2 NORTHWEST, INC.
GINSBERG Syllabus undo federal deregulation with regulation of their own,”
Trans World Airlines, Inc.
, 504 U. S. 374, 378. In
the Court recognized that the key phrase “related to” expresses a “broad pre-emptive purpose,”
at 383, and held that the ADA pre-empted theuse of state consumer protection laws to regulate airline advertising, concluding that “relat[es] to” means “ha[s] a connection with, or ref-erence to, airline ‘rates, routes, or services,’ ”
at 384. And in
American Airlines, Inc.
, 513 U. S. 219, the Court found that the ADA pre-empted the use of an Illinois consumer law to challenge an airline’s devaluation of frequent flyer earned miles. But it did not pre-empt breach of contract claims because “terms and conditions air-lines offer and passengers accept are privately ordered obligations” not “ ‘a State’s “enact[ment] or enforce[ment] [of] any law, rule, regu-lation, standard, or other provision having the force and effect of law” within the [pre-emption provision’s] meaning.’ ”
at 228–229. Pp. 4–6.(b) The phrase “other provision having the force and effect of law” includes state common-law rules like the implied covenant at is-sue. Common-law rules are routinely called “provisions,” see,
Women’s Health Center, Inc.
, 512 U. S. 753, 765, n. 3, and they clearly have “the force and effect of law.” The pre-emption pro-vision’s original language confirms this understanding. As first en-acted, the provision also applied to “rule[s]” and “standard[s],” a for-mulation encompassing common-law rules. See
CSX Transp., Inc.
, 507 U. S. 658, 664. And Congress made clear that thedeletion of those terms as part of Title 49’s wholesale recodification effected no “substantive change.” §1(a), 108 Stat. 745. Respondent’s reliance on
, 537 U. S. 51, is misplaced. There, the Court held that the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971 did not pre-empt a common-law tort claim, but that Act’spre-emption provision is more narrowly worded than the ADA provi-sion. The Boat Safety Act’s saving and pre-emption provisions werealso enacted at the same time, while the Federal Aviation Act’s gen-eral remedies saving clause is “a relic of the pre-ADA/no pre-emptionregime,”
, 504 U. S., at 385, that “cannot be allowed to super-sede the specific substantive pre-emption provision,”
Exempting common-law claims would also disserve the ADA’s cen-tral purpose, which was to eliminate federal regulation of rates,routes, and services so they could be set by market forces. Finally, if
state common-law rules fell outside the pre-emption provision’s ambit,
would not have singled out a subcategory, for common-law claims based on the parties’ voluntary undertaking, as fallingoutside that provision’s coverage. Pp. 6–9.(c) Respondent’s claim “relates to” “rates, routes, or services.” It