Introduction
The following paper attempts to draw a general outline of a scientific framework thatinvestigates consciousness. Herefore we will in large part follow up David Chalmers' attempts toformulate a scientific and yet non-reductive approach to consciousness.In chapter I we will present the hard problem of consciousness, i.e. why a scientificapproach to consciousness – conceived of in terms of qualitative feel - is so particularly difficult toformulate. In chapter II we will further agree with Chalmers that consciousness is irreducible tomatter. Chapter III will beyond that suggest that as consciousness does not seem to logically followfrom the physical, we might treat it as fundamental entity, inexplicable in terms of something else.Yet again following Chalmers will will argue that although consciousness itself is basic, there might be psychophysical laws, according to which consciousness is correlated with matter. These we will present in chapter IV and hereby conclude our outline of how Chalmers conceives of a theory of consciousness as a search for basic psychophysical laws.In chapter V we will draw from Searle to indicate a first criticism of this overall approach.With Searle we will argue that from postulating the irreducibility of consciousness (chapter II andIII) to postulating his basic laws of how consciousness arises from matter (chapter IV), Chalmersmakes use of a functional conception of ontology that carries certain difficulties with it. With Searleon the other hand will argue that purely functional approaches to reality are counter-intuitive as theycannot distinguish
intrinsic
from
extrinsic
facts
.
And yet Searle gives no more differentiatedontological account but rather
assumes
a physicalist counter-position.In following Ken Wilber we will in chapter VI make even more explicit, that both, Searleand Chalmers, avoid systematic discussions of how they conceive of
ontology
before starting withtheir attempts to formulate a theory of consciousness. Starting from different unquestionedassumptions about ontology they almost necessarily have to come to different conclusions about thenature of consciousness. Furthermore they also avoid a second important question which is aboutthe first-personal developmental structure of consciousness. Not only do Searle and Chalmers avoidclarifying their ontologies, they also avoid clarifying their first-personal conceptions of consciousness. Following Wilber we will attempt to show that giving a more systematic account onthese two questions is
possible
and might be necessary condition for developing an overall theory of consciousness. As we will show, remaining silent about these two questions results in manyimpasses between Chalmers and Searle, where their actual theories of consciousness are concerned.3
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