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BURMA: A THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND PEACE
 Roland WatsonJuly 1, 2007
 
The following article is compiled from a number of sources. None of the specific items described, though,has been confirmed by additional independent sources. Nonetheless, we judge the information to becredible.We would have liked to provide a smoking gun: an irrefutable document or photo. However, it would beextremely dangerous to attempt to secure such proof, and in any case we do not have the necessaryresources.Journalists would probably not run this without confirmation. We appreciate that, but we are not journalists. We are advocates, for freedom and democracy in Burma and against the military junta that rulesthe country, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). We have this information; we are confidentit is correct; so we published it. The world needs to know.
The SPDC as international threat
 Burma and the SPDC are a threat to international security and peace on many grounds, including that thecountry is one of the largest sources of refugees and human trafficking, and narcotics, and through both of communicable diseases and other public health and law enforcement problems. All of these underminesecurity and social order, particularly in Burma’s neighboring nations.The country therefore was legitimately discussed in the United Nations Security Council, but the resolutionagainst the SPDC that was prepared by the United States was vetoed by China and Russia, and also votedagainst by South Africa. These nations applied an outdated definition of international threat, one limited tomilitary conflict and terrorism. They did this, for China and Russia, because they are the SPDC’s allies, inreturn for the right to pillage the nation’s natural resources (and for other reasons); and for South Africa, asa favor to China, befitting its similar status as Beijing’s client.Burma is a threat to international security and peace for the above reasons, and also because of military andterrorist threats, as this article will describe. Our objective is to provide information that the United Statescan use to reopen the Security Council debate and to get China and Russia to back down.
Uranium trafficking
 We have previously reported that the SPDC has a major program underway to exploit Burma’s reserves of uranium ore, including through its processing into the refined form known as yellowcake. This is being bartered to North Korea and Iran for their respective enrichment programs (in contravention of the SecurityCouncil sanctions on these nations). It is also likely being bartered to both China and Russia, in return for weapons from the former and weapons and nuclear assistance, including a reactor, from the latter.For North Korea, while the country has made a commitment to close its reactors and end its atomicweapons program, the extension of this commitment to its secret but nevertheless well-established uraniumenrichment activities is unclear. The U.S. itself has said that the shutdown will be a long, arduous process.There is no reason to expect that enrichment in the North will cease anytime soon. (Also, even if it did,Kim Jong-il would still have an interest in stockpiling yellowcake supplies.)It is public knowledge that the SPDC wants to increase its hard currency inflows. (Its barter arrangementswith Russia will not be sufficient to pay for the reactor.) It would therefore not be surprising if the juntaseeks cash-paying customers for its uranium. Also, the market price is skyrocketing. It is nowapproximately $135 a pound, up from $7 in 2000. The nuclear power industry is also growing(unfortunately!), so this trend is unlikely to reverse. Some thirty countries now have nuclear power plants.An additional forty have research reactors. Thirteen are known to have enrichment facilities. This is an
 
obvious business opportunity for the junta, which it clearly would not want to miss.Dictator Watch has received first-hand information that SPDC representatives are looking for industrialcustomers for yellowcake in Bangkok, and that large quantities are available. This certainly represents a business that Thailand would prefer not to host. Furthermore, while the intended customers, power utilities,are in a sense legitimate, there is no guarantee that small quantities will not be diverted. For the right price,the SPDC would no doubt happily sell to terrorists. While yellowcake is not an ideal substance for a dirty bomb, due to its low radioactivity, it can be used for such a purpose, and anywhere in the world. Theimpact of a well thought out attack would be incalculable.
Missile launch facilities
 Dictator Watch has further learned that the SPDC has constructed launch facilities for surface-to-surfacemissiles of North Korean origin. The sites are spaced along the Thai/Burma border, from archipelagoes inthe Andaman Sea to Shan State. We are able to conclusively identify two of the sites:1. Maung-ma-gan Islands, about 20 miles off the coast of Tavoy.2. Ka-la-goke Island, about 18 miles north of Ye.Construction of these facilities began in 2002-2003. Some are complete but others are still in progress. Thesites contain launchers, storage buildings, a communications center, and air defense radar.The missiles are surface-to-surface, with a maximum range of 300 miles (500 kilometers). We believe atleast one if not two of the sites are already fully operational. The missiles are targeted at Thai air basesincluding in Bangkok, Phitsanulok, and elsewhere.An April article inAsia Timessaid there were reports that the SPDC was interested in acquiring from North Korea the Hwasong SRBM (short range ballistic missile), a SCUD-type missile with a range of 500kilometers (the Hwasong-6). It is likely that this is the missile that has been deployed.The secret of the cargo in the North Korean ships that have been visiting Burma is now at least partiallyrevealed. (We have also received information that North Korean ships, after docking at Thilawa Port inBurma, continued on to Iran.)The Hwasong-6 is twelve meters tall and weighs 6400 kilograms. It carries a conventional high explosivewarhead of up to 800 kilograms, although it is also capable of being armed with chemical or biologicalagents. North Korea reportedly has several hundred. The missile was first developed in the mid-1980s,tested in the early 1990s, and then phased out of production in the mid-1990s as the manufacturing of thelonger range No-dong was scaled up. Hwasong-6 generally come in groups of four, one on the launcher andthree on a reload carrier. They can also be launched from ships.As we understand it, the SPDC’s military strategy is as follows. During the time of Ne Win and the BSPP(Burma Socialist Program Party), China was considered the main enemy (other than the people, particularlythe ethnic nationalities). This changed in 1989, after the collapse of the Burma Communist Party. Thedesignation of main enemy then shifted to Thailand, because of its alliance with and extensive materielsupply from the United States.The Thai Army is well equipped, but it is not considered to be a serious threat because topographicalfeatures – the nature of the terrain – would prevent a deep penetration into Burma. The Tatmadaw also haslarge supplies of anti-tank weapons including SAMs and possibly TOW missiles. (Also, as we recentlyreported, the SPDC is working with North Korea to create a domestic production capability for 120 mmrockets.)This confidence does not extend to the air. Burma has only two squadrons of MIG-29s, and its pilots areunder-trained. Thailand has a large fleet of fighters, including some sixty F-16s and thirty F-5s. The F-16sare stationed in Khorat and Nakhon Sawan. They are also equipped with deadly ordinance, including
 
AMRAAMS (advanced medium range air-to-air missiles), and their Thai pilots are highly skilled. In anycombat, it would be a mismatch. The missiles are therefore viewed as an offset. In case of war, they would be fired at the Thai air bases in an attempt to disable the fleet.One problem with this strategy, though, is that ballistic missiles have only limited accuracy. Whenlaunched, they initially follow programmed guidance but then continue to the target through a free falltrajectory. They are not capable of making flight adjustments en route, as with cruise missiles. TheHwasong-6 CEP (circular error probable) is not known, but it is estimated at 1-2 kilometers. CEP is theradius of the circle around the target in which fifty percent of fired missiles will land. This is of insufficientaccuracy to effectively attack airbases – to be certain of damaging the runways – unless large quantities areused.The missiles also have strategic implications beyond the possibility of conflict with Thailand. The SPDChas two main fears: a popular uprising, and a foreign military intervention led by the United States. For thefirst, they have imprisoned the democracy movement’s charismatic leader, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (whocould instigate such a rebellion were she free and so inclined), and also other potential uprising leaders. The junta has further created local paramilitary forces, including the Swan Arr Shin militia, to brutally suppressmass popular expressions of discontent. Further, as we have also reported, the SPDC has a plan to initiate amilitary incident with Thailand, to create a distraction in the event of such an uprising.For the second, and taken together with the SPDC’s nuclear aspirations and our recently announced newsthat again with North Korea it intends to produce sea-mines to have the ability to mine nearby shippinglanes, it seems clear that the junta is taking very seriously its defense against a possible U.S. organizedintervention. To this we can add the emplacement of ballistic missiles. Viewed this way, the missiles arenot only a defense against Thai unilateral action. More realistically, their basic function is to intimidateThailand, to dissuade the country from offering meaningful assistance to the United States.When combined these different items create a picture of a fanatical SPDC leadership that is prepared to goto any lengths to retain power. (Those people who are still calling for dialogue would be well advised toconsider this fact.) Burma under the SPDC is unquestionably a threat to international security and peace,which threat must be addressed in the Security Council.
Political implications for Thailand
 As with the trade in refined uranium, Thailand should not stand for being the target of ballistic missiles.The SPDC has taken advantage of the country. This has particularly been the case during the last five years,since Thaksin Shinawatra put his personal affairs above the interests of the nation. (One wonders if Thaksineven had a business involvement in the communication systems for the missile installations, which, if so,would make him a traitor.) Thailand needs to bring this to an end. These are real defense and internalsecurity issues. It is completely unacceptable that Burma target Thailand with North Korean ballisticmissiles.This, and Thai relations with Burma in general, over refugees, migrant workers, narcotics, the Salweendams, etc., should be major issues in the upcoming Thai election. Every candidate, beginning withDemocrat Party leader Abhisit Vejjajiva, should be questioned about his or her intended Burma policy,especially in light of these revelations.Thailand has historically pursued “Bamboo diplomacy.” This policy stresses flexibility (the analogy is theease with which bamboo bends) if not, as with Switzerland and Sweden, neutrality. One positiveconsequence of the policy is that Thailand has never been colonized. On the other hand, the countryimmediately capitulated to the Japanese (just as Sweden did to the Nazis). By doing so, however, itsuffered only minimal damage during the war.Flexibility is an excellent approach for many international policy concerns, but its utility is questionable inthe face of distinct and direct threats. Should Thailand accept SPDC intimidation, and the never-endingstream of problems from its neighbor? We would argue that even bamboo diplomacy has limits, and that
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