has given absolutely no reason to think that the Court’s order constituted reversible error even if itwere reviewable.
The order is not appealable, as the State apparently recognizes.
The State does not say, in its motion, what part or parts of the April 10 order it is complainingabout. But no part of the order is presently appealable; and the best inference is that the Staterealizes this.The type of issues that the State can appeal before trial, in a criminal case, are strictly limitedunder A
P. 15.7(a). The only one that is even in the ballpark of this case, at this point,is Rule 15.7(a)(1): pretrial orders “(1) suppressing a confession or admission or other evidence.” The State cannot appeal an
order that declines to exclude evidence, or that indicates thatevidence will be admitted. And the State can appeal a suppression order only if the State “certifiesto the Court of Criminal Appeals that the appeal is not brought for the purpose of delay and that theorder, if not reversed on appeal, will be fatal to the prosecution of the charge.” Rule 15.7(a).The State has not identified any part of the April 10 order that comes within Rule 15.7(a),and that, if not reversed, will be fatal to the prosecution of the charge. If the State is displeased bythe Court’s ruling on the State’s motion
regarding custom evidence (April 10 order, pp. 2-3), that does not come within Rule 15.7(a)(1); it does not suppress evidence. If the State isdispleased with the Court’s ruling in section A of the Court’s discussion of Barron’s motion
(April 10 order, p. 3), the State cannot honestly certify that such order will be fatal to the prosecutionof any charge against Barron (even if that order constitutes an order “suppressing” evidence under Rule 15.7(a)(1)).2