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CI Boom 2008 to 2009

CI Boom 2008 to 2009

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This Critical Infrastructure time line installment is mainly official reaction to recent serious disasters … what needs to be done better, to mitigate against history repeating. Some companies are organizational disasters, lacking proper controls to do their jobs properly. Should there come a time when they should be forcibly taken over, by more competent companies, by government command, like is done with some failing financial institutions, or is there some less drastic solution?

As usual there are some omissions. One recurring story is construction crews cutting into gas lines which they did not know were there. They smell gas, don’t know that they caused the leak. They call 911, which ought to order an evacuation, when they confirm the gas smell. At least one building blows up. There is a general lack of recognition of the risks, of all sorts of behavior, until after the explosion, fire, massive harm.

• Gas lines should be on a city map, available to city engineers, 911, etc. so that when a fire or similar crisis called in, they know instantly if it is in proximity to what critical infrastructure. Also if any construction plans seek city approval, it is also known in advance if the plans are in proximity to gas lines. In either case, give rapid notification to the gas company.
• Gas lines should be clearly marked, in such a way that they do not get covered up by snow and ice in bad winter weather.
• It should be illegal for anyone to cover up the gas line markers, such as with advertisements.
• Construction crews should be trained to recognize the markings.
• The company, which owns the lines, should be notified, in advance, of any construction in proximity to their lines, so that their people can verify the safety.
• First responders need training specific to dealing with gas pipeline rupture fires. This should include authority to cut off the flow of gas to a fire, since gas companies are often much slower than fire depts to get to the scene and do what needs to be done.
• If either the gas company, or the fire dept, is responding to a reported gas leak, they should notify the other organization of where this is going on, and keep them in the loop of being informed on what they are finding out.
• There should be proper funding of regulatory agencies to inspect that these mitigation efforts are in place, so we can get fixes when they are not, before more disasters.
• Auditors and Insurance companies should be in the loop regarding both inspection discoveries and what regulatory inspectors are looking for, so that they can incorporate ISO 9000 safety standards into their work with the companies involved.
This Critical Infrastructure time line installment is mainly official reaction to recent serious disasters … what needs to be done better, to mitigate against history repeating. Some companies are organizational disasters, lacking proper controls to do their jobs properly. Should there come a time when they should be forcibly taken over, by more competent companies, by government command, like is done with some failing financial institutions, or is there some less drastic solution?

As usual there are some omissions. One recurring story is construction crews cutting into gas lines which they did not know were there. They smell gas, don’t know that they caused the leak. They call 911, which ought to order an evacuation, when they confirm the gas smell. At least one building blows up. There is a general lack of recognition of the risks, of all sorts of behavior, until after the explosion, fire, massive harm.

• Gas lines should be on a city map, available to city engineers, 911, etc. so that when a fire or similar crisis called in, they know instantly if it is in proximity to what critical infrastructure. Also if any construction plans seek city approval, it is also known in advance if the plans are in proximity to gas lines. In either case, give rapid notification to the gas company.
• Gas lines should be clearly marked, in such a way that they do not get covered up by snow and ice in bad winter weather.
• It should be illegal for anyone to cover up the gas line markers, such as with advertisements.
• Construction crews should be trained to recognize the markings.
• The company, which owns the lines, should be notified, in advance, of any construction in proximity to their lines, so that their people can verify the safety.
• First responders need training specific to dealing with gas pipeline rupture fires. This should include authority to cut off the flow of gas to a fire, since gas companies are often much slower than fire depts to get to the scene and do what needs to be done.
• If either the gas company, or the fire dept, is responding to a reported gas leak, they should notify the other organization of where this is going on, and keep them in the loop of being informed on what they are finding out.
• There should be proper funding of regulatory agencies to inspect that these mitigation efforts are in place, so we can get fixes when they are not, before more disasters.
• Auditors and Insurance companies should be in the loop regarding both inspection discoveries and what regulatory inspectors are looking for, so that they can incorporate ISO 9000 safety standards into their work with the companies involved.

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Published by: Alister William Macintyre on Feb 12, 2014
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1
CriticalInfrastructuredisasters 2008 to 2009
2/12/201411:01:32 AM1Critical Infrastructure disasters 2008 to 2009
Here is the main document:http://www.scribd.com/doc/114094060/Indy-Boom
Critical Infrastructure Disasters 2008 to 2009
News etc. digested by
 Alister William Macintyre
CI Boom2008 to 2009
tracks critical infrastructure disasters time line. What can be doneto mitigate such disasters is in the main related document.
1
Last updated 2014Feb 04
Version1.43
Table of Contents, thru level
3
Summary.....................................................................................................................1Notable CI disasters 2008 to 2009......................................................................................22008 March 5- Plum Borough PA Gas explosion and fire........................................42008 May
 – 
 CPUC audited PG&E.............................................................................52008 Aug 1
 – 
 CPUC informed PG&E........................................................................52008 Sep 14 Appomattox VA pipeline explosion......................................................62008 Nov 5
 – 
 PG&E replies to CPUC........................................................................62008 Nov 21 Plum Borough PA NTSB Report..........................................................72008 Dec 24
 – 
 RC = Rancho Cordova CA.....................................................................9RC Dec-24 9.16 am+ SOS-A to PG&E HQ...............................................................9RC Dec-24 10.15 am+ Technician arrives at 10716.................................................10RC Dec-24 10.25 am+ request proper equipment of PG&E HQ..............................11RC Dec-24 10.29 am+ SOS-B to PG&E HQ...........................................................11RC Dec-24 time uncertain
 – 
 Technician finds gas leak............................................12RC Dec-24 10.41 am+ PG&E maintenance dispatching begins...............................13RC Dec-24 11.11 am+ SOS-C to PG&E HQ...........................................................13RC Dec-24 1.14 pm+ Maintenance arrives...............................................................14RC Dec-24 1.35 pm+ Explosion...............................................................................15RC Dec-24 1.43 pm+ First Responders arrive..........................................................162009 July 30
 – 
 Bryan Texas......................................................................................162009 Oct 14
 – 
 NTSB on Dixie in Carmichael MS.......................................................16Dixie Carmichael Probable Cause and Safety Issues...............................................17NTSB Recommendations re: Carmichael MS incident............................................17Continued in more documents..........................................................................................18
Summary
This time line installment is mainly official reaction to recent serious disasters … what
needs to be done better, to mitigate against history repeating. Some companies areorganizational disasters, lacking proper controls to do their jobs properly. Should therecome a time when they should be forcibly taken over, by more competent companies, bygovernment command, like is done with some failing financial institutions?
1
http://www.scribd.com/doc/114094060/Indy-Boom
 
2
CriticalInfrastructuredisasters 2008 to 2009
2/12/201411:01:32 AM2Critical Infrastructure disasters 2008 to 2009
Here is the main document:http://www.scribd.com/doc/114094060/Indy-Boom
As usual there are some omissions. One recurring story is construction crews cutting into
gas lines which they did not know were there. They smell gas, don’t know that they
caused the leak. They call 911, which ought to order an evacuation, when they confirmthe gas smell. At least one building blows up. There is a general lack of recognition of the risks, of all sorts of behavior, until after the explosion, fire, massive harm.
Gas lines should be on a city map, available to city engineers, 911, etc. so thatwhen a fire or similar crisis called in, they know instantly if it is in proximity towhat critical infrastructure. Also if any construction plans seek city approval, it isalso known in advance if the plans are in proximity to gas lines. In either case,give rapid notification to the gas company.
Gas lines should be clearly marked, in such a way that they do not get covered upby snow and ice in bad winter weather.
It should be illegal for anyone to cover up the gas line markers, such as withadvertisements.
Construction crews should be trained to recognize the markings.
The company, which owns the lines, should be notified, in advance, of anyconstruction in proximity to their lines, so that their people can verify the safety.
First responders need training specific to dealing with gas pipeline rupture fires.This should include authority to cut off the flow of gasto a fire, since gascompanies are often much slower than fire depts to get to the scene and do whatneeds to be done.
If either the gas company, or the fire dept, is responding to a reported gas leak,they should notify the other organization of where this is going on, and keep themin the loop of being informed on what they are finding out.
There should be proper funding of regulatory agencies to inspect that thesemitigation efforts are in place, so we can get fixes when they are not, before moredisasters.
Auditors and Insurance companies should be in the loop regarding both inspectiondiscoveries and what regulatory inspectors are lookingfor, so that they canincorporate ISO 9000 safety standards into their work with the companiesinvolved.7TagsGas explosion, disaster causes, utilities, construction, mitigation, NTSB, dysfunctionalcompanies,
Notable CI disasters 2008 to 2009
Here is an incident time line section of my notes on Critical Infrastructure (CI) disasters.I collect info about many disasters, see what they have in common, then consider whatimprovements could be made in efforts to mitigate risk of high damage in the next similarincident, or even reduce the frequency in which they occur. My overall analysis and
mitigation evaluation is in a separate “parent”
document, from these incident time-linechunks.
2
 Scribd loses statistics when we change document name, so I kept the original
2
http://www.scribd.com/doc/114094060/Indy-Boom
 
3
CriticalInfrastructuredisasters 2008 to 2009
2/12/201411:01:32 AM3Critical Infrastructure disasters 2008 to 2009
Here is the main document:http://www.scribd.com/doc/114094060/Indy-Boom
name “Indy Boom” because I first started looking into this topic on the occasion of a gas
explosion which demolished a housing sub-division of Indianapolis. That incident turnedout to be deliberate sabotage for insurance fraud, which is not the typical cause of theseindustrial disasters. There seem to be many causes, such as unintentional criminalnegligence, a lack of public education to get witnesses to promptly report leak odors anda lack of enforcement of national safety standards for companies mis-managing thesedangerous chemicals.The events, in this time line segment, occurred in USA. Incidents listed here include:
Construction Excavation near a pipeline, can lead to damage to the pipeline, notnoticed by the construction workers, who can lack the qualifications to notice thedamage. The organization responsible for pipeline security should always inspecttheir infrastructure when there is construction touching, or almost touching it, tomake sure that there is no damage, or if there is any, repair it promptly. Failure todo so, led to the2008Plumb Borough PA disaster.
Counterfeit parts used in Pipeline Repair, can lead to later Pipeline Disasters.
o
See Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E), for that happening.
Dixie Pipeline disaster 
.
o
2007 Nov 01 was the pipeline rupture and fire.
o
2008 Oct 14 NTSB report
Emergency Response, in name only, can make an emergency worse.
o
See Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E), for that happening, with both the2008 Dec Rancho Cordova (RC) and 2010 Sep San Bruno incidents.
First 911 Responders need to have training in how to deal with pipeline disasters.Lack of such training contributed to the Dixie Pipeline disaster in 2007.
Pacific Gas & Electric
 (PG&E) shows up in multiple serious incidents, withan associated record of warnings, which apparently were not heeded in time toavoid the incidents.
o
2006 Sep 15pipeline repair, not done properly, at site of 2008 Dec 24Rancho Cordova Ca PG&E disaster.
o
2007 Oct 7 identifies flaws in PG&E pipeline repair process, such ascounterfeit parts getting into their inventory.
o
2008 May California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) audited PacificGas & Electric (PG&E).
o
2008 Aug CPUC sent a letter to PG&E, identifying what needed to befixed, which was found by the 2008 May audit. This included:
Personnel to be properly trained in responding to leaks.
PG&E documentation, on emergency response, needed someupgrades.
o
2008 Nov PG&E responds to CPUC pledging to make all corrections by2008 Dec 31.
o
2008 Dec 24 Rancho Cordova Ca Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E)Explosion, Leak Release, and Ignition of Natural Gas.

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