Additional Burmese Missile Sites Identified

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ADDITIONAL BURMESE MISSILE SITES IDENTIFIED

Roland WatsonAugust 3, 2007

In our last articlewe identified two surface-to-surface missile installations that have been built by theBurma Army. These employ missiles supplied by North Korea, and which are aimed at airbases inThailand. Our information is that the site in the Maung-ma-gan Islands has been completed, while thefacility at Ka-la-goke Island is still under construction.We have now learned of two additional sites. The first is associated with the Burma Air Force’s NamsangAir Base, near Loilem in Shan State. This facility is reported to be fully operational: North Korean missilesare already emplaced. The second is under construction on Naw Ta Ya Mountain, which lies about eightykilometers north of Myawaddy (thirty kilometers north of Mae La Refugee Camp).Again, while we apologize for not providing photos of these facilities, or photocopies of missile purchaseorders with North Korea, this is good intelligence. We were surprised that there was so little publicdiscussion after the first article was released. Short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) in Burma are asignificant political development.We recognize that it is easier, and also less work, to assume that this is not true. However, some allegationsare so serious that you are obliged to follow-up.In October 2003, Kyodo News International reported that Burma was negotiating to buy missiles from North Korea. The source for the information was given as U.S. intelligence. The U.S., though, was only anintermediary. The actual source undoubtedly was Burmese.Our situation is no different. Dictator Watch is also only an intermediary.It was interesting that the day after our release, Burma’s junta, the SPDC, announced that “terrorists” were planning to disrupt the National Convention. We believe this was an effort to distract attention from therelease.We also note that the BBC recently received clandestine information from inside Burma about the refiningof uranium ore, which confirms what we reported first (that such refining is underway). We’re right aboutthe missiles, too, and at some point it will inevitably be confirmed as well.The Asean Regional Forum has just ended. This issue should have been at the top of the agenda.Unfortunately, it was not considered (at least publicly).We do understand, of course, why Thailand would be hesitant to openly discuss this new threat. Thecountry is preoccupied with historic political events. Having said that, though, this threat, and relations withBurma in general, should be a major issue in the upcoming election.The SPDC is a brutal dictatorship. It is increasingly well armed. It considers Thailand to be its number oneenemy. This situation should be the country’s top foreign policy priority. The Thai government shouldcompletely reevaluate its relationship with the regime.In the last article we speculated that the missiles were Hwasong-6, a Scud variant with low accuracy. Sincethen, North Korea has conducted a number of tests of a new SRBM, apparently based on improvedtechnology and which is much more accurate. While the Hwasong-6 might be available at discount prices,we would be surprised if the SPDC, flush with cash from its energy sales, did not at least express aninterest in the new weapons. Procuring them would alter the threat analysis of a missile-armed Burma.With the more accurate technology, the SPDC would have a far greater capability to successfully attack Thai facilities.

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