impact are global rather than merely regional. Butthere are four basic interests that make the Middle East an area of specialimportance and special responsibility for American policymakers. First andforemost is the need to contain Soviet influence, check Soviet expansion,and limit the number of Soviet clients in the area. Second, and of growingsignificance since
1973,
has been the need to preserve Western access to theoil of the Gulf, an area containing two-thirds of the world's knownpetroleum reserves. A third American interest is to limit Arab radicalismand sustain the moderate and pro-Western regimes in the Middle East andthe Gulf. Last, but not least, is the long-standing and deeply feltcommitment to Israel's security and well-being.There is a high degree of consensus within the American foreign policyestablishment on the importance of the first three interests, but there ismuch less agreement on how they relate to the fourth one. There is no clearunderstanding, let alone a consensus, on how to reconcile America'sinterests in relation to the Soviets, oil, and the Arabs with its commitmentto Israel. Much of the ambiguity, abrupt shifts, and outright contradictions
'Avi Shlaim is Alastair Buchan Reader in Race Relations, St. Antony's College, 0xford.This paper wasprepared for the conference on "The Superpowers, Central America, and the Middle East," Universityof Essex,
23-25
May
1986.
The author would like to thank the Economic and Social Research Counciland the Ford Foundation for research support.
 
16
JOURNAL
OF PALESTINE STUDIES
that have marred American policy toward the Middle East stem from thesecontradictory interests.U.S. policymakers have found it immensely difficult, if not impossible,to devise a policy toward the Middle East that would serve the full range ofU.S. interests. Since the first three interests are not only compatible butmutually reinforcing, it would be relatively easy to devise a strategy forfurthering all of them simultaneously. The one interest that cannot beeasily fit into an overall framework is the commitment to Israel. Ideologicalaffinity with the Jewish state is reinforced by the argument, propounded byinfluential American Jews as well as non-Jews, that Israel constitutes astrategic asset, a bulwark against Soviet penetration and a cornerstone ofregional order. Attempts have also been made to develop a comprehensiveregional strategy for the United States with Israel as its linchpin. But noneof these attempts has been successful in the long run since they were, ineffect, attempts to square a circle. In view of the profound antagonismbetween Israel and the Arabs, America's identification with Israel wasbound to arouse widespread Arab hostility toward the United States anddrive some Arab regimes into the arms of Moscow.Since America's four basic interests cannot easily be reconciled andsince close identification with Israel has adverse effects on America'sstanding in the region, one would have expected American policymakers toestablish a definite ceiling beyond which they would not be prepared to goin support of their ally. But in practice it has been equally difficult toestablish some sort of balance between the different strands of Americanpolicy. The commitment to Israeli security, largely for domestic politicalreasons, has all too frequently outweighed the other considerations. As oneobserver has concluded:
The issue is essentially domestic-what it comes down to, in concrete terms, isthat, owing to the unmatched influence of the Israeli lobby in Americanpolitics, Israeli security (or, more exactly, the conceptions of Israeli securityheld by incumbent Israeli governments) has been permitted to
preempt
othervital interests in American policy. This, rather than the undoubted complexityof the issues, or the strategic, economic, or moral stakes of one case as opposedto another, has been the root cause of a chronically unbalanced policy that,despite certain tactical successes, remains a strategic failure.'
A brief survey of the evolution of the relationship between the UnitedStates and Israel since
1948
serves a double purpose. It both exposes thecontradictions that plague U.S. policy toward the Middle East andilluminates the impact of that policy on the region.'
Of
the institutions
of 00

Leave a Comment

You must be to leave a comment.
Submit
Characters: ...
You must be to leave a comment.
Submit
Characters: ...