Welcome to Scribd, the world's digital library. Read, publish, and share books and documents. See more
Download
Standard view
Full view
of .
Look up keyword
Like this
1Activity
0 of .
Results for:
No results containing your search query
P. 1
The Place of the Sacred in the Absence of God: Charles Taylor's "A Secular Age"

The Place of the Sacred in the Absence of God: Charles Taylor's "A Secular Age"

Ratings: (0)|Views: 41|Likes:
Published by David Sessions
Review of Charles Taylor, "A Secular Age," by Peter E. Gordon, Harvard University. Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol 69. No. 4, (October 2008), 647-73.
Review of Charles Taylor, "A Secular Age," by Peter E. Gordon, Harvard University. Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol 69. No. 4, (October 2008), 647-73.

More info:

Published by: David Sessions on Mar 01, 2014
Copyright:Attribution Non-commercial

Availability:

Read on Scribd mobile: iPhone, iPad and Android.
download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
See more
See less

04/27/2014

pdf

text

original

 
The Place of the Sacred in the Absence of God:Charles Taylor’s
 A Secular Age
Peter E. Gordon
INTRODUCTION
The philosopher Simone Weil, born in France in 1909 to Jewish but secularparents, succumbed to her initial mystical experience in Santa Maria degliAngeli, a twelfth-century Romanesque chapel in Assisi once frequented bySaint Francis. ‘‘Something stronger than I was,’’ Weil later wrote, ‘‘com-pelled me for the first time in my life to go down on my knees.’’ An ardentlypolitical thinker with Trotskyist sympathies—Lev Bronstein at one pointstayed with her family—Weil was known for both an ascetic leftism and afervidly Catholic piety. The combination inspired peers at the
 E´ cole Nor-male Superieure
 to give her a vicious sobriquet: ‘‘the Red Virgin.’’ An earlypacifist, by 1939 Weil condemned her non-violent period as ‘‘mon erreurcriminelle,’’ and in exile, first in New York and then London, she becamean outspoken essayist for the Free French. Throughout her life she waspassionate in spirit but precariously frail in body. By 1943 her acts of strin-gent self-privation brought her to the Middlesex hospital, where she diedof heart failure at the age of only 34.The example of Simone Weil came to mind when reading Charles Tay-lor’s monumental new book,
 A Secular Age
.
1
Perhaps this was due to thefact that Weil, though by origin a secular Jew, opened her soul to a highly
1
Charles Taylor,
 A Secular Age
 (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard UniversityPress, 2007), hereafter
 SA
.
Copyright
 by Journal of the History of Ideas, Volume 69, Number 4 (October 2008)
647
 
 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS
 
 OCTOBER 2008
reflective, politically progressive, and philosophically articulate strain of Catholicism not unlike the sort Taylor seeks to defend in his book. Weilherself remained critical of the Church as a political institution. She evenrefused communion, preferring instead an anomic spirituality modeledupon Saint Francis and the long tradition of Catholic mysticism. Taylor,too, is noticeably bitter regarding the less progressive aspects of the modernChurch. In a work otherwise noteworthy for its restraint and a generousacknowledgement of the varieties of religious expression, the angriest pas-sages concern Roman Catholicism’s retreat from the promises of VaticanII. Taylor is also critical of the Church for its ambivalence concerning thefacts of human sexuality. He grants that asceticism and priestly celibacymay have a place for some believers but he is worried at official Catholicpolicies that betray an unrealistic denial of the body and a drive toward‘‘excarnation.’’ On this theme he is worlds apart from Weil, whose habitsof self-mortification were extreme and proved ultimately fatal. But it is acentral lesson of Taylor’s book that there are multiple paths to God. Againandagain headmonishes ustoremain opentoward thevarieties of religioustranscendence. Taylor therefore ranks alongside Weil within a tradition of religiously and politically progressive Catholic philosophy. Admittedly, thistradition no longer has the strength it once did. In the swelling chorus of intellectuals who advocate a greater place for religion within the secularworld, very few, whatever their creed, speak in tones so measured and hu-mane.But there is a further reason that Weil’s example may prove instructive.This has to do with the especially unorthodox character of her convictions,best captured in a remark from the anthology of her writings,
 Waiting forGod 
: ‘‘Attentiveness without an object is prayer in its supreme form.’’ Likemany theological aphorisms, the phrase embodies a paradox. After all,doesn’t religious prayer necessarily have some object, some purpose?Doesn’t one have to pray to some
 thing,
 some
 One
? Perhaps so, perhapsnot. As Tertullian is (falsely) remembered as saying:
 Credo quia absurdumest 
. The notion of prayer without an object may serve here as an introduc-tion to my comments. At the end of this review, I will come back to thisidea so as to explain why, notwithstanding my deep admiration for Taylor’sbook, I must confess to a certain perplexity regarding some of its premisesand implications.
2
2
I owe an enormous debt to three Harvard colleagues, Sean Kelly, James Kloppenberg,and Michael Sandel, for our reading group during a snow-heavy January in Cambridge,Massachusetts. I also received many suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper fromWarren Breckman, Ludmila Guenova, Sean Kelly, James Kloppenberg, Benjamin Lazier,
648
 
Gordon
 
 Charles Taylor’s
 A Secular Age
TAYLOR’S PREVIOUS WORK
The publication of Taylor’s new book is in itself an event of immense im-portance for intellectual historians, philosophers, and social theorists, asit represents a culmination to more than forty years’ philosophical labor.Beginning with his
 The Explanation of Behavior
 in 1964, he has developeda theory of practice rooted in the phenomenological tradition of Husserl,Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty that emphasizes the sense-directedness orintentionality of human action.
3
Drawn most of all to German canons of hermeneutic and historicist philosophy, Taylor has grown ever bolder in hisarguments against behavioralist and rational-choice models of explanation,insofar as these presuppose what he considers a formalistic and culturallyimpoverished model of selfhood he calls ‘‘disengaged agency.’’
4
Taylor’s classic 1975 text,
 Hegel, An Exposition
, broke through dec-ades of anti-Hegelian prejudice in the English-speaking world by providingan historically faithful yet rationally intelligible reconstruction of Hegel’sphilosophy.
5
The animating claim of the book was that Hegel’s model of Spirit, borrowing upon concepts from Herder and the
 Sturm und Drang 
movement, exhibiteda certain dynamicof self-realizationthrough external-ization which Taylor termed ‘‘expressivism’’ (a phrase he took from histeacher Isaiah Berlin). The expressivist self was not fully formed and onto-logically independent of its surroundings, it was rather dependent upon itsactions and articulations to realize what it was. The subject, individual orcollective, was of necessity embodied in certain historical and cultural con-texts, and it achieved self-consciousness and self-satisfaction as a freeagency only insofar as it came to recognize itself in a world after its ownimage.
6
Taylor’s model of subjectivity in the Hegel-book drew upon a vari-ety of resources, especially the cardinal insight of existential phenomenolo-gists such as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty that the essence of selfhood is apractical and historically situated
 being-in-the-world 
: perceptual knowl-edge cannot be understood within the confines of the post-Cartesian tradi-
Samuel Moyn, Judith Surkis, and Eugene Sheppard. My comments here are of coursewholly my own, and this applies most of all to any misunderstandings of Taylor’s book.
3
See, for example, the remarks on Merleau-Ponty in Charles Taylor,
 The Explanation of Behavior
 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964), 69.
4
Charles Taylor, ‘‘Engaged Agency and Background in Heidegger,’’ in
 The CambridgeCompanion to Heidegger
, ed. Charles Guignon (New York: Cambridge University Press,1993), 317–36.
5
Taylor,
 Hegel 
 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975).
6
For a critical response to Berlin and Taylor’s use of the category of expressivism, seeRobert Norton, ‘‘The Myth of the Counter-Enlightenment,’’
 JHI 
 68 (2007): 635–65.
649

You're Reading a Free Preview

Download
scribd
/*********** DO NOT ALTER ANYTHING BELOW THIS LINE ! ************/ var s_code=s.t();if(s_code)document.write(s_code)//-->