CANTWELL V. CONNECTICUT Facts: A Connecticut statute required licenses for those soliciting for religious or charitable purposes.

. The statute was an early type of consumer protection law: it required the Secretary, before issuing a certificate permitting solicitation, to determine whether the cause was "a religious one or is a bona fide object of charity or philanthropy" and whether the solicitation "conforms to reasonable standards of efficiency and integrity." Upon determination of the cause's legitimacy, a solicitation certificate would be issued. Jesse Cantwell (a Jehovah's Witness) and his two sons, Newton and Russel, were proselytizing in a heavily Roman Catholic neighborhood in New Haven, Connecticut. The Cantwells were going door to door, with books and pamphlets and a portable phonograph with sets of records. Each record contained a description of one of the books. One such book was "Enemies", which was an attack on organized religion in general and especially the Roman Catholic Church. Jesse Cantwell stopped two men on the street and requested permission to play a phonograph. They gave permission, and after hearing the recording, the two citizens were incensed; though they wanted to physically assault the Cantwells, they restrained themselves. Cantwell and his two sons were arrested and charged with: (1) violation of a Connecticut statute requiring solicitors to obtain a certificate from the secretary of the public welfare council ("Secretary") before soliciting funds from the public, and (2) inciting a common-law breach of the peace. The Cantwells stated they did not get a license because they did not believe the government had the right to determine whether the Witnesses were a religion. They argued that the statute denied the trio

their due process rights under the 14th Amendment, and it also denied them their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and religious expression. Prior History: The Connecticut Supreme Court disagreed with the Cantwells, finding that the statute was an effort by the state of Connecticut to protect the public against fraud, and as such, the statute was constitutional. The Connecticut Supreme Court upheld the conviction of all three on the statutory charge and affirmed one son's conviction of inciting a breach of the peace, but remanded the inciting a breach of peace charge against the other two for a new trial. Issue: Whether the state's action in convicting the Cantwells with inciting a breach of the peace and violating the solicitation statute violated their First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. Ruling: The Court found that Cantwell's action was protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Justice Owen Roberts wrote in a unanimous opinion that "to condition the solicitation of aid for the perpetuation of religious views or systems upon a license, the grant of which rests in the exercise of a determination by state authority as to what is a religious cause, is to lay a forbidden burden upon the exercise of liberty protected by the Constitution." In general the court hold with respect to the Establishment

Clause and Free Exercise Clause and their embodiment in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: "We hold that the statute, as construed and applied to the appellants, deprives them of their liberty without due process of law in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment. The fundamental concept of liberty embodied in that Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment. The First Amendment declares that Congress shall

make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws. The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus the Amendment embraces two concepts,-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society. The freedom to act must have appropriate definition to preserve the enforcement of that protection. In every case the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom. No one would contest the proposition that a state may not, be statute, wholly deny the right to preach or to disseminate religious views. Plainly such a previous and absolute restraint would violate the terms of the guarantee. It is equally clear that a state may by general and nondiscriminatory legislation regulate the times, the places, and the manner of soliciting upon its streets, and of holding meetings thereon; and may in other respects safeguard the peace, good order and comfort of the community, without unconstitutionally invading the liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." Justice Owen Roberts (J. Roberts) stated that while it is obvious that the principles of freedom of speech and religion do not sanction incitement to riot or violence, it is equally obvious that a State may not unduly suppress free communication of views under the guise of maintaining desirable conditions. With these considerations in mind, we note that there was no evidence of assaultive behavior or threatening of bodily

harm, no truculent bearing, no profane, abusive, indecent remarks directed to the person of the hearer. Thus, it cannot be said that Cantwells actions resulted in a breach of the peace or an incitement to a breach thereof By ruling that the facts of this case, speaking to an audience hostile to ones message, does not amount to a breach of the peace, the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) gives insight into the degree of public disorder it requires to permit a government to regulate free expression on those grounds

MURDOCK V. PENNSYLVANIA Facts: The Borough of Jeannette, Pennsylvania mandated that all solicitors that sold goods within the borough purchase a solicitation license. Robert Murdock was a Jehovah's Witness who canvassed door to door within Jeannette, offering religious texts in exchange for donations. He and other Jehovah's Witnesses were arrested for their solicitation of their texts. They were convicted and fined for violating Jeannette's ordinance. The Jehovah's Witnesses appealed to the Superior Court of

government is capable of making it prohibitively expensive and could only be done by the wealthy. The state claimed that this argument was unimportant because the tax was not expensive in practice. It is a license tax-a flat tax imposed on the exercise of a privilege granted by the Bill of Rights. A state may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the federal constitution. The fact that the ordinance was imposed indiscriminately does not save it from being unconstitutional. This case also established the preferred position doctrine, which states that "[f]reedom of press, freedom of speech, [and] freedom of religion are in a preferred position," indicating that certain fundamental human rights have prerogative.

Pennsylvania, alleging that the ordinance violated the Free Speech, Free Press, and Free Exercise of Religion clauses of the First Amendment. The Superior Court upheld the ordinance and their convictions, and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania declined to hear their appeal. Ruling: Justice William O. Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. The court held that the ordinance was an unconstitutional tax on the Jehovah's Witnesses' right to freely exercise their religion. The petitioners used the distribution of pamphlets and brochures as a form of missionary activity with an evangelical purpose. Not all behavior could be allowed by claiming that it was a religious activity. The only hold that spreading one's religious beliefs or preaching the Gospel through distribution of religious literature and through personal visitations is an age-old type of evangelism with as high a claim to constitutional protection as the more orthodox types. If the activity were done in order to raise money, it would be commercial and could be taxed. However, in this case, although donations were sought, the activity served a religious function. Religions are not entirely free from facing financial burdens from the government. It is one thing to impose a tax on the income or property of a preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax from him for the privilege of delivering a sermon. If the exercise can be taxed then the

EVERSON V. BOARD OF EDUCATION Facts:

Arch R. Everson, a taxpayer in Ewing Township, filed a lawsuit alleging that this indirect aid to religion through the mechanism of reimbursing parents and students for costs incurred as a result of attending religious

The case was brought by a New Jersey taxpayer against a tax funded school district that provided reimbursement to parents of both public and private schooled children taking the public transportation system to school.

schools violated both the New Jersey state constitution and the First Amendment. After a loss in the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals, then the state's highest court, Everson appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court on purely federal constitutional grounds. Arguments were heard on November 20, 1946. Ruling:

The taxpayer contended that reimbursement given for children attending private religious schools violated the constitutional prohibition against state support of religion, and the taking of taxpayers' money to do so violated the constitution's Due Process Clause.

The Court found that while the Establishment Clause requires that the state remain neutral among religions and between religion and non-

The Justices were split over the question whether the New Jersey policy constituted support of religion, with the majority concluding these reimbursements were "separate and so indisputably marked off from the religious function" that they did not violate the constitution.

religion, the New Jersey plan merely provided money to parents as part of a general government service that was not inherently religious in character, similar to providing sewer and police services to churches. "The establishment of religion clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church

However both affirming and dissenting Justices were decisive that the Constitution required a sharp separation between government and religion and their strongly worded opinions paved the way to a series of later court decisions that taken together brought about profound changes in legislation, public education, and other policies involving matters of religion.

Both

Justice Hugo

Black's

majority

opinion

and

Justice Wiley

attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect a wall of separation between church and State." (Justice Hugo Black)

Rutledge'sdissenting opinion defined the First Amendment religious clause in terms of a "wall of separation between church and state".

After repealing a former ban, a New Jersey law authorized payment by local school boards of the costs of transportation to and from schools including private schools. Of the private schools that benefited from this policy, 96% were parochial Catholic schools.

Dissent: Although the Court was unanimous in affirming the principle of "neutrality" by the government toward religion, four Justices disagreed with the majoritys view that allowing reimbursement for bus

The Petitioners brought suit challenging the constitutionality of the program alleging that the prohibition against any laws respecting the establishment of any religion also prohibited this voluntary program.

The Petitioners appealed from a judgment for the Respondents, Clauson and other member of the Board of Education of the City of New York (Respondents) and the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) granted writs.

transportation to parents of students in parochial schools was not a breach of church-state separation. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Wiley B. Rutledge defined "no establishment" this way: "The prohibition broadly forbids state support, financial or other, of religion in any guise, form or degree. It outlaws all use of public funds for religious purposes."

Issue. The issue is simply whether New York, through its acceptance of the released time program, has engaged in the respect of an establishment of religion, within the meaning of the First Amendment of the Constitution.

ZORACH V. CLAUSON Brief Fact Summary. The Petitioners, Zorach and other taxpayers and residents of New York City (Petitioners), brought suit challenging the constitutionality of a released time program, which allowed children to leave school, with parental permission, for religious instruction.

Held. Affirmed. The Supreme Court held for the Respondents, noting that because instruction occurred away from the schools and did not require school participation, no respect for a particular establishment had occurred. Additionally, the Supreme Court held that a philosophy of hostility toward religion cannot be read into the Bill of Rights. Just because the First Amendment of the Constitution prohibits the making of a law which will respect the establishment of religion, it does not necessarily follow that the government should be hostile toward the exercise of religion, which would also be an abrogation of the Free Exercise Clause of the same amendment

Synopsis of Rule of Law. This case stands for the proposition that the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution) does not advocate hostility toward religion and mere acknowledgment of a religious program, without participation, is not unconstitutional. Facts. The released time program allowed children, with parental permission, to be released from school for religious instruction. The instructions took place away from the school grounds and no school involvement was required, other than acknowledging the students participation.

Dissent: Justices Hugo Black (J. Black) and Robert Jackson (J. Jackson) wrote separate dissents, both standing for the proposition that the majority had blurred the line between the separation of church and state Discussion: While the establishment clause prohibits governmental support of religion, it does not prohibit students from exercising their religions

BRAUNFELD V. BROWN Facts: Plaintiffs sought to have a 1959 Pennsylvania statute, 18 Purdon's Pa. Stat. Ann. 4699.10 (1960 Cum. Supp.) overturned as unconstitutional. A three judge panel rejected their petition. (See Abraham Braunfeld v. Thomas J. Gibbons and Victor H. Blanc, 184 F. Supp. 352 (E.D.Pa 1959)). The Court also based its opinion in part on two earlier rulings.

Ruling: Chief Justice Warren wrote the plurality opinion, joined by

Justices Black, Clark, and Whittaker. Chief Justice Warren first rejected appellants' Establishment

Clause and Equal Protection Clause arguments, ruling that the Court's earlier opinion in Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc., v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961) had concluded that the statute at issue did not violate either of those provisions. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 600-01. Chief Justice Warren then addressed appellants' remaining argument that by requiring Orthodox Jewish merchants to remain closed for one day in addition to their religiously required day of rest, the statute unfairly burdened existing Orthodox Jews and made it more difficult for the religion to recruit more members, thereby violating the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States

In Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc., v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961), the Court had previously ruled that the same Pennsylvania statute was not unconstitutional, either as (i) a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution or (ii) an impermissible establishment of religion under the First

Constitution. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 601-02. Chief Justice Warren reasoned as follows: While originally enacted for religious purposes, the so-called "Sunday Closing Laws" had a legitimate state purpose in providing for the general welfare by establishing a day of rest. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 602-03, citing McGowan, 366 U.S. at 437-40. Although the Court had previously held that the Free Exercise Clause prevented the States from passing laws that forbade the exercise of religion or required citizens to "say or believe anything in conflict with their religious tenets," states could in some cases regulate conduct, even if that regulation burdened citizens of a particular religion. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 603-05. In order to balance the interests at issue, the Court held that: 1. Where the "purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or all religions or is to discriminate

Amendment to the United States Constitution. Therefore, the only remaining issue in Braunfeld was whether the Pennsylvania statute was an unconstitutional interference in the appellant's religion. In McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), the Court had previously held that a similar Maryland statute was constitutional. Abraham Braunfeld and the other appellants

were Pennsylvania merchants. As Orthodox Jews, the appellants were unable to do business on Friday evening or Saturday. They objected to a Pennsylvania law forbidding them from doing business on Sunday, arguing that the law unfairly discriminated against them by effectively forcing them to remain closed for one more day than

competing Christianmerchants.

invidiously between religions, that law is constitutionally invalid even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect." Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 607. 2. However, where "the State regulates conduct by enacting a general law within its power, the purpose and effect of which is to advance the State's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance unless the State may accomplish its purpose by means which do not impose such a burden."Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 607. In the specific case before the Court, the plurality opinion held that the law in question had only an indirect effect, and that the Court could not conclude that there was any less burdensome means of achieving the State's goals. In particular, although appellants argued that a law exempting citizens who were required to rest on other days from the Sunday rest day would be a wiser choice, the Court concluded that there were valid reasons for which a state might choose a single day of rest. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 607-09.

On that basis, Justice Frankfurter rejected most of the appellants' claims. McGowan, 366 U.S. at 511-42. However, Justice Frankfurter, writing solely for himself and not for Justice Harlan, did dissent on one point. Based on the procedural history of Braunfeld, Justice Frankfurter argued that appellants' claim that the law was irrational and arbitrary should not have been dismissed for failure to state a claim, but should have been permitted to proceed to an evidentiary stage. McGowan, 366 U.S. at 542-43.

Concurrence/dissent (Harlan) In his opinion, Justice Harlan concurred with the Court's initial conclusion that the Pennsylvania statute did not violate the Establishment Clause or the Equal Protection Clause. However, Justice Harlan dissented from the remainder of the opinion, arguing that the statute should be held unconstitutional under the Free Exercise Clause. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 610-16. Justice Harlan wrote in part: [T]he issue in this case - and we do not understand either appellees or the Court to contend otherwise - is whether a State Concurrence/dissent (Frankfurter) Justice Frankfurter wrote a concurring opinion with which Justice Harlan joined. (Justice Frankfurter published that opinion as part of McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), but declared his opinion applicable to Braunfeld and several other cases. McGowan, 366 U.S. at 459, fn). Like Justice Harlan, Justice Brennan concurred in the plurality opinion to First, Justice Frankfurter examined the history of the First Amendment and "Sunday Statutes" in detail, and concluded that the Sunday statutes had a long history and substantial non-religious purpose. McGowan, 366 U.S. at 460-511. the extent that it held that the Pennsylvania statute did not violate the Establishment Clause or the Equal Protection Clause, but dissented from the remainder of the opinion, arguing that the statute should be held unconstitutional under the Free Exercise Clause. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 610-17. Two years later, Justice Brennan wrote a majority may put an individual to a choice between his business and his religion. The Court today holds that it may. But I dissent, believing that such a law prohibits the free exercise of religion. Concurrence/dissent (Brennan)

opinion, in Sherbert v. Verner, that largely tracked his dissent in this case. In the Sherbert case, the court struck down a law on Free Exercise grounds that prohibited a worker from collecting unemployment compensation who was terminated from her job because she would not work on Saturdays for religious reasons. Dissent (Douglas) Like Justice Frankfurter, Justice Douglas also published

unemployment benefits to a Seventh-Day Adventist because she refused to work on Saturday

Synopsis of Rule of Law. A state may not constitutionally apply the eligibility provisions of its unemployment compensation scheme so as to constrain a worker to abandon her religious convictions respecting the day of rest

his Braunfeld dissent as part of the earlier McGowan decision, at 366 US 561-82. In that opinion, Justice Douglas argued that the "Sunday Laws" could not be separated from their religious roots, and that the imposition of those laws on persons of other religions violated both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution Dissent (Stewart) Justice Stewart joined Justice Brennan's dissent, and wrote further: Pennsylvania has passed a law which compels an Orthodox Jew to choose between his religious faith and his economic survival. That is a cruel choice. It is a choice which I think no State can constitutionally demand. For me this is not something that can be swept under the rug and forgotten in the interest of enforced Sunday togetherness. I think the impact of this law upon these appellants grossly violates their constitutional right to the free exercise of their religion.

Facts. The Appellant, Sherbert (Appellant), a Seventh-Day Adventist was denied unemployment benefits by South Carolina because she refused to work on Saturdays. Specifically, her claim for unemployment benefits was denied because the state compensation law barred benefits to workers who failed, without good caus e, to accept suitable work when offered. She refused to take a job that required her to work Saturdays. The highest state court sustained the denial of benefits.

Issue. Whether the disqualification for benefits imposes any burden on the free exercise of Appellants religion?

Whether some compelling state interest justifies the substantial infringement of Appellants First Amendment constitutional right?

Held. Yes. Judgment of the highest state court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The consequences of such a disqualification to religious principles and practices may be only an indirect result of welfare legislation within the states general competence to enact. Here, not only is it apparent that Appellants declared ineligibility for benef its solely derives from the

SHERBERT V. VERNER Brief Fact Summary. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) held that South Carolina may not constitutionally apply the eligibility provisions of its unemployment compensation scheme in order to deny

practice of her religion, but the pressure upon her to forego that practice is unmistakable. Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against Appellant for her Saturday worship. Therefore, the disqualification for benefits imposes a burden on the free exercise of Appellants religion.

No. Judgment of the highest state court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The states asserted interest is no more than a possibility of the filing of fraudulent claims by people feigning religious objections to Saturday work. Here, no justifications underlie the determination of the state court that Appellants religion makes her ineligible to receiv e benefits. South Carolina may not constitutionally apply the eligibility provisions of its unemployment compensation scheme in order to deny unemployment benefits to a SeventhDay Adventist because she refused to work on Saturday. Therefore, there are no compelling state interests that justify the substantial infringement of Appellants First Amendment constitutional right Dissent. In no way did the state did not discriminate against the Appellant on the basis of her religious beliefs or that she was denied benefits because she was a Seventh-Day Adventist.

the pupils request, ownership remaining with s tate, 3) no funds or books were furnished to parochial schools, and financial benefit was to parents and children, not to schools, 4) only secular books, not religious books, could receive approval for loans, and 5) the statute was not alleged in any way to have coerced the plaintiffs as individuals in the practice of their religion.

Syllabus: The express purpose of the statute was the furtherance of educational opportunities for the young, and the law merely makes available to all children the benefits of a general program to lend school books for free, and the financial benefit is to parents and children, not to schools. No religious books have been loaned, and it cannot be assumed that school authorities are unable to distinguish between secular and religious books. Parochial schools, in addition to sectarian function, give secular education, and US SC cannot agree that all teaching in sectarian schools are religious and that textbooks furnished to them are instrumental in teaching religion. The law has also not been seen to coerce them in any way in the practice of religion.

Concurrence. It is the Supreme Court s duty to face up to the dilemma posed by the conflict between religion cases Discussion. In the wake of thisholding, religious objectors to general regulations repeatedly came to the Court invoking Sherberts strict scrutiny inclaiming constitutionally mandated exemptions. Although the Court

Facts: The law authorizes public school boards to designate textbooks for use in public schools, purchase such books with public funds, and rent/sell them to public school students. Law was amended such that boards were required to lend them without charge to all children in the district of public or private

typically adhered to the Sherbert analysis in form, it quite frequently rejected the religious objectors claims in fact

BOARD OF EDUCATION V. ALLEN NY CA upheld. Plaintiffs members of a local board of education sought relief from enforcement of a NY statute requiring local public school authorities to lend textbooks free of charge to all students grades7-12, including students attending private parochial schools. Statute valid since 1) the statute merely made available to all children the benefits of a general program to lend schoolbooks free of charge, 2) the books were furnished at

schools. Present complaint alleged that if books are not be lent to parochial schools by the boards, they would be removed from office by Allen. They wanted to stop Allen from being able to remove, and from being compelled to purchase books to be lent to parochial schools. NY CA said laws purpose was to benefit all school children, regardless of school type, and only textbooks approved by public school authorities could be loaned. The law was completely neutral with religion, merely making available secular books

at request of individual students, asking no question about which school he attends.

religious schools will use them to teach religion, for they have 2goals, religious instruction and secular education.

Issue: Whether or not the law violates the free exercise of religion.

If the state has interest in secular education through private schools, it has proper interest in the manner in which those schools perform their secular educational function. The states interest is education, broadly, and

Held: No. Everson is the case here: non-establishment clause does not prevent state from extending benefit of laws to all citizens regardless of religion, does not prohibit raising funds to pay bus fares of parochial schools as part of a general program; law valid even if children used the fare to get to church schools, and some children could not go to church schools if parents were not compelled to pay. At present, the problem is one of degree. A test has been fashioned to distinguish forbidden involvements of state with religion:

its method comprehensive. Individual interests are aided only as the common interest is safeguarded. Such private schools form part of the informed opinion, and function to increase the level of knowledge in the state, which the state has interest in. All teaching in a sectarian school is not religious, or that processes are so intertwined that secular textbooks are instrumental in the teaching of religion. No record shows that physics books, etc., are used to teach religion. It is necessary in a free exercise case for one to show the coercive effect of the enactment as it operates against him in the practice of his religion, and appellants have not contended that the New York law in any What are the purpose and primary effect of the enactment? If it is way coerces them as individuals in the practice of their religion.

to advance or inhibit religion, then exceeds legislative power. There must be secular legislative purpose and primary effect which does not advance nor inhibit religion. (Concurring, Harlan): The attitude of government toward religion must be one of neutrality. Neutrality is a coat of many colors. It requires government neither to engage The express purpose of the assailed law is furtherance of educational opportunities for the young, merely making available to all children the benefits of a general program to lend school books for free. Ownership remains with the state, so no funds or books are furnished to parochial schools. The law does not authorize the loan of religious books, and the state claims no right to distribute religious literature. The loan must be approved by public school authorities, and only secular books may receive approval. No records contain suggestion that religious books have been loaned. Presumed that public school authorities can distinguish between secular and religious books. Although books are essential to teaching, it does not mean that nor compel religious practices, no favoritism between religion and nonreligion. Such objectives have no simple and clear way of measurement. Where the contested governmental activity aims to achieve nonreligious purposes otherwise within states competence, and where activity does not involve state so significantly and directly in the realm of the sectarian as to give rise to influences and inhibitions of freedom, is not allowed.

WALZ V. TAX COMMISSION New York law granted property tax exemptions to religious organizations for religious properties used solely for religious worship. This exemption is authorized by N.Y. Const. art. XVI, 1. Under this provision, exemptions from taxation may be granted only by general laws. Exemptions may be altered or repealed except those exempting real or personal property used exclusively for religious, educational or charitable purposes as defined by law and owned by any corporation or association organized or conducted exclusively for one or more of such purposes and not operating for profit. This exemption is implemented by N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law 420(1). This provision states in part: Real property owned by a corporation or association organized exclusively for the moral or mental improvement of men and women, or for religious, bible, tract, charitable, benevolent, missionary, hospital, infirmary, educational, public playground, scientific, literary, bar association, medical society, library, patriotic, historical or cemetery purposes and used exclusively for carrying out thereupon one or more of such purposes shall be exempt from taxation as provided in this section.

contribution to religious bodies and thereby violated the religion clauses of the First Amendment.

Procedural history[edit]
Rejecting this contention, the New York Supreme Court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint. The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court (30 App Div 2d 778, 292 NYS2d 353) and the New York Court of Appeals (24 NY2d 30, 298 NYS2d 711, 246 NE2d 517) affirmed.

Opinion of the court[edit]

The United States Supreme Court affirmed, in an opinion by Burger, Ch. J., expressing the views of five members of the court.

Reasoning[edit]
The Court held that there was no nexus between these tax exemptions and the establishment of religion, and that federal or state grants of tax exemption to churches did not violate the First Amendment: (1) exemptions were granted to all houses of religious worship within a broad class of property owned by nonprofit, quasi-public corporations which included hospitals, libraries, playgrounds, and scientific, professional, historical, and patriotic groups, and the legislative purpose was thus not aimed at establishing, sponsoring, or supporting religion, and (2) the exemptions for religious organizations created only a minimal and remote involvement between church and state, and far less of an involvement than would be created by taxation of churches, and the effect of the exemptions was thus not an excessive government entanglement with religion. The grant of a tax exemption was not sponsorship of the organizations because the government did not transfer part of its revenue to churches but simply abstained from demanding that the churches support the

Dispute[edit]
The plaintiff, an owner of real estate, brought suit in the New York Supreme Court, Special Term, seeking to enjoin the New York City Tax Commission from granting these exemptions. The plaintiff contended that the exemptions indirectly required him to make a

state. The exemption created a more minimal and remote involvement between church and state than did taxation because it restricted the fiscal relationship between church and state and reinforced the desired separation insulating one from the other.

Held . No. The statutes result in excessive entanglement between the government and religion. Excessive entanglement is determined by the character and purpose of the institutionbenefited, the nature of the aid given, and the resulting relationship between the government and church Discussion. The framers of theUnited States Constitutionspecifically and purposefully prohibited the establishment of a state church because of the inherent problems. The Establishment Clause was designed to avoid state sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.
WISCONSIN V. YODER

Concurrences[edit]
Justices Brennan and Harlan, each in a separate opinion, while concurring in the court's conclusion that the tax exemptions did not violate the First Amendment, would reach this conclusion by applying different criteria from those applied by the court.

Dissent[edit]
Justice Douglas would have held that the tax exemptions for religious organizations violated the establishment-ofreligion clause of the First Amendment.

Brief

Fact

Summary. Several

Amish families appealed

a decision convicting them of failing to send their children to school until the age of 16 based upon Freedom of Religion under the constitution.

LEMON V. KURTZMAN

Brief Fact Summary. The state reimburses parochial schools for certain expenses associated with the education of its children

Synopsis of

Rule

of

Law. The

law

compelling parents to

send

their children topublic school until the age of 16 is unconstitutional as applied because it impermissibly interferes with the Amish religious

Synopsis

of

Rule

of

Law. To

be

valid,

a statute must

have

beliefs. Facts. Respondents Jonas Yoder, Wallace Miller, and Adin Yutzy are members of the Amishreligion . Wisconsins compulsoryschool-

a secular legislative purpose, must not advance or inhibit religion, and must not excessively entangle church and state. Facts. Pennsylvania has a statute that reimburses religiousschools for teacher salaries, textbooks, and other instructional materials. Rhode Island has a similar statute that allows the state to pay private school teachers a 15% salary supplement

attendance law required them to cause their children to attend public or private schooluntil they reach 16. Respondents declined to send their children to public school after completion of the eighth grade. Respondents were convicted of violating the law and fined $5 each.

Issue. Is it constitutional for the state to provide financial assistance to religious schools for the cost of teaching secular subjects?

Issue. Did

the

application

of

the

compulsory

attendance

law violate respondents

rights

under

the

First

and

Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution?

Held. The application of the law is unconstitutional as applied to the Amish. The Amish object to the high school education because the values taught there are in marked variance from the Amish values and way of life. It places Amish children in an environment hostile to their beliefs and takes them away from their community during a crucial period in their life. The Amish do not object to elementary education. Expert Dr. Hostetler testified that the compulsory attendance could result in not only great psychological harm to Amish children but ultimately the destruction of the Old Order Amish church community. The State has the power to impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic education. Previous precedent has held that this power must yield to the right of parents to provide an equivalent education in a privatelyoperated system . The States power is subject to a balancing test when it impinges on fundamental rights such as those protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their children. In order for Wisconsin to compel such attendance, it must follow that either the State does not deny the free exercise of religious belief by its requirement or that there is a state interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under the Free Exercise Clause. This Court determines that the Amish objection to the attendance is rooted in religious beliefs that directly conflict with the compulsory school attendance law. The State advances two arguments. First, it notes that some degree of education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system. Second, education prepares individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society. We accept these propositions. However, the evidence adduced shows that an additional one or two years of formal high school would do little to serve those interests. Such education may be necessary for preparation

for the modern society in which we live, but is not for the separated agrarian community of the Amish faith. The State attacks respondents position as fostering ignorance from which children must be protected by the State. However, the record shows that the Amish community has been a highly successful social unit within our society, producing productive and law-abiding citizens. The State also supports its position on the possibility that some children will choose to leave the Amish community. This argument is highly speculative on the record, and the practical agricultural training and habits of industry would support children that did choose to leave. The requirement for compulsory high school education is a fairly recent development, designed to not only provide educational opportunities, but also to avoid child labor or forced idleness. In these terms, Wisconsins interest in compelling school attendance is less substantial for Amish children than for children generally. The State finally argues that exempting the Amish children fails to recognize the childrens substantive right to a secondary education, giving due regard to the power of the State as parens patriae. On this record there is no need to decide an issue in which the Amish parents are preventing children who wish to further their education from attending school. Dissent. The majority assumes that the interests at stake are only those of the parents and the State. The children also have a legitimate interest in their education. The inevitable effect of the decision is to impose the parents notions of religious duty upon their children. It is the future of the student, not the parents, that is imperiled by todays decision. The views of the two children in question were not canvassed, and should be on remand. Discussion. The majoritys decision did not determine that the statute would violate Constitutional rights if the children wanted to pursue further education, but found that such a decision was unnecessary because no such claim was made on the record. The dissent suggested that the cause should be remanded to determine the desire of the children.

MARSH V. CHAMBERS