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Iraq’s Non-Existent WMDs: Using Human Factors Science to InvestigateIntelligence Failures

By Moin Rahman

The Bush administration has now all but conceded that Iraq didn’t have Weapons of MassDestruction (WMDs). This was based on conclusions drawn by two highly professional andrespected groups. The first one was the

Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of theUnited States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction

consisting of a distinguished group of experts nominated by President Bush. This commission was charged with the responsibility toinvestigate the intelligence collection procedures relating to highly secretive and regimentedsocieties who actively conceal their conduct through denial and deception; and this list includedIraq under the rule of Saddam Hussein. The second one was the

Iraq Survey Group

made up of 1500 military and intelligence specialists who, among other things, conducted a systematicsearch for WMDs in Iraq’s military installations, laboratories and factories. Theseinvestigations were triggered by the colossal loss of lives and money spent in the unsuccessfulsearch and elimination of what turned out to be Iraq’s non-existent WMDs.Both the above-mentioned groups have done a thorough job of studying and investigating topicsas varied as intelligence collection procedures, counterintelligence, information sharing, SaddamHussain regime’s strategic intent, illicit financing and building of the WMD programs, amongother things. However, the

Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities

seems to have missed anissue close to home. That is, the human decision making process at the higher levels of the U.S.Government, their [human] psychology, predilections and biases. Why is it one may ask thatthe human decision making process regarding Iraq’s WMDs didn’t adhere to the scientificmethod and didn’t express a sufficient amount of skepticism and peer review. And is there ascience concerning human behavior that can help us find an answer to this thorny issue thatinvolves government, politics, elected representatives and the decision to go to war.Consider the science of human factors (HF). Human Factors is involved in the design of processes and systems, to match with human capabilities and limitations. HF is utilized in thedesign process – say of a car, cellphone or a space shuttle – to optimize the design of the human-machine interface by making it user-friendly and to prevent failures by taking into account theway humans perceive stimuli, think and respond both during normal circumstances and whenunder stress. HF with its ample amount of peer-reviewed literature, seems to be an appropriatescience, that could have been put to use to unravel this puzzle of the WMD failure, particularlyby addressing the issue of human decision making of people in the government, includingelected representatives.As a practicing human factors specialist, I think, the groups investigating the issue of Iraq’s non-existent WMDs have not addressed a critical factor relating to human decision-makingprocesses. And in a larger sense, the science of human factors, which concerns itself wheneverhuman(s) are involved in a system or process, doesn’t seem to be sufficiently applied in theanalysis and investigations of failures that arise time to time in our government.

2Next, I put to work the science of human factors to demonstrate as to why failures in the human-decision making process in the higher echelons of the U.S. Government may have played a directrole in drawing the wrong conclusions about Iraq’s WMDs, which resulted in a preemptive war.To do this human factors analysis I will begun with the 9-11 attacks.The intelligence failure of 9-11 was blamed on the inability to connect the dots. The prewarintelligence failure that resulted in the war against Iraq is now being blamed on missing dots(WMDs).Congress and two independent commissions (9-11 &Iraq’s WMDs, respectively) appointed bythe president investigated these massive intelligence failures.To correctly diagnose the reasons for the Iraq WMD failure, it behooves that the investigatorsunderstand the fallibilities and fallacies of humans, when they process information and makedecisions in ominous and uncertain circumstances.

Mr. Tenet pointed out in a speech at Georgetown University that intelligence is “almost nevercompletely wrong or completely right.” Due to its nebulous nature, it gives the appearance of not being an exact science; however, a method known as Signal Detection Theory (SDT), whichis part of human factors sciences deals with how humans process information – and makedecisions – in a world that is inexact.SDT in its essence explains how humans’ process information in an uncertain world and react toit when there is a need to separate wheat (referred as “signal”) from the chaff (“noise”). HumanFactors engineers utilize SDT to understand human information processing and decision-makingcapabilities when designing critical systems, such as nuclear power plant control rooms, wherethere is no room for error.

Let us consider the example of a radiologist to understand SDT in detail. When a radiologistlooks at an X-ray and correctly identifies a tumor (signal) it is called a “hit”; if he fails it is calleda “miss”. However, if he falsely concludes that there is a tumor when in reality there was none –say, due to the fuzziness of the picture – it will be a “false alarm”. Alternatively, if he correctlyrejects a mass that is an integral part of a healthy organ, but gives a false appearance of a tumor,it will be called a “correct rejection”.The accuracy of the two correct decisions (hit and correct rejection) could be affected by priorknowledge of the radiologist. For example, if the radiologist was aware that the patient wasreferred because of possible cancer, the radiologist is likely to lower his threshold – or “decisioncriterion” in SDT jargon – for detecting a tumor. This may result in the radiologist adopting aconservative approach and wrongly concluding a normal mass (noise) as a tumor (signal).As seen with the above example, SDT provides a scientific framework to dispassionately analyzeproblems relating to human information analysis and decision making on uncertain terrain. ThusSDT provides a bipartisan approach, in a scientific sense, to address the intelligence analysis and

3human decision-making failures pertaining to the Iraqi WMDs in a politically chargedatmosphere.

“Intelligence” as Mr. Tenet explained in his speech, “deals with the unclear, the unknown, [and]the deliberately hidden”. When intelligence is seen under the rubric of SDT involves identifyinga signal that could be disguised as noise: for example, Saddam Hussein’s deliberate deceptionwhen he constructed dual purpose facilities that produced both arms and industrial goods in theearly 80s and 90s. Furthermore, a smoke and mirror effect could be willfully applied to misleadobservers that could result in mistaking noise for a signal: for instance, even though Saddamfully disarmed in recent years he kept the world guessing by not showing it to the inspectors, andwas even willing to bear hardships caused by international sanctions and lost oil revenues.

Thus Intelligence analysts have to work in a very complex, confusing, and demandingenvironment, where overlooking one thing or falsely claiming something that did not exist canhave severe repercussions (9-11 attack and the Iraq war, respectively). The human factor of intelligence analysis can benefit by the application of SDT to maximize correct decisions andminimize error.

The human factor in the decision making phase involves the consumers of intelligenceinformation, which include the higher echelons of our government. They are charged with anenormous responsibility of correctly comprehending the information and making the rightdecisions to protect the American people.

So the next question is where (and why) did the Bush administration set its decision criterion,which resulted in a conclusion that war was necessary? But to give this a fair hearing, it isimportant to see the decision-making in the light of events following the 9-11 terrorist attacks.

Did the terrible consequences of 9-11 and prior knowledge of Saddam’s WMD capabilities in the80s and 90s – even if unrelated – result in a jittery Bush administration lowering its decisioncriterion? In other words, did they develop a conservative response to wage a war abroad ratherthan take American casualties on the homeland? Based on SDT this scenario is plausible, but itshould not be misconstrued as an excuse for the administration’s decision to go to war.Or as the critics of the Bush administration claim, did the neo conservative ideology within theadministration result in the cherry picking of intelligence information to make the case for war?If true, this would have biased the decision makers and lowered their decision criterion evenfurther resulting in a shoot first ask questions later response

The investigations relating to the Iraq’s non-existent WMDs should have utilized SDT to ensurethat the human factors in the decision making process was sufficiently addressed in a fair andbalanced manner. This may have helped the investigators determine if the actual performance of intelligence analysts, key decision makers, including the commander-in-chief, was a normalhuman response given the circumstances. Or did intelligence analysts commit genuine mistakestrying to tease apart probable proof for WMDs from Saddam’s bluff? Or whether ideologydriven decision makers overruled probable proof that there were no WMDs and rushed to war?