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From Environmental to Ecological Sociology

By

Dr. Gary Bowden

Sociology,
University of New Brunswick-Fredericton

Paper presented at the 2004 Annual Meeting of the Australian Sociology

Association, LaTrobe University, December 8-11, 2004

Published in: In K. Richmond (Ed.) TASA 2004: Proceedings of the Australian

Sociology Association, December 2004.

Contact information:

Email: glb@unb.ca

Mailing address: Department of Sociology, University of New Brunswick, PO Box 4400,

Fredericton, NB, Canada, E3B 5A3
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From Environmental to Ecological Sociology

Abstract
The rise and institutionalization of environmental sociology represents one of the

most significant changes to the discipline of the past quarter century. Underlying this

success, however, is a deeper question: Do these developments represent the first step

down a longer path toward more fundamental theoretical change or have the changes to

date delivered us to the promised land? Riley Dunlap (2002), one of the sub-discipline‟s

founders and most tireless advocates, recently argued the latter position. The three

sections of this paper combine to argue the former, that fundamental theoretical change is

still required. The first section distinguishes between environmental and ecological

sociology and advocates the latter. The second section examines current sociological

theorizing about the environment and concludes that the label “environmental sociology”

accurately describes the current state of affairs. The third section identifies three

theoretical disputes that have, in the past, prevented the development of ecological

sociology. Recent scholarship has resolved these debates, thus paving the way for the

development of ecological sociology, the characteristics of which are briefly described.

Distinguishing Environmental and Ecological Sociology

A quarter century ago, William Catton and Riley Dunlap wrote a series of articles

defining environmental sociology (Catton and Dunlap 1978a; 1978b; 1980; Dunlap and

Catton 1979; 1983; 1994). Frustrated with perceived deficiencies in then contemporary

sociological practice, they argued that sociology should examine the relationship between

society and the biophysical environment. This link was overlooked, they argued, because

the taken-for-granted assumptions of mainstream sociology led the discipline to ignore

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the biophysical environment. To rectify the situation, they advocated a new paradigm

based on an alternative set of background assumptions.

A close reading of Catton and Dunlap‟s publications shows two distinct

definitions of environmental sociology: one methodological and the other paradigmatic.

In contrast to Dunlap and Catton, I do not see the two definitions as alternative ways of

rendering the same thing. Instead, I wish 1) to draw a distinction between environmental

sociology (defined methodologically) and ecological sociology (defined

paradigmatically) and 2) to argue that present thinking conflates the two.

Methodologically, Catton and Dunlap (1978a: 44) defined environmental

sociology as the “study of interaction between the environment and society.” Studies

using social variables as both cause and effect, for example the examination of social

class distinctions in public opinion toward the environment, merely transferred the gaze

of traditional sociological theory to a new substantive area – attitudes about the natural

environment. In contrast, Dunlap and Catton argued for the inclusion of both

environmental and social variables as cause and/or effect. Such studies, for example of

the impact of social class on environmental degradation or of energy shortages on

society, they viewed as „real‟ environmental sociology.

Such studies were exceptionally rare in the 1970‟s, they argued (Catton and

Dunlap 1978a; 1978b; 1980), because Western society was premised upon a particular set

of background assumptions – the Dominant Western Worldview (see column 1 of Table

1). Traditional sociology emerged out of this tradition and, hence, shared a set of related

background assumptions, the Human Exceptionalism Paradigm (see Column 2 of Table

1). In other words, they described a sociological paradigm based upon a shared
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anthropocentrism that – irrespective of particular theoretical orientation (Marxist,

functionalist, symbolic interactionist, or whatever) – led sociologists to treat modern

societies as „exempt‟ from ecological constraints. In contrast to these existing paradigms,

they advocated an environmental sociology that embodied a new set of assumptions

(Column 3 of Table 1). Thus, the second definition defines a set of background

assumptions comprising the paradigmatic structure of environmental sociology.

Table 1 highlights three significant differences between the two

conceptualizations of “environmental sociology.” First, the paradigmatic definition is

more elaborate and precise. In addition to the methodological element of the first

definition (the assumption about social causation), the paradigmatic definition includes

several other assumptions. Second, the nature of those additional assumptions –

particularly those about society – significantly shift the focus from environment to

ecology (i.e., from the biophysical realm to a particular systemic conceptualization of the

biophysical realm). Recognizing this, Catton and Dunlap, who had originally labeled the

NEP the “New Environmental Paradigm” (Catton and Dunlap 1978a), renamed it the

“New Ecological Paradigm” (Dunlap and Catton 1979:250) to emphasize the ecological

foundation of society. Third, language of paradigms and paradigm change, invokes

Kuhn‟s famous work The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962).

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Table 1: Major Assumptions of the Dominant Western Worldview, Sociology’s

Human Exemptionalism Paradigm, and the New Ecological Paradigm.

Dominant Western Human New Ecological

Worldview (DWW) Exemptionalism Paradigm (NEP)
Paradigm (HEP)

Assumptions about People are Humans have a Despite exceptional

the nature of human fundamentally cultural heritage in characteristics,
beings different from all addition to (and humans remain one
other creatures on distinct from) their among many
Earth, over which genetic inheritance, species that are
they have dominion. and thus are quite interdependently
unlike all other involved in the
animal species. global ecosystem.

Assumptions about People are masters Social and cultural Human affairs are
social causation of their destiny; they factors (including influenced not only
can choose their technology) are the by social and
goals and learn to major determinants cultural factors, but
do whatever is of human affairs. also by intricate
necessary to achieve linkages of cause,
them. effect, and feedback
in the web of nature

Assumptions about The world is vast, Social and cultural Humans live in and
the context of and thus provides environments are dependent on a
human society unlimited the crucial context finite biophysical
opportunities for for human affairs, environment that
humans. and the biophysical imposes potent
environment is physical and
largely irrelevant. biological restraints
on human affairs.

Assumptions about The history of Culture is Although human

constraints on humanity is one of cumulative; thus inventiveness may
human society progress; for every technological and appear to
problem there is a social progress can temporarily extend
solution, and thus continue carrying capacity
progress need never indefinitely, making limits, ecological
cease. all problems laws cannot be
ultimately soluble. repealed.

(adapted from Dunlap 2002:333)

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Thus, Catton and Dunlap‟s work suggests three distinct visions of sociological

practice: traditional sociology, environmental sociology (the methodological definition)

and ecological sociology (the paradigmatic definition). The conceptual differences among

them can be clarified by a simple visual representation. Think of two colored circles, one

yellow and one blue, separated by an empty space. The yellow circle represents the social

sphere; the blue circle represents the natural sphere. Traditional sociology (the HEP)

operates like a set of colored glasses that obscures the blue circle and, hence, sociological

theorizing ignores the biophysical environment. Environmental sociology, the

methodological definition imploring sociology to take the biophysical environment (and

its interactions with society) into account, removes those glasses. We now see both

circles and, in addition, the arrows of causation (representing interactions between the

two spheres) flowing between them. Note, however, that expanding the perspective to

include the natural sphere does not necessitate a fundamental overhaul of the way the

social is theorized (it continues to exist as an autonomous, identifiable yellow circle).

In contrast, the paradigmatic definition (ecological sociology) argues that each

sphere is, in part, embedded within the other. This can be visualized as two overlapping

circles, one yellow and one blue. Embedding the spheres within each other has two

significant implications. First, the shapes of the yellow and blue circles are altered (they

each have a bite taken out of them by the overlap). Second, a new region (the green area

created by the blending of the yellow and blue in the overlapped area) is created. Stated

in theoretical terms, paradigm change involves a significant modification of a disciplines

conceptual apparatus (the change in shape of the yellow area). In addition, seeing the two

spheres as embedded (rather than interacting) focuses attention on the possibility of a

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new type of emergent phenomenon (e.g., phenomenon such as global warming that

emerge from the blending of the two spheres) represented by the green area.

The Current State of Environmental Sociology

Which of the three representations best describes current practice? Looking over

the developments of the past 25 years, several things are evident. First, sociological

studies of the nature-society connection have been institutionalized as part of a

recognized sub-discipline, complete with journals and scholarly associations. Second, as

a series of recent theoretical reviews have noted (Dunlap et al 2002: 3-32; Redclift and

Woodgate 1997; Buttel 1996; Dunlap 1997), theoretical diversity among self-identified

environmental sociologists has increased over time. Indeed, the variety of theories in

environmental sociology closely approximates the various theoretical traditions present in

the discipline as a whole: Marxist, Durkheimian, Weberian, world-systems, social

constructionist (for examples of each of these, and others, see Dunlap et al 2002). Third,

there exists a general consensus that theory development in the field has occurred;

through a process of “greening” previously existing theories (Dunlap et al 2002: 3-32;

Redclift and Woodgate 1997; Buttel 1996; Dunlap 1997). In other words, the core of each

of the previously existing theories has remained fundamentally intact. The modifications

have occurred through a process of extension – i.e., integrating previously ignored

concerns into the fabric of the existing theories. This is the equivalent of the second

alternative (environmental sociology) described above. The basic outline of sociology‟s

theories – be it social constructivist approaches, Marxist perspectives, cultural studies, or

whatever – as represented by the yellow circle remain unchanged.

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Without denying the significance of these developments, it is erroneous to claim,

as Dunlap (2002) does, that the greening of sociological theory constitutes a Kuhnian

paradigm shift (see Bowden 2004 for an elaboration of this point). On the other hand,

self-identified environmental sociologists tend to embrace the assumptions of the NEP

and, as a result, see themselves as working within a paradigm that differs from that of

traditional sociology.

How can we explain this apparent contradiction: the objective fact that the

emergence of environmental sociology has not caused a paradigm revolution within

sociological theory juxtaposed against the belief of environmental sociologists that they

employ a different paradigm? A close examination of Column 3 of Table 1 provides the

answer. The defining characteristic of the NEP is a concept borrowed from biology – the

notion of carrying capacity – or the existence of biophysical limits on human society. By

removing sociology‟s colored glasses, environmental sociologists have become aware of,

and adopted, ideas from outside the traditional discipline, specifically the biologist‟s

concept of carrying capacity. Thus, environmental sociologists have embraced biology‟s

orientation toward scarcity (in contrast to the economic conception traditionally held by

the discipline) while “greening” sociological theory rather than radically revising it.

The fact that environmental sociology did not bring about a paradigm change does

not mitigate the need for change. Several recent empirical studies concluded that systems

combining people and nature are not the same thing as the interaction of autonomous

social and natural systems (Gunderson and Holling 2002: 121-146, 195-240). More

specifically, they argue that social and natural systems are involved in a process of co-

evolution (Holling 1994). This concept implies the need for an integrative framework that
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encompasses both the natural and the social, i.e., for ecological sociology. But such

theoretical development has yet to occur. Why?

Three Theoretical Disputes and The Developments That Resolved Them

Three theoretical disputes have acted as barriers to the paradigm change necessary

for the emergence of ecological sociology: the division between economic optimists and

neo-Malthusians, the division between realists and social constructivists, and the

inadequate and discredited conception of system characterizing most sociology. In each

case, recent developments have removed resolved these debates and paved the way for

paradigm change.

As noted above, the distinction between the HEP and the NEP reflects a division

between economic and biological conceptions of scarcity. The economic optimists argue

that social arrangements – typically free markets, science and liberal democracy –

provide the institutional arrangements that allow humans to solve any problem they

confront. Economic markets raise capital and provide incentives for entrepreneurs to

solve problems; science provides knowledge about the functioning of the natural world,

knowledge that can be applied to the problem; and democracy allows participation by

wider segments of the public, thus enhancing the probability that a solution will be found.

In contrast, the neo-Malthusian tainted NEP holds that the demand for resources,

stemming from population growth and the increasing standard of living, grows

exponentially while the ability to provide them grows arithmetically. As a result, there

exist strict biophysical limits on resource supply – the carrying capacity of an ecosystem

or the biosphere.
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This argument was recently resolved by Homer-Dixon (1999). Where the

economic optimists and neo-Malthusians argued past one another, holding that the key

claims of the other side were false, Homer-Dixon recognized that both groups offered

partial truths and developed a theory integrating the insights from both. He accomplished

this by shifting the discussion from a focus on scarcity to an analysis of whether or not

we can supply the requisite ingenuity and identifying the factors relevant to determining

society‟s supply of and requirement for ingenuity.

A second conundrum involved sociology‟s debate between realist and

constructionist ontology. Chronologically paralleling the rise of environmental sociology

was another development – the sociology of scientific knowledge – which treated

scientific conclusions as just another socially constructed knowledge claim (Latour and

Woolgar 1979). Many environmental sociologists, however, took a strong realist view;

science legitimized the existence of environmental problems and the need for remedial

action. These debates culminated in the science wars (Parsons and Long 2003). Since that

time, researchers on both sides have moved toward a common middle ground. See, for

example, the „critical realism‟ of Collier (1994) or the „realist constructivism‟ of Murphy

(2002). Even Bruno Latour now claims that “things strike back” and, in recognition of

this, has added “a realist social philosophy of science” to the “old tired theme of social

construction” (Latour 2000: 115, 114).

The third limiting factor involves sociology‟s traditional attitude toward system

thinking. In the late 1970‟s, when Dunlap and Catton were advancing their ideas,

sociological theorists were engaged in an Oedipal rejection of functionalism, the

dominant tradition of an earlier generation of theorists. In the process of throwing out the
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functionalist bath water, the discipline also threw out the baby – any discussion of

system. Functionalism treated social systems as a self-regulating equilibrium in which,

when confronted with pressure to change, a mechanism acts to restore the system to a

state of balance. This approach, exemplified in the highly influential work of Parsons

(1951), was beset with a number of problems; an excessively rigid relationship between

parts and the whole and an inability to deal with either a) sudden change or b) diversity.

Unable to overcome the objections, sociology largely abandon systems theorizing (Walby

2004: 1-9).

That was not the case in other disciplines. Updated versions of systems theory,

notably the idea of complex adaptive systems (Byrne 1998; Holland 2000; Kauffman

1995), overcome the objections leveled against traditional systems thought in sociology

and are now being applied to social systems (Walby 2004). The most promising such

theory, Holling‟s (2001) notion of a panarchy, outlines a common framework for the

explanation of social, economic and ecological systems while recognizing the distinctive

nature of social systems (Gunderson and Holling 2002: 103-120).

With the disputes resolved, the guiding principals of an ecological sociology

become apparent: 1) a model of human nature – human‟s as problem-solvers – predicated

upon what is ecologically unique about our species (we are adaptive generalists rather

than adapted to the specifics of a particular ecological niche) (see Homer-Dixon 2001:

191-220) and 2) a model of co-evolving natural and social systems premised upon that

model of human nature. Such a conceptualization would integrate the social and

ecological demands for energy flows (social organization requires energy inputs to

overcome the tendency toward disorganization implicit in the second law of

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thermodynamics) with the differential cycling present in natural systems (water, carbon,

etc.) and social systems (the information necessary for problem-solving). While not

totally foreign to current theory (Meyerowitz 1985), an information processing model of

society differs substantially from more traditional models (e.g., Marxist class conflict)

and, hence, will involve a true paradigm shift within sociology.

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