Alfarabi: Book of Letters

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Alfarabi

Book of Letters

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Translated by Muhsin Mahdi and Charles E. Butterworth

Part Two

[The Origin of Language, Philosophy, and Religion]

[Chapter XIX. Religion and philosophy are spoken of as being prior and being subsequent]

108. Because demonstrations are such that they are noticedonly after these [dialectical and sophistical arguments], itfollows that the faculties for dialectic, sophistry, and presumedphilosophy or fanciful philosophy were prior to certain – namely,demonstrative – philosophy in time. If religion is set down assomething human, then it is on the whole subsequent to philosophyin time; for by it one seeks to teach the multitude thetheoretical and practical things inferred in philosophy, but bymeans of the ways that bring about an understanding of that – bymeans of persuasion, imagining, or both together.109. The arts of theology

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and jurisprudence are subsequentto religion in time and dependent on it.Whenever religion depends on ancient presumed orfanciful philosophy, the corresponding theology and jurisprudencethat depend on it will conform to, or be even lower than, the twotypes of philosophy.

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This is especially so if it leaves out thethings it adopted from the two [types of philosophy], or from oneof them, and replaces them with images and likenesses of them,and if the art of theology takes those likenesses and images asthough they themselves are true and certain and seeks to validatethem with arguments.Moreover, it may happen that a subsequent lawgiver,

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inlegislating about theoretical things imitates a lawgiver who wasprior to him and had adopted theoretical matters from a presumedor fanciful philosophy. He adopts the likenesses and images bywhich the first lawgiver made it imagined that what he hadadopted from that philosophy was true and not likenesses. And heseeks to make them imagined [132] as well by means of likenessesthat make those things imagined. Now if the practitioner oftheology adopts those likenesses in his religion as though theyare true, then what the art of theology in this religion looksinto is further from what is true than in the first case. Forthere what was sought was only to validate an image of somethingpresumed to be true or fancied as being true.110. It is evident that the arts of theology andjurisprudence are subsequent to religion and religion is

Alfarabi

Book of Letters

2subsequent to philosophy, whereas the faculty for dialectic andsophistry is prior to philosophy and dialectical and sophisticalphilosophy are prior to demonstrative philosophy. Thusphilosophy as a whole is prior to religion in the way the one whouses instruments is prior to the instruments in time, the facultyfor dialectic and for sophistry is prior to philosophy in the waythe tree being nourished is prior to the fruit or in the way theblossom of the tree is prior to the fruit, and religion is priorto theology and jurisprudence in the way the ruler who uses aservant is prior to the servant and the one who uses aninstrument is prior to the instrument.111. Since religion teaches theoretical things by means ofevoking images and persuasion, and those who depend on it are notcognizant of any method of teaching other than these two, itappears that the art of theology depending on religion takes noteonly of persuasive things and thus validates anything theoreticalonly by means of persuasive methods and arguments – especiallywhen the intention is to validate images of what is true asthough they were themselves true. Persuasion comes about onlythrough premises that are generally approved and generallyaccepted according to unexamined opinion, through enthymemes andexamples, and on the whole through rhetorical methods – whetherthese are arguments or external matters.The theologian

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is therefore limited to validatingtheoretical things according to what is common with respect tounexamined opinion. So he has this in common with the multitude.However, he sometimes scrutinizes unexamined opinion as well; yethe scrutinizes unexamined opinion only by means of some otherthing that is unexamined opinion as well. At most, his scrutinyof that opinion succeeds in making it as reliable as one that isdialectical. So in this respect, he sets himself apart somewhatfrom the multitude. Moreover, he sets down as his goal in lifewhat can be acquired through the art of theology. So in this,too, he sets himself apart from the multitude.Moreover, since [133] he is a servant of religion, andthe status of religion with respect to philosophy is that status,the relationship of theology to philosophy also becomes, in acertain way, that of a servant, likewise through the intermediaryof religion. For, in order to attain to a teaching common toall, it defends and seeks to validate, by means of what isgenerally accepted by all according to unexamined opinion, whatwas originally validated by demonstrations in philosophy. So inthis, too, he sets himself apart from the multitude.For this reason, it is presumed that he is one of theelect, not one of the multitude. It ought to be known that he isone of the elect also, but only in relation to the adepts of thatreligion, whereas the philosopher’s being [one of the] elect is

Alfarabi

Book of Letters

3in relation to all men and to [all] nations.112. The jurist is similar to the prudent man; they differonly in the principles they employ to infer the correct opinionwith respect to particular practical things. That is because thejurist employs as principles only premisesadopted and generallyreceived from the founder of the religion

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with respect toparticular practical things, whereas the prudent man employs asprinciples premises that are generally accepted by all andpremises he has attained through experience. For this reason,the jurist becomes one of the elect in relation to a particularreligion, while the prudent man becomes one of the elect inrelation to all.113. Therefore, the elect who are unqualifiedly so are thephilosophers who are unqualifiedly philosophers. The rest ofthose who are reckoned among the elect are so reckoned onlybecause they have a similarity to the philosophers. Forinstance, everyone who is put in charge of political rulership ortakes it upon himself, is qualified to take it upon himself, oris disposed to take it upon himself considers himself one of theelect. Thus, he has a certain similarity to the philosophersinasmuch as the practical ruling art is one of the parts ofphilosophy.Likewise, among the adepts of each practical art, hewho is skilled considers himself to be among the elect because hehas exhaustively scrutinized what the adepts of that art adopt onthe basis of appearance. Further, not only does the skilledadept of every art call himself by this name, [134] but sometimesthe adepts of every practical art call themselves “elect” inrelation to someone who is not an adept of that art. For hediscusses and looks into his art only by means of thingsparticular to his art, while the others discuss and look into itonly by means of unexamined opinion and by means of what iscommon to everyone in all the arts. Moreover, physicians callthemselves “elect,” too, either because they have taken uponthemselves the governance of seriously sick invalids, becausetheir art has natural science in common with philosophy, becausethey need to scrutinize the unexamined opinions present in theirart more exhaustively than happens in the rest of the arts onaccount of the danger and harm that may befall people from theslightest error on their part, or because the art of medicineturns to its service many of the practical arts such as the artsof cooking and chilling

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and in general the arts beneficial tohuman health.So in all of these arts there is a similarity tophilosophy in a particular way. Yet not one of these peopleought to be called “elect” except metaphorically. To be set down

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