Defects in the Reactor Pressure Vessels of Doel 3 and Tihange 2

Report

March 2014

info@anti-akw-ac.de

translated from German

Results Report - Defects in the RPVs of Doel 2 and Tihan e 2

Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary........................................................................................................... 4 2 Introduction........................................................................................................................ 8 2.1 Conference Order........................................................................................................8 2.2 Involved Persons.........................................................................................................8 2.2.1 Participants of the !onference..............................................................................." 2.2.2 #urther Participants..............................................................................................10 2.2.$ %d&isors and Peer Re&iewer.................................................................................10 2.3 Documents.................................................................................................................10 3 Caveats............................................................................................................................. 12 4 Lack of Conservatism......................................................................................................13 5 Superf uous tests............................................................................................................. 15 ! Se ection of Investi"ated #etai s....................................................................................1! 6.1 Defects....................................................................................................................... 16 '.1.1 !lassification........................................................................................................1' '.1.2 #indin .................................................................................................................. 1' '.1.$ (ocali)in .............................................................................................................1' '.1.4 #or* and +i)e......................................................................................................1, '.1.- .ri in....................................................................................................................1, '.1.' +earch for Representati&e +a*ple Material.........................................................1/ 6.2 Structural Integr t!....................................................................................................21 '.2.1 (oads.................................................................................................................... 21 '.2.1.1 !old Ton ues 0Plu*e 1ffect2.........................................................................21 '.2.1.2 1arth3uake and Paleoseis*olo ie.................................................................22 '.2.1.$ Desi n 4asis %ccidents durin +hutdown......................................................22 '.2.2 5roupin of Defect...............................................................................................2$ '.2.$ Material Properties...............................................................................................24 6.3 Core Damage "re#uenc!..........................................................................................26

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6.$ %anufactur ng Documentat on.................................................................................28 '.4.1 Missin Docu*entation........................................................................................2" '.4.2 !ontradictor6 Docu*entation...............................................................................2/ 6.& 'ecessar! cond t ons for restart ng........................................................................30 '.-.1 Preparator6 7ork of the .perator.........................................................................$0 '.-.2 Re3uire*ents of #%8!.........................................................................................$0 '.-.2.1 % co*plete reactor-inspection after an6 si nificant de&iation fro* the nor*al operation................................................................................................................... $0 '.-.2.2 #%8! Re3uire*ents 1 9 1'...........................................................................$1 $ %ppendix........................................................................................................................... 33 (.1 )uest ons to "*'C....................................................................................................33 (.2 +e#u rement of "*'C for restart ng........................................................................3( (.3 Source D rector!....................................................................................................... $0 (.$ Inde,........................................................................................................................... $2

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Results Report - Defects in the RPVs of Doel 2 and Tihan e 2

1 -,ecut ve Summar!
:n su**er 2012; defects were found in a pre&iousl6 unknown hi h a*ount in the reactor pressure &essels 0RPVs2 of the two 4el ian nuclear power plants 08PP2 in Doel $ and Tihan e 2. The operation of the two reactors was therefore te*poraril6 stopped. The defects ha&e an a&era e si)e of 1.0 c* and a *a<i*u* si)e of 2.4 c*. :n the reactor pressure &essel of Doel $ *ore than ";000 and in the one of Tihan e 2 *ore than 2;000 defects1 were found =04>. The 4el ian 8uclear Re ulator6 %uthorit6 0#%8!2 de*anded an in&esti ation ?6 the operator. This in&esti ation was e&aluated ?6 #%8! and ends with its final report =14>. #%8! appro&ed in Ma6 201$ the re-start of the two reactors. The reactor pressure &essel is the central co*ponent of a nuclear power plant 08PP2. The reactor pressure &essel contains the reactor core with the fuel rods where the nuclear fission occurs. The RPV is *ade of steel rin s which are welded to ether. The RPV is e<posed to hi h ther*o-*echanical loads. :n operation; the &essel has a te*perature of appro<. $00 @! and a pressure of 1'0 ?ar. +tartin and shuttin down procedures ?ut also reactor scra*s pose hi h loads on the RPV. Durin the operation the pressure &essel wall is su?Aected to neutron ?o*?ard*ent caused ?6 the nuclear fission. %ll these processes contri?ute to the e*?rittle*ent of the steel. :t is standard to all studies of nuclear plants that in the consideration of desi n ?asis accidents; the reactor pressure &essel failure is e<cluded 0annual pro?a?ilit6 less than10 -,2. % ?i leaka e or ?urstin of the RD4 *ust ?e a&oided under all circu*stances; ?ecause this will ine&ita?l6 lead to a *eltdown. The hi h nu*?er of defects in ?oth reactor pressure &essels increases the risk of spontaneous failure of these RPV and thus a *eltdown and the release of lar e 3uantities of radioacti&e *aterials. %n ad&ance warnin ti*e to initiate e&acuation procedures is not i&en in this case. +uch an accident could possi?l6 surpass the e&ents of #ukushi*a and - due to the hi h population densit6 - e&en !herno?6l. Due to the afore*entioned risks; which *a6 ?e caused ?6 these defects; the conference concernin the flawed reactor pressure &essels was con&ened ?6 an anti-nuclear roup fro* %achen 05er*an62 B%achener %ktions?Cndnis e en %to*ener ieD to ether with the parlia*entar6 roup of the 5reens in the 1uropean Parlia*ent. The in&ited e<perts were i&en the task to assess whether the operation of the plant is responsi?le e&en with these e<istin defects. The docu*ents pu?lished ?6 the #%8! and other standards ser&ed as ?asis for the discussion. 4ased on the pu?lished docu*ents the participants of the conference identified si nificant deficienciesE *ethodolo ical errors; errors in the docu*entation and errors in in&esti ation 1 +6non6* for flaws; indications
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details. +u**ari)in the assess*ent the participants concluded; that the restart of the two reactors is not in accordance with reco ni)ed international standards. 4esides the critical e&aluation of the #%8! decision ?6 the participants open 3uestions on the ?asis of the pu?lished docu*ents arose repeatedl6. #or this reason a list of 3uestions was ela?orated for #%8! 0pa e $$2.

The *ethodolo ical errors concern the followin pointsE

the necessar6 conservat veness in assess*ent and calculation does not e<ist the or g n of t.e defects cannot ?e identified the actual mater al /ro/ert es of the RPV are unknown to the operator and #%8!

0Conservat veness1 descri?es a principle of en ineerin . %ssu*ptions are alwa6s *ade in a wa6 that the6 co&er the worst case. +ucceeds the pro&e of suita?ilit6 under these assu*ptions; the approach is considered as conser&ati&e. This approach takes into account uncertainties and inaccuracies of assu*ptions. :n this case; one can ?e sure that assu*ptions are Fon the safe sideF. :*portant parts of the studies accepted ?6 #%8! do not show this conser&ati&eness. 1&en conser&ati&e reco**endations of the :nternational 1<pert Re&iew 4oard 0:1R42 which was con&ened ?6 #%8! are i nored. % definite reco**endation fro* this co**ittee would ha&e led to an i**ediate ter*ination of the opera?ilit6 of the two reactors =0->. The or g n of t.e defects is unknown. 8e&ertheless; the #%8! follows the declaration of the operator 1lectra?el; that these ha&e arisen durin *anufacture. This h6pothesis ?6 the operator is ?ased on the fact that there are no other e<planations a&aila?le =01>; =14>. +uch an assu*ption cannot ?e accepted as conser&ati&e. :t is noted that at the ti*e of the *anufacture of the RPVs defects of this kind should ha&e ?een identified - e&en with the technolo ies a&aila?le of that ti*e =0->. #or at least one rin of the RPV of Tihan e 2 acceptance was refused due to too *an6 defects =04>. The reAected co*ponent was not installed and replaced. % conser&ati&e approach *ust conclude that the defects detected in 2012 cannot ?e considered to ?e *anufacture induced; ?ut ha&e e&ol&ed or at least rown durin operation. :f this is the case; a +uper&isor6 %uthorit6 *ust prohi?it the further operation of these two reactors. The actual mater al /ro/ert es cannot ?e deter*ined. Gowe&er; these are the necessar6 ?asis for an6 further consideration. There is no representati&e sa*ple *aterial; where current *aterial properties could ?e deter*ined. +ince takin sa*ples fro* the reactor pressure &essel itself is technicall6 not possi?le; representati&e sa*ples are necessar6. :n this conte<t Frepresentati&eF *eans that *aterial has to ?e a&aila?le; which co*es fro* the sa*e *anufacturin process as the RPV and has one throu h si*ilar processes of a ein . % ein is understood here as a co*para?le load ?6 the operation; in particular the neutron

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?o*?ard*ent and the start-up and shutdown procedures of the reactor 0pressure and te*perature chan es2. %s a supposedl6 representati&e *aterial a reAected piece fro* a stea* enerator of a #rench nuclear power plant as well as a cut of the no))le shell fro* Doel $ =21> used ?6 1lectra?el. 4oth sa*ples ha&e not e<perienced a si*ilar a ein process; the6 were not e<posed to radiation or te*perature chan es. The cut of Doel $ has no si*ilar defects. The stea* enerator was *anufactured in 2012 =20>; $0 6ears after the two RPV. :t is hardl6 to ?e assu*ed that the stea* enerator was produced under co*para?le conditions. The sa*ple fro* the stea* enerator cannot ?e considered as representati&e *aterial neither ?6 specification nor ?6 *anufacturin . The co*para?ilit6 of the defects in the speci*en of the #rench stea* enerator cannot ?e pro&en. To reco ni)e these two speci*ens as representati&e cannot ?e considered to ?e conser&ati&e. The relia?ilit6 of these input &aria?les is essential for an6 further 3ualified anal6sis. The conference participants *utuall6 deter*ine that the relia?ilit6 of the input &aria?les has not ?een esta?lished. #or this reason; an6 further scientificall6 serious anal6sis is not possi?le. 8or*all6 at this point an6 further discussion needs to ?e cancelled. %s lon as no *ore relia?le input &aria?les can ?e supplied ?6 the operator; the operation of ?oth reactors is not in the interest of pu?lic safet6 and needs to ?e denied ?6 a neutral 8uclear Re ulator6 %uthorit6. This report outlines the issues that *ust ?e addressed ?efore the two reactors can ?e returned to ser&ice. Despite this conclusion the participants anal6sed the ar u*entation of #%8! which led to the decision to continue operation of the two reactors as co**issioned ?6 the conference. :t is repeatedl6 noted ?6 the #%8! that the e<istin *anufacturin docu*entation is contradictor6 and inco*plete =14>. To e&aluate the 3ualit6 of the RPV a co*plete and consistent docu*entation is *andator6. Tests durin operation are i*portant and necessar6; ?ut the6 can ne&er ser&e solel6 to e&aluate the 3ualit6 of a co*ponent. This can onl6 ?e done in conAunction with the *anufacturin docu*entation.

7ithin the detail re&iew the followin points see* to ?e rele&antE

Des gn bas s acc dents are s m/l f ed and obv ousl! not e,/l c tl! calculated. +ecommended safet! marg ns are not applied.

#ro* the pu?lished docu*ents it is not clear which des gn bas s acc dents 0leaka es and transients2 were considered. Hsin these two points the *ost penali)in loads for the RPV can ?e deter*ined. Rather; there was o?&iousl6 a discrepanc6 ?etween #%8!Is e<perts and the operator a?out the *ost penali)in load for the RPV. =14>. #ro* the docu*ents is not clear whether ?oth load cases were calculated e<plicitl6.

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The :nternational 1<pert Re&iew 4oard 0:1R42 con&ened ?6 the #%8! reco**ended hi her safet6 *ar ins. :n the F#inal ReportF of #%8! this reco**endation is i nored without an6 further notice. The application of this reco**endation should ha&e led to an i**ediate shutdown of the two reactors 0pa e 242.

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2 Introduct on
2.1 Conference Order

Due to the defects in the two reactors the anti-nuclear roup fro* %achen 05er*an62 B%achener %ktions?Cndnis e en %to*ener ieD to ether with the parlia*entar6 roup of the 5reens in the 1uropean Parlia*ent ha&e in&ited to a conference on 24 and 2- Januar6 2014 to %achen. The i&en task for the conference was to anal6se the a&aila?le docu*ents on the reported defects in the reactor pressure &essels of Doel $ and Tihan e 2 reported ?6 #%8! in 2012 and to assess the decision to continue operation of two 8PPs. 4ased on this anal6sis state*ents a?out the ha)ard potential should ?e *ade.

2.2

Involved Persons

The participants of the conference and consultants who support the results of the conference and ha&e supple*ented this report with their posts are listed ?elow. The conference participants are di&ided into those who attended the conference due to their e<pertise and participants fro* the anti-nuclear *o&e*ent who ha&e dealt in detail with this issue 0further participants2. +o*e e<perts are kept anon6*ous to a&oid conflicts of interest with custo*ers. 2.2.1 Part c /ants of t.e Conference

Prof. Dr. 7olf an Kro*p 9 Materials +cience; +afet6 and Risk +ciences Dipl.:n . Dieter MaAer 9 8uclear Re ulator6 re&iew; plant safet6 +tudied *echanical en ineerin at the uni&ersit6 of 4erlin. 7orked fro* 1/,$ to 2011 for &arious 5er*an re ional and central authorities 0*inistries2 in the field of nuclear safet6. 7orked fro* 1//" to 2011 for the Ministr6 of 1n&iron*ent; 8ature !onser&ation and 8uclear +afet6 as a senior official; responsi?le with a?out -0 staff for the safet6 of nuclear installations in 5er*an6. %lso responsi?le for international affairs. +ince 2011 retired. %fter retire*ent nuclear consultant for &arious do*estic and international or ani)ations. +e&eral studies on safet6 deficiencies in nuclear power plants in 1urope pu?lished.

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Dr. Rainer Moor*ann 9 8uclear +afet6 1/,' PhD 0ph6sical che*istr62 Technical Hni&ersit6 4raunschwei ; #R5

1/,'-2012 +cientific e*plo6ee at #orschun s)entru* 0Research !enter2 Juelich #LJM safet6 anal6ses for nuclear s6ste*s as pe??le ?ed reactors; fusion reactors and spallation neutron sources 2011 7histle?lower award for pu?lication of safet6 pro?le*s of pe??le ?ed reactors in spite of *assi&e opposition in #LJ. These pu?lications were one reason for the collapse of the unsafe pe??le ?ed reactor proAect P4MR in +outh %frica.

M.+c. !hristian +teffens 9 en ineerin sciences in the ener 6 sector Dr. :lse Tweer 9 Materials +cience 1/'' PhD Hni&. of Vienna; %ustria 0Radiation da*a e in *etals2

1/''-1/'" %ssistant at the Hni&. of Vienna; :nst. for +olid +tate Ph6sics 1/'"-1/,0 Research #ellowshipsE Hni&. of Delaware; !ath. Hni&. of %*erica; 7ashin ton D.!. since 1/,2 Docu*entation work for se&eral Research :nstitutes 0i.a. PT4 4raunschwei ; LD1-Ganno&er; #:L 1ner ieN#:L Karlsruhe; #:L 7erkstoffe; #:L Technik; 7T:-#rankfurt2E *aterials science; solid state ph6sics; reactor *aterials; nuclear *edicine 1/",-1//4 !ooperation with Oko-:nstitut Dar*stadt 08PP .?ri hei*2M 5ruppe Okolo ie 08PP 5reifswald; 8PP +tade2E structural inte rit6 of reactor pressure &essels since 1//0 !ooperation with :R# 0:R+2NHni&. of Vienna; *e*?er of %ustrian 1<pert Tea*s 08PP 4ohunice; 8PP Krsko; 8PP Mocho&ce; 8PP Te*elin; Trilateral Participation accordin to the Melk Protocol2; special fieldE structural inte rit6 of the reactor pressure &essel

Dr. M. C.2 9 +tructural inte rit6 and fracture *echanics Dr. S. H. 9 +tructural inte rit6 and fracture *echanics

2 +o*e e<perts are kept anon6*ous to a&oid conflicts of interest with custo*ers.
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2.2.2

"urt.er Part c /ants

1loi 5lorieu< 9 5reenpeace; 4el iu* JPr +chellen?er 9 %achener %ktions?Cndnis e en %to*ener ie; 5er*an6 7alter +chu*acher 9 %achener %ktions?Cndnis e en %to*ener ie; 5er*an6 (eo Tu??a< - nuclQaire stop kernener ie; 4el iu* 2.2.3 *dv sors and Peer +ev e2er

Dr. Joe Gopenfeld 9 Peer re&iewin and ad&ises in the field of structural inte rit6 and fracture *echanics Dr. Gopenfeld has -0 6ears of e<perience in industr6 and o&ern*ent in the areas of stea* enerator perfor*ance; ther*al-h6draulic; and *aterial de radation and testin in nuclear and fossil power plants. 7hile e*plo6ed ?6 the 8R! 01/"2-20012 he has *ana ed *aAor international pro ra*s on stea* enerator perfor*ance in P7Rs durin accidents. Gis work at the H+ 8R! led to the for*ulation of the current technical re3uire*ent specifications for stea* enerators. Durin the last 1$ 6ears Dr. Gopenfeld *ade se&eral &er?al and written presentations to the %to*ic +afet6 and (icensin 4oard 0%+(42 in connection with the life e<tension of the Ver*ont Rankee and the :ndian Point Plants and the need for the shutdown of the +an .nofre plant. Dr Gopenfeld raduated fro* the 1n ineerin +chool at the Hni&ersit6 of !alifornia; (os %n eles 04+ 1/'0; M+ 1/'2; Ph.D 1/',2. Ge has pu?lished *an6 scientific articles and he holds ei ht patents. httpENNwww.stop-tihan e.or N!VSJoeSGopenfeld

2.3

Documents

This anal6sis is ?ased on the docu*ents pu?lished ?6 #%8!. %ll docu*ents are listed in the source director6 0pa e 402. % list of these docu*ents is also pu?lished on the ho*epa e of the super&isor6 authorit6 and is accessi?le &ia the followin linkE httpENNfanc.f o&.?eNnlNpa eNdossier-pressure-&essel-doel-$-tihan e-2N14"".asp<T(5U2

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:n addition; the 4oiler and Pressure Vessel !ode 04PV!2 of the %*erican +ociet6 of Mechanical 1n ineers 0%+M12 ser&ed as a source of infor*ation. %ccordin to this code; the two reactor pressure &essel were created and *onitored. % re3uest at the %*erican +ociet6 of Mechanical 1n ineers to pro&ide this standard to the conference free of costs re*ained unanswered. The necessar6 search of the conference participants took therefore place with pu?licl6 a&aila?le copies of this standard for e<a*ple in uni&ersit6 li?raries.

4asicall6 all in&esti ations; calculations and checks were perfor*ed e<clusi&el6 ?6 the operator 1lectra?el and its instructed e<perts. %ll other docu*ents of the ?odies in&ol&ed

#%8! - 8uclear Re ulator6 %uthorit6 4el V 9 technical +u?sidiar6 of #%8! %:4-VinVotte 9 perfor*s inspections in the 4el ian 8PP. :nternational 1<pert Re&iew 4oard 0:1R42 9 ad&isor6 roup con&ened ?6 #%8! 8ational +cientific 1<pert 5roup 08+152 9 ad&isor6 roup con&ened ?6 #%8!

are ?ased on these docu*entation pro&ided ?6 the operator without perfor*in their own in&esti ations; own calculations and e&idences. Rather; these roups rel6 on the accurac6 of the infor*ation in ter*s of calculations and e<peri*ental tests i&en ?6 1lectra?el =0'>. The &arious roups transferred their reports to #%8!. These indi&idual reports are su?su*ed ?6 the #%8! and the rele&ant report was pu?lished. This contains the final e&aluation and further conditions for operation. The first series of reports pu?lished ?etween the 6ear 2012N201$ still contained *an6 open issues. These issues had to ?e clarified ?6 the operator prior to a the restart of the two reactors. #or this reason; there was a second series of studies and reports in sprin 201$. These reports led to the #inal Report of #%8! in Ma6 201$. :t *a6 ?e noted that in the second series the Aud e*ent of the :nternational 1<pert Re&iew 4oard 0:1R42 is *issin without an6 e<planation.

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3 Caveats
The participants of the conference a reed that a science-?ased e&idence has failed for ?oth issuesE the current *aterial properties and the ori in of defects. 1lectra?el has not ?een a?le to pro&ide representati&e sa*ples. :n this respect all cost and ti*e consu*in anal6ses that were perfor*ed ?6 1lectra?el to de*onstrate the structural inte rit6 of the reactor pressure &essels and to i&e a Austification for the continued operation of the facilities are not appropriate. Despite these funda*ental reser&ations; the conference participants decided to anal6se and assess the further work of 1lectra?el and the decision of #%8! for the re-start of the two reactors. Moti&e of this decision is the hi h ha)ard potential of the defectsE The o?ser&ed defects in the reactor pressure &essels increase the pro?a?ilit6 of a reactor pressure &essel failure without an6 ad&anced warnin ?6 orders of *a nitude. +uch an accident would e<ceed the e&ents in #ukushi*a and could e&en sur*ount the accident at !herno?6l - due to the lar e population densit6; ?ecause local de*ocratic rules e<clude certain *andator6 *easures and ?ecause of the a?o&e alread6 *entioned lack of warnin ti*e.

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$ 3ac4 of Conservat sm
The conference participants ?6 consensus assu*e that for all aspects of reactor safet6; a Fconser&ati&e approachF has to ?e selected and would ?e chosen ?6 all 8uclear Re ulator6 %uthorities. 4est 1sti*ate approaches are to ?e reAected due to their lower relia?ilit6. 7ith respect to the structural inte rit6 of the reactor pressure &essel a failure of the RPV *ust ?e a&oided under all circu*stances$. #or this reason; a conser&ati&e approach is i*perati&e. :*portant parts of the pro&ided e&idences of 1lectra?el do not show such a conser&ati&eness. 8e&ertheless; #%8! accepted the*. 1<e*plar6 e<a*ples of non-conser&ati&e approachE

% pressure &essel with a densit6 of fault indications as the6 were found in 2012 in ?oth RPVs would not ha&e ?een accepted at the ti*e of construction 0not e&en in accordance to the criteria of the *anufacturerW2 althou h the #%8! appro&ed the two reactors to re-start. #%8! accepted &erifications ?6 e<peri*ents; o?tained with non-representati&e sa*ples. 1lectra?el uses a new; self-de&eloped and not e<peri*entall6 &alidated *ethod 05roupin Method2 for fracture *echanical anal6sis of lar e a*ounts of flaws. This ?eca*e necessar6 ?ecause such a hi h densit6 of defects is not foreseen in the %+M1 !ode. #%8! accepts the assu*ption that the defects in the RPVs are *anufacture induced. This assu*ption is not ?ased on scientific e&idence. #%8! accepted a RT8DT-shift of -0 @! to co&er all additional *aterial propert6 chan es as reco**ended ?6 1lelctra?el. This shift includes an assu*ed shift of 2- @! for h6dro en flakin ; another 1, @! for the effect of *acrose re ations; the re*ainin " @! are supposed to co&er the unknown radiation effect on flawed *aterial. :n addition 1lectra?el does not use the #:+ for*ula for the deter*ination of RT8DT shift; ?ut the *easured data fro* the radiation sur&eillance pro ra*. Takin into account the scatter of e<peri*ental data; which are not ne li i?le especiall6 in irradiated *aterials; the a*ount of " @! is not sufficientl6 conser&ati&e to co&er the co*pletel6 unknown processes

#urther e<a*ples are i&en in the detailed chapter.

$ Gere da*a e pro?a?ilities of less than 10 -, 0?is 10-/2 are re3uired.

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#%8! itself clai*s that reactor pressure &essel failure has to ?e e<cluded under all circu*stances. 1lectra?elIs de*onstration of structural inte rit6 - as accepted ?6 #%8! does not *eet this re3uire*ent. Xuestion 1E 7hich assu*ptions in the reports of 1lectra?el are ?ased on F?est esti*ateF assu*ptionsT Please list these in detail.

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& Su/erfluous tests

#%8! de*ands e<peri*ents that in principle cannot lead to an6 *eanin ful results as lon as no representati&e sa*ples are a&aila?le. %s a result data are produced with reat effort that cannot answer the crucial 3uestions and therefore these tests and the respecti&e data are superfluous. #or e<a*ple; there is no wa6 to deter*ine the actual stren th of the fault6 *aterial; unless ?6 cuttin sa*ples fro* the RPV.

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6 Select on of Invest gated Deta ls

The followin su?-chapters are the result of indi&idual su?Aect areas of the conference. 1ach su?Aect area deals with one aspect of the defects. The totalit6 of the su?Aect areas do not clai* to ?e co*plete.

6.1
6.1.1

Defects
Class f cat on

The defects in the RPVs of Doel $ and Tihan e 2 are the central conference issue. Defects are rele&ant ?ecause the6 are e*?edded in the steel and dependin on si)e; shape; position and orientation the6 can ha&e a si nificant i*pact on the structural inte rit6 of the entire RPV. The6 were unifor*l6 na*ed as FflawsF in the pu?lic docu*ents of 1lectra?el and #%8!. The shape; especiall6 if the6 are cracks or round inclusions is essential. +ince the characteristic of F#lawsF cannot ?e esta?lished ?e6ond reasona?le dou?t ?6 now; the conference participants ha&e chosen the neutral ter* FdefectsF. 6.1.2 " nd ng

%lread6 durin construction of Doel $ and Tihan e 2 in 1/,/ there were reports in the *edia and political disputes a?out defects in the RPVs =2/>. % detailed o&er&iew of that newspaper reports was not a&aila?le to the participants of the conference. :n su**er 2012; studies on underclad crackin were carried out in the two RPVs. These tests were carried out ?ecause such cracks were found in the #rench 8PP Tricastin. %i* of this test was to e<clude such cracks in 4el ian 8PP. Hnderclad cracks were not found; ?ut other lower l6in defects. This result forced #%8! to to de*and a full in&esti ation of the wall thickness of the co*plete RPV. Durin this inspection the flaws discussed here were found. 6.1.3 3ocal 5 ng

The e<act locali)ation of the defects is perfor*ed with an auto*ated and ro?ot-assisted ultrasound procedures. The in&esti ation took place at co*pletel6 dischar ed reactors usin pulse-echo *ethod in the su**er of 2012. The stud6 was carried out fro* the inside of the RPV throu hout the entire wall thickness of the RPV. :n addition to the accurac6 this *ethod has two funda*ental li*itationsE

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The e<tension of the defects in radial direction is su?Aected to lar e inaccuracies. Gidden indications 0defects ?ehind defects2 cannot ?e e<cluded and; if at all; detected onl6 with &er6 lar e uncertainties.

The necessar6 e&idence that a detection especiall6 with the two a?o&e-*entioned points is possi?le is carried out usin reAected ?locks V4$/-N1 of a #rench stea* enerator. =20> 0pa e 1/2. This *aterial cannot ?e considered to ?e representati&e for the RPVs. The defects focus on indi&idual shells of the RPV. 7ithin these shells; the defects are focused on specific areas. The defects are located in the inner 10 c* of the cross section. Xuestion 2E Gow hi h is the inaccurac6 in the deter*ination of the radial co*ponent of the defectsT Xuestion $E Gow hi h is the pro?a?ilit6 that hidden defects are not detectedT Xuestion 4E 7h6 do 6ou consider a cali?ration of HT on ?asis of the ?lock V4$/-N1 as sufficientT 6.1.$ "orm and S 5e

+hape; si)e; defect densit6 0nu*?er of defects per &olu*e unit2 and orientation affect the structural inte rit6 of the RPV. Defects with crack-like structure ha&e a su?stantial safet6 ha)ard; since the ?eha&iour of the lar e nu*?er of closel6 spaced defects in the case of se&ere transients is not known and thus the risk of spontaneous failure of the RPV cannot ?e e<cluded. The ar u*ent of the licensee; that the flaws are har*less due to their *ostl6 parallel orientation to the inner surface is ?e6ond co*prehension. The ?eha&iour of such defects durin operation and in case of transients is co*pletel6 unknown. Moreo&er; the radial part of indi&idual defects and how this radial co*ponent *a6 chan e in the case of ther*o-*echanical influences is not known. .&erall; the lar e nu*?er of defects weaken the RPV. :t *ust also ?e noted at this point *ust that the cali?ration of the HT is not perfor*ed on representati&e sa*ples. :n co*?ination with the eneral li*itations of HT an insufficient de ree of conser&atis* *ust ?e stated here as well. 6.1.& Or g n

The ori in of the defects is crucial. :t *ust ?e clarified ?e6ond dou?t whether the defects caused durin *anufacture or durin operation. 7ould the defects ?e caused durin operation; a continued operation of the two reactors would in principle ?e no lon er possi?le. :n this case; it *ust ?e assu*ed that the RPV is not sufficientl6 a?le to withstand the loads durin operation.

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!urrentl6; the licensee cannot de*onstrate the ori in of the defects. 8e&ertheless; the #%8! follows 1lectra?elIs e<planation; that the defects are related to *anufacturin . This h6pothesis is supported ?6 the operator to the fact that there are no other e<planations Y:n the a?sence of an6 other e<planation at this sta e; the licensee supposes the presence of fa?rication defects; ?ut does not e<clude other e<planations.B =01> and also in the #inal Report #%8! notes YThe *ost likel6 ori in of the indications identified in the Doel $ and Tihan e 2 reactor pressure &essels is h6dro en flakin due to the *anufacturin process.B =14>. +uch a presu*ption is not sufficient and can under no circu*stances ?e re arded as conser&ati&e. Rather; it *ust ?e assu*ed that the defects were not present after *anufacturin ?ecauseE

%t the ti*e of *anufacturin a&aila?le =0->.

the technical options to detect these defects were

%t least one shell of the RPV of Tihan e 2 were refused due to too *an6 defects =04>. The a*ount of defects that lead to a refusal of acceptance at that ti*e was si nificantl6 lower than the findin s of 2012. Thus; there is no plausi?le e<planation wh6 these defects should not ha&e ?een found if the6 had alread6 ?een present at that ti*e.

!onse3uentl6; it *ust ?e assu*ed that no defects e<isted at the start of operation of the reactors; ?ut ha&e e&ol&ed durin operation. The participants of the conference e*phasi)e at this point that the ori in of the defects is also unclear to the*. Due to the a?o&e-*entioned facts and in ter*s of a conser&ati&e approach; it *ust not ?e assu*ed that the for*ation of the defects occurred durin *anufacturin ; it has to ?e assu*ed that the defects e&ol&ed or at least ha&e rown durin operation. 7ith respect the assu*ption of the licensee; that the defects are h6dro en-flakes it *ust ?e noted that in eneral h6dro en in steel is hi hl6 pro?le*atic; therefore deh6dro enation treat*ents of the steel ha&e to ?e carried out durin the *anufacturin of an RPV. Xuestion -E Gow can the clai* of production-related ori in of the defects ?e *aintained e&en if durin production control no defects ha&e ?een found; althou h the techni3ue for detection was a&aila?le at that ti*e and was usedT Xuestion 'E Gow can the h6dro en flakin ?e e<plained ?6 the G Z + concentration of the in otsT Xuestion ,E 7hat is the ?ack round for the note on pa e 1' 0#%8!; #inal Report2 =14> that in the sa*ples with h6dro en flakes the car?on concentration is hi herT Xuestion "E Gow can it ?e e<plained that onl6 shells of the RPVs of Doel $ and Tihan e 2 are affectedT Xuestion /E Gow can it ?e e<plained that the defects occur onl6 at a certain depth fro* the inner surfaceT

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Xuestion 10E Gow can it ?e e<plained that the defects are not e3uall6 distri?uted throu hout the &olu*eT Xuestion 11E %ccordin #%8! the pressure &essel would ha&e ?een reAected durin acceptance if affected with a defect densit6 found in 2012. Gow can it ?e that the disco&er6 of the defects in 2012 does not i**ediatel6 lead to the sa*e ar u*ent and an i**ediate and per*anent closure of the reactorsT 6.1.6 Searc. for +e/resentat ve Sam/le %ater al

The current *aterial properties of the RPV cannot ?e deter*ined. #or this reason; the operator has to rel6 on findin representati&e sa*ples. Representati&e *eans that *aterial has to ?e a&aila?le;

which ori inates fro* the sa*e *anufacturin process that has under one a si*ilar a ein process that has co*para?le defects 0defect t6pe and defect densit62

Hsin representati&e sa*ple *aterial further in&esti ations can ?e carried out to assess the actual structural inte rit6 of the RPV. The operator presents two different sa*ples that are representati&e to his point of &iew. These are

a reAected piece fro* a steam generator; that includes h6dro en flakes and no55le cuts fro* the RPV fro* Doel $

The ?lock of the steam generator; also often referred to in the docu*ents with V4$/-; co*es fro* a stea* enerator for a #rench 8PP that was reAected due to too *an6 defects. Y+hell V4$/- is a for ed shell that was *anufactured ?6 %R1V% as part of a stea* enerator for a 1$00 M7-t6pe power plant. :t was reAected durin *anufacturin in 2012 due to the presence of a lar e nu*?er of h6dro en flakes.B =20> The ?lock V4$/- cannot ?e assu*ed to ?e representati&e. The ?lock was *anufactured *ore than $0 6ears after the RPV of Doel $ and Tihan e 2. The specifications of the *aterial for a pressure &essel and a stea* enerator are funda*entall6 different. :t is hardl6 plausi?le that this ?lock can ?e considered representati&e with respect to the *aterial and the *anufacturin process. V4$/- was ne&er e<posed to neutron ?o*?ard*ent or co*para?le te*peratureNpressure c6cles. !o*para?ilit6 of the defects of ?lock V4$/- with those of the RPV are *ere speculation. The no55le cut of Doel $ was also not e<posed to si*ilar a ein ; neither ther*o*echanical nor ?6 neutron ?o*?ard*ent. This speci*en also has no si*ilar defects. :t can ?e assu*ed that special attention is laid on the *anufacturin of the no))le shell. This shell is due to the cut-outs for the coolin circuits; a particularl6 critical area.

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Re ulations re3uire that for accelerated irradiation speci*ens onl6 archi&e *aterial *a6 ?e used; that has the sa*e production histor6 as the RPV. The sa*e applies of course also to the deter*ination of the *echanical properties of the *aterial without irradiation. Xuestion 12E Gow can it ?e that for the de*onstration of the structural inte rit6 of the RPV non-representati&e sa*ples are used; neither co*para?le with respect to *anufacturin nor with respect to specifications 0%R1V% ?lock2T Xuestion 1$E 7h6 are the no))le cuts considered as representati&e sa*plesT Do the6 contain a co*para?le defect densit6T :f not; then it is Aust sa*ple *aterial that would ?e assi ned to a defect-free re ion of the RPV; in which case the operational loads and the irradiation histor6 is still *issin .

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6.2

Structural Integr t!

The proof of the structural inte rit6 is in principle not possi?le; since a deter*ination of the actual current *aterial properties failed with the e<istin sa*ples. The underl6in sa*ples are not representati&e 0see also Y+earch for Representati&e +a*ple MaterialB pa e 1/2. 4ut this infor*ation is necessar6 for an6 assessin of the structural inte rit6 of the RPVs. Hndou?tedl6; the defects cause a weakenin of the RPVs. Thus; it *ust ?e assu*ed that the two RPVs will no lon er ?e a?le to withstand the sa*e stresses as the6 did in the initial state. 4asicall6 a si nificant reduction of the wall thickness of the RPV *ust ?e assu*ed ?ecause such a wide &ariet6 of defects. 6.2.1 3oads

The RPV of an 8PP has to withstand the loads occurrin durin operatin and incidents in a wa6; that there are no e<ceedin of the li*its of the release of radioacti&e nuclides. The followin distinctions are *adeE F?asic loadF 0nor*al operation2; FtransientsF and Fdesi n ?asis accidentsF 0with &alues a?o&e the nor*al le&el2. 4asicall6 it has to ?e proofed that an RPV can withstand all for*s of these loads. :n the docu*entation pu?lished ?6 #%8! is not reco ni)a?le that a successful &erification of all transient in nor*al operation and in the case of desi n ?asis accidents took place. Xuestion 14E 7hich desi n ?asis accidents and transients were used for the &erification of structural inte rit6T Xuestion 1-E 7hich desi n ?asis accidents and transients ha&e ?een calculated e<plicitl6T Xuestion 1'E 7h6 are the selected transients loads are li*itin T Xuestion 1,E 7hich pressure and ther*al shock loads under nor*al and desi n ?asis accidents 0D4%s2 were used in the anal6sis. Xuestion 1"E 7hich ther*al h6draulic *odels and co*puter codes were used to enerate ther*al loads. '.2.1.1 !old Ton ues 0Plu*e 1ffect2 Durin reactor scra* lar e 3uantities of cold water can ?e inserted into the reactor pressure &essel. Thus the coolin -down of the reactor pressure &essel wall cannot ?e accepted as s6**etrical. !o*pared with the pre&ailin te*perature there; the te*perature differences

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will arise here ?6 around 2-0 @!. :nternationall6 it is assu*ed that the Fcold ton uesF 0plu*es2 represent a si nificant pro?le*. The licensee howe&er assu*es; that in the RPV of Doel $ and Tihan e 2 the s6**etrical load is the *ost penali)in load case. The #%8! accepts that e<planation of 1lectra?el. :n the docu*ents #%8! tells YThat issue leads to numerous exchanges with the licensee. Finally, in anuary 2!"#, the licensee $ro%ided &el ' with information allowing concluding that the ($lume effect) may *e neglected.( =14> #ro* this sentence it is not &isi?le; whether a calculation of this load-case e&er took place. Xuestion 1/E Does a calculation e<ist for the a<iall6 s6**etrical and the as6**etrical load 0plu*e effect2 0cold ton ues2T '.2.1.2 1arth3uake and Paleoseis*olo ie #or assessin risks to e3uip*ent with re ard to earth3uake nowada6s approaches of paleoseis*olo 6 are also applied in addition to historical records. Paleoseis*olo 6 in&esti ates earth3uakes on the ?asis of sedi*ent deposits. That *ethod can look e<tre*el6 far into the past. This *ethod is not ?ased on hu*an records of earth3uakes; which allow onl6 a &er6 s*all look into the past. Thus the paleoseis*olo 6 allows a *ore accurate assess*ent of the earth3uake ha)ard in the respecti&e re ions. :n the docu*ents of the #%8! is not reco ni)a?le that earth3uake load cases were applied for the de*onstration of the structural inte rit6 of the RPVs. %lso the principle use of paleoseis*olo 6 was not docu*ented. 8owada6s; paleoseis*olo 6 is state of science and technolo 6. Therefore she *ust ?e considered at toda6Is re&iews of possi?le strains on a nuclear power plant. Xuestion 20E 7hich earth3uake was chosen 0pro?a?ilit6 and i*pact2T Xuestion 21E 7hich *ethods for the earth3uake-calculations were carried outT Xuestion 22E 7as the *ethod BPaleoseis*olo 6D applied at allT '.2.1.$ Desi n 4asis %ccidents durin +hutdown Recent studies ha&e re&ealed that the pro?a?ilit6 of a *eltdown durin the plant shutdown la6 in the sa*e *a nitude as durin operation =$0>. :t is therefore essential to consider appropriate desi n ?asis accidents despite plant shutdowns and plant- re&ision of the s6ste*. Xuestion 2$E 7ere desi n ?asis incidents considered durin downti*e; tooT

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Xuestion 24E :t was asked for earth3uake loads in chapter '.2.1.2. 7ere these loads also considered for plant shutdownT 6.2.2 6rou/ ng of Defect

4ecause the %+M1 [: !ode onl6 pro&ides uidance for fracture *echanical e&aluation for cracks that ha&e e&ol&ed durin operation 0sin le or a few2 in the present case it is difficult to conclude the %+M1 !ode can ?e applied for such a lar e nu*?er of defects that are supposed to ha&e de&eloped durin *anufacturin 0accordin to the licensee2. :t *ust ?e assu*ed that in the case of transients durin operation an interaction of nei h?ourin flaws can take place; which could then lead to a sudden increase of the rele&ant defect si)e. #or co*putational e&aluation of such processes 1lectra?el has proposed in accordance with the %+M1 !ode a 5roupin *ethod in which ?6 appropriate roupin of the o?ser&ed defects a co**on defect si)e is defined in order to perfor* the fracture *echanical anal6sis =04>. +uch a *ethod is not en&isa ed ?6 the re ulations. The standards also do not discuss such a lar e nu*?er of *anufacturin -related defects; shape and location of defects; as o?ser&ed; are not addressed. The application of an approach like the roupin *ethod has to ?e &alidated ?6 e<peri*ental studies. 4ecause no representati&e sa*ple *aterial is present; a relia?le &alidation in principle cannot ?e perfor*ed. Xuestion 2-E Gow can it ?e that in the case of such a lar e nu*?er of supposedl6 *anufacturin induced defects which should ha&e led 0in accordance with the criteria for acceptance2 to a reAection of the co*ponent; the safet6 of the co*ponent is now de*onstrated usin non-&alidated co*putational *ethodsT Xuestion 2'E 7hich e<peri*ental &alidation of the *ethod e<istT Xuestion 2,E 7hich *aterial was used for possi?le test ?lockT Xuestion 2"E Gow was the nu*?er of defects si*ulatedT Xuestion 2/E Gow was the spatial distri?ution of the defects; as o?ser&ed in the real co*ponent si*ulated in the test ?lockT Xuestion $0E Gow is the une<plained nature of the defects in the real co*ponent in the test ?lock consideredT Xuestion $1E Please show the fracture *echanics calculations that de*onstrate that the inte rit6 of the RPV is i&en for all desi n ?asis accidents; statin the scientific sources. Xuestion $2E Pro&ide co*parisons of crack propa ation predictions fro* the B5roupin ModelD with the appropriate e<peri*ental data.

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Xuestion $$E Gow does the 5roupin e*?rittle*entT

Model accounts for interaction ?etween fati ue and

Xuestion $4E 7hich uncertainties in the input data used to calculatin crack propa ation are assu*edT Xuestion $-E Gow does uncertainties in crack depth *easure*ents affect crack predictionsT rowth

Xuestion $'E Gas a sensiti&it6 stud6 on the effect of crack si)e; stress and reduction in fracture tou hness on RPV failure risk ?e perfor*edT 6.2.3 %ater al Pro/ert es

Due to the continuous neutron ?o*?ard*ent of the RPV there is a pro ressi&e e*?rittle*ent of the steel. Thus; the nil-ductilit6 transition te*perature te*perature 0RT 8DT2 *o&es further and further into hi her te*perature ran es. The :nternational 1<pert Re&iew 4oard :1R4 has reco**ended to add a safet6 *ar in of 100 @! to the ?6 the licensee calculated &alue of the 0RT8DT2 =0->. 1lectra?el itself had onl6 su ested a &alue of -0 @!. Gowe&er; alread6 42 @! fro* this &alue are ascri?ed ?6 the deter*ined influences of G6dro en #lakin and *acro-se re ation as reported ?6 1lectra?el. Thus; onl6 " @! re*ain to co&er the radiation effect on the *aterial afflicted with so *an6 defects. %?out the radiation effect on *aterial with such a densit6 and t6pe of defects no literature data are a&aila?le. This &alue therefore cannot ?e considered as conser&ati&e. n addition; 1lectra?el does not appl6 the RT8DT shift calculated usin the #:+ for*ula; ?ut uses the e<peri*ental data fro* the sur&eillance pro ra*; which is certainl6 o a further reduction of conser&atis*. Therefore the :1R4 has de*anded a &alue of 100 @!. Gowe&er; this re3uire*ent does not enter into the final report of the #%8!. %ccordin to 1lectra?el RT8DT *ust ?e ?elow 1$2 @! =0/>. The &alue of 1lectra?el includin the proposed -0 @! was 10';/ @!. Thus; the allowa?le upper li*it was not reached. 4ut in case the 100 @! proposed ?6 :1R4 are taken into account; the &alue would ?e 1-'./ @! thus o&er the per*issi?le &alue of 1$2 @!. #urther operation of the two reactors would then not ?e per*issi?le. Xuestion $,E 7hat ?eca*e out of the de*and of the :1R4 to carr6 out a sensiti&it6 anal6sis and wh6 was it not included in the #inal Report an6*oreT Xuestion $"E Gas the proposal of :1R4 to use 100 @! instead of the ?6 1lectra?el additionall6 proposed -0 @! to co&er the possi?le radiation effects in sensiti&it6 anal6ses; not i*ple*ented ?ecause this would i**ediatel6 lead to an e<ceedin of the li*it &alue of the RT8DT of 1$2 @!T

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Xuestion $/E :f accordin to 1lectra?el 2- @! of the -0 @! shift should co&er the tou hness decrease ?6 e<istin h6dro en flakes 0these are data fro* non-representati&e sa*ples2 and additional 1, @! co&ers e*?rittle*ent and *acro-se re ation; where is a safet6 *ar in for co&erin the uncertaint6 of irradiation effect on h6dro en flakesT Xuestion 40E 7h6 does the licensee clai*s to perfor* a F&er6 conser&ati&eF approach; althou h the used RT8DT &alues are not calculated usin the #:+ for*ula ?ut are replaced ?6 less conser&ati&e &alues fro* the sur&eillance pro ra*T

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6.3

Core Damage "re#uenc!

The core da*a e fre3uenc6 !D# is of central i*portance for the safet6 assess*ent of li ht water reactors; as all serious accidents include a core da*a e. The !D# is not the sa*e as the pro?a?ilit6 of a catastrophic accident; there is a certain pro?a?ilit6 that despite core da*a e the effects are li*ited to the plant and do not reach the en&iron*ent. 0see; for e<a*ple TM: accident2. #or newer s6ste*s 01PR2; a !D# of 10--N6 to 10-'N6 is e<pected; while an uncontrolled *eltdown is assu*ed with 10-,N6. These &alues are si nificantl6 hi her for older plant; since the6 contain no e<plicit desi n a ainst *eltdown in contrast to the 1PR. More i*portant than the !D# itself is e&en the *echanis* leadin to core da*a eE 7hile a low-pressure core *elt is considered to ?e easier to control and runs relati&el6 slowl6 0i.e. possi?l6 pro&ides opportunities to counter-*easures and disaster preparedness2; leads the so-called hi h-pressure core *elt under certain circu*stances to a lar e &essel failure due to the *eltin . Hnder hi h pressure the failin &essel is torn fro* its anchora e. This would result in an i**ediate destruction of all safet6 facilities and safet6 ?arriers and thus represents in the safet6 anal6ses the *ost se&ere i*pacts of a *eltdown. Gowe&er; there is still a period of se&eral hours ?etween accident start and &essel failure for counter *easures and initiation of ci&il protection *easures such as e&acuations. 1<cluded in usual safet6 considerations is a serious core da*a e due to *aterial related &essel failure; the so-called Fcatastrophic &essel failureF. :t is si*ilar to the hi h-pressure core *eltE Tri erin e&ent is a sudden crack induced ?6 *aterial failure in the &essel which without an6 ad&ance warnin - leads to e<tensi&e destruction of the reactor. %s there?6 a co*plete loss of coolant takes place; it results in a rapid *eltdown with &er6 hi h le&els of radioacti&it6 release into the en&iron*ent. #or this case there is no sufficient ti*e span for counter-*easures and disaster pre&ention; so that the conse3uences of this e&ent would e&en far e<ceed a hi h-pressure core *elt. :n 5er*an6 the catastrophic &essel failure is ?e &irtuall6 eli*inated in reactors ?6 the concept of so-called ?asic safet6. :ts pro?a?ilit6 is assu*ed to ?e less than 10-/N6. =$0> The predo*inant safet6 si nificance of the detected defects in Tihan e 2 and Doel $ lies in the fact that this could possi?l6 ?e the tri er for such a catastrophic &essel failure. The effects of these defects actuall6 are co*para?le to a reduction of the wall thickness of the &essel. :n face of the enor*ous potential conse3uences of a catastrophic &essel failure it *ust ?e co*pletel6 e<cluded that the defects ha&e si nificant effect on the pro?a?ilit6 of a catastrophic &essel failure. Therefore; it is i*perati&e to deter*ine the pro?a?ilit6 of such a catastrophic &essel failure for the &essels of Tihan e 2 and Doel $ with and without defects ?6 conser&ati&e anal6sis; that is; to answer the 3uestionE Gow does the pro?a?ilit6 of failure of the &essel has chan ed ?6 the defectsT Gere strict standards are to ?e applied; that is;

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uncertainties in the worst possi?le conditions *ust ?e taken into account. Relia?le anal6sis are not 6et known; there is onl6 a eneral state*ent of the #%8! a&aila?le that the failure of the pressure &essel *ust ?e e<cluded. Xuestion 41E 7hich effect ha&e the o?ser&ed RPV defects on the !D#; at the Doel $ and Tihan e 2 plants. +pecif6 the calculated !D#s ?efore and after the disco&er6 of the defects. Xuestion 42E Discuss how the calculated chan e in !D# 0delta !D#2 leads to the conclusion that plant operation with a de raded RPV does not co*pro*ise pu?lic safet6. Xuestion 4$E Discuss the *odels that were used to calculate the delta !D#. The discussion does not ha&e to ?e &er6 detailed and e<hausti&e ?ut it should pro&ide sufficient infor*ation so that the reader can assess the &alidit6 of the conclusion re ardin plant safet6. #or e<a*ple; *odel description should include at the *ini*u*E 1. The nu*?er of operational transients 0?oth past and anticipated2 that ha&e ?een considered. 2. T6pe of the transients durin desi n ?asis accidents. $. Hncertainties in *aterial properties. 4. Hncertainties in crack li*itations. eo*etries due to ultrasonic *easure*ent

-. Ma nitudes of stress intensit6 factors introduced ?6 surface defects. '. Hncertainties in the location of the *a<i*u* stresses. Xuestion 44E Present a sensiti&it6 stud6 showin the sensiti&it6 of delta !D# to the a?o&e listed uncertainties. Xuestion 4-E +how how the *iti atin actions taken ?6 the licensee 0e. reduction in the se&erit6 of start up and shutdown transients2 reduce the delta !D#.

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6.$

%anufactur ng Documentat on

To assess the 3ualit6 of indi&idual co*ponents of the RPV a co*plete and consistent docu*entation is *andator6. .nl6 with it; the 3ualit6 of the co*ponent can ?e e&aluated. :nser&ices inspections are i*portant and necessar6; ?ut the6 can ne&er ser&e solel6 to e&aluate the 3ualit6 of a co*ponent this can onl6 ?e done in conAunction with the production docu*entation. The assess*ent of the current 3ualit6 of co*ponents depends not onl6 on the continuous testin durin operation ?ut also on the followin steps durin productionE

Tests and other *easures of 3ualit6 assess*ent carried out with funds accordin to the state of science and technolo 6. The tests and creation of production docu*entation are acco*panied ?6 independent e<perts. These tests are lo ed.

The production docu*entation is archi&ed and is per*anentl6 and co*pletel6 accessi?le. % ss ng Documentat on

6.$.1

There are conflictin e&idences of #%8! on the co*pleteness of the docu*entation. In October 2012 it is statedE +,ota*ly, detailed documentation a*out the first thermal treatment $erformed *y -DM .which according to the /0FC has *een done1, an intermediate 2T ins$ection and some -DM s$ecifications are lac3ing.( 4!25 Im 7anuar 2013; the licensee is cited as followsE +The manufacturing data and documentation $ro%ed to *e com$lete, tracea*le, and in accordance with international codes and standards) 4!65 In t.e same document; #%8! ascertainedE (Gi%en that the whole documentation currently a%aila*le was ex$loited and no additional finding can *e deri%ed from that material, the F7,C issues no further re8uirement on this to$ic.) Im %a! 2013; the topic is not *entioned in the #inal Report =14> an6 *ore.

Xuestion 4'E 1<plain 6our different conclusions to the docu*entation. Xuestion 4,E 7hich acceptance reports of the indi&idual shells and the entire RPV are a&aila?leT

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Results Report - Defects in the RPVs of Doel 2 and Tihan e 2

6.$.2

Contrad ctor! Documentat on

The #%8! suspected a confusion of *anufacturin docu*entation of the upper and lower core shell of the RPV of Doel $. The conference participants do a ree that in further in&esti ation of these possi?le interchan in is *eanin less and renounce to an6 further 3uestions. The conference participants re&iew this interchan e ?ut as further e&idence of the inade3uate 3ualit6 of the production docu*entation.

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Results Report - Defects in the RPVs of Doel 2 and Tihan e 2

6.&

'ecessar! cond t ons for restart ng

:n 201$ #%8! has linked the restart of the reactors to conditions. These are descri?ed in the su?chapters. The conference participants conclude that not all the necessar6 in&esti ations were carried out ?efore restart. :t is not understanda?le that these pro&es took place prior restart. % ain; it *ust ?e noted that this is not a conser&ati&e approach. 6.&.1 Pre/arator! 8or4 of t.e O/erator

The operator 1lectra?el has pre-defined li*itin conditions for the continued operation of the reactors =14>E

For Doel # and Tihange 2, the licensee has reduced the authori9ed heat:u$ and cool: down gradients during start:u$ and shut:down o$erations. 7ccording to the licensee, this will further reduce the thermal and $ressure loadings on the reactor $ressure %essels during normal o$eration. For Doel #, the licensee im$lemented a $ermanent $reheating of the safety in;ection water reser%oirs to #!<C. 7ll o$erators of the Doel # and Tihange 2 reactor units had a refresher training session on the full sco$e simulator. 7n extended *riefing will *e gi%en to all shift $ersonnel a*out the start:u$ and changes in the o$erational $arameters and s$ecifications.

These reductions of loads are conditions for the calculations for the proof of the structural inte rit6 of the RPV. Xuestion 4"E 7ould an on oin operation of the reactors ha&e ?een possi?le durin the entire calculated lifespan e&en without the a?o&e *entioned reductions of loadsT 6.&.2 +e#u rements of "*'C

'.-.2.1 % co*plete reactor-inspection after an6 si nificant de&iation fro* the nor*al operation %part fro* the re3uire*ents for the restart of the plant 0Re3uire*ents 1 - 1'2 and the operator\s preconditions; #%8! additionall6 re3uired that a co*plete check of the reactor *ust ?e *ade on an6 si n of a si nificant de&iation fro* nor*al operation =14>E

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Results Report - Defects in the RPVs of Doel 2 and Tihan e 2

7s an additional $recautionary measure, whene%er a se%ere transient occurs during the future o$eration of the Tihange 2 and Doel # reactor units .such as an effecti%e safety in;ection in the reactor coolant system during $ower o$eration1, an additional in:ser%ice ins$ection of the reactor $ressure %essel is re8uired to detect a $otential e%olution of the flaw indications *efore the reactor unit will *e allowed to resume its o$eration after this transient.

4ased on this re3uire*ent it *ust ?e assu*ed that e&en #%8! fears that the reactor pressure &essels cannot ade3uatel6 withstand pressures; that are to ?e e<pected. Xuestion 4/E 1<plain what 6ou understand as Bse&ere transientBT '.-.2.2 #%8! Re3uire*ents 1 9 1' The #%8! re3uire*ents appl6 to three different periods of ti*eE

Measures prior to the restart 0to Ma6 201$2 Measures durin on- oin reactor operation Measures durin the ne<t re&ision and e<chan e of fuel asse*?lies

:n the BPro&isional ReportB of Januar6 201$ =04>; #%8! *ade the restart of the reactors dependent on certain re3uire*ents. These re3uire*ents were listed a ain in the B#inal ReportD of Ma6 201$ =14> and nu*?ered as descri?ed ?elow 0pa e $,2. Gerein i nored were the de*ands *ade ?6 the international e<pert re&iew ?oard 0:1R42 E

Ycontinuin a neutron fluence reduction pro ra* to *ini*i)e further *aterial e*?rittle*ent until clarification is achie&ed on the other issues.B =04> Y:n &iew of the potentiall6 lar e increase in RT 8DT that *a6 ?e re&ealed ?6 the tests Aust descri?ed; the 4oard reco**ends that ?efore restart; a sensiti&it6 stud6 ?e perfor*ed usin a RT8DT shift up to 100 @! 0instead of -0 @! used in the current calculations2 to take into account the uncertain effect of the se re ation of che*ical i*purities and other uncertain effects. :t is the 4oard\s &iew the successful outco*e of such a sensiti&it6 anal6sis pro&ides assurance of the continued operatin safet6 of these reactors while the necessar6 e<peri*ents are ?ein conducted.B =04> 0#or details see pa e 242

#urther the participants of the conference note;

that the e&idence of the e<istence of a co*plete *anufacturin docu*entation has to ?e a *andator6 condition for the appro&al of the restart. +uch a re3uire*ent has not ?een de*anded ?6 #%8!.

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Results Report - Defects in the RPVs of Doel 2 and Tihan e 2

Xuestion -0E 7h6 has a Yneutron fluence reduction pro ra*B not ?een de*andedT Xuestion -1E 7h6 has a YRT8DT shift up to 100 @!D not ?een de*andedT Xuestion -2E 7h6 has a co*plete *anufacturin docu*entation not ?een de*andedT &e'uirements prior to t(e restart This section co&ers the Re3uire*ents 1; 2; $; 4; -; '; /; 10; 14; 1-; and 1'; see appendi< YRe3uire*ent of #%8! for restartin B; pa e 40. The #inal Report =14> onl6 *entions their Bsuccessful i*ple*entationD. 4ut it does not descri?e; how the operator\s successful e&idence was conducted. Xuestion -$E Pro&ide details of this Bsuccessful i*ple*entationD; includin 6our reasons for acceptance. &e'uirements durin" on)"oin" reactor operation

This section co&ers the re3uire*ents ,; 11; 12; and 1$; see appendi< Requirement of
FANC for restarting, page 40. FANC noticed a substantial amount of open questions. From the conference participants point of !ie" all these requirements# should ha!e been clarified before starting operation in $ai %0&'. (t "as therefore untenable to re)connect the plant to the net. *he procedure "as not in accordance "ith a conser!ati!e approach. Again it must be mentioned, that all information about e+perimental tests "ith non)representable probes must be re,ected. -ecause this missing representati!e the. can not achie!e reliable results. *herefore the. are not able to pro!e the structural integrit. of the R/0. Xuestion -4E .n which date ha&e these re3uire*ents ?een co*pletel6 fulfilledT Xuestion --E Pro&ide details for the fulfillin reasons for acceptance. of the indi&idual re3uire*ents. :ncludin 6our

&e'uirements durin" t(e next revision and exc(an"e of fue assem* ies *his section co!ers the Requirement 1, see appendi+ Requirement of FANC for restarting, page 40 %ccordin to a current research 01'.02.20142; the ne<t re&isions are planned as followsE

Doel $ - %2.04. ) '0.03.%0&4 *ihange % ) '&.03. ) &&.04.%0&4

Xuestion -'E :s the successful i*ple*entation and pu?lication of the re3uire*ent " one of the preconditions for a renewed re-start of the two reactorsT

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Results Report - Defects in the RPVs of Doel 2 and Tihan e 2

( *//end ,
(.1 )uest ons to "*'C

Xuestion 1E 7hich assu*ptions in the reports of 1lectra?el are ?ased on F?est esti*ateF assu*ptionsT Please list these in detail.SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS14 Xuestion 2E Gow hi h is the inaccurac6 in the deter*ination of the radial co*ponent of the defectsTSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS1, Xuestion $E Gow hi h is the pro?a?ilit6 that hidden defects are not detectedTSSSSSSSSSSSS1, Xuestion 4E 7h6 do 6ou consider a cali?ration of HT on ?asis of the ?lock V4$/-N1 as sufficientTSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS1, Xuestion -E Gow can the clai* of production-related ori in of the defects ?e *aintained e&en if durin production control no defects ha&e ?een found; althou h the techni3ue for detection was a&aila?le at that ti*e and was usedTSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS1" Xuestion 'E Gow can the h6dro en flakin ?e e<plained ?6 the G Z + concentration of the in otsTSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS1" Xuestion ,E 7hat is the ?ack round for the note on pa e 1' 0#%8!; #inal Report2 =14> that in the sa*ples with h6dro en flakes the car?on concentration is hi herTSSSSSSS1" Xuestion "E Gow can it ?e e<plained that onl6 shells of the RPVs of Doel $ and Tihan e 2 are affectedTSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS1" Xuestion /E Gow can it ?e e<plained that the defects occur onl6 at a certain depth fro* the inner surfaceTSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS1" Xuestion 10E Gow can it ?e e<plained that the defects are not e3uall6 distri?uted throu hout the &olu*eTSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS1/ Xuestion 11E %ccordin #%8! the pressure &essel would ha&e ?een reAected durin acceptance if affected with a defect densit6 found in 2012. Gow can it ?e that the disco&er6 of the defects in 2012 does not i**ediatel6 lead to the sa*e ar u*ent and an i**ediate and per*anent closure of the reactorsTSSSSSSSS1/ Xuestion 12E Gow can it ?e that for the de*onstration of the structural inte rit6 of the RPV non-representati&e sa*ples are used; neither co*para?le with respect to *anufacturin nor with respect to specifications 0%R1V% ?lock2TSSSSSSSSSSS20 Xuestion 1$E 7h6 are the no))le cuts considered as representati&e sa*plesT Do the6 contain a co*para?le defect densit6T :f not; then it is Aust sa*ple *aterial that

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Results Report - Defects in the RPVs of Doel 2 and Tihan e 2

would ?e assi ned to a defect-free re ion of the RPV; in which case the operational loads and the irradiation histor6 is still *issin .SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS20 Xuestion 14E 7hich desi n ?asis accidents and transients were used for the &erification of structural inte rit6TSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS21 Xuestion 1-E 7hich desi n ?asis accidents and transients ha&e ?een calculated e<plicitl6TS 21 Xuestion 1'E 7h6 are the selected transients loads are li*itin TSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS21 Xuestion 1,E 7hich pressure and ther*al shock loads under nor*al and desi n ?asis accidents 0D4%s2 were used in the anal6sis.SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS21 Xuestion 1"E 7hich ther*al h6draulic *odels and co*puter codes were used to enerate ther*al loads.SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS21 Xuestion 1/E Does a calculation e<ist for the a<iall6 s6**etrical and the as6**etrical load 0plu*e effect2 0cold ton ues2TSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS22 Xuestion 20E 7hich earth3uake was chosen 0pro?a?ilit6 and i*pact2TSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS22 Xuestion 21E 7hich *ethods for the earth3uake-calculations were carried outTSSSSSSSSSS22 Xuestion 22E 7as the *ethod BPaleoseis*olo 6D applied at allTSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS22 Xuestion 2$E 7ere desi n ?asis incidents considered durin downti*e; tooTSSSSSSSSSSSS22 Xuestion 24E :t was asked for earth3uake loads in chapter '.2.1.2. 7ere these loads also considered for plant shutdownTSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS2$ Xuestion 2-E Gow can it ?e that in the case of such a lar e nu*?er of supposedl6 *anufacturin induced defects which should ha&e led 0in accordance with the criteria for acceptance2 to a reAection of the co*ponent; the safet6 of the co*ponent is now de*onstrated usin non-&alidated co*putational *ethodsT SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS2$ Xuestion 2'E 7hich e<peri*ental &alidation of the *ethod e<istTSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS2$ Xuestion 2,E 7hich *aterial was used for possi?le test ?lockTSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS2$ Xuestion 2"E Gow was the nu*?er of defects si*ulatedTSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS2$ Xuestion 2/E Gow was the spatial distri?ution of the defects; as o?ser&ed in the real co*ponent si*ulated in the test ?lockTSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS2$ Xuestion $0E Gow is the une<plained nature of the defects in the real co*ponent in the test ?lock consideredTSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS2$ Xuestion $1E Please show the fracture *echanics calculations that de*onstrate that the inte rit6 of the RPV is i&en for all desi n ?asis accidents; statin the scientific sources.SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS2$

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Results Report - Defects in the RPVs of Doel 2 and Tihan e 2

Xuestion $2E Pro&ide co*parisons of crack propa ation predictions fro* the B5roupin ModelD with the appropriate e<peri*ental data.SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS2$ Xuestion $$E Gow does the 5roupin Model accounts for interaction ?etween fati ue and e*?rittle*entTSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS24 Xuestion $4E 7hich uncertainties in the input data used to calculatin crack propa ation are assu*edTSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS24 Xuestion $-E Gow does uncertainties in crack depth *easure*ents affect crack rowth predictionsTSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS24 Xuestion $'E Gas a sensiti&it6 stud6 on the effect of crack si)e; stress and reduction in fracture tou hness on RPV failure risk ?e perfor*edTSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS24 Xuestion $,E 7hat ?eca*e out of the de*and of the :1R4 to carr6 out a sensiti&it6 anal6sis and wh6 was it not included in the #inal Report an6*oreTSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS24 Xuestion $"E Gas the proposal of :1R4 to use 100 @! instead of the ?6 1lectra?el additionall6 proposed -0 @! to co&er the possi?le radiation effects in sensiti&it6 anal6ses; not i*ple*ented ?ecause this would i**ediatel6 lead to an e<ceedin of the li*it &alue of the RT8DT of 1$2 @!TSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS24 Xuestion $/E :f accordin to 1lectra?el 2- @! of the -0 @! shift should co&er the tou hness decrease ?6 e<istin h6dro en flakes 0these are data fro* non-representati&e sa*ples2 and additional 1, @! co&ers e*?rittle*ent and *acro-se re ation; where is a safet6 *ar in for co&erin the uncertaint6 of irradiation effect on h6dro en flakesTSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS2Xuestion 40E 7h6 does the licensee clai*s to perfor* a F&er6 conser&ati&eF approach; althou h the used RT8DT &alues are not calculated usin the #:+ for*ula ?ut are replaced ?6 less conser&ati&e &alues fro* the sur&eillance pro ra*TSSSS2Xuestion 41E 7hich effect ha&e the o?ser&ed RPV defects on the !D#; at the Doel $ and Tihan e 2 plants. +pecif6 the calculated !D#s ?efore and after the disco&er6 of the defects.SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS2, Xuestion 42E Discuss how the calculated chan e in !D# 0delta !D#2 leads to the conclusion that plant operation with a de raded RPV does not co*pro*ise pu?lic safet6.S 2, Xuestion 4$E Discuss the *odels that were used to calculate the delta !D#. The discussion does not ha&e to ?e &er6 detailed and e<hausti&e ?ut it should pro&ide sufficient infor*ation so that the reader can assess the &alidit6 of the conclusion re ardin plant safet6. #or e<a*ple; *odel description should include at the *ini*u*ESSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS2, Xuestion 44E Present a sensiti&it6 stud6 showin the sensiti&it6 of delta !D# to the a?o&e listed uncertainties.SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS2,
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Results Report - Defects in the RPVs of Doel 2 and Tihan e 2

Xuestion 4-E +how how the *iti atin actions taken ?6 the licensee 0e. reduction in the se&erit6 of start up and shutdown transients2 reduce the delta !D#.SSSSSSSSS2, Xuestion 4'E 1<plain 6our different conclusions to the docu*entation.SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS2" Xuestion 4,E 7hich acceptance reports of the indi&idual shells and the entire RPV are a&aila?leTSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS2" Xuestion 4"E 7ould an on oin operation of the reactors ha&e ?een possi?le durin the entire calculated lifespan e&en without the a?o&e *entioned reductions of loadsTSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS$0 Xuestion 4/E 1<plain what 6ou understand as Bse&ere transientBTSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS$1 Xuestion -0E 7h6 has a Yneutron fluence reduction pro ra*B not ?een de*andedTSSSSSSS$2 Xuestion -1E 7h6 has a YRT8DT shift up to 100 @!D not ?een de*andedTSSSSSSSSSSSSSS$2 Xuestion -2E 7h6 has a co*plete *anufacturin docu*entation not ?een de*andedTSSSS $2 Xuestion -$E Pro&ide details of this Bsuccessful i*ple*entationD; includin 6our reasons for acceptance.SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS$2 Xuestion -4E .n which date ha&e these re3uire*ents ?een co*pletel6 fulfilledTSSSSSSSSSS$2 Xuestion --E Pro&ide details for the fulfillin of the indi&idual re3uire*ents. :ncludin 6our reasons for acceptance.SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS$2 Xuestion -'E :s the successful i*ple*entation and pu?lication of the re3uire*ent " one of the preconditions for a renewed re-start of the two reactorsTSSSSSSSSSSSSSS$2

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Results Report - Defects in the RPVs of Doel 2 and Tihan e 2

(.2

+e#u rement of "*'C for restart ng

+u?se3uentl6; all the re3uire*ents and the ti*in of their pro&ision are listed; that #%8! has placed at the further operation of the two reactors =14>. 'o. Descr /t on 9nt l ?efore restart

1 !(%D :8T1R#%!1 :MP1R#1!T:.8+E The licensee shall re-anal6)e the 1%R ac3uisition data for Tihan e 2 in the depth ran e fro* 0 to 1** in the )ones with h6dro en flakes to confir* whether or not so*e of these technolo ical claddin defects ha&e to ?e considered as h6dro en flakes. 2 8.8-:8+P1!T%4(1 %R1%+E The licensee shall de*onstrate that no critical h6dro en flake t6pe defects are e<pected in the non-inspecta?le areas. $ :D18T:#:!%T:.8 .# P.T18T:%((R H8R1P.RT1D G:5G1R T:(T1D #(%7+E The licensee shall de*onstrate that the applied ultrasonic testin procedure allows the detection of the hi her tilt defects in the Doel $NTihan e 2 data 02012 inspections2 with a hi h le&el of confidence. 4 :8D:!%T:.8+ 7:TG 4-@T +G1%R 7%V1 R1+P.8+1E The licensee shall present the detailed report of all *acro raphical e<a*inations includin the sa*ple with the 4-@T reflections and shall also anal6)e and report additional sa*ples with 4-@T reflecti&it6. - P%RT:%((R G:DD18 :8D:!%T:.8+E The licensee shall include a set of defects partiall6 hidden ?6 other defects for *acro raphic e<a*ination; to confir* whether the si)in *ethod continues to function well. ' :8!(:8%T:.8 .# #(%7+ D1T1!T1D 4R H(TR%+.8:! T1+T:85E The licensee shall re-anal6)e the tilts of the defects in the V4-$/-N1 ?lock with the sa*e *ethod as applied on-site.

?efore restart

?efore restart

?efore restart

?efore restart

?efore restart

, #H(( XH%(:#:!%T:.8E %s soon as possi?le after the restart of ?oth %+%P after reactor unitsE The licensee shall achie&e a full 3ualification pro ra* to Restart de*onstrate the suita?ilit6 of the in-ser&ice inspection techni3ue for the present case. The 3ualification shall i&e sufficient confidence in the accurac6 of the results with respect to the nu*?er and features 0location; si)e; orientation]2 of the flaw indications. 7here appropriate; the process shall ?e su?stantiated ?6 appropriate e<peri*ental data usin representati&e speci*ens. The full 3ualification pro ra* shall ?e

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Results Report - Defects in the RPVs of Doel 2 and Tihan e 2

'o.

Descr /t on achie&ed ?efore the ne<t planned outa e for refuellin .

9nt l

" #.((.7-HP :8-+1RV:!1 :8+P1!T:.8+E %fter the restart of ?oth Durin the reactor units; the licensee shall perfor* follow-up in-ser&ice inspections ne<t durin the ne<t planned outa e for refuellin to ensure that no e&olution planned of the flaw indications has occurred durin operation. outa e for refuellin / % D D : T : . 8 % ( ! G % R % ! T 1 R : L %T : . 8 . # T G 1 M %T 1 R : % ( M1!G%8:!%( PR.P1RT:1+E The licensee shall co*plete the *aterial testin pro ra* usin sa*ples with *acro-se re ations containin h6dro en flakes. This e<peri*ental pro ra* shall includeE

?efore restart

s*all-scale speci*en testsE

local tou hness tests at h6dro en flake crack tip; local tensile tests on li a*ent *aterial near the flakesM

lar e-scale 0tensile2 speci*en tests ?efore restart

10 R1+:DH%( GRDR.518E The licensee shall perfor* additional *easure*ents of the current residual h6dro en content in speci*ens with h6dro en flakes; in order to confir* the results of the li*ited nu*?er of tests achie&ed so far. #or e<a*ple; the licensee has esti*ated an upper ?ound on the a*ount of residual h6dro en that *i ht still ?e present in the flaws. The licensee shall de*onstrate that the chosen *aterial properties are still &alid; e&en if the upper ?ound 3uantit6 of h6dro en would still ?e present in critical flaws.

11 :RR%D:%T:.8 PR.P1RT:1+E % further e<peri*ental pro ra* to stud6 %+%P after the *aterial properties of irradiated speci*ens containin h6dro en Restart flakes shall ?e ela?orated ?6 the licensee. 12 (.!%( M:!R.+!%(1 PR.P1RT:1+E The licensee shall further %+%P after in&esti ate e<peri*entall6 the local 0*icro-scale2 *aterial properties of Restart speci*ens with *acro-se re ations; host lines and h6dro en flakes 0for e<a*ple local che*ical co*position2. Dependin on these results; the effect of the co*position on the local *echanical properties 0i.e. fracture tou hness2 shall ?e 3uantified. 1$ TG1RM%( %51:85E The licensee shall further e&aluate the effect of %+%P after ther*al a ein of the )one with *acro-se re ation. Restart

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Results Report - Defects in the RPVs of Doel 2 and Tihan e 2

'o.

Descr /t on

9nt l ?efore restart

14 +18+:T:V:TR +THDR .# G:5G1R T:(T1D #(%7+E The licensee shall e&aluate the i*pact of the possi?le non-reportin of flaws with hi her tilts on the results of the structural inte rit6 assess*ent 0takin into account the results of the actions related to the pre&ious re3uire*ent on the detection of the hi her tilt defects durin in-ser&ice-inspections2. 1- (%R51 +!%(1 V%(:D%T:.8 T1+T+ E The licensee shall co*plete the on- oin *aterial testin pro ra* ?6 testin lar er speci*ens containin h6dro en flakes; with the followin 2 o?Aecti&esE

?efore restart

.?Aecti&e 1E Tensile tests on sa*ples with 0inclined2 *ultiple h6dro en flake defects; which shall in particular de*onstrate that the *aterial has sufficient ductilit6 and load ?earin capacit6; and that there is no pre*ature ?rittle fracture. .?Aecti&e 2E %n e<peri*ental confir*ation of the suita?ilit6 and conser&atis* of the $D finite ele*ents anal6sis. ?efore restart

1' (.%D T1+T+E :n addition to the actions proposed ?6 the licensee and the additional re3uire*ents specified ?6 the #%8! in the pre&ious sections; the licensee shall; as a prere3uisite to the restart of ?oth reactor units; perfor* a load test of ?oth reactor pressure &essels. The o?Aecti&e of the load test is not to &alidate the anal6tical de*onstration on the reactor pressure &essel itself ?ut to de*onstrate that no une<pected condition is present in the reactor pressure &essels. The *ethodolo 6 and associated tests 0acoustic e*ission and ultrasonic testin ...2 will ?e defined ?6 the licensee and su?*itted to the nuclear safet6 authorit6 for appro&al. The acceptance criterion will ?e that no crack initiation and no crack propa ation are recorded under the pressure loadin .

Ta?le 1 - Re3uire*ents of #%8! for restartin of Doel $ and Tihan e 2

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Results Report - Defects in the RPVs of Doel 2 and Tihan e 2

(.3

Source D rector!

=01> #law indications in the reactor pressure &essel of Doel $; #%8!; +epte*?er 2012 =02> #law indications in the reactor pressure &essels of Doel $ ^ Tihan e 2; #%8!; .cto?er 2012 =0$> #law indications in the reactor pressure &essels of Doel $ and Tihan e 2 - Technical infor*ation note; #%8!; #e?ruar6 201$ =04> Report on independent anal6sis and ad&ice re ardin the safet6 case - Doel $ Reactor Pressure Vessel %ssess*ent; :nternational 1<pert Re&iew 4oard; Ma6 201$ =0-> Doel $ - Tihan e 2 RPV issue - #inal Report; :nternational 1<pert Re&iew 4oard; Januar6 201$ =0'> Report of the 8ational +cientific 1<pert 5roup on the RPVD$T2; 8ational +cientific 1<pert 5roup; Januar6 201$ =0,> Doel $ N Tihan e 2 9 Justification of the Reactor Pressure Vessel 0RPV2 shell; %:4VinVotte; Januar6 201$ =0"> +afet6 1&aluation Report 9 #law indication in the RPV of Doel $ and Tihan 2; 4el V; Januar6 201$ =0/> +afet6 !ase ReportE Doel $ - Reactor Pressure Vessel %ssess*ent; 1lectra?el; Dece*?er 2012 =10> Report on independent anal6sis and ad&ice re ardin the safet6 case - Doel $ Reactor Pressure Vessel %ssess*ent; 1lectra?el; Dece*?er 2012 =11> +afet6 !ase ReportE Tihan e 2 - Reactor Pressure Vessel %ssess*ent; 1lectra?el; Dece*?er 2012 =12> Report on independent anal6sis and ad&ice re ardin the safet6 case - Tihan e 2 Reactor Pressure Vessel %ssess*ent; 1lectra?el; Dece*?er 2012 =14> Doel $ and Tihan e 2 reactor pressure &esselsE #inal e&aluation report; #%8!; Ma6 201$ =1-> Report of the 8ational +cientific 1<pert 5roup on the RPV Doel $; 8ational +cientific 1<pert 5roup; Ma6 201$ =1'> Report of the 8ational +cientific 1<pert 5roup on the RPV Tihan e 2; 8ational +cientific 1<pert 5roup; %pril 201$ =1,> Doel $ 9 :+: 2012 9 Justification of the Reactor Pressure Vessel 0RPV2 shell; %:4VinVotte; Ma6 201$

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Results Report - Defects in the RPVs of Doel 2 and Tihan e 2

=1"> Tihan e 2 9 :+: 2012 9 Justification of the Reactor Pressure Vessel 0RPV2 shell; %:4VinVotte; Ma6 201$ =1/> +afet6 1&aluation Report - #law indications in the RPVIs of Doel $ and Tihan e 2; 4el V; Ma6 201$ =20> +afet6 case report - %ddendu*E Doel $ - Reactor Pressure Vessel %ssess*ent; 1lectra?el; %pril 201$ =21> +afet6 case report - %ddendu*E Tihan e 2 - Reactor Pressure Vessel %ssess*ent; 1lectra?el; %pril 201$ =22> Report on independent anal6sis and ad&ice re ardin the safet6 case addendu* - Doel $ Reactor Pressure Vessel %ssess*ent; 1lectra?el; %pril 201$ =2$> Report on independent anal6sis and ad&ice re ardin the safet6 case addendu* Tihan e 2 Reactor Pressure Vessel %ssess*ent; 1lectra?el; %pril 201$ =2"> #%8! e<perts i&e positi&e opinion on restart Doel $ ^ Tihan e 2 reactor units ; #%8!; Ma6 201$ =2/> :n 1/,/ al scheurtAes in Doel $; De Mor en; %u ust 2012 =$0> Vor espannte 5u_-Druck?eh`lter 0V5D2 als ?erstsichere Druck?eh`lter fCr inno&ati&e %nwendun en in der Kerntechnik; 7. #rPhlin et al.; +chriften des #orschun s)entru*s JClich; Reihe 1ner ietechnik 4d. 14; 2000 =$0> Hntersuchun en)u* 8ichtleistun s?etrie? &on /00 M7 und 1$00 M7 +tandardD7R; 1lectricitQ de #rance; 1//0

Pa e 41 of 42

Results Report - Defects in the RPVs of Doel 2 and Tihan e 2

(.$

Inde,
8PP 4 paleoseis*olo 6 22 radiation sur&eillance pro ra* 1$ RPV 4 sur&eillance pro ra* 2transients 21 underclad crackin 1'

%+M1 11 4est 1sti*ate 1$ 4PV! 11 desi n ?asis accidents 21 earth3uake 22 #%8! 4 :1R4 -; ,; 11; 24

Pa e 42 of 42