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Afghanistan 2011: Three Scenarios
OCTOBER 2009
By Andrew M. Exum, CNAS Fellow
pOliCy BRiEf
O
n March 27, 2009, the Obamaadministration released its new policy andstrategic goals for Afghanistan amidst much fanfare.Just six months later, though, the administrationhas mounted yet another review of U.S. policy and
strategy – the fth high-level review by the U.S.
government in the past 12 months. Two thingshappened to spur this review.
First, the contested Aghan elections were, in many ways, a worst-case scenario or U.S. and other NAOpolicy-makers. Prior to the elections, the scenariomost eared by the international community wasone in which Karzai was re-elected by a thin marginamid widespread irregularities and allegations o corruption. Tat is exactly what happened, leadinga much-respected U.S. deputy to the United NationsAssistance Mission in Aghanistan (UNAMA) todepart acrimoniously aer witnessing what he per-ceived to be a U.N. cover-up o ballot box-stungand election-rigging. Te U.N.-backed ElectoralComplaints Commission has now disqualied ballots210 polling stations, ensuring a run-o election.Second, the grim strategic assessment presented by Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) commander in Kabul,has persuaded the Obama administration that win-ning in Aghanistan will be much more dicult thanthen-Senator Barack Obama imagined in 2008 whenhe pledged to devote more resources to a campaign inCentral Asia.In any strategic planning exercise, one starts with alist o planning assumptions and should revisit theplan i an assumption turns out to be wrong. It nowappears as i some o the assumptions behind theadministration’s original policy and strategic goalswere alse. Te administration is thus correct torevisit its plan. As it does so, it is useul to imaginescenarios or what Aghanistan might look like 24months rom now and how U.S. policy might makeeach scenario more or less likely.
A Return to September 10, 2001
Te worst case scenario
is as rightening as it isunlikely. In such a scenario, the insurgent groups o Aghanistan deeat the Government o Aghanistanin relatively short order and re-establish the state thathosted al-Qaeda and provided such a useul base ortransnational terror groups to train and plot againstWestern targets prior to November 2001. Tese sametransnational terror groups then turn their attentionto overthrowing the regime in Pakistan and under-mining the regimes o Central Asia. Insurgenciesand terrorist activity in states and ungoverned spacesin Yemen and the Horn o Arica worsen while
 
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a repositioning o U.S. and allied power leaves a vacuum in which such activities fourish.It is hard to imagine U.S. and allied policies inAghanistan that would allow such a nightmarescenario. At the very least – and regardless o howmany U.S. and allied orces remain in Aghanistan –the United States and its allies are likely to continuetheir support o Aghan National Security Forces(ANSF) and take direct action against insurgentgroups through air and drone strikes or specialoperations raids. A long and bloody civil confict inwhich the United States openly supports the orceso the Government o Aghanistan would thereoreprecede any takeover o the country by the alibanand its allies.
Proxy War
Te most likely scenario
in Aghanistan, by con-trast, is one in which the United States and its alliesgradually tire o a costly counterinsurgency cam-paign and transition to a more limited engagementthat, while not meeting many o the strategic goalsarticulated by the president in March, allows theUnited States and its allies to still infuence aairs inCentral Asia and prevent a total return o the alibanand its allies to power in Aghanistan.In this scenario, most U.S. allies withdraw theirorces rom Aghanistan in the next 18 months asthe war becomes more exclusively a concern o theUnited States and its Aghan partners. Spurredby popular displeasure with the war in his ownparty, the president directs the commanders inAghanistan to reduce the presence o U.S. generalpurpose orces and to shi the mission away rom alarge-scale counterinsurgency campaign to oreigninternal deense (FID) making better use o U.S.Special Forces and other special operations orces.A limited and short-term “surge” into Aghanistanprecedes this transition, with the goal o rapidly training more ANSF. A combination o U.S. andallied airpower and direct-action special operationssupport this limited surge.Aghanistan remains caught in civil war betweena government in Kabul, led by essentially the samepoliticians and warlords who ruled Aghanistanbetween 1992 and 1996, and a disenranchisedPashtun community in the south and east repre-sented by the Quetta Shura aliban and the HaqqaniNetwork. Te ormer, backed by the United Statesand its allies, ghts insurgents backed by elementso Pakistan’s intelligence community and military and nanced by supporters in the Persian Gul. ForAghans, this
is
the worst-case scenario.Despite Pakistan’s support or insurgent groups inAghanistan, Pakistan continues to receive U.S.assistance due to U.S. ears that Sindh and PunjabProvinces will all to militant groups i the insur-gents targeting Pakistan’s regime and security services grow too strong. Te Pakistani state, mean-while, remains ocused on the perceived threat romIndia and views its internal violence as a byproducto that rivalry.In this scenario, President Obama’s policy o notallowing Aghanistan and Pakistan to be a saehaven rom which transnational terror groups canplot attacks against the United States and otherWestern states will likely not be realized. And whileal-Qaeda and related groups have established similarsae havens in Yemen and the Horn o Arica, theborder between Aghanistan and Pakistan served asthe training ground or the terrorists o the 9/11 and7/7 attacks and holds strong potential to become thebase or uture attacks. A containment strategy inwhich the United States attempts to limit the threatrom these areas through cruise missiles ailed dur-ing the 1990s. So too, it appears likely, would a policy in which the United States attempts to either punishor disrupt al-Qaeda rom aar through drone strikes.Te success or ailure o drone strikes depends onaccess to time-sensitive human intelligence – the
 
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kind o intelligence dicult to obtain rom an air-cra carrier in the Indian Ocean or in an oce atFort Meade.I this scenario transpires, the president will eitherestablish a new policy o containment, which articu-lates why we can now live with risks previously unthinkable, or admit policy ailure. Nonetheless,this strategy would most certainly reduce the short-term costs o U.S. and allied investment in CentralAsia.
A Foundation for Peace
Te best case scenario
or Aghanistan is a unction-ing Aghan state inhospitable to transnational terrorgroups. In this scenario, a government representingall major actions in Aghanistan, however imper-ectly, would be essential. Tis government must bebacked by a strong military and security services.Disenranchised Pashtun communities would bereintegrated into the political process – and in cases,peeled o rom insurgent groups – ollowing theestablishment o security in key population centersand the construction o eective security orces.Realizing this scenario requires a considerableinvestment o resources, though perhaps ewer thanimagined. Te rst requisite is additional troops totrain and partner with Aghan military and policeunits. Second would be additional troops to providesecurity or particularly endangered populationcenters in Kandahar and Khost. Te ormer is thepriority target or the Quetta Shura aliban, whilethe latter is the priority target or the HaqqaniNetwork.Politically, the United States and its allies ace a shortwindow o opportunity with the Karzai administra-tion. Te United States has leverage over Karzai solong as he and his allies believe a U.S. withdrawalrom Aghanistan remains a real possibility. Asa condition or continued or greater U.S. eortsin Aghanistan, then, the Obama administrationshould communicate to Karzai a “black list” o thoseAghans whose participation in an Aghan govern-ment would endanger continued U.S. support orthe Karzai administration. Karzai’s governmentmay claim this kind o demand subverts the Aghanpolitical process, but the Aghan political process isalready subverted by the presence o a large inter-national orce. Te Karzai government’s ability tomaintain power in Aghanistan, in act, is entirely dependent on the U.S. presence in the country.Aid in Aghanistan, meanwhile, should be shiedaway rom large-scale development projects andtoward those projects that address issues – such asirrigation rights and land disputes – driving confictat the local level. U.S. military units in southern andeastern Aghanistan have already begun such eorts.But or this reason, conducting a census and build-ing a land registry are more important in many areasthan building schools and hospitals. It is dicult, inact, to overestimate the degree to which these twomeasures would stabilize the country. Such eortssupport the establishment o the rule o law andenable ISAF and Aghan units to resolve disputesthe Aghan people currently rely on the insurgent“shadow” government to adjudicate.Regardless o what the United States does or does notdo in Aghanistan, problems in Pakistan will remain.For starters, policy makers in the United States andPakistan will continue to disagree as to whetherIndia or Islamist insurgents represent the greaterthreat to Pakistani society. In part due to these di-erences, the state o Pakistan, worth supporting inits ght against a domestic insurgency, could remaina problematic actor in the region, threatening boththe Aghan state and U.S. interests.At the least, Pakistan will continue to employ ahedging strategy that empowers Aghan insurgentsin the event U.S. and allied orces depart the region.Many U.S. analysts o Pakistan have urther inter-nalized the Pakistani narrative that Indian activity is
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