1785INTRODUCTION TO THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALSby Immanuel Kanttranslated by W. HastieDIVISIONSGENERAL DIVISIONS OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALSI. DIVISION OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS AS A SYSTEM OFDUTIES GENERALLY.1. All duties are either duties of right, that is, juridicalduties (officia juris), or duties of virtue, that is, ethical duties(officia virtutis s. ethica). Juridical duties are such as may bepromulgated by external legislation; ethical duties are those forwhich such legislation is not possible. The reason why the lattercannot be properly made the subject of external legislation is becausethey relate to an end or final purpose, which is itself, at the sametime, embraced in these duties, and which it is a duty for theindividual to have as such. But no external legislation can causeany one to adopt a particular intention, or to propose to himself acertain purpose; for this depends upon an internal condition or act ofthe mind itself. However, external actions conducive to such amental condition may be commanded, without its being implied thatthe individual will of necessity make them an end to himself.But why, then, it may be asked, is the science of morals, or moralphilosophy, commonly entitled- especially by Cicero- the science ofduty and not also the science of right, since duties and rightsrefer to each other? The reason is this. We know our own freedom- fromwhich all moral laws and consequently all rights as well as all dutiesarise- only through the moral imperative, which is an immediateinjunction of duty; whereas the conception of right as a ground ofputting others under obligation has afterwards to be developed outof it.2. In the doctrine of duty, man may and ought to be represented inaccordance with the nature of his faculty of freedom, which isentirely supra-sensible. He is, therefore, to be represented purelyaccording to his humanity as a personality independent of physicaldeterminations (homo noumenon), in distinction from the same person asa man modified with these determinations (homo phenomenon). Hencethe conceptions of right and end when referred to duty, in view ofthis twofold quality, give the following division:DIVISION OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS ACCORDING TO THE OBJECTIVERELATION OF THE LAW OF DUTY.I. The Right of Humanity.I. Juridical Oneself in our own person (juridicialDuties to or duties towards oneself) Perfect
Others DutyII. The Right of Mankind.in others (juridical dutiestowards others.)III. The End of Humanity.II. Ethical Oneself in our person (eithical dutiesDuties to or towards oneself) ImperfectOthers DutyIV. The End of Mankind.in others (ethical dutiestowards others.)II. DIVISION OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS ACCORDING TO RELATIONSOF OBLIGATION.As the subjects between whom a relation of right and duty isapprehended- whether it actually exists or not- admit of beingconceived in various juridical relations to each other, anotherdivision may be proposed from this point of view, as follows:DIVISION POSSIBLE ACCORDING TO THE SUBJECTIVE RELATION OFTHOSE WHO BIND UNDER OBLIGATIONS, AND THOSE WHO AREBOUND UNDER OBLIGATIONS.1. The juridical relation of man to beings who have neither rightnor duty:Vacat. There is no such relation, for such beings are irrational,and they neither put us under obligation, nor can we be put underobligation by them.2. The juridical relation of man to beings who have both rightsand duties:Adest. There is such a relation, for it is the relation of men tomen.3. The juridical relation of man to beings who have only dutiesand no rights:Vacat. There is no such relation, for such beings would be menwithout juridical personality, as slaves of bondsmen.4 The juridical relation of man to a being who has only rights andno duties (God):
Vacat. There is no such relation in mere philosophy, because sucha being is not an object of possible experience.A real relation between right and duty is therefore found, in thisscheme, only in No. 2. The reason why such is not likewise found inNo. 4 is because it would constitute a transcendent duty, that is, oneto which no corresponding subject can be given that is external andcapable of imposing obligation. Consequently the relation from thetheoretical point of view is here merely ideal; that is, it is arelation to an object of thought which we form for ourselves. Butthe conception of this object is not entirely empty. On thecontrary, it is a fruitful conception in relation to ourselves and themaxims of our inner morality, and therefore in relation to practicegenerally. And it is in this bearing that all the duty involved andpracticable for us in such a merely ideal relation lies.III. DIVISION OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS AS A SYSTEM OFDUTIES GENERALLY.According to the constituent principles and the method of thesystem.I. Principles I. Duties of Right I. Private Right.II. Public RightII. Duties of Virtue, etc.And so on, including all thatrefers not only to thematerials, but also to thearchitectonic form of ascientific system of morals,when the metaphysicalinvestigation of the elementshas completely traced out theuniversal principles constitutingthe whole.II. Method I. DidacticsII. AsceticsGENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALSI. THE RELATION OF THE FACULTIES OF THE HUMAN MIND TO THEMORAL LAWS.
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