The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President meresupervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, whichallegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally, "supervision" is notincompatible with disciplinary authority The Court does not believe that the petitioners can rightfully point to the debates of theConstitutional Commission to defeat the President's powers. The Court believes that the deliberations areby themselves inconclusive, because although Commissioner Jose Nolledo would exclude the power of removal from the President, Commissioner Blas Ople would not. The Court is consequently reluctant to say that the new Constitution has repealed the LocalGovernment Code, Batas Blg. 337. As we said, "supervision" and "removal" are not incompatible terms andone may stand with the other notwithstanding the stronger expression of local autonomy under the newCharter. We have indeed held that in spite of the approval of the Charter, Batas Blg. 337 is still in force andeffect. As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means "a more responsive and accountablelocal government structure instituted through a system of decentralization." The Constitution, as weobserved, does nothing more than to break up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local governments and as put by political adherents, to "liberate the local governments from theimperialism of Manila." Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership andinterdependence between the central administration and local government units, or otherwise, to usher ina regime of federalism. The Charter has not taken such a radical step. Local governments, under theConstitution, are subject to regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeitparadoxically, to enhance self-government.As we observed in one case, decentralization means devolution of national administration - but notpower - to the local levels. Thus:
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administrationwhen the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of governmentpower and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable," and "ensure their fullest development asself-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress." At thesame time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on nationalconcerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered accordingto law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments unitsdeclared to be autonomous, In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future withminimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to itscontituency.
Issue:WON the several suspensions imposed upon Mayon Ganzon are properHeld:NoRatio:The successive sixty-day suspensions imposed on Mayor Ganzon is albeit another matter. Whatbothers the Court, and what indeed looms very large, is the fact that since the Mayor is facing tenadministrative charges, the Mayor is in fact facing the possibility of 600 days of suspension, in the eventthat all ten cases yield prima facie findings. The Court is not of course tolerating misfeasance in publicoffice (assuming that Ganzon is guilty of misfeasance) but it is certainly another question to make himserve 600 days of suspension, which is effectively, to suspend him out of office. The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease with suspensions, for the above reasons, andso also, because it is out of the ordinary to have a vacancy in local government. The sole objective of asuspension, as we have held, is simply "to prevent the accused from hampering the normal cause of theinvestigation with his influence and authority over possible witnesses" or to keep him off "the records andother evidence." It is a means, and no more, to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against anerring local official. Under the Local Government Code, it can not exceed sixty days, which is to say that itneed not be exactly sixty days long if a shorter period is otherwise sufficient, and which is also to say thatit ought to be lifted if prosecutors have achieved their purpose in a shorter span.Suspension finally is temporary, and as the Local Government Code provides, it may be imposed forno more than sixty days. As we held, a longer suspension is unjust and unreasonable, and nothing lessthan tyranny. We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of Interior fromexercising a legal power, yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of Interior is exercising that poweroppressively, and needless to say, with a grave abuse of discretion.
1. Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization of administration, not of power, in whichlocal officials remain accountable to the central government in the manner the law may provide;2. The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism;