ANALYSIS OF BURMA’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM
Roland WatsonJanuary 2007The material in this report derives from many different sources. Dictator Watch has received a largequantity of information, much more than what is presented here. We can hint at a bit of the balance but themajority we cannot discuss at all, because of risk to the sources. If you have any additional informationabout these subjects, including information that confirms or contradicts what is described below, please getin touch. We will disclose publicly only what you authorize.In our November 7th statement, we reported that the SPDC is mining and refining uranium and then bartering the final product, “yellowcake,” to North Korea and Iran. We have now learned that theannouncement by the SPDC later the same day, that a North Korean ship in distress had taken refuge inRangoon harbor, was an attempt to discredit the report. This in itself is indirect confirmation of the news.Also, the SPDC announcement was widely ridiculed, since Than Shwe and his fellow generals are knownto be pathological liars.We have now received word from a second, independent source, with a completely different means of access to the information, that the yellowcake transactions are taking place, including to Iran. We do notyet know the nature of the arrangements with Iran, if they are direct with the SPDC or if North Korea isacting as an intermediary (or Russia). The transactions with North Korea, though, for which the SPDC isreceiving missiles and also technical assistance on its own nuclear weapons program, are direct, althoughthey may also be taking place with China and Russia as intermediaries.(Note: North Korea has its own high-grade uranium deposits, but the state of its mining and refiningcapabilities is unknown.) North Korean ships have been visiting Burma for at least the last five years. Ships either dock at a mainland port at night and under tight security, or they anchor at a lighthouse island an hour away in internationalwaters. At the island, Burmese navy ships exchange cargos with the Koreans. (Navy, Customs andImmigration ships are permanently stationed there.) This is also one of the ways that Burmesemethamphetamines were distributed in the past, with speedboats bringing the pills to the island for loadingonto ships bound for Bangkok.
Uranium deposits
Nuclear proliferation begins with uranium. In a 2001 document athttp://www.energy.gov.mm/Nuclear_1.htm, five known uranium deposits are listed:1. Magway [Magwe]2. Taungdwingyi3. Kyaukphygon (Mogok)4. Kyauksin5. Paongpyin (Mogok)The document also includes a call for assistance: “
Interested parties from inside the country and abroad are welcomed for possible cooperation.
..”It is evident that in the intervening years the exploitation of uranium ore has been successful. We areuncertain if this involves any foreign companies.We also learned that additional uranium deposits have been found, including in Moehnyin, KachinDivision; southwest of Taunggyi; and also possibly near Moulmein. It is noteworthy that some gemstonesfrom Burma are radioactive, due to their proximity in the earth to radioactive ores. We further learned thatin 2001, Russian geologists, with Burma Army security, prospected for uranium in Karenni State. They
were discouraged from this enterprise by the KNPP.The ores vary in quality, including earthen ores and solid rock, and in percentage of uranium metal. Also,the private concession for one of the Mogok deposits was cancelled two years ago and taken over byBurma Army soldiers.Once the uranium is mined it is refined into yellowcake. We have reason to believe that there is a seconduranium refinery in Burma, in addition to the facility on the Irrawaddy River north of Mandalya atThabeikkyin.
Nuclear reactors and weapons research
Burma’s nuclear program dates from Ne Win, who sent a professor to Russia for five years, whichindividual received International Atomic Energy Commission certification. The program collapsed after 1988, but it was later revived by Khin Nyunt, who searched the states left over after the breakup of theSoviet Union for nuclear experts. The program was again suspended following his purge, but it was quicklyrestarted.Russia offered in 2001 to sell Burma a nuclear reactor for research purposes. Similarly, the Soviet Unionalso helped establish North Korea’s nuclear program, in 1964, by offering and then helping to assemble inthe country a Soviet research reactor.The Far Eastern Economic Review reported in November 2003 that North Koreans were now involved inBurma’s effort, after technicians from the country were seen unloading large crates and constructionequipment at Myothit, Magwe Division. Bertil Lintner in a July 2006 Asia Times article added that NorthKoreans had been seen at Natmauk, but commented “there is no evidence that Russia ever delivered thereactor.” However, he also noted that the North Koreans built a huge underground bunker at Taundwingyi,which is one of the acknowledged uranium ore sites.According to a 2004 article in the Irrawaddy by Kyaw Zaw Moe, Magwe is an area of active fault lines,and it experienced a strong earthquake in September 2003. There is also a report that a bunker in this areashelters ten MIG-29s from Russia.A second possible site, where Burma’s “nuclear battalion” is located, is in the Setkhya Valley east of Mandalay and south of Maymyo near the villages of Lun Kyaw and Taung Taw. This valley is perpetuallycovered by clouds, and it is surrounded by mountains. There is a new report of a related nuclear researchfacility in a restricted area near Wetwun village, northeast of Maymyo. Drivers who make deliveries to thearea have to hand over their trucks to personnel from inside.Another source says that the reactor in Magwe may be relocated, it is also possible that it already has beenrelocated, to the Setkhya Valley site, because of the earthquake risk at the former.We can also report that the businessman Tayza is the primary dealmaker for Burma’s nuclear and missile programs. He is organizing many of the specific transactions, with the North Koreans, Chinese andRussians. For example, Tayza is the agent for Aeroflot, which flies to Mandalay. The hundreds of traineeswho went to Russia were taken in a special train to Mandalay, from which they completed their journey byAeroflot.We have learned that twenty-five nuclear physics academics are now in North Korea on a three-year training course.We also received a report that the SPDC has uranium enrichment centrifuges at one end of the South Nawin Dam (which was built with funding from Japan, and forced labor). If true, this is a significantescalation in the SPDC’s program, since enrichment is used to create not only fuel for nuclear power reactors, but also the fissile cores for nuclear weapons.
Missiles
Regarding missiles, we have received information that is too sensitive, for the sources, to reveal, but we arenow more convinced than ever that the SPDC has ballistic missiles.We can disclose that there is a report that the highway near Minhla is closed once or twice a month for missile test firing. Local roads are also closed. This creates a restricted area for the flight path that is sixtymiles long. Tests have been underway for the last three years.Also, near Hle Gu, just north of Rangoon, two small hills, side-by-side, have been bridged by a large roof and then covered with dirt and plants. Local villagers were told that heavy weapons are stored underneaththe roof. Long cylinders, the diameter of bullock cart wheels, and covered by tarps, were transported there.
Summary
The information in this and our November report presents a sketchy picture of the SPDC’s nuclear program. The people of Burma were surprised at the opulence of the marriage of Than Shwe’s daughter.We believe there would be a similar degree of astonishment were all the details of the SPDC’s nuclear ambitions known, including all the assistance the junta is receiving from North Korea, Iran, Russia andChina (and also from the Pakistani nuclear scientists who took refuge in Burma in 2001).Moreover, we believe that such details are known, by the international intelligence community (certainly by U.S. intelligence agencies). Any decent intelligence initiative directed at North Korea and Iran, and alsoRussia and China, would reveal links to Burma, which would then become subjects of investigation in their own right. Sources including human intelligence, the types of sources intelligence professionals with large budgets should be able to cultivate inside a target like the SPDC, and also remote sensing – uraniumactivities create a distinct “signature,” would no doubt yield a far more complete picture than what we have been able to present.This leads one to question why such a picture has not been publicly disclosed, with the only logical answer being that if the world knew of the SPDC’s nuclear threat to international security and peace, not only thethreat it presents through the spillover effects of its massive internal repression, diplomats would be forcedto act.The SPDC having radioactive materials is a threat of the greatest possible magnitude, and in many differentways.The international community prefers to ignore problems wherever possible, but the resistance to action onBurma also reflects a vested interest by the West not to strain relations with the SPDC’s patron, China (andalso relations with Russia). More generally, diplomats, and political leaders as a class, refuse to divulgesecret information until it suits them personally, not the interests of the public, if ever.This means we must force the issue. Just as by investigating and documenting the SPDC’s crimes againsthumanity Burma pro-democracy activists convinced the international community, grudgingly, to acceptthat they were taking place, so too will we have to force recognition of its nuclear program and theaccompanying danger to world security and peace.
The SPDC and Thailand
Lastly, we have learned that the SPDC has a contingency plan to create a military incident with Thailand,in the event that a significant popular uprising inside Burma develops. Such an incident would shift thefocus, both internally and externally, away from the uprising, and also justify a draconian crackdown,similar to the 1988 massacre.This claim is supported by the recent designation by Than Shwe of Thailand as Burma’s nearest enemy.
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Analysis of Burma's Nuclear Program
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