The Terrost Mind

The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches Author(s): Jeff Victoroff Reviewed work(s): Source:
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The Mind of the Terrorist

A REVIEW AND CRITIQUE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACHES
JEFFVICTOROFF
Departmentof Neurologyand Psychiatry Universityof SouthernCaliforniaSchool of Medicine
the psychology of terrorThis articlereviewsthe stateof the artof availabletheoriesanddataregarding ism. Dataandtheoreticalmaterialwere gatheredfrom the world'sunclassifiedliterature. Multipletheories andsome demographic datahave been published,butvery few controlledempiricalstudieshave been conductedinvestigatingthe psychological bases of terrorism. The field is largelycharacterized by theoretical of anecdotalobservations. Moreover,most studiesandtheospeculationbased on subjectiveinterpretation Manypractical, of terrorists. ries fail to takeintoaccountthe greatheterogeneity conceptual,andpsychological barriers have slowed progressin this important field. Nonetheless,even at this early stage of terrorism reportssuggestthatmodifiablesocial andpsychologicalfactorscontribute to the genestudies,preliminary couldpossibly mitigatetheriskof catastrophic mind-set.Psychologicalscholarship attack sis of the terrorist mentalities. by initiatingthe long overduescientific study of terrorist Keywords: terrorism;terrorist; psychiatry;psychology;sociology; homelandsecurity
Terrorism has surelyexisted since before the dawn of recordedhistory(Merariand

Friedland 1985). Human nature has not changed. However, three interlocking trends have significantly changed the nature and degree of the threat: the globalization of commerce, travel, and information transfer, which puts economic disparities and ideological competition in sharp relief and facilitates cooperative aggression by far-flung but like-minded conspirators; the ascent of religious fundamentalism as an aggrieved competitor with the market-economic, democratic, and secular trends of modernity; and the privatization of weapons of mass destruction, putting the potential of macroterrorist acts into the hands of small groups or even individuals (Hoffman 1998; Laqueur 1999; Enders and Sandler 2000). September 11, 2001, is one result-and
2002). It perhapswould not be an probablya warningof events to come (Gunaratna

exaggeration to state that these fast-evolving trends together constitute a clear and present danger to the security of civilization (Stern 1999).
in partby a grantfrom the FreyaFoundation AUTHOR'SNOTE:This work was supported for Brain, Behavior,andSociety.I gratefullyacknowledgecriticalreviewsof this manuscript by JessicaSternandTodd Sandler. a revisionof a lecturefirstpresentedat the annualmeetingof the AmericanNeuropsyItrepresents chiatricAssociation, San Diego, California,March2002. Addressreprintrequeststo victorof@usc.edu. Vol. JOURNAL 20053-42 OFCONFLICT RESOLUTION, 49 No. 1, February
DOI: 10.1177/0022002704272040
2005 Sage Publications
JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION
for the scholarlydisciplinesof psychology andpsychiaIt would seem appropriate try to bringtheirintellectualresourcesto bearon the politicalproblemof terrorism, a Apartfroma problemthat-stripped to thebasics-is one of atypicalhumanbehavior. drive for truth,political psychological theory advises that the better a targetgroup the roots of the terrorist understands mind-set,the betterthatgroupmay developpolicies to effectively manage the risk (Wardlaw1989; Clayton, Barlow, and BallifSpanvill1998). Despitethe compellingneedfor suchan understanding, manytheoretical andpracticalimpedimentshave delayed,andperhapseven derailed,the objective scientific psychological study of terrorism(Reich 1998; Horgan2003). Indeed, the following questionmust be asked:to what degreeare leadingpsychologicaltheories of terrorismsupportedby valid concepts and objective research?A comprehensive review of the literature suggests that a lack of systematicscholarlyinvestigationhas left policy makersto design counterterrorism strategieswithout the benefit of facts behavior-or, worse, guidedby theoreticalpresumpregarding the origin of terrorist tions couched as facts. Investigatingthe terroristmind may be a necessaryfirst step towardactualizingmodernpolitical psychology's potentialfor uncoveringthe bases aggressionand designing an optimumcounterterrorism policy. of terrorist Information for this articlewas derivedfrom a review of the unclassifiedliterature on psychosocial aspects of terrorism,including peer-reviewedarticles, books and book chapters,news reports,and personalcommunicationswith terrorismexperts. Scholarlyarticleswere identifiedby a searchfor the term terrorismin the following databases:PsychINFO (1887-2003), Sociological Abstracts(1974-2003), Medline (1966-2003), andLexis-NexisAcademicUniverse(1980-2003), as well as frombibliographiesof the identifiedarticles.This articlecriticallyreviewspublishedtheoriesof the psychologicalbases of terrorism, reviewsthe psychosocialdatadescribingterrorists, defines the limits of andimpediments to inquiryin this field, andoffers a preliminarypolitical-psychologicalclassificationof terrorism.
DEFINITION AND DIMENSIONS OF TERRORIST BEHAVIOR Schmid (1983) compiled 109 academic definitionsof terrorism,suggesting that there are roughly as many availabledefinitionsas there are publishedexpertsin the field. The lack of consensusis to some extentinescapable,given the heterogeneityof terrorist behaviors,the varietyof declaredor assumedmotivations,andthe questionof of is anotherman'sfreedomfighter"probpoint view, a.k.a.,the "oneman'sterrorist Hoffman 1982; 1998). (Jenkins Nonetheless, two common elements are usually lem in contemporary found involvesaggressionagainstnondefinitions:(1) thatterrorism in to and that action combatants (2) the terrorist itself is not expectedby its perpetrator influence accomplisha political goal but insteadto a targetaudienceand changethat (Badey 1998; audience'sbehaviorin a way thatwill servethe interestsof the terrorist Laqueur1999). is complex and controversial The typology of terrorism since actorscan be characterizedacross multiplevariables.Schultz (1980) proposedseven such variables-
Victoroff/ THEMIND OF THETERRORIST 5
TABLE 1
Dimensions of Terrorism
Variable number Perpetrator Sponsorship Relationto authority Locale Militarystatus Spiritualmotivation Financialmotivation Political ideology Hierarchical role Willingnessto die Target Methodology Classification Individualvs. group State vs. substatevs. individual vs. pro-state/pro-establishment Anti-state/anti-establishment/separatist vs. transnational Intrastate Civilian vs. paramilitary or military Secularvs. religious Idealisticvs. entrepreneurial Leftist/socialistvs. rightist/fascist vs. anarchist Sponsorvs. leaderversusmiddle management vs. follower Suicidal vs. nonsuicidal Property(includingdata)vs. individualsvs. masses of people Bombing, assassination,kidnapping/hostage taking,mass poisoning, cyberterrorism) rape,other (e.g., bioterrorism,
causes, environment,goals, strategy,means, organization,and participation-that might be specified for revolutionary versus subrevolutionary terrorism.Post (2004) terrorism, usefully dividedpoliticalsubstateterrorism into (1) social revolutionary (2) right-wingterrorism,(3) nationalist-separatist terrorism,(4) religious extremistterproposingthat each type rorism,and (5) single-issue (e.g., animalrights) terrorism, tends to be associatedwith its own social-psychologicaldynamics.A more comprehensive typology is shown in Table 1, listing variablessubjectto analysis and classificationswithin those variables. Any such typology mustbe considereda heuristiccompendiumof ideal types, and classes shouldnot necessarilybe construedas dichotomous.Forexample,while many instances of collective violence unequivocallymeet the criteriafor state terrorism (e.g., the gassing of Iraqi civilians in Halabja),the distinction between state and substateterrorism paramilitary death can be blurred,as in the case of pro-government squadsin SouthAfrica or Columbia(Hoffman1998; Stern 1999). It is an open questype of mind is disproportionately associatedwith a given tion whethera particular politicalcategoryof terrorism. Yetanother challengeto anypsychologicalinquiryinto the "mindof the terrorist" organigroupstypicallyexhibithierarchical is thatterrorist zation, with variousroles assumedwithin each level of thathierarchy(see Figure 1). Each position on such a matrixmay attractindividualswith differentpredispositions who perhapsplay theirroles because of profoundlydifferentpsychological factors. One might postulate, for example, that some leaders are more likely to be selfimaginedidealistsor altruists,othersaredrivenby messianicdelusions,othersby ethambitions-a point thatseems nic or religious animus,and othersby entrepreneurial when we intuit, the of for example, differences psychic attributes clear likely separating the three convicted terroristleaders Shoko Asahara, Abu Nidal, and Nelson Mandela.Of course, roles may blur dependingon the type of the group and its size. mightplay extremelydifferNonetheless,since individualsof differenttemperaments
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-Sponsor
Leader
Executive
Committee
Middle Manage ment

Strategist/ technocrat
Follower
Lone
Wolf
State authority figure Substate group sponsor
Selfimagined idealist Selfimagined messianic
Political policy maker Military policy maker
Foot soldier/ action perpetrator
Recruiter
Technician
Individual Ethnic or financial religious contributor animusdriven EntrepreneurI
Trainer/ dispatcher Supplier/ armorer
Researcher/ surveyor errand runner Transporter/ harborer
Sympathizer/ fellow traveler Figure 1: Roles and Types within TerroristHierarchies

NOTE:Mostterrorists, belongto groupsexhibdependingon the politicalcategoryandsize of organization, iting some or all of the hierarchical levels of authority depictedhere.The exceptionis the Lone Wolf (e.g., actingin isolation.Role or responsibility withineach level of authority TheodoreKaczynski)-a terrorist is probablydeterminedin partby self-selection. Levels and roles may blurin application.Note thatthe proa heuristiclist of ideal types based on a review of posed typology of leadersis theoreticalandpreliminary, multiple sources. The self-imagined idealist leader (e.g., Menachim Begin, Ulrike Meinhof, Nelson Mandela,andpossibly Usamabin Laden)commitshis life to a goal he imaginesas a moralnecessity,calling for a strategictriumph he claims to engineeraltruistically. The self-imaginedmessianicleader(e.g., Adolph Hitler,DavidKoresh,ShokoAsahara, andpossibly some Islamicextremistimams)regards himselfas a guru Many destinedto fulfill a uniqueplace in historyin which strategictriumph equatesto personalascendancy. leaders,especially those promotingviolence against all out-groupmembers(e.g., perhapsYasserArafat, SlobodanMilosevic, variousProvisionalIrishRepublicanArmy (PIRA)leaders,and possibly Usamabin Laden),may be primarilydrivenby ethnic or religious animusthatoverridesidealistic or messianic aims. The entrepreneurial andleadersof the Abu Sayyaf group)may leader(e.g., AbuNidal, "Carlosthe Jackal," justify his actionsaccordingto one of the othertypes butis primarily by shallow,materialist circumscribed drives.
ent parts in a terroristgroup, any empirical study claiming to characterize"the might be very misleading if it fails to stratifyits findings psychology of terrorists" accordingto level and role. for a psychologicalanalysis,it seems reasonablethattheremay be Most important heterogeneity in the temperaments,ideologies, thought processes, and cognitive
Victoroff/ THEMIND OF THE TERRORIST 7
withinpoliticalcategories,hierarchical levels, androles (Taylor capacitiesof terrorists it Thus, 1988; is Reich 1998). andRyan essentialto acknowledgefrom the outsetthat any effort to uncover the "terrorist mind" will more likely result in uncovering a spectrumof terrorist minds.
PSYCHOSOCIAL DATADESCRIBING TERRORISTS Demographicstudiesfromthe 1960s and 1970s constructed a profileof the typical terrorist as a well-educatedsingle male in his mid-twentiesfroma middle-classbackground(see Table2). Forinstance,in a 1976 studyof eighteengroups,averageages of membersrangedfrom 23.2 to 31.3. Most identified/convicted terroristscame from backgrounds, middle- or upper-middle-class and the majorityhad some college education(RussellandMiller 1983). These findingsaresimilarto those froma contemporaneousstudy of 48 Euzkadita Askatasuna(ETA) members(Clark 1983). Handler and socioeconomic betweenpolitical orientation (1990) investigatedthe relationship (FBI) Investigation interviewdata on rightfactorsby tabulatingFederalBureauof and left-wing terroristsactive in the United States duringthe 1960s and 1970s. He thatwomenrepresented of left- thanright-wingterreported a muchlargerproportion rorists(46.2 vs. 11.2 percent),college completion was much more common among left- than right-wing terrorists(67.6 vs. 19.0 percent), blue-collar occupation was (74.8 vs. 24.3 percent),andthere morefrequentamongright-thanleft-wingterrorists was a trendfor both left- andright-wingterrorists to achievelow- to medium-income levels even if they had college education.WeinbergandEubank's(1987) dataon 451 Italian women terroristsalso reveal a predominanceof those in their twenties, althoughthe majoritywereteachersor white-collarworkers.In a rarecontrolledstudy, Ferracuti andBruno 1981; see also Post 2004) comparedItalianRed (1982; Ferracuti Brigade terroristswith politically active controls, finding no notable differences in family backgrounds. Thependulumswung in the 1980s with the relativequiescenceof Americanterroranarchist-Marxist groups, and ist groups,the decimationof Europeanrevolutionary the risingworldprofileof radicalIslamicterrorists. The typicalPalestinianterrorist of thatlaterperiodwas age seventeento twenty-three, came from a largefamily with an and had low educationalachievement(Strentz1988). But background, impoverished the pendulumhas swung again. Middle Easternterrorists in the late 1990s and early range,includinguniversitystutwenty-firstcenturycome from a widerdemographic dents,professionals,marriedmen in theirlate forties, and young women (Rees et al. 2002). For example, the 9/11 pilots included the middle-aged,middle-class urban Attaandthe well-to-do ZiadJarrah, plannerMohammad a manfrom an affluentfamily who attendedChristianschools and enjoyed discos and beer (Carey2002; Laabs andMcDermott2003; Anonymous2004). The most recentdevelopment,the recruitmentof women as suicidebombers,arisesat least in partfromthe fact thatthe al-Aqsa Martyr'sBrigade-associated with YasserArafat'sFatah-is the first seculargroup fighting for Palestinianindependenceand thereforepermits females to participate (Rees et al. 2002; Wilkinson2002).
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TABLE2
ReportedDemographicsof Terrorists
Author(s)and Year Russell and Miller (1983) Subjects Age Social Class
Clark(1983) Weinbergand Eubank(1987)
Strentz(1988)
Strentz(1988) Handler(1990)
Hassan(2001)
Pedahzur, Perliger, andWeinberg (2003) Sageman(2004)
23.2-31.3 > 2/3 middle or uppermiddle class 350 membersof eighteen European,Middle Eastern, South American,and Japanese groups,active 19661976 28 percentlower;30 percent 48 ETA members,active 24 (avg.) middle 1970s 451 Italianwomen terrorists 60 percent 35 percentstudents,43 Terrorists: ages 20-29 percentwhite-collarworkersor teachers,and 7 percent"workers";fathersof subgroupof 27: 10 percentblue-collarworkers and 41 percentuppermiddle class Leader. Middle class U.S. domestic terrorists: 1960s and 1970s leftist 25-40; follower, groups(n, NA) 20-25 17-23 1980s Middle Easternter"Unskilledandunemployable" rorists(n, NA) Right wing: 74.8 percentblue161 right-wingand 119 left- NA active in wing terrorists collar workers,18.3 percent United States, 1960s-1970s white-collarworkers;left wing: 24.3 percentblue-collarworkers, 15 percentwhite-collarworkers 18-38 "Many" "Nearly250" Hamasor middle class Islamic Jihadmembers, 1996-1999 24.5 (avg.) Mean socioeconomic status 80 Palestiniansuicide (SES) = 5.97 (high SES = 1; terrorists low = 10) 102 Salafi Muslim terrorists 25.69 (avg. 18 percentupperclass, 55 percent age of middle class, and 27 percent from SaudiArabia,Egypt, lower class joining) France,Algeria, Morocco, and Indonesia
NOTE:NA = not available;ETA= Euzkadita Askatasuna.
A poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR)in 2001 among 1,357 adultsin the WestBankandGazatestedthe hypothesis
that poverty or low levels of education influence attitudes regarding political violence and found that support for terrorism against Israeli civilians was even more common among professionals than among laborers (43.3 vs. 34.6 percent) and more common among those with secondary education than among illiterate respondents (39.4 vs. 32.3 percent) (Krueger and Maleckova 2002). This is consistent with Sageman's (2004) finding that 94 of 132 (71 percent) of Muslim terrorists had at least some college education, and 57 of 134 (43 percent) were professionals, although his study is
biased towardleaders. More important,Kruegerand Maleckova(2002) also tested in political how economic status and educationcomparedwith actual participation violence: comparing129 Hezbollahfightersages fifteen to thirty-eightwho died in action between 1982 and 1994 with membersof the generalLebanesepopulationof the sameage range,the povertyratewas similar(28 percentamongfightersvs. 33 percent in the population),but fighterswere significantlymore likely to have attended secondaryschool (33 vs. 23 percent).These findings are not consistentwith theories tying political violence to povertyand lack of education(althougha critiqueof this conclusion is noted laterin the section on sociological theories). thansocioeconomicdata,althoughseveralproPsychologicaldataareeven sparser jects reported"typical"psychosocial characteristicsof terroristsin the 1970s and interviews,Americanpsychiatrist David Hubbard 1980s. On the basis of unstructured (1971) reportedfive traitsof skyjackers: (1) violent, often alcoholic father;(2) deeply religious mother; (3) sexually shy, timid, and passive; (4) younger sisters toward On the basis of actedprotectively; whomthe terrorist and(5) poor social achievement. primarily secondhandsourcematerial right-wing regarding terrora subsampleof 908 andBruno(1981) claimedto haveidentifiedninetypicalcharacists in Italy,Ferracuti, teristics:(1) ambivalence (2) defectiveinsight,(3) adherenceto contowardauthority, from the consequencesof theiractions, (5) sexual vention,(4) emotionaldetachment role uncertainties,(6) magical thinking,(7) destructiveness,(8) low education,and (9) adherenceto violent subculture normsand weaponsfetishes. It is interestingthat and these lists, compiled a decade apart,overlapin regardto sexualrole uncertainties Yetapartfrom probablylow education(if this is a proxyfor poor social achievement). this superficialoverlap, the two studies do not suggest common features of backgroundor personality. Neitherof these studiesused controlsor validatedpsychologiunderthe auspicesof Thelargeststudyof thiskindwas thatperformed cal instruments. the WestGermanMinistryof the Interior; this ambitious1980-1983 projectinvolved semistructured interviews of 227 left-wing terroristsand 23 right-wing extremists (Jiger, Schmidtchen,and Siillwold 1981). Certaindemographic,life historical, or psychologicalfactorswere reportedwith high frequencyin this studypopulation:25 percentof leftist terroristshad lost one or both parentsby age fourteen,33 percent reportedsevere conflict with parents,and 33 percenthad a history of juvenile court conviction.This studyalso claimedto haveidentifiedtwo patterns of personalitytraits commonto terrorists: stimulus-seeking,dependentpatternand a hosan extroverted, tile, suspicious, defensive pattern.This Germanstudy presentsa majorchallenge to simplyby recognizingheterogeneouspsychosome psychology theoriesof terrorism logical categories among terrorists.But again, the psychological conclusions were impressionistic,and differentpsychologists on the Germanteam drew differentconclusions (Crenshaw1986). Withoutthe use of valid andreliablebehavioralmeasures andwithouta controlgroup,one cannotconcludethatthe characteristics identifiedin the American,Italian,or Germanstudies distinguishterrorists from nonterrorists. Since the tragiceventsof September11, 2001, attentionhas shiftedto the psycholterrorism. Thereis a dearthof publishedliterature deogy of Islamic fundamentalist scribingpsychological studies of Muslim extremists.Merariand colleagues administered a batteryof standardizedpsychological tests, including some measures of
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fighterscaptured infilcognitivefunction,to Hezbollah,Amal, andsecularpro-Syrian tratingIsraelfromLebanonin the late 1980s (Ariel Merari,personalcommunication, 2003). Unfortunately, his datahave been classified by the IsraeliDefense Forces and are unavailablefor scholarly scrutinyor attemptedreplication.Post, Sprinzak,and Denny (2003) conductedsemistructured Midinterviewswith thirty-fiveincarcerated dle Easternextremists,includingtwenty-oneIslamicreligiousterrorists from Hamas and its armedwing, Izz a-Din al-Qassam,Islamic Jihad,and Hezbollah, as well as fourteensecularterroristsfrom Fatah.Most had a high school education;some had additionalschooling. (However,the subgroupof suicidebombersamongthe Palestinians was described as ages seventeen to twenty-two, "uneducated,unemployed, unmarried.") theiractivism,with 30 Mostcamefromrespectedfamiliesthatsupported percentof the families of religious terrorists and 15 percentof the families of secular terroristsreportingtheir own radical involvement.Peer influence was cited as the group,andjoining increasedsocial standing.Memmajorreasonforjoining a terrorist bershipwas describedas being associatedwith a fusionof the young adult'sindividual identitywith the group'scollective identityandgoals. Prisonexperiencewas claimed to strengthengroupcommitmentfor most terrorists of both types. Anger and hatred withoutremorsewere often expressed,but therewas little interestin obtainingweapons of massdestruction. Thisprojectis one of the few to employa directpsychological the methodof subjectselecUnfortunately, examinationof recentlyactive terrorists. tion, the circumstancesof the interviews,and the method of interviewingwere not describedin this otherwise impressivereport;few specific demographicswere reported,no formalmeasuresof anypsychologicalvariableswere used, andno controls were examined. MarcSageman(2004) compileddatafrompublic sourceson 172 indiPsychiatrist meaningMuslims viduals he identifiedas membersof a "globalSalafi mujahedin," engagedin terrorist acts againstthe "farenemy"in the service of a new Islamicworld order.He includedexpatriate leadersof the EgyptianIslamic Group(EIG),members of the EgyptianIslamic Jihad(EIJ),JemaahIslamiyah,the Moro Islamic Liberation Front,the AlgerianGroupeSalafistepourla Predication et le Combat(GSPC),and al Qaeda. Sageman excluded terroristsengaged in local jihads, such as Chechnyans, Afghans,andPalestinians. His sampleis thusbiasedtowardthose involved Kashmiris, in transnational andtowardthe subgroup, terrorism mostly leaders,who have come to publicattention.He identified"somefragmentof childhooddata"in 61 cases. Only 4 hadhistoriessuggestiveof conductdisorder. Only 1 case (HabibZacariasMoussaoui) was suggestive of a childhood trauma.Descriptorsof childhood personalitywere outgoingchildren,most descriptors foundfor 69 cases; althoughlonersoutnumbered of the group had historiesof petty crime. Dewere neutralor positive. One-quarter tailedbiographieswere examinedfor 10 cases. Sagemanclaimsthathe found"noevipersonality in dence of pathologicalnarcissism" disorder" and"nopattern of paranoid this subgroup,with the exception of possible traits of al Qaeda leader Ayman alZawahiri.AlthoughSageman'sconclusions seem highly plausible,the authoris candid in admittingthe limitationsof this work:his sample is very small, atypical,and uncontrolled,and the authorhad no formal method for confirming these indirect psychiatricimpressions.
Potentiallyhigh-valuedatawere gatheredoutsidethe academicresearchapparatus interviews by UnitedNations(UN) relief workerNasraHassan,basedon unstructured with "nearly250" membersof Hamas or Islamic Jihadconductedin Gaza between 1996 and 1999. She reportsthatthe suicide bombersrangedin age from eighteen to more thanhalf were refugees, "many" were middleclass, 2 were sons of thirty-eight, reportedthatthey had been millionaires,and none were depressed,although"many" Hassan's lucid and widely cited beaten or torturedby Israeli forces. Unfortunately, reportdoes not specify the actualnumberof terrorist subjects,as well as whatproportion of this total subject populationwere intended suicide bombers, failed suicide bombers,or trainers,andoffers no specific demographic,socioeconomic, or psychointo logical data(Hassan2001; Atran2003). (Some of these datawill be incorporated a forthcoming book [N. Hassan,personalcommunication, 2004].) Barber(1999) conducted the most extensive study of psychological factors possibly associated with Islamic political violence. His reportis based on data from the PalestinianFamily Study, a project involving 6,923 ninth-gradestudentsin the West Bank and Gaza. Aggressivity and mood were measured with the Child Behavior Checklist (Achenbachand Edelbrock 1987), "familyvalues" were measuredby one question regardingthe importancethat respondentsplaced on getting marriedand having a family, and participation in the intifadaof 1987-1993 was measuredby the yes/no responseto a single question:"Beforethe withdrawal of Israelitroopsfrom the Gaza Stripand Jericho,did you ever distributeleaflets, protectsomeone from Israeli soldiers or police, march or demonstrateagainst the occupation,and throw stones at Israelisoldiers?" A yes answerto this questionwas positivelyassociatedwith depression, aggression,and family values. Unfortunately, this questiondoes not allow disbetween violent andnonviolentpoliticalparticipation, crimination undermining conclusions one might drawfrom this ambitiousstudyregardingthe predictivevalue of psychological factorsfor Islamic insurgentaggression.
OVERVIEW OF PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES fall into two generalcategories: Attemptsto accountfor the behaviorof terrorists thatseek the seeds of terrorism in political,social, economic, or top-downapproaches even evolutionarycircumstancesand bottom-upapproachesthatexplore the charac(e.g., Wieviorka1993, 2004). teristicsof individualsandgroupsthatturnto terrorism These approachesare not mutually exclusive. In fact, approachessuch as rational choice theory and relative deprivation/oppression theory combine these points of andactors.While acknowledgbetweencircumstances view, consideringinteractions of top-downanalysesand ultimatecauses, this articlefocuses priing the importance The prinmarilyon bottom-upapproaches andproximalcauses in substateterrorism. cipal approachesare organizedinto groups for the sake of clarity.However,it will become apparent thatconceptualoverlapexists betweentheorieswithinandbetween groups.It will also become apparent thata particular fundamental conceptualframework-such as psychoanalysis-may informdiversetheoriesand thatthe same theory may be championedfrom differentconceptualframeworks.For example, group
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theoryhas psychoanalyticand nonpsychoanalytic champions.Theoriesof terrorism also vary in the extentto which they considerpsychologicaldifferencesbetween terroristsplaying differentroles (e.g., leadersvs. followers), whetherterroristsare regardedas psychologicallyhomogeneousor heterogeneous,and whethersubtypesof terrorism are associatedwith subtypesof terrorists.
PSYCHOPATHOLOGICALTHEORY mustbe insane or At one end of the spectrumis the popularopinionthatterrorists psychopathic(Hacker1976;Cooper 1977;Pearce1977;Taylor1988). Herea distinction must be made:modernWesternpsychiatryidentifies adultbehavioraldisorders accordingto a multiaxialclassificationschemein whichAxis I refersto the majorclinor majordepression-while Axis II refers ical illnesses-those such as schizophrenia to personalitydisorders-such as antisocialpersonalitydisorder(APD) (American PsychiatricAssociation 2000). APD is the currentterm for a patternof remorseless disregardfor the rightsof othersthatwas calledpsychopathyup until the mid-1950s Psychosisrefersto a loss of realitytestingobservedprimarandsociopathythereafter. of Axis I disorders(e.g., schizophrenia) butis not expectedin Axis II ily in a subgroup disorderssuch as APD. Insanityis not a behavioralscience termbut a legal termthat usuallyimpliespsychosis,althoughits definitionis subjectto significant jurisdictional variance(ResnickandNoffsinger 2004). Hence, a psychotic or "insane" personis so mentallydisorderedas to not know rightfrom wrong, while a sociopathknows right from wrong and chooses wrong for selfish reasonswithoutpangs of conscience. In regardto Axis I clinical disordersamongterrorists, very little researchhas been done involving comprehensivepsychiatricexamination,and no properlycontrolled researchis foundin the open literature. However,the conclusion-at leaston the basis of uncontrolled empiricalpsychologicalstudiesof left-wing Germanmilitants,membersof the AlgerianFrontde Lib6ration Nationale(FLN),membersof the Provisional IrishRepublicanArmy (PIRA), and Hezbollah-has been thatterrorists do not usually exhibitwhatwe referto as Axis I or even Axis II psychiatricdisorders(Crenshaw 1981; Jager,Schmidtchen,and Stillwold 1981; Heskin 1984; Merari1998). German psychiatrist WilfredRasch(1979) examinedeleven terrorist suspects,includingmemgroup,and reportedon a FederalPolice studyof another bers of the Baader-Meinhof findingno evidenceof mentalillness in anyresponfortypersonswantedas terrorists, Post, (2003; Sprinzak,and Denny dent. also see Post and Gold 2002) also found no Axis I disorderson psychiatricevaluationsof twenty-onesecularandfourteenradical (1982) suggested IslamicMiddleEastern terrorists. As criminologistFrancoFerracuti two as has supported more than decades ago, and by subsequentreports(Reich been 1998; Silke 1998; Horgan2003), while terrorist groupsare sometimesled by insane to unequivocallyinsane individuals,andwhile a few terrorist acts mightbe attributed persons,terrorists rarelymeet psychiatriccriteriafor insanity. most of the literature clinicalmentaldisorder to terrorists speaks Rather, attributing type,psychopathyor sociopathy(Taylor1988). Cooper of the remorselesspersonality (1977, 1978), for example, states thatterrorists,like psychopaths,are ruthless"out-
laws" and "outcasts" who adhereto an anomalousscheme of values out of tune with thatof the rest of society andthatthereis a "nearidentityof this fundamental characteristicin both the psychopathand the terrorist." Pearce (1977) statedthat terrorists meaninggaps in selfwere sociopathsacting antisociallydue to "superegolacunae," monitoring;he supportshis conclusion partlyon the basis of tattoos found on one terrorist. The claim of sociopathy,advancedwithout evidence from any empirical study, raises the importantquestion of whetherterrorismis usually antisocialor prosocial behavior.It makes a common kind of sense thatindividualswho harminnocentsare antisocial.Those who rejectand attacktheirown society, such as the Germanstudent whojoined the 1970s Red ArmyFactionor the Christian-to-Muslim convertwhojoins a modem radicalIslamic cell, standagainsttheirown and might be regardedas antisocial. Yet severallines of reasoningtend to discreditthe simplisticclaim that antiFirst,extensive evidence supsociality is typical or even common among terrorists. that,farfrombeing outcasts,terrorists portsthe observation by their areoften regarded in-groupas heroic freedomfighters.As Post (2004) points out, nationalist-separatist terrorists must be distinguishedfrom revolutionary in this regardsince the terrorists formerare typically regardedas riskingtheirlives for social welfare,while the latter attack their society of origin. That is, the Basque studentwho joins the ETA, the a Moscow theater,or the Liberation Tigersof Chechen"blackwidow"who terrorizes TamilEalem (LTTE)suicide bomberall use terrorismto fight on behalf of their ingroup.The Irishmanwho joins the PIRA or the Middle Easternstudentwho joins an Islamicradicalgroup,dependingon his specific nationandprovince,may enjoy considerablepopularsupportand conscientiously serve his society in a prosocial way. Ironically,therefore,with respect to in-groupsof identity,certaintypes of terrorism prosocialbehavior.Second,evidenceexists fromthe quantitative oftenrepresent literaturethatthe actionsof terrorists, even those who fail and die, mightbenefit theirkin and social group (Azam forthcoming).Furtherevidence of the prosocialityof some comes from the empiricalwork of Italiansociologist Donatelladella Porta terrorists (1988): among 1,214 Italianmilitants,351 (45.6 percent)enjoyed personalties with eight or more group membersbeforejoining a terrorist organization.This raises the questionof how large one's groupof identitymust be to considercollaborationproofteninvolvesa networkof sharedsocial social, butit at least suggeststhatrecruitment values. Pedahzur,Perliger,and Weinberg(2003) examinedthis issue from the perspective of Durkheim,who distinguishedaltruisticsuicide-suicide in the service of that80 Palestinsociety-from egoistic andanomicsuicide.Based on the observation from 1973 to 2002 exhibiteda higherrateof religiouseducation, ian suicideterrorists membershipin fundamentalist andrepeatterrorist organizations, acts comparedwith nonsuicidalterrorists,these authorsproposedthat they were probablyacting from altruisticmotives.Indeed,this is the essence of the concept of istishad, selfless death in the serviceof Allah (Post, Sprinzak,andDenny 2003; see also Sageman2004). It is obviously conceptually inadequateto judge antisociality from the perspective of the targetedout-group,yet it is premature to conclude thatmost membersof ethnic, religious, or national-separatist terroristgroups exhibit prosocialitybased on these limited reports.Some antisocial individualsperhapsuse the moral cover of group
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JOURNAL RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT
affiliationto disguise theiraggressiveandremorselessdrives.However,pendingdata to the contrary, it seems plausiblethatmanyterrorists act in a prosocialmanner,both believingthemselvesto be servingsociety andjudgedby theirin-groupto be actingin its interest.(It is a separatequestionto ask whetherthey subjectivelyadoptthe moral (1982) positionthatCorrado[1981] labeled"misplacedidealism.")Thus,Ferracuti's formulation terrorism equally insanity and regarding the relationship might between apply to the relationship between sociopathy and terrorism: sociopaths may but terroristsare not, by virtue of their political sometimes be among the terrorists, necessarily violence, sociopaths.Intuitively,one might expect differentpersonality antisocial traits among and prosocial terrorists.This speculation requires further study.
RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY do not meet diagnosticcriteriafor a majormentalillness or for If most terrorists sociopathy,must one conclude thatthey are rational?This raises the questionof the action derives explanatory power of rationalchoice theory-the theorythatterrorist from a conscious, rational,calculateddecision to takethis particular type of actionas the optimumstrategyto accomplish a sociopolitical goal (Sandler,Tschirhart, and Cauley 1983; SandlerandLapan1988; Crenshaw1992; Wilson 2000). A distinction shouldbe madebetweenrational-or strategic-choice theoryandotherindividualor group psychological theories of terrorism.The lattertry to explain why people are inclinedtowarda type or style of behavior(e.g., to be a terrorist), while rationalchoice theory, derivedfrom economics, assumes this behavioralproclivity as a given and attemptsto explain how changes in policy-the rules of the "game"that is played betweenterrorists andgovernments-might predictably alterbehavior.Since rational choice theoryconsidersboth policy and individualbehavioralresponsesto policy, it combines the top-downand bottom-upapproaches. of rationality" Gametheory,basedon this "assumption in strategicchoice formulations, has beenused to analyzeandpredictpoliticalbehaviorsince the seminalworkof Deutschin the 1950s (Deutsch 1954;DeutschandKrause1962;MilburnandWatman 1981; Machinaet al. 1989). Empiricalsupportfor game theory comes from experimentsin whichvolunteersplay againstrivalsin games such as the prisoner'sdilemma, sometimesto win a payoff such as points,sometimesto avoidcosts suchas loss of face 1947; Deutsch 1954; Borah 1963; or electric shocks (von NeumannandMorgenstern (2003) listed six strengthsof modChammah 1968). Arce Sandler Rapoportand and game quantifiable theoryfor revealing factorstheoretically ern underlyingthe behavior of terroristsand targetedgovernments:game theory (1) captures the interdependentnatureof such interactions, (2) helps discoverthe strategicimplicationswhen its each side acts accordingto best guess abouthow the other side thinks, (3) incorporates the impact of threatsand promises from each side, (4) takes advantageof tendto maximizegoals subjectto constraints, that"players" (5) helps the observation predictoutcomes in bargainingover demands,and (6) acknowledgesthe impact of uncertainty-incomplete information-on all the above.They cite the exampleof the
afterthe installationof metaldetectorsat shift away from skyjackingsto kidnappings in 1973 as evidenceof a predictable airports responseto new constraints. andrational Crenshaw (2000) has cautionedthatthe ostensiblegoal of PoliticalscientistMartha often appearsso unlikelyto be achievedby the chosen actionthatit is diffiterrorists cult to supportan overarching theoryof terrorism. Furthermore, rationalist the outraof attackson innocentcivilianschallengesthe commonplaceundergeous inhumanity standing of "rational"behavior. Given questions about incoherent motivations, ghastlymeans,andpoliticalinefficacyof terrorism, some scholarshaveproposedthat the typical terroristis not simply a "rationalactor" in the strict Weberiansense (Brannan,Eslerm, and Anders Strindberg2001). On the other hand, historicalevidence suggests that terrorismis sometimes a practical,low-cost strategy through which subordinategroups leverage their power to successfully achieve their ends (Sandlerand Enders2004). Indeed,modem history is repletewith examplesof successful substatepolitical violence: Irgun'sbombingswere a majorfactorin securing by the Irish Republican the independenceof EretzIsraelfrom the British;terrorism accommodations leadingto theIrishFreeState;Shi'ite MusArmy(IRA)precipitated lim terrorists providedkey assistancein the ousterof the Shahof Iran;Hezbollah'ssuicide bombingcampaignof 1983-1985 directlyled to theAmerican,French,andIsraeli withdrawal of a Shi'a-controlled andestablishment society in majorpartsof Lebanon; as partof its remarkably African Congress terrorism andthe National suc(ANC) used cessful strategyto overthrowthe apartheidgovernmentof South Africa. More recampaign,includingthe mass murdersat New cently,al Qaeda'sbrutaltransnational York'sWorldTradeCenterin 2001, may have not only rapidlyadvancedUsama bin Laden'sstatedgoal of removingthe large U.S. militarypresencefrom Saudi Arabia but also servedas an extremelypotentrecruitingtool (Laqueur1987; Hoffman 1998, expecta1999; Whittaker 2001). Thus, historicalprecedentssupportmanyterrorists' tions of success, so the theory of strategicchoice must not be discounted on the grounds that terrorism's goals are uniformly improbable. Game-theoreticalapproachesare also sophisticatedenough to recognize that the "winnings"that satisfy terrorists may not be theirovertantigovernment goals but less obvious goals such as whichmaynot only serveas anend in itself butalso yield unexpectedbenmartyrdom, efits to the terrorist's offspringthatexceed the "opportunity cost" of an educatedlife lost prematurely(Brooks 2002; Azam forthcoming). Moreover, game theory has predictionssuch as the possibility yielded evidence of counterintuitive but important that governmentinvestmentsin deterrencemight waste resources or even produce paradoxicalincreasesin threats(Sandlerand Arce 2003). Strategicchoice theorypotentiallyoffers vital insights into the potentialpayoff of terroristversus governmentactions. By uncoveringotherwise cryptic benefits, this mayhelp explainotherwiseenigmaticbehaviors.Insofaras humansevolved approach to function as sophisticatedcalculatorsof risks and benefits, and insofar as groups functioncollectively to actualizethe will of theirmembers,one can makequantitative predictionsregardingthe theoreticalcircumstancesunder which terroristbehavior serves group and individual interests. Such microeconomic analyses may help in calculatingthe likely outcome of differentpolicy options, such as hardeningtargets, calculatingconcessions, or performingretaliatorystrikes(Sandlerand Lapan 1988;
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RESOLUTION JOURNAL OF CONFLICT
and Conybeare1994; Sandierand Arce 2003; Sandier Lee 1988; Brophy-Baermann and Enders2004). But the following question remains:what are the limitations,or even potentialpitfalls, of the game-theoretical approach? Evidence suggests thatvery few individualswho rationallybelieve thatterrorism may advancetheir cause ever become terrorists (Schbley 2000). This is conceivably relatedto the discoverythat85 percentof WorldWarII infantrymen facing the enemy failed to pull the triggers of their weapons, despite the urgent rational benefits (Grossman 1995). In other words, even obvious strategicbenefits may not compel humansto violence, an arguablyirrational resultof modem culture.And some terrorterrorist wolf" ists (e.g., "lone TheodoreKaczinski)commitviolence dueto unequivocally irrational motives (in his case, paranoidschizophrenia). Thus,the rareand idiosyncraticdecision to become a terrorist cannotbe explainedby rationalchoice theory. Yetit is inappropriate to criticizethis theorybecauseit fails to explainwhy only a tiny it does not tryto. It focuses insteadon what minorityof individualsturnsto terrorism; membersof this raregroupare likely to do undervariousconditions. Twoothercriticismsof rationalchoice theorymaybe morecompelling.First,ratioboth from nal choice theoryclaims predictivepower for futureevents, extrapolating playingnonnaturalistic laboratory experiments of the behaviorof nonterrorists games and from post hoc analysis of real-worldincidents. But as Wieviorka(1993, 57) observed, this kind of strategicanalysis weighs "questionsof resourcesand power relationships... as if the principlesunderlyingtheiractionshadbeen establishedonce (see also andmeasurable" andfor all, andas if the effects of violence were predictable Wieviorka2004). The uncertainty of theprinciplesof terrorist-government interaction adds to the uncertainty of the facts known by the players since, as the early work in game theoryillustrates,a slight change in the "rules"may yield opposite behavioral results (von Neumannand Morgenstern1947; Milburnand Watman1981; Machina of terrorist-government engagements et al. 1989). Refinementsin the understanding based on increasinglysophisticatedevent analysis and classification should reduce and strengthen this element of uncertainty the predictivevalidityof this approach. Second, it may be dangerousto assumethata profileof a "typicalplayer"will preresponses.As Merari(2002, 4) has said, "Ina perfectlyratiodict an actualterrorist's nal system, the basic idea of deterrenceis to deliver a clear,crediblemessage to the opponentthatthe cost of pursuinga certaincourseof behavioroutweighsits benefits. In reality,however,this simple formulararely,if ever, works accordingto expectations."The most likely explanation consequencesis simplythat for suchunanticipated the immenseplasticityandindividualvariability of the humancentralnervoussystem often generateidiosyncraticand individualisticresponses that defy predictionsnot only because of incomplete informationheld by the actor but also because of impulsivity,faulty cognition, and emotional processes that overruleadaptivechoices. Writingthe applicablegame-theoretical equationbecomes ever more challengingas are accommodate added imponderable to variables individualemotionalpeculiarities terrorists, lure victims, and governments: the of of bravadoand romanceof risk, the urge in for "success" likely failurewith or withoutthe utility of marself-destructive tyrdom,the Svengali-likeinfluence of charismaticleaderson either side whose fol-
columns,thepowerof rageto betterreason,the blindness lowersmarchin maladaptive to the stoof ambition,the illogic of spite, or the frenzy of revengeall may contribute scenarios.Moreover,the lack of an empiricallyvalichastic occurrenceof surprising dated typology of terroristvariantscomplicateswriting optimumtheoremsfor subtypes of playerswho may exhibit very differentbehavioralproclivities(Bowen et al. 1985; Friedland andMerari1985;Merari2002). Nonetheless,no behavioraltheoryis expectedto accommodateall examples;the law of largenumbersby itself guarantees some failuresof prediction.It wouldbe sufficientlyvaluableif rationalchoice calculations predicteda higher proportionof terroristbehaviors than did nonquantitative methods or reliably predictedresponses in some subtype of engagements.Merari's behaviors"rarely, (2002) strongclaim thatterrorist if ever"follow such predictionsis empiricalwork should be able to resolve thatdebate. the key question.Further I would proposethatrationalchoice analysisis a powerfultool for discoveringtheoreticallyvalidandsurprisingly counterintuitive forces thatprobablyinfluenceterrorist and governmentbehaviors.Game theorymay also prove invaluablein predicting likely changes in the base rate (the rate predictedin rationalactor simulations)of However, behaviorsof an idealizedterrorist in responseto concessions or deterrents. rationalchoice theoriescannotpredictidiosyncraticresponses.Policy recommendations thatpredictdeterrenceof terroristacts are only as valuableas their capacityto of humans. anticipatethe extraordinary variabilityand adaptability theory choice not at does explainwhy a very few indiMoreover, present,rational hundreds viduals, among of thousands in virtually identical political positions, become terrorists.As Crozier (1960, 9) suggested, "Men do not necessarily rebel it takes a rebel to rebel."Indimerelybecause theirconditionsof life are intolerable: vidualfactorsmustbe at work.Temperaments vary.Humanfrontallobe corticalplanningbasedon rationalcalculationof costs andbenefitsis foreversubjectto limbictyrbehaviorsmay deviate significantlyfrom the anny.Passion often trumpsrationality, predictedbase rate,andunderstanding the mindof the terrorist-with or withoutpredictionof futurebehavior-requires investigations beyondtherealmof gametheory. If neitherinsanity/sociopathy norrationalchoice can fully accountfor the genesis of terrorist behaviors,what alternative psychologicalexplanationsseem most plausible? As Crenshaw(1986, 386) stated,even though terrorismdoes not result from a condition,thatis not to say that"thepoliticaldecision to specific psychopathological join a terroristorganizationis not influenced or, in some cases, even determinedby subconscious or latent psychological motives."In other words, although terrorists rarely exhibit psychological disorders, they may exhibit identifiablepsychological traits or may have been influencedby identifiablesocial factors.Political scientists, sociologists, psychologists,andpsychiatrists have offereddiverseopinionsregarding the degree to which the roots of terroristaggression are innate versus acquired,the productof psychodynamicversus social forces, or the productof individualversus groupforces.The most frequentlycited theoriescan be dividedinto sociological theories,psychoanalytic approaches to individualpsychology,nonpsychoanalytic psychological approaches to individualpsychology, and theoriesof groupprocess.
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SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES
SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY
Bandura's (1973, 1998) social learningtheoryof aggressionsuggeststhatviolence follows observationandimitationof an aggressivemodel, anda variantof this theory has been invoked to explain terroristbehaviors not as the consequence of innate of moralimperatives.Teenagersliving in aggressivitybut of cognitive "reconstrual" behaviorsand seek to imitate hotbedsof political strifemay directlywitness terrorist themor,even morecommonly,learnfromtheirculture'spublicglorificationof terrorists-for example,the "martyr posters"lining the streetsof Shi'a regionsof Lebanon camps or the songs celebratingthe exploits of the PIRA and Palestinianrefugee (Crenshaw1992;TaylorandQuayle 1994; Kelly andRieber1995). Social learningof the acceptability of terrorist violence may also takea didacticform,as in the teaching of an extremistform of jihad in manyPakistaniand Palestinianmadrasas-religious schools for young Muslimboys. Madrasas haveexisted since the time of Muhammad, butthe recentworldwideresurgenceof Islamicfundamentalism has led to an increase in theirnumbersandpossibly in the violence of theirmessage (Armstrong 2000; MarshallandDanizewski2001; Kepel2002; Atran2003). Evidencesuggeststhata minorMuslimterrorists (Sageman ity of prominent transnational were educatedin madrasas 2004; Anonymous2004). This, however,does not exclude the possibility that widespreadeducationof this type influences even nonattendees via culturaldiffusion. of terrorist philosophy didacticlearningalso occursvia the dissemination Terrorist andmethodologyin communiquds, audiovisualtapes,compactdisks,books, andWeb sites. The most influential historical example may be the widely translated1969 by Brazilian terrorist "Mini-Manual" or "Handbookof Urban Guerilla Warfare" CarlosMarighella(1971; also see Saper 1988), which, amongotherpracticaladvice, suggests that readerslearn to pilot a plane. The charterof the Islamic Resistance Al-Islamiya [Hamas])representsa more recent Al-Muqawama Movement(Harakat example; article 15 of this documentemphasizesthe importanceof teachingjihad: of Muslimsthatthe Palestinian "Wemustimprinton the mindsof generations problem is a religiousone... I indeedwish to go to warfor the sake of Allah! I will assaultand kill, assault and kill, assaultand kill" (Alexander2002, 57). It seems plausiblethat didacticteachingor social learningmay influence some young people towardterrorrestructuring ism. However,the social learning/cognitive model fails to explain why only a smallminorityamongthe hundreds of thousandsof studentseducatedforjihad in madrasas,the millions exposed to extremistpublications,and the tens of millions exposed to public glorificationof terroristshave become terrorists.As Taylorand Quayle(1994, 32) put it, "Noteveryonefromthose communities,althoughsubjectto those same or similar influences, becomes a terrorist"(see also Sageman 2004). Therefore,while social learningprobablyhelps animatethe smallminoritywho turns individualsbeto political violence, this theoryfails to explain why these particular Otherfactorsmust be sought. come terrorists.
/ THEMIND OF THETERRORIST 19 Victoroff
FRUSTRATION-AGGRESSIONHYPOTHESIS
This raises the questionof how politically motivatedpeople reachthe point of no returnat which theirpotentialenergyis convertedinto violent action.The frustrationcollaborationby aggression (FA) hypothesis-one outcome of an interdisciplinary political and social scientists at Yale University to better understandthe violence Europe-has oftenbeen cited,attributing the final observedin earlytwentieth-century expressionof the terroristimpulse to desperationin the face of oppression(Dollard et al. 1939;Friedland1992). PoliticalpsychologistJohnChowingDavies (1973, 251) (emphasisadded).The has even stated,"Violenceis always a responseto frustration" is included although the originalintentof FA hypothesis here as a sociological theory, Dollardet al. (1939) was also to accountfor individualbehavior;thus, terrorist violence of eithergroupsor individualsmight be explainedby this theory. However,the applicationof this theoryto terrorismstudieshas been criticizedon circumstances severalgrounds:millions of people live in frustrating but neverturnto terrorism, they manyterrorists do notbelong to the desperate classes whose frustration claim to be expressing,and terrorismdoes not uniformlyappearto be an act of last resortby those who have exhaustedalternateapproaches(Billig 1976; Merariand Friedland1985;Laqueur1987; Friedland1992; SidaniusandPratto1999). The leftist terrorismof 1970s Europe,for example, was primarilyperpetrated by membersof privileged classes, and state-sponsoredterrorismcan hardly be attributedto the by its victims.Frustration, oppressionof the government therefore, mayplausiblyplay some partin the genesis of some political violence, but the FA hypothesis is not by itself sufficientto explainterrorism.
RELATIVE DEPRIVATIONTHEORY
It has also been proposed that economic disparitiescause terrorism.This claim underliesGurr's(1970) theory of relative deprivation-that rebellions come to be when people cannotbearthe misery of theirlot. As Schmid (1983) observed,Gurr's theoryderivesmore from psychoanalysisthanfrom empiricalsociology and is conceptuallyborn of the FA hypothesis.Irrespective of these psychiatricroots, multiple writershaveclaimeda sociological linkbetweenpovertyandterrorism (Schmid 1983; Harmon 2000; Hasisi and Pedahzur2000; Krueger and Maleckova 2002). More recently,increasingdifferencesbetween the materialwelfare of the haves and haveto provokea new eraof politicalviolence thatwill accelerate notshavebeen postulated as globalizationnot only creates new foci of povertybut facilitatescommunication betweenthose who perceivethemselvesto be globalization'svictims (Maya,Lander, and Ungar 2002). One possibility is that either absolutedeprivationor relativeeconomic disparityignites terroristsentiments, especially among members of an oppressedunderclass. The majorEuropean revolutionsof the eighteenththroughthe earlytwentiethcenFromthe Frenchto turieswereprobablyprovoked,at least in part,by class disparities. becamemajorparticipants in political the Russianrevolutions,have-notsindisputably
20
violence (Zamoyski1999). On the otherhand,as notedabove,the left-wing terrorists of the 1960s to 1970s were not usually impoverished; indeed, they were sometimes the miseryof a different accusedof belongingto an idle middleclass thatexpropriated class to serve theirown goals. So, althoughpovertymay play a role in some political violence, relativedeprivation is neithernecessarynor sufficientto explainrevolutionEvidence also exists thatright-wingextremismoccurs independentof ary terrorism. economic status.CanettiandPedahzur(2002), for example,reportedthatright-wing extremistsentimentswere unrelatedto socioeconomic variablesamong 1,247 Israeli universitystudents. Kruegerand Maleckova's(2002) previouslycited importantwork with Palestinconclusion. However,their ians does not supporta simple poverty-causes-terrorism analysis is based on socioeconomic background,not on socioeconomic prospects. Giventhe 70 percentadultunemployment ratein Gaza,the gross domesticproductof less than $1,000 throughout the severelyconstrainedecothe PalestinianTerritories, nomic opportunitiesdespite educationalachievementdue to the unresolvedIsraeliconflict,andthe cultural role, it is preimportance of the malebreadwinner Palestinian matureto ruleout the possibilitythatdiminishedeconomicprospectshavehelpedpronationalist-separatist voke Palestinianterrorism(Bennet 2004). Furthermore, and terrorists many religious fundamentalist tend to enjoy the supportof theircommunities. In such cases, terrorismmay be a prosocial activity ostensibly undertakenon behalf of all classes. If the entirein-group(thatof the politicalactor)faces economic disparities relativeto anout-group(thatof theprivilegedtarget),participation in political violence would not be expectedto be an economic class phenomenonbuta groupof-identityphenomenon.Further researchwill be necessaryto determine the relationshipbetweenclass of origin,economicexpectations,individual factors,andterrorism.
OPPRESSION THEORY
Multipleauthors, contendthatoppressionprofromsociologiststo revolutionaries, in vokes political violence (Fanon 1965; Whitaker1972; Schmid 1983). Particularly the case of nationalist-separatist or ethnic-sectarianterrorism(e.g., ETA, PIRA, by governments Hamas),actorsoften cite the injusticeof theirtreatment thatrobthem of identity,dignity, security,and freedom as the motive for theirjoining a terrorist group (Crenshaw1986; Taylorand Quayle 1994; Post, Sprinzak,and Denny 2003). Since it is difficultto measureoppressionitself-a sociopoliticalrelationship subject to point of view-and since the impact of oppression may be felt subjectivelyto greateror lesser degreesby individualswithina communityat risk,perceivedoppresvariableto examineas a potentialriskfacsion may be the propercognitive-emotional There scales for and instrumentsfor assessing perare innumerable tor terrorism. ceived prejudiceanddiscrimination McNeilly (e.g., et al. 1996; Utsey andPonterotto 1996; Neto 2001; Loo et al. 2001; Murryet al. 2001; Duckittet al. 2002). However, virtuallyall of these are specifically designed to addressthe experience of a single group-in most cases, African Americans. None of them measures the life-anddominion of one group over another implied by the psycholiberty-threatening political concept of oppression. In fact, an extensive review of multiple databases
revealsthatno generalpsychologicalinstrument has yet been validatedandpublished for the study of perceivedoppression.As a result, no persuasiveempiricalevidence is availablesupportingthe much-citedhypothesis that oppressionor its perception drivesthe behaviorof terrorists. Evenif perceivedoppressioncouldbe shownto breedterrorism, it wouldneverbe a sufficient explanation.As Silke (2003, 33) said so well, "Veryfew individuals of aggrievedminoritiesgo on to become activeterrorists. The questionhas alwaysbeen, why did these particular individualsengage in terrorism when most of theircompatriots did not?"Sociological theories,like rationalchoice approaches, do not answerthis question.
NATIONAL CULTURAL THEORY
While many differences are observed between cultures, a specific variablewas claimed to be key by Weinbergand Eubank (1994), who proposed that terrorism expressesitself differentlyin "collectivist" cultures.According versus"individualist" to this theory,in collectivist cultures,a person'sidentityis primarilyderivedfromthe social system, dividingthe world strictlyaccordingto in-groupsand out-groupsand linkingtheirpersonalwell-being to the well-being of theirgroup,while in individualist cultures,identity is derivedfrom personalgoals. Weinbergand Eubankpropose to carryout terrorist thatcollectivistswould be morelikely thanindividualists attacks on out-groups, wouldbe less inhibitedin attacking includingforeigners.Individualists one of theirown. The authorsused psychologicalrankingsof IBM corporate employees in forty nationson a scale of individualism/collectivism, reportingthatU.S. citizens were the most individualistic(score 91), Israelis were in the middle (54), and ThirdWorldnations tended to be the most collectivist, such as Pakistanat 14 and Columbiaat 13. Comparingthese rankingswith reportsof terrorist activityfrom the Terrorism: Events 1968-1977"(ITERATE) "International Attributes dataof Terrorist base (Mickolus 1980), they claim that the data support their prediction that aremorelikely to collectivistsaremorelikely to attackforeigners,while individualists cultures.Theyalso claim,without attackconationalsor membersof otherindividualist data, that individualists feel morally restrainedfrom attacking innocents, while collectivists have two moralities-one for the in-group,one for the out-group-and would not be morallyinhibitedfrom attackinginnocentsin the out-group. This work might be criticizedon numerousgrounds:the paucityof data thatcultures can be rankedon this collectivist/individualist dimension;the doubt that IBM of their cultures;the failure to addressthe possibility employees are representative that,withinnations,subcultures exist thatvaryon the presumeddimension(such that derivefrom a distinctsubculture); the likelihoodthat,regardlessof national terrorists the likelihood thatthe ITERATE culture,individualistsarise who become terrorists; databasefor thatdecadecaptured who may beara primarilyleft-wing revolutionaries or relidifferentrelationshipto their cultureof origin than do nationalist/separatists the theoryof differential gious radicals;andthe factthatno dataareofferedsupporting culmoralinhibition.Nonetheless, setting aside the simplisticconcept of "national" ture,the concept thatdifferencesin group culture,as exploredin culturalanthropol-
22
and audienceresponsesto terrorism ogy, might influencethe expressionof terrorism seems worthyof furtherinvestigation.
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES In contrastto sociological theoriesthatemphasizefactorsinfluencingthe behavior behaviorprimarilyemphasize of an entire group,psychological theories of terrorist individualfactors.Since the earlytwentiethcentury, a fiercecontroversy has roiledthe psychiatriccommunity, dividingpsychoanalyticapproaches to the studyof individual psychology, primarilyderivativeof Freudiantheory, from nonpsychoanalyticapproaches (Wallerstein1995). For the purposes of this review, these approachesare consideredseparately.
PSYCHOANALYTICPSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES OF TERRORISM
Psychoanalysisis basedon the propositionthatmuchof mentallife is unconscious, thatpsychologicaldevelopment proceedsin stagesbasedon infantilesexualfantasies, conflict regardand thatpsychologicaldistressderivesfrom unresolvedintrapsychic of this theory was literallydeing those fantasies(Gabbard 2000). The "dynamics" rived from nineteenth-century concepts of physics, in which the flow of mentaland expressed,repressed,or discharged.The theory libidinalenergy is deterministically (as opposedto intrinsictemhas variants,butthey sharethe notionsthat(1) parenting determines andhealth;(2) active,unconscious perament) psychologicaltemperament forces excludeunpleasant thoughtsfromthe consciousness;and(3) relationships with are controlledby unconsciousforces such as projectionothers,"objectrelations," the theory that one irrationallyattributesone's own attitudeto others (Wallerstein 1995; Gabbard 2000). Multiplenonscientificassumptionsunderliethe "discoveries" claimed by psychoanalysts,principallythatthe early analysts'impressionisticinterpretations of classic cases accordingto theirown dynamictheoryconstituteevidence that theory. supporting to terrorist Psychoanalyticapproaches behaviormay be roughlydividedaccording to theiremphasison identitytheory,narcissismtheory,paranoia theory,andabsolutist thinking. Identity Theory It has been proposedthatcandidatesfor terrorism are young people lacking selfesteemwho have strongor even desperateneeds to consolidatetheiridentities(Olsson interviewswith Irish 1988). On the basis of unstructured (andlargelyundocumented) terrorists, Taylorand Quayle (1994) reportedthatmanybecamepolitiandEuropean cally violent, seeking a sense of purposeand self-worth-"a place in the sun."The theoryof psychologistErikErikson(1959), thatadolescentsreacha stage of identity formationat which ideologies assist in self-definition,was the basis for Bollinger's
(1981; also see Crenshaw1986) psychoanalyticinterpretation of his interviewswith eight members of Germanterroristgroups: Billinger claimed that overcontrolling parentspreventedthese respondentsfrom developing autonomy,leading to identity At the extreme,those with identityconfucrisesthatmadeviolent struggleirresistible. sion are perhapstormentedby a sense of isolation, conceivablyengaging in terrorist violence as an adaptiveresponseto the pain of anomie (Ferracuti1982). Thisperspectiveis consistentwith Freud's(1953-1974) speculationthatthe princimay be inseparablefrom the impulse for destruction.This ple of self-determination FrantzFanon(1965), who posview is also reminiscentof the theoriesof psychiatrist ited thatviolence againstcolonial oppressionliberatesnot only the body but also the self-identity.MenachemBegin (1977) offered his own confirmation of this mode of aphorism: thinkingwith his neo-Cartesian "Wefight, thereforewe are."Youngpeople turningto politicalviolence in a desperatesearchfor identitymay act alone (e.g., perhapsCharlesBishop, a fifteen-year-old who flew a small airplaneinto a bankin early 2002, leaving a suicide note declaring his allegiance with al Qaeda) (Rosenberg, Waddell,and Smalley 2002), yet they may be very eager to join groups-a behavior offeringan instantaneous graftingof identity.Identity-starved joinersarealso hypothesized to be motivatedby a desire to embracethe intimatetutelage of a charismatic leader-a formof anacliticdevotion(choosing a love objectwho resemblesa parent). To date,no controlledempiricalstudytestingthe applicabilityof this theoryto young has been published. terrorists Narcissism Theory Pearlstein(1991), andothershave JohnCrayton(1983), EricShaw(1986), Richard invoked Kohut'sself psychology to explain the sequence that drives young people to terrorism.PsychoanalystHeniz Kohut (1972, 1978; see also Wallerstein1995; Gabbard 2000) developedself psychology as a departure from the classical ego psychology of Freud.Self psychology emphasizesthe needs thatan infanthas for caring responses to develop normally.Failureof maternalempathyleads to damage to the self-image-so called narcissistic injury-that arrestsdevelopment in one of two ways: persistentinfantile grandiose fantasies or failure to internalizethe idealized image of the parent.Eitherproblempreventsthe developmentof adult identity and morality. Crayton,for example,proposedthatpoliticalexperience,such as the humilimightproducean adultnarcissisticinjurythatmightreawaken ationof subordination, the psychologicaltraitof infantilenarcissism.The resultmightbe a pathologicalexaltationof self (the genesis of the leader),the abandonment of independenceto merge with the archaicomnipotentfigure (the genesis of the follower), or a combinationof these impulses,as seen in the egotisticalyearningfor glory underthe maskof selflessness. Both of these forms of infantileretreatarehypothesizedto mobilize the expression of the desireto destroythe sourceof the injury(i.e., narcissisticrage).This rageis, in essence, rage againstthe damagedself, projectedonto the targetof the terrorist's feelings the terrorist has about animus,as if thetargetwerethe sourceof theintolerable himself (Crayton1983; Akhtar1999). Accordingto Risto Fried(1982), the targetor victim is treatedas a "discardable object,"which psychoanalystRichardPearlstein
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cited as evidencethatterrorism is a "spectacularly vivid exampleof narcissisticobject manipulation." The theory of terroristnarcissismis consistent with many reportsregardingthe pathologicallydependentpsychology of cult adherents,but it is perhapsmore pertinent that it fits with empirical observationsof both Hubbard(1971) and el Sarraj (2002) that terrorists, far from being the aggressivepsychopathsof public imaginaemotionally are timid, often tion, damagedadolescents-those who havesufferedego injuriessuch as parental rejectionthatdelay or preventfull achievementof adultidentity-who seem to be in searchof affiliationand meaning.In this respect,narcissism of narcissismcomes andidentitytheoryoverlap.Potentialsupportfor the importance from GustaveMorf's (1970) clinical examinationsconductedwith prisonersheld as membersof the Frontfor the Liberationof Quebec (FLQ). Morf reportedthat these individualsexhibitednarcissistictraits,wishing to put themselvesat the centerof the universe,but did not fulfill the criteriafor a full-blownnarcissisticpersonalitydisorconcludedthata "permissive der.He further society"was responsiblefor theirnarcissism. However,he used no standardized no statispsychologicalinstruments, reported ticaldata,andused no controlgroup.Like Sageman's(2004) previouslycitedexegesis biographies,the conclusionsregarding of ten terrorist narcissismareimpressionistic, not empirical.As a result,it remainsundetermined whetherthe prevalenceof narcissistic traitsamong terroristsexceeds the prevalencein the general population.And haveobjectedthatnarcissismis unlikelyto explainterrorism in even a otherauthorities small numberof groups(Corrado1981; Reich 1998). Again, the intuitivelyplausible pathto terrorism scenarioof identitydeficitwith narcissisticragein thedevelopmental has yet to be supported by scientific study. Paranoia Theory George Washington University psychiatrist Jerrold M. Post is unequivocally amongthe principalcontributors to politicalpsychologicaltheoriesof terrorism. Post of terrorbasedformulation (1998, 2004) offers a comprehensive, psychoanalytically ist behaviors-one thatincludesan explanation for the terrorist's capacityfor murder: psychologyis echoing Kohut(1972, 1978), he positsthatthe salientfeatureof terrorist projection,an infantiledefense thatassigns intolerableinternalfeelings to an external object when an individualwho has grown up with a damagedself-concept idealizes the good self and splits out the bad self. This projectionis proposedto be the root of an adult persistenceof the infantilephase that Melanie Klein called the "paranoidschizoid position"(RobinsandPost 1997). While not overtlypsychotic,the paranoid with suspicionsthatjustify bloody acts of position nonethelessinflamesthe terrorist the alacrityof the killer, "self-defense"againsthis victims: "the zeal of the torturer, represents his eagernessto destroythedevaluedanddisownedpartof the self"(Robins and Post 1997, 146). Post's paranoiatheory offers a developmentalmodel that explains not only why only a minorityof individualswith political grievancesturnsto terrorism kill those who do not appear butalso why terrorists to constituteanimminent threat.
Victoroff / THEMIND OF THETERRORIST 25
Post (1998, 2004) bases his theoryin parton an interpretation of the findingsof the that interviewed 250 radicals Germanpsychological team from the 1970s-mostly left-wing revolutionaries (Jiger, Schmidtchen,and Stillwold 1981; Billinger 1981). Unfortunately, despitethe earnestambitionsof thatmajorstudy,no formalmeasurementsof paranoia were used, therewas littleeffortto stratifyaccordingto hierarchical level androle, therewereno controls,andextrapolations fromthis subtypeof terrorists It seems plausible,for example,that to otherpoliticalcategoriesmaybe inappropriate. idethe studentradicalof the 1970s who adopteda flagrantlyantisocialrevolutionary ology is more likely to have exhibitedsome kind of psychological atypicalitythanis who chooses behaviorwidely thetypicalPalestinian extremistor SunniIraqiinsurgent supportedwithin his community.A scientificallyweak but plausiblecriticismof the paranoia theoryis providedby Sageman's(2004) findingthatnine of ten Muslimtercriticism roristbiographiesrevealedno evidence of paranoia.Yet the most important of such psychoanalyticaltheories is that it is impossible to test any hypothesisthat covertadultpsychodynamicforces to covertpsychosexualprocessespostuattributes latedto haveoccurreddecadesbefore,in infancy.Paranoia theory,like narcissismtheory, remains an intriguingalbeit impressionisticpsychoanalyticinterpretation that might, after controlledresearchusing validatedmeasuresof paranoia,someday be shown to explain some instancesof this very heterogeneousadultbehavior. Absolutist/Apocalyptic Theory HarvardpsychiatristRobert J. Lifton is anotherimportantcontributor. Lifton's (2000) majorrecent contribution is an accountof the Aum Shinrikyocult and other apocalypticgroupsthatenvision mass destruction as a pathtowardreplacingthe corruptworldwith a purenew social order.Apocalypticgroupstypicallyexhibitabsolutidealizationof a messianicfigure,and impairedrealitytesting, ist moralpolarization, of Jews. imaginingvast conspiraciesof evil such as a "worldshadow government" moralthinkinghelps motivateterrorism via Lifton's insights-that absolutist/totalist its seductive appeal to young adults with weak identities and that terroristsdefend themselves from normal emotional responses to violence through denial, psychic numbing,or isolationof affect-both fit withpsychoanalytic theory.Althoughneither absolutismnor isolationof affectby themselvesoffers an animusbelli or explainsthe specific impulse to harminnocents, it seems plausibleto predictthat irrationalviolence againstthe "other"would be precipitatedwhen pathologicaldefenses lead to black-and-white thinkingaboutthe out-groupcombinedwithparanoia aboutin-group annihilation. This is consistentwith the proposalof Devine and Rafalko(1982) to the effect that,paradoxically, moralistswho see the are often uncompromising terrorists world in starklypolarterms. to terrorism representsa compellingcombinaLifton's (2000) absolutistapproach tion of psychoanalyticdevelopmental theorywith a theoryof atypicalcognitive style. However,the evidence offeredto supportthis theoryconsists of a subjective,theoryinterviewswith a few individualswho maynotbe of unstructured driveninterpretation representative, fantasiesof worldand the postulatedexistentialistdespair,irrational
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wide dominion,andpathologicallydependentgroupbehaviorof apocalypticcults led by messianic leaders seem to characterize only a small minorityof terroristactions. One must still explain the majority. The great strengths of psychoanalytic interpretationsof terrorism are their thatindividualdevelopmentalfactorsbeginningin early childhood acknowledgment probablyinfluence adult behavioralproclivities,their recognitionof the enormous power of the unconsciousto influence conscious thought,and theirobservationthat The greatweakcovertpsychodynamicforces of groupsmay subsumeindividuality. ness is theirlack of falsifiability.Psychoanalysishas been largely abandonedamong modern psychiatristsprecisely because it rejects the scientific method, asking that adherentsaccept its propositionsas received wisdom. This is not by any means to deny that early childhood,unconsciousprocesses, and group dynamicsmay be key pseudoHowever,psychoanalytic claimsregarding factorsin the genesis of terrorism. stagesof sexualitycannotbe condynamicstied to presumptive physicalintrapsychic firmedaccordingto the modernmethodsof social andbehavioralscience. A less ideological and more empirical psychodynamic model that nonetheless considers the crucialrole of the unconscious-tested, for example,via controlledresearchexamining whether a stratifiedsubgroupof terroristsexhibit elevated scores on validated measures of maternal rejection, self-absorption, or paranoia-might more persuasively demonstratehow developmentaland unconscious processes help drive terrorism.
NONPSYCHOANALYTICPSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES OF TERRORISM
Cognitive Theories Cognitivecapacity refersto mentalfunctionssuch as memory,attention,concentration,language, and the so-called "executive"functions,includingthe capacityto outcomes,to makesensibleinferences,andto perlearnandfollow rules,to anticipate accurate risk-benefit calculations form (Lezak 1995). Many of these mental operaare within the prefrontal dorsolateral cortexof thebrain,a largeneural tions conducted association region that attends to perceptionof present circumstances,previously learnedassociations, and emotions to calculate and activateadaptiveplans. In contrast,the capacityto restrainimpulses and comportone's behaviorto social expectations depends on the ventromedialcortex, a region that sits just behind the eyes (Gazzaniga2000; Mesulam2000). Cognitivestyle refersto ways of thinking-that is, factorsin decision makbiases, prejudices,or tendenciesto over- or underemphasize has beenpaidto thepossiing. Apartfromreportsof absolutistthinking,littleattention exhibitidiosyncrasiesof eithercognitive or subtypesof terrorists, bility thatterrorists, capacityor cognitive style. evidence exists thatviolent behavioris influencedby cognitive capacSubstantial ity and/orstyle (Bryantet al. 1984; Kandelet al. 1988; Satterfield1998; Ernstet al. 2003). It has also been proposedthatcognitive style influencesthe aggressivebehav-
ior of political leaders(Satterfield1998). It is temptingto speculatethatvariationsin either the capacity or style of thoughtmight affect the likelihood that an individual would sympathizewith,join, follow, or lead a terrorist group.It is also plausiblethat knowledge of typical variationsin cognitive capacityor style might supplementthe rational choice approach to help predict otherwise unaccountablebehaviors in responseto contingenciessuch as interactionswith governments.Unfortunately, this potentiallyrich vein of study has hardlybeen mined. Taylorand Quayle (1994), for groups make a fundamental example, speculatedthatyoung people joining terrorist error,a cognitivebias inaccuratelyattributing devious and evil motives to attribution this reasonthose theyperceiveas oppressors.However,they offer no datasupporting able-soundingclaim and no solutionto this potentialproblem,a cognitive factorthat might accountfor certaincomplicationsof conflict resolution.While some classified cognitivecapacitiesof young terrorists dataexist regarding (e.g., Merari1998, 2002), the open literaturedoes not reportneuropsychologicalfindings meaningfullycomparingterrorists or ex-terrorists with matchednonterrorists. Sidanius (1985) conductedone study of potentialimportanceto the question of cognitive style among terrorists:to examine cognitive factors in differenttypes of extremism,he measured conservatism, cognitiveflexibility,cognitivecomplexity,and of using normed and validated instruments,including the ambiguity intolerance BudnerIntolerance of AmbiguityScale (Budner1962), in a randomlyselectedsample of 195 Swedishhigh school students.Respondentswere classified as extremeleftists, moderateleftists,moderate,moderate to theorightists,or extremerightists.Contrary ries claimingthatextremismis associatedwith cognitive limitations,extremeleftists and moderaterightistshad the highest cognitive complexity;moderateshad the lowthe rigidityof right-wingvalues,less regarding est. Consistentwith some assumptions cognitive flexibility was associatedwith more sexual repressionand greatergeneral conservatism.Perhapsmost useful for the analysis of terrorism,reduced cognitive flexibility was associatednot only with intoleranceof ambiguity,especially the need Thus, it seems for certaintyand uniformity,but also with racismand ethnocentrism. drivenby a black-andworthexploringwhetherthose who become ethnic terrorists, white animus that does not accept the possibility of valued characteristicsamong membersof the out-group,aremorelikely to exhibitthe traitof cognitiveinflexibility. These findingsperhapsmeshwith those of CanettiandPedahzur (2002), who reported that right-wingextremismamong Israelis is associatedwith authoritarian attitudes, beliefs. xenophobia,and supernatural workwouldbe neededto determine whethercognitivefactorssuch as Muchfurther a predictable a generaltraitof terrorists, trait inflexibilitymightconceivablyrepresent of a politicalsubgroup of terrorists, or a traitof leadersthatmightbe identifiedby analysis at a distance.Findingsin this areamayconceivablyhavestrategicimportance. For example, terroristswith diminishedexecutive function will fail to anticipatefuture consequences.As a result,theirresponsesto negotiationor threatmay be less predictable. Those with excessive intoleranceof ambiguityor cognitive inflexibilitymay be unableto appreciate nuance,and more irrational less adaptable, in bargaining. Political psychologists could potentiallycapitalizeon these factorsto help refine security
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OF CONFLICT JOURNAL RESOLUTION
plans, identifyingbehavioralmarkers who are more or less thatdistinguishterrorists likely to follow projectedpaths. Novelty-Seeking Theory to specific innateaspects of temSome psychologicaltheoriesattribute terrorism perament.For example, developmentaltheories might predictthat youngsterswith would be disproportionately aggressivetemperaments to terrorist attracted organizations (Pettit1997). However,no publishedresearchsupportsthis intuitivelyplausible psychologicalanalysisof 227 left-wing German supposition.In fact, a semistructured of aggressivity(Jager,Schmidtchen, andSillwold militantsfoundno commonpattern 1981). Anotherpossibilityis thatterrorism is associatedwith the traitof novelty seeking. Terrorist thrillingactionoutsidethe realm planningandexecutionis indisputably experience,andmanytheoristshaveopinedthatpoliticalviolence may satof ordinary risk, and needs for high-level stimulation, isfy innate,perhapsgeneticallydetermined catharsis(Hacker1983; Kellen 1979;Levine 1999). Possibly consistentwith this proposal, many incarcerated terroristshave expressed their pleasureand excitementat being involved in such thrillingaction (Juergensmeyer 2000). IsraeliPrimeMinister YitshakShamir,who spenthis early adulthoodwith the terrorist Irgun, organization conceivablyhintedat the samewhen he said, "Thatperiodin the underground was the best partof my life" (Marton1996, 53). The "romance of risk"mayexplainthe special affinity of teenagersfor such behavior:adolescentanxieties, sexual frustration, and to risk takingmay play a role in a dangerousflirtationwith developmentalattraction political violence (Ponton 1997; Levine 1999). This thesis raisestwo issues: first, sensationandnovelty seeking, a normativefeature of adolescentdevelopmentprobablytied to expected changes in neuralactivity involvement.Second, (Dahl 2004), may play a role in the naturalhistoryof terrorist and probably the personalitytraitof novelty seeking-a measurable, nonnormative, geneticallyinfluencedcharacteristic thatpersistsin certainindividualswell into adulthood (Zuckerman 2002)-possibly distinguishesthose who aremorelikely to be terto the firstpoint,evidencesuggeststhatthetypicaldeveloprorismprone.Withregard ment of terrorist sympathiesperhapsfollows an arc:young adolescentsare plastic in theirpoliticalorientation andopen to indoctrination. Positionshardenin lateradolesanddescence suchthat,as Saper(1988, 26) putit, "oncebelief systems,resentments,
perate response tendencies are rigidly instilled . . . they are virtually impossible to
At the far end of the arc, reductionin destructiveness may occur modify belatedly." with maturity: interviewswith many"retired" terrorists haverevealeda mellowingof attitudeconsistentwith the theory that enthusiasmfor terroristaction is primarilya phenomenonof late adolescenceand early adulthood(Laqueur1987; developmental Levine 1999; Akhtar1999). So the normative developmental formof novelty seeking the Withregard point,no studieshave probablydoes contribute to terrorism. second to yet been reportedassessing the association between terroristsand adult-persistent traitsof risk taking or novelty seeking. While it seems plausiblethat nonnormative individualsexhibitingsuch traitsaredisproportionately amongterrorists, represented
evidence, it is premature to concludethatthis atypicalpersonality pendingsupportive featurehelps drive terrorism. Humiliation-Revenge Theory Humiliation-and the consequentinternalpressurefor revenge-is anotherpsychological factor that has been hypothesized to drive terrorist violence 2000). Revengefor humiliationby an oppressoris, in fact, an ancient (Juergensmeyer culturaltraditionwith direct links to the currentviolence in the Middle East. The embodiedin the image of Christon the cross, was oppressionof the early Christians, for the apocalypticmovementin Christianity partof the inspiration thatculminatedin the FirstCrusade(Armstrong 2001). A cycle of oppressionandhumiliation,followed by violent actionin the nameof liberation,characterizes the subsequenthistoryof the MiddleEast. PalestinianpsychiatristEyad el Sarraj(2002) has specifically observed thathumiliationis an important factormotivatingyoung suicide bombers.Dr. Abdul Aziz Rantisi,the late political leaderof Hamas,confirmedthis notion in a statement published three years before his death via targetedkilling by the Israeli Defense and humiliation" Forces:"Todie in this way is betterthanto die daily in frustration (Juergensmeyer 2000, 187). Several other authoritiesalso propose that humiliation, eitherby parentsin earlychildhoodor by politicaloppressorslaterin life, can provoke butno quantitative researchhas yet exploredthis hypothesis(Crayton1983; terrorism, Volkan1997; Stern2003). Whetherconsideredfromthe psychoanalyticpointof view as an inevitabledynamicconsequenceof narcissisticinjuryor from the nonpsychoanalyticpoint of view as a painfulsocial stressor,humiliationseems plausibleas the rootof anurgeto retaliateagainstpoliticalentitiesthatareperceivedto be responsible. of gives rise to a The conceptthatfeelings of humiliationor being takenadvantage forensic criminology very psychiatry is and andprobafamiliar passionfor revenge in (Miller murders Brooks, Thomas, many and 1993; contributes to nonpolitical bly Droppleman 1996; Schlesinger 2000; Meloy 2001). Note that revenge, in itself, should not be regardedas antisocialbehaviorbut as a normaland potentiallyuseful formalizesthis featureof social contracts,emphasizingretriactivity.Jurisprudence andpolitieshaveused vengeancefor misdeedsto maintain butionin partas deterrence, the War. since integrity at least Trojan their Indeed,revengeis anemotionthatis probathe to rooted adaptive in bly deeply instinct punishtransgressors who violate the contractsof social species;hence, it is a motivator thatoften servesnot only the goals of a and Parker1995). vengeful individualbut also the goals of his group(Clutton-Brock In this sense, revengeis often prosocialand sometimes-if the vengeancetaker(e.g., Achilles or suicidebombers)standsto sufferandhis groupto gain-even altruistic.In a recent study combining psychological with functional neuroimagingstudies in et al. (2004) showedthatindividualspunishsocial transgressors humans,de Quervain even when it is quitecostly to the punisher, andtheyreported evidencethatthis altruistic behaviorwas drivenby deep subcorticalbrainactivitythatmay have overruledthe more rationalcortex. Knutson(2004) highlights the self-defeating and emotionally driven natureof vengeance demonstrated by this study, stating that these findings
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"chip yet anothersliver from the rationalmodel of economic man."While this science intriguinglyhelps to explainhow revengemight motivateterrorists andperhaps governmentsto commit murderousbehaviors without likely strategicbenefits, no questionnaire dataor measurements of subjectivehumiliation,desire for revenge,or emotionalsatisfactionafterretribution have yet been pubin terrorists or ex-terrorists lished. This plausibletheoryawaitsbettersubstantiation.
THEORIES OF GROUP PROCESS Most publishedpsychological theoriesexplain terrorismas the productof group subcultures thatcoalesce in reactionto circumstances psychology withinidiosyncratic they perceiveas intolerable(Taylorand Ryan 1988; Friedland1992; Hoffman 1998; Merari 1998; Levine 1999; Post 2004; Sageman 2004). Membershipin a terrorist offersdisciplesa headyliquorof a well-definedpersonalrole, a righteous organization andthe liftingof conpurpose,the opportunity for revengefor perceivedhumiliations, straintson the expression of otherwise prohibitedbehaviors-freeing the member frompersonalresponsibility for attackson out-groups(Hacker1983;TaylorandRyan 1988; Weinbergand Eubank1994; Stern 1999). Groupforces, includingideological indoctrination,repetitive training, and peer pressures,have been hypothesized to influencethe group'sviolence, whetheror not individualmemberswere predisposed to such behavior(Crenshaw1992; Clayton,Barlow,and Ballif-Spanvill1998). This mayoccurbecausecollectiveidentitysubsumesindividual identity.As Post, Sprinzak, and Denny (2003, 176) put it, "Anoverarchingsense of the collective consumes the individual.This fusion with the groupseems to providethe necessaryjustificationfor This descriptionof the subtheiractionswith an attendant loss of felt responsibility." mersion of individualityis very reminiscentof Eric Hoffer's (1951, 128) statement that people who plunge into mass movements "arefashioned into incomplete and dependenthumanbeings even when they have withinthemselvesthe makingof selfsufficiententities." fromthe mainstream may increasethe potencyof colWithdrawal lectivethought:basedon a semiquantitative reviewof life historiesof morethan1,500 Italianand Germanmilitants,greaterisolation is associatedwith greaterseparation from social reality (della Porta 1992). The principaldebate among those discussing group versus individualfactors in political violence centerson whethergroup dynamicsare sufficientin and of themor whetherindividualhistoryandperselves to turnan averagepersoninto a terrorist sonality must be consideredas well. Sageman, one strong proponentof the group hypothesis,goes so faras to say that"it'sa groupphenomenon.To searchfor individual characteristics . . . will lead you to a dead end" (Rotella 2004, A3). However,
Sageman'spsychiatricassessmentsof Islamic mujahedinwere exclusively based on secondarysourcesthatdid not includeanyobjectivebehavioral data,so his conclusion seems premature. Rasch(1979, 82) observedthatthe dynamicsof living in a terrorist grouptendsto alienateone fromothersbutthat"thestarting point andpersonalneeds grouparevery differentfor the different existing at the time of entryinto the terrorist terrorists." This claim of initial psychological heterogeneity followed by group-
inducedhomogenizationappearssensible,butit requiresempiricalverification.Conis notpurelya group sistentwiththis theory,Friedland (1992) postulated thatterrorism phenomenonbutis obviouslythe resultof an interaction betweensocial processesand individual dispositions. However, he proposes three conditions under which inditurning: vidualproclivityto violence is a relativelyminorfactorin the group'sterrorist (1) deprivationis intense, (2) the group has ideologized its discontent,and (3) the groupis cohesive andclearlydifferentiated fromthe out-group.He gives the example whose specialcircumstances of the Palestinians, driveindividualswith no specialpropensityto violence to undertake terrorist acts. This formulation seems plausibleon its surface.However,one still mustaccountfor the fact that,while most Palestinianssupno publishedstudies portsuicidebombing,a very smallminoritydoes it. Furthermore, support the propositionthatthese threeconditionsincreasegroupdynamicsuccess in drivingnonviolentpersonsto politicalviolence. Unless anduntil systematicresearch is conducted making in-depth psychological comparisons between terroristsand matched controls from identical political circumstancesand estimating prememwillingnessto harminnocents,one cannotmeaningfully bershipandpostmembership influence of individualand groupfactors. quantifythe relative
LIMITS AND IMPEDIMENTS TO BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE RESEARCH ON TERRORISM WalterReich (1998, 262) has warnedthat"psychologicalaccountsof Psychiatrist terrorismare replete with explanationsthat ignore or blur the variety and complexfor the need for evidence, and ity... a productof loose andweak thinking,a disregard endemicin so manyareasof psychologicaldiscourse,of havthe habit,unfortunately ing a single idea and applying it to everything."Reich's strong caveat against overgeneralization andreductionismis a vital counterto the potpourri of psychologiby terrorism scholars.In this, he supportsCorrado's(1981) cal theoriespromulgated criticalreview of the mentaldisordersapproach to politicalterrorism; Corradostates thata terrorist personalityprobablydoes not exist and thatefforts to psychopathologize this type of aggressionarerootedin biased theory,not in unbiaseddata. and unwarranted Caveats against overgeneralization medicalizationof terrorist behaviorsare logical and important. Yet it seems reasonableto seek a middle ground between the reductionist position thatproposesa single psychology of terrorism and the nihilist position that denies any explicit psychology of terrorism.That is, until a rigorouseffortis madeto investigatethe nullhypothesisvia the collectionof empirical to conclude that there are no distinguishingpsychological evidence, it is premature amongthetinyminorityof individuals who arewilling to senda terrifycharacteristics ing political message to a targetaudienceby attackinginnocentnoncombatants. Whyhas thebehavioralscience communityso farfailedto amassa persuasivebody of evidence in this domain? Multiple practical and theoretical impedimentshave delayedthe scientificpsychological studyof terrorism. Most of the practicalbarriers areobvious.Forexample,terrorism researchmay involveexpensiveandinconvenient travelto politicallyunstableregions,is potentiallydangerous,andraisesethicalissues
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that may challenge institutionalreview boards (e.g., Wieviorka 1995; Brannan, Eslerm, and Anders Strindberg2001). These issues may explain why journalists, proportion ratherthanacademics,have publisheda substantial of the availableliterature reportingbehavioralobservationsof terrorists.Active terroristsmay have little motivationto cooperatewith behavioralassessment, and inactiveterroristsmay no longerexhibitthe psychology of interest(Reich 1998). Languagebarriers-including the lack of expert translationsof high-qualitypsychological instruments-frustrate collection of data. Authoritiesmay deny scholars access to incarceratedterrorists because of security concerns and the perceptionthat such assessmentsare not pertinentto counterterrorism. A theoretical issue thatseriouslylimitsthe utilityof interviewswith specificterrorto some publishedhypotheses,terrorism is not a ists or groupsis the fact that,contrary unitarybehavior(Crenshaw1986; Laqueur1987; Haroun1999). As a result,theories thatattempt begin with a premise to generalizeandreducethe psychology of terrorism thatis inconsistentwith the availableobservations, and studiesbasedon such theories will produceresultswith limitedpredictivevalue since they conflatedatafrommixed Classifyingterrorism populations. accordingto probable homogeneouspsychological subtypesthatare"atleast descriptive,inclusive,discrete,endowedwith forecastingor prognostic value, policy-generating, possibly etiological, and theoretically grounded," preliminary as advisedby Ferracuti (1982, 132), may be an indispensable data(Wilson2000). Moreover,as step to designingresearchprojectsandinterpreting Crenshaw(1986, 384-85) urged,"theanalysisof terrorism deals with the intersection of psychological predispositions(which may be derivedas much from priorexperience andsocializationas frompsychologicaltraitsemergingfromearlychildhoodand A completeunderstanding of the psychology infancy)andthe externalenvironment." therefore,will requirethe difficultinvestigationof the dynamicsof that of terrorism, of the forces of groupdynamicsand a intersection,in concertwith an understanding quantitative analyses of events, a challenge demanding an interdisciplinary perspectivebeyond the bordersof parochialregimes. Fundinghas long been a problem,with limitedfederalsupport(Jenkins1983). In 2004, the U.S. Homeland Security Department(DHS) published a Broad Agency HomelandSecurityCenter Announcementsolicitingproposalsfor a university-based for BehavioralandSocial Aspects of Terrorism andCounter-terrorism, to be fundedat Homeland Security $4 millionperyearfor threeyears(U.S. Department 2004). On of hand, first, the research is support this a historic on this one largestgranteverofferedto hand, a very smallproportion the amountinvolvedrepresents vital issue. On the other of the DHS researchbudgetof morethan$500 millionperyear(Brumfiel2003) anda emphasizesmodeling "to paltrypartof the U.S. defense budget.The announcement detect, prevent,preparefor, and respondto terroristactivity at the earliest possible point in time" (U.S. Departmentof HomelandSecurity2004, 8). The above review suggeststhatthat"earliest pointin time"may occurdecadespriorto the formationof a group or the planningof an attackand may relateto a combustibleconverterrorist gence of historical,political, and psychosocial factors.Psychological researchmay contribute most to long-termnationalsecurityby an open-mindedexplorationof the with a time horizonthatextendsfarbeyond imminentthreats deep roots of terrorism,
and a conceptualhorizonthatextends beyond the traditional mission of intelligence services. barriers to scientificresearchon terrorism may have deeper But the most important origins. like a sharkattack,wields tremendouspsychological impact.It is rare Terrorism, but awesome, deriving almost mystical significance by virtue of the suddenness, drama,and outrageousnessof its violence (Zulaikaand Douglass 1996; Mahmood 2001). But terroristsare not bogeymen, and both behavioral scientists and the mind-setby procounterterrorism communitymustbe waryof explainingthe terrorist to act in this way. "Terrorists," writespsychoanalyst jecting the stateof mindrequired into which one can projectone's unconLloyd DeMause(1986, 419), are"containers While statement scious hostility." this again presumes a difficult-to-testpsychodynamictheory,it is legitimateto proposethatsubjectivityconfoundsthe design and the interpretation of terrorismstudies. That is, in both the scholarly and counterterrorism excites passions realms,one mustacknowledgethepossibilitythatterrorism thaterode logical discourse,leading to responsesthatarereactiveand enragedrather adopts thanproactiveandanalytical(ZulaikaandDouglass 1996). Justas the terrorist absolutistthinkingto justify his indefensiblyimmoralactions, the horrificthreatof terrorismmay perhaps provoke absolutist thinking about terroristsamong some observersand may conceivablylead threatened groupsnot only to discountthe value the availabledatabutalso to rationalize of objectivestudyandprejudgeor misinterpret of civil rights in the name of a war on terrorism extralegalsteps and the curtailment (Pettit 1997). In his WorldWar I-era essay, "Thoughtsfor the Times on War and Death,"Freud (1953-1974) admonishedthat nation-statessometimes "makeuse of theirintereststo rationalizetheirpassions."This hypothesisitself could be the subject of study. A culturaldividealso separates behavioralscientistsfromlaw enforcement,intelliposition forces occupy an adversarial gence, andmilitarypersonnel:counterterrorism and must steel themselves against any sympatheticconsiderationof the terrorist's position. Behavioral scientists, no matterhow much they despise terroristactions, must steel themselvesto adoptthe position of unbiasedobserversand interpreters of behavior(Soskis 1983). While behavioralscientists may recognize markedpsychological heterogeneityandeven prosocialfeaturesof terrorists thatmight be exploited in the developmentof policy, counterterrorism forces and even policy makersmay resist suchconclusionsdue to culturalbias, cognitiveinflexibility,or attribution error. by isoThis divide unfortunately may undercutthe effectivenessof counterterrorism lating practitioners from theorists-a separationakin to isolating engineersfrom the discoveriesof physicists.
CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS includea broadspectrumof socioThe leadingpsychologicaltheoriesof terrorism logical, psychological,andpsychiatricapproaches.Strikingly, virtuallynone of them has been testedin a systematicway. They areoverwhelminglysubjective,speculative,
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TABLE3
PsychologicalVariablesPotentiallyIdentifyingTerrorist Subtypes
Variable Reality testing Sociality Temperament Classification Nonpsychoticvs. psychotic Prosocialvs. antisocial Typicalvs. atypicalfor culture Atypically aggressive/hostile Novelty seeking Identityseeking anxiety) Affectively atypical(depression,irritability, Vulnerable to charismaticinfluence Sensitiveto perceptionof oppression Sensitiveto humiliation Vengeful Self-destructive Normalvs. impaired Executivefunctionimpairment Impulsecontrolimpairment Typicalvs. atypicalfor culture Intoleranceof ambiguity Low vs. high complexity Leadervs. follower
Cognitivecapacity
Cognitivestyle
Dominance
and, in many cases, derivedfrom 1920s-erapsychoanalytichypothesesthat are not mightjustifiablyconclude from the peeramenableto testing. Studentsof terrorism the total number literature of reviewed that publishedtheoriesexceeds the numberof empiricalstudies-an imbalancethatmay be of morethanacademicimport.Even the smallamountof psychologicalresearchis largelyflawed,rarelyhavingbeen basedon scientificmethodsusingnormedandvalidatedmeasuresof psychologicalstatus,comwith appropriate of individuals controls,andtestinghypothparingdirectexamination eses with accepted statisticalmethods. Insofar as policy makersrely on published analysesof the "themindof the terrorist," policies intendedto reducetheriskof terrorresearch ism may be basedon invalidpremises.The best solutionis hypothesis-based thatend, I offer severalpreliminary conclusions andevidence-basedpolicies. Toward and proposals: alwaysdetermined behavior of innate factors, by a combination 1. Terrorist is probably factors, factors, envicognitive factors, biological earlydevelopmental temperament, 3). Thedegree ronmental andgroup influences, dynamics to whicheachof (seeTable to a giveneventprobably contributes varies terrorists, thesefactors between individual typesof groups. groups, Theories thatclaimthepreindividual andbetween between theothers have sincenostudies dominance over of oneof theseinfluences arepremature morethanone or twoof thesefactors, systematically let aloneempirically examined onewhilecontrolling Inparticular, themuch-cited examined fortheothers. claimthat terrorists oncompletely thoseatriskforbecoming noindividual identify factors is based research. inadequate
A new model is needed,one thataccommodatesthe multiplicityof forces at workto arriveat plausibleandtestableconsilience-that is, a unifiedtheorythatis explanatory across levels of analysis and examples of terroristactivity.One possibility is a neuroeconomic model thatacknowledgesthe ultimateadaptivenatureof this behavior,modified by an empiricallybased psychology identifying the influence of individualand subtype is unequivocallya multiplyandvariablydetermined groupdynamics.Terrorism of humanaggression.Recognizing this fact may be the first step towardthe extremely challengingjob of designingresearch,conductingresearch,and interpreting data. 2. Terrorists arepsychologicallyextremelyheterogeneous.Whateverhis statedgoals and groupof identity,every terrorist, like everyperson,is motivatedby his own complex of psychosocial experiences and traits.Plausible psychological variablesand classes of in Table3. behaviorare summarized 3. Terroristsexhibiting differentpsychological subtypes probablyconform to different behavioralproclivities.It is plausiblebutyet to be proventhatdifferenttypes of terrorism disproportionately attractindividualswith specific temperaments. Futureresearch should attemptto determinethe most likely psychological types among terroristsin groupswith differentpolitical orientations, as well as the relationship betweenpsychological types, individualroles in the group, and typical responses to constraints.For amongterrorists who are example,the psychology,morality,andresponseto bargaining differentfromthat prosocialin theirorientation may proveto be dramatically primarily Leadersand followers tend to be psychologically distinct.Beof antisocialterrorists. cause leadershiptends to requireat least moderatecognitive capacity,assumptionsof rationalitypossibly apply better to leaders than to followers. Those with diminished cognitive flexibility executivefunctionmay be less predictable.Those with subnormal may be less adaptableand more irrational in bargaining. Those with atypicaltemperaments-who aredrivenby an excessive need for self-affirmation, hatred,vengefulness, Improvedmodeling of markers or self-destructiveness-may behave more erratically. of psychological subtypesmay enhancethe predictionof terrorist behaviors. of 4. Acceptingthatterrorists areheterogeneous, fourtraitsmaypossiblybe characteristics "typical"terrorists who lead or follow in substategroups: a. High affective valence regardingan ideological issue b. A personalstake-such as stronglyperceivedoppression,humiliation,or persecuneed for identity,glory,or vengeance;or a drivefor expression tion;anextraordinary of intrinsic aggressivity-that distinguisheshim or her from the vast majorityof those who fulfill characteristic a andelevatedtendencytoward c. Low cognitiveflexibility,low tolerancefor ambiguity, error attribution d. A capacityto suppressboth instinctiveandlearnedmoralconstraintsagainstharming innocents, whether due to intrinsic or acquired factors, individual or group forces-probably influencedby a, b, and c Thesefourcharacteristics of research.They seem plausiblebasedon the abovesummary are testablehypothesesproposedfor furtherstudy. to some degree,expectedindi5. It seems plausiblethatthe cultureof origindifferentiates, vidual and group dynamics. However, group theory would predict that the internal of a terrorist groupis influencedas muchby the specific personalityof psychodynamics of its followers as accordingto any systematicdifferits leaderand the temperaments vs. religious). ence accordingto politically types (e.g., nationalist/separatist 6. The current thrustof strategicchoice studiesfocuses on predictingthe behaviorof comForthepurposesof long-termsecuritypolicy formulation, mittedterrorists. anincreased emphasisshouldbe placedon earlyprevention, thatis, on the analysisof the interaction between those psychological, cultural,economic, and political factors that influence uncommitted but impressionableyoung people to turntowardterrorism.
36
7. A balance must be achieved between the benefits of secrecy and the urgentneed to advanceknowledgein this field. Restrictedaccess to datawill slow scholarlyprogress with unknownconsequencesto nationalandinternational security.A reviewof the ultito optimateimpactof this issue at the highestlevels of securitypolicy may be required barriers. mize this balanceand overcomepotentiallycounterproductive 8. Scholarsmust be willing to attemptresearchthatbringsthem into directcontactwith active terrorists, recentlyactive terrorists, or those at risk for becomingterrorists. Noncoercive recruitment, voluntaryparticipation, and informedconsent are essential. 9. A majorinvestmentis required to advancethe field of the behavioralandsocial aspects of terrorism. Meaningfulresearchis likely to be interdisciplinary, empirical,controlled, ethical, conductedacross levels of analysis, anddirectedat root causes andmodifiable riskfactorsalong the entirechain of causalityfromhistoricalforces to childhoodinfluact. Since the best expertsin anydisciplineareinevitaences to the momentof a terrorist bly scatteredgeographically,ratherthan dependingon a single center of excellence, fundingcommensurate with the magnitudeof the threatshouldbe availableon a competitivebasis to seriousscholarswhereverthey workthroughindependent science supporterssuch as the NationalScience Foundationor the Department of Defense. The problem is to ask questions the answers to which are most likely to make a difference for security, to prioritize research within the remarkable spectrum of possible investigations, and to develop practical projects. For example, is the carrot of perceived concern for victims of disenfranchisement or the stick of high-altitude bombing a better investment in reducing the psychological forces nurturing the next generation of potential terrorists? What observable behavioral traits distinguish terrorist groups or leaders who would be likely to back away from aggression if their grievances were addressed by negotiation, as opposed to traits distinguishing groups that can only be deterred by force? Is the social influence of fundamentalist madrasas associated with a measurable increase in the likelihood of adult terrorist behavior? If so, could support for alternative, culturally valued education help impressionable young people find more productive foci for their high emotional energy? Do economic prospects and a sense of personal hope reduce the lure of terrorism? If so, what socioeconomic or psychological factors modify that association, and what cost-benefit formula is applicable? Do psychological traits of leaders of target nations drive policies that mitigate or exacerbate the threat? Answers to these and similar questions may be part of the key to avoiding catastrophic violence in the twenty-first century.
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The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches Author(s): Jeff Victoroff Reviewed work(s): Source:

The Mind of the Terrorist

Terrorism has surelyexisted since before the dawn of recordedhistory(Merariand

2002). It perhapswould not be an probablya warningof events to come (Gunaratna

2005 Sage Publications

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Middle Manage ment

State authority figure Substate group sponsor

Selfimagined idealist Selfimagined messianic

Political policy maker Military policy maker

Foot soldier/ action perpetrator

Individual Ethnic or financial religious contributor animusdriven EntrepreneurI

Trainer/ dispatcher Supplier/ armorer

Researcher/ surveyor errand runner Transporter/ harborer

Sympathizer/ fellow traveler Figure 1: Roles and Types within TerroristHierarchies

Victoroff/ THEMIND OF THE TERRORIST 7

OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION JOURNAL

Clark(1983) Weinbergand Eubank(1987)

Pedahzur, Perliger, andWeinberg (2003) Sageman(2004)

NOTE:NA = not available;ETA= Euzkadita Askatasuna.

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