3that my grounds consist of the sorts of things that are common to all of my epistemic counterparts, but the conditions that determine whether the justification I would offer for my beliefs is a justification offered for a belief that truly is justified includes the conditions that determine whethermy experiences are veridical.We can show that Factivity leads to no problematic skeptical conclusions. Consider theview that says that a belief is justified iff that belief constitutes knowledge.
If you know that
istrue, it must be that
is true. According to the knowledge account of justified belief, the facts invirtue of which your justified beliefs are justified entail that those beliefs are true. If Cohen is goingto show that this view leads to skepticism, he has to show that knowledge is unattainable. Of course, if he can show that knowledge
unattainable he could show that Factivity leads toskepticism, but then the (alleged) skeptical consequences of Factivity would not be so troubling.For what it’s worth, I don’t think that we should identify justified beliefs with items of knowledge.It seems that the propositions we know we believe with justification but there are justified beliefsthat do not constitute knowledge. If we revise the knowledge account of justified belief as I thinkwe should, we would weaken the account and say that something less than knowledge is necessaryfor justified belief. Any argument from Factivity to skepticism that addressed these accounts wouldhave to show that these conditions are conditions that our beliefs cannot satisfy, but as theseconditions would be necessary for knowledge, the argument from Factivity to skepticism wouldhave to include an argument that our beliefs do not satisfy some condition necessary for knowledge.Again, this would only show that the (alleged) skeptical consequences of Factivity would not be sotroubling. Of course, since we know that we have knowledge, we know that these arguments thatpurport to derive a skeptical consequence from Factivity are unsound unless additional argumentsare produced that show that
is necessary for justifiably believing
. Whilethere may be cases of knowledge without justification, such cases are not typical. In the typical caseif someone says that you knew
, they cannot then say that you shouldn’t have believed
or thatyou didn’t believe with justification.
I doubt these additional arguments are forthcoming, so itseems there’s no argument from Factivity to skepticism.1.2
JUSTIFICATION AND EPISTEMIC DUTY
Justification is often taken to be a normative or deontological notion, and many of those who saythat justification is a deontological notion subscribe to the view that justification is an internalistnotion.
These writers say that we should reject Factivity because it fails to do justice to the ideathat justification is a deontological notion.What do people mean when they say that justification is a deontological notion? Accordingto Steup:… I take the concept of epistemic justification to be a
one. I believe that epistemic justification is analogous to moral justification in the following sense: Both kinds of justification belong to the family of deontological concepts, concepts such aspermission, prohibition, obligation, blame, and responsibility …A belief that is epistemically justified is a belief that isepistemically permissible, a belief for which the subject cannot justly be blamed, or a belief the subject is not obliged to drop.
Before him, Alston offered us this:The terms, ‘justified’, ‘justification’, and their cognates are mostnaturally understood in what we may term a “deontological” way,