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Quindell PLC: A Country Club Built On Quicksand

Quindell PLC: A Country Club Built On Quicksand

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Published by gothamcityresearch
Gotham City Research initiates coverage on Quindell PLC, with a price of 3p/share (92% downside)

SUMMARY

42%-80% of Quindell’s profits are suspect, as we are unable to reconcile the whole with the sum of the parts.

Quindell was little more than a country club until 2008/2009, yet QPP somehow began reporting Microsoft/Google-esque profit margins in 2010/2011.

26%-43% of Quindell’s 2009 and 2010 revenues came from Clickus4.com, a subsidiary owned by CEO Robert Terry.

41% of Quindell’s 2011 revenues came from an undisclosed related party (controlled by a QPP executive).

10+ acquisitions lack economic substance. Several of the acquired companies are little more than paper companies.

QPP’s largest telematics customer is itself (via subsidiaries Himex & Ingenie), accounting for 61% of 2013 revenue.

99% & 80% of Himex’s 2012 and 2013 balance sheets are seriously deficient (Himex is QPP’s largest acquisition).

Former executives allege Himex/Navseeker lied to them about its financial state and that in effect they were operating a Ponzi-style scheme.

2011-2013 accounts receivable are between 86%-231% of revenue, while deferred revenue only 1%-2% of revenue.

Nearly all of CEO Terry’s £11 mm personal investment into Quiindell was used to build Quindell the country club.

Quindell fails to explain how its personal injury business complies with Lord Jackson’s reforms & referral fee ban.

The Chairman of the Transport Select Committee, Louise Ellman recently initiated a probe to determine whether ABSs are used to side-step the Jackson reforms.

3 auditors in 3 years, since 2011.
Gotham City Research initiates coverage on Quindell PLC, with a price of 3p/share (92% downside)

SUMMARY

42%-80% of Quindell’s profits are suspect, as we are unable to reconcile the whole with the sum of the parts.

Quindell was little more than a country club until 2008/2009, yet QPP somehow began reporting Microsoft/Google-esque profit margins in 2010/2011.

26%-43% of Quindell’s 2009 and 2010 revenues came from Clickus4.com, a subsidiary owned by CEO Robert Terry.

41% of Quindell’s 2011 revenues came from an undisclosed related party (controlled by a QPP executive).

10+ acquisitions lack economic substance. Several of the acquired companies are little more than paper companies.

QPP’s largest telematics customer is itself (via subsidiaries Himex & Ingenie), accounting for 61% of 2013 revenue.

99% & 80% of Himex’s 2012 and 2013 balance sheets are seriously deficient (Himex is QPP’s largest acquisition).

Former executives allege Himex/Navseeker lied to them about its financial state and that in effect they were operating a Ponzi-style scheme.

2011-2013 accounts receivable are between 86%-231% of revenue, while deferred revenue only 1%-2% of revenue.

Nearly all of CEO Terry’s £11 mm personal investment into Quiindell was used to build Quindell the country club.

Quindell fails to explain how its personal injury business complies with Lord Jackson’s reforms & referral fee ban.

The Chairman of the Transport Select Committee, Louise Ellman recently initiated a probe to determine whether ABSs are used to side-step the Jackson reforms.

3 auditors in 3 years, since 2011.

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Categories:Types, Presentations
Published by: gothamcityresearch on Apr 21, 2014
Copyright:Traditional Copyright: All rights reserved

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11/21/2014

 
GOTHAM CITY RESEARCH LLC 󰁷󰁷󰁷.󰁧󰁯󰁴󰁨󰁡󰁭󰁣󰁩󰁴󰁹󰁲󰁥󰁳󰁥󰁡󰁲󰁣󰁨.󰁣󰁯󰁭 󰁩󰁮󰁦󰁯@󰁧󰁯󰁴󰁨󰁡󰁭󰁣󰁩󰁴󰁹󰁲󰁥󰁳󰁥󰁡󰁲󰁣󰁨.󰁣󰁯󰁭 
GOTHAM CITY RESEARCHGOTHAM CITY RESEARCHGOTHAM CITY RESEARCHGOTHAM CITY RESEARCH LLCLLCLLCLLC
Q󰁵󰁩󰁮󰁤󰁥󰁬󰁬 PLC: A C󰁯󰁵󰁮󰁴󰁲󰁹 C󰁬󰁵󰁢 B󰁵󰁩󰁬󰁴 O󰁮 Q󰁵󰁩󰁣󰁫󰁳󰁡󰁮󰁤
󲀜󰁔󰁨󰁥 G󰁲󰁯󰁵󰁰 󰁛󰁑󰁵󰁩󰁮󰁤󰁥󰁬󰁬󰁝 󰁩󰁳 󰁡 󰁐󰁯󰁲󰁴󰁦󰁯󰁬󰁩󰁯 󰁏󰁦 󰁥󰁳󰁴󰁡󰁢󰁬󰁩󰁳󰁨󰁥󰁤 E󰁴󰁨󰁩󰁣󰁡󰁬, I󰁮󰁤󰁵󰁳󰁴󰁲󰁹 󰁔󰁲󰁵󰁳󰁴󰁥󰁤, E󰁸󰁰󰁥󰁲󰁴 󰁔󰁥󰁣󰁨󰁮󰁯󰁬󰁯󰁧󰁹 󰁡󰁮󰁤 B󰁵󰁳󰁩󰁮󰁥󰁳󰁳 󰁐󰁲󰁯󰁣󰁥󰁳󰁳 󰁓󰁥󰁲󰁶󰁩󰁣󰁥 󰁣󰁯󰁭󰁰󰁡󰁮󰁩󰁥󰁳.󲀝 󲀓
Q󰁵󰁩󰁮󰁤󰁥󰁬󰁬 CEO, 󰁒󰁯󰁢󰁥󰁲󰁴 󰁔󰁥󰁲󰁲󰁹
 
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󰂣 12󰁭 󰁰󰁥󰁲󰁳󰁯󰁮󰁡󰁬󰁬󰁹󲀜 
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74
 
D󰁩󰁳󰁣󰁬󰁡󰁩󰁭󰁥󰁲:
B󰁹 󰁲󰁥󰁡󰁤󰁩󰁮󰁧 󰁴󰁨󰁩󰁳 󰁲󰁥󰁰󰁯󰁲󰁴, 󰁹󰁯󰁵 󰁡󰁧󰁲󰁥󰁥 󰁴󰁨󰁡󰁴 󰁵󰁳󰁥 󰁯󰁦 GOTHAM CITY RESEARCH LLC󲀙󰁳 󰁲󰁥󰁳󰁥󰁡󰁲󰁣󰁨 󰁩󰁳 󰁡󰁴 󰁹󰁯󰁵󰁲 󰁯󰁷󰁮 󰁲󰁩󰁳󰁫. I󰁮 󰁮󰁯 󰁥󰁶󰁥󰁮󰁴 󰁷󰁩󰁬󰁬 󰁹󰁯󰁵 󰁨󰁯󰁬󰁤 GOTHAM CITY RESEARCH LLC 󰁯󰁲 󰁡󰁮󰁹 󰁡󰁦󰁦󰁩󰁬󰁩󰁡󰁴󰁥󰁤 󰁰󰁡󰁲󰁴󰁹 󰁬󰁩󰁡󰁢󰁬󰁥 󰁦󰁯󰁲 󰁡󰁮󰁹 󰁤󰁩󰁲󰁥󰁣󰁴 󰁯󰁲 󰁩󰁮󰁤󰁩󰁲󰁥󰁣󰁴 󰁴󰁲󰁡󰁤󰁩󰁮󰁧 󰁬󰁯󰁳󰁳󰁥󰁳 󰁣󰁡󰁵󰁳󰁥󰁤 󰁢󰁹 󰁡󰁮󰁹 󰁩󰁮󰁦󰁯󰁲󰁭󰁡󰁴󰁩󰁯󰁮 󰁩󰁮 󰁴󰁨󰁩󰁳 󰁲󰁥󰁰󰁯󰁲󰁴. T󰁨󰁩󰁳 󰁲󰁥󰁰󰁯󰁲󰁴 󰁩󰁳 󰁮󰁯󰁴 󰁩󰁮󰁶󰁥󰁳󰁴󰁭󰁥󰁮󰁴 󰁡󰁤󰁶󰁩󰁣󰁥 󰁯󰁲 󰁡 󰁲󰁥󰁣󰁯󰁭󰁭󰁥󰁮󰁤󰁡󰁴󰁩󰁯󰁮 󰁯󰁲 󰁳󰁯󰁬󰁩󰁣󰁩󰁴󰁡󰁴󰁩󰁯󰁮 󰁴󰁯 󰁢󰁵󰁹 󰁡󰁮󰁹 󰁳󰁥󰁣󰁵󰁲󰁩󰁴󰁩󰁥󰁳. GOTHAM CITY RESEARCH LLC 󰁩󰁳 󰁮󰁯󰁴 󰁲󰁥󰁧󰁩󰁳󰁴󰁥󰁲󰁥󰁤 󰁡󰁳 󰁡󰁮 󰁩󰁮󰁶󰁥󰁳󰁴󰁭󰁥󰁮󰁴 󰁡󰁤󰁶󰁩󰁳󰁯󰁲 󰁩󰁮 󰁡󰁮󰁹 󰁪󰁵󰁲󰁩󰁳󰁤󰁩󰁣󰁴󰁩󰁯󰁮. Y󰁯󰁵 󰁡󰁧󰁲󰁥󰁥 󰁴󰁯 󰁤󰁯 󰁹󰁯󰁵󰁲 󰁯󰁷󰁮 󰁲󰁥󰁳󰁥󰁡󰁲󰁣󰁨 󰁡󰁮󰁤 󰁤󰁵󰁥 󰁤󰁩󰁬󰁩󰁧󰁥󰁮󰁣󰁥 󰁢󰁥󰁦󰁯󰁲󰁥 󰁭󰁡󰁫󰁩󰁮󰁧 󰁡󰁮󰁹 󰁩󰁮󰁶󰁥󰁳󰁴󰁭󰁥󰁮󰁴 󰁤󰁥󰁣󰁩󰁳󰁩󰁯󰁮 󰁷󰁩󰁴󰁨 󰁲󰁥󰁳󰁰󰁥󰁣󰁴 󰁴󰁯 󰁳󰁥󰁣󰁵󰁲󰁩󰁴󰁩󰁥󰁳 󰁣󰁯󰁶󰁥󰁲󰁥󰁤 󰁨󰁥󰁲󰁥󰁩󰁮. Y󰁯󰁵 󰁲󰁥󰁰󰁲󰁥󰁳󰁥󰁮󰁴 󰁴󰁯 GOTHAM CITY RESEARCH LLC 󰁴󰁨󰁡󰁴 󰁹󰁯󰁵 󰁨󰁡󰁶󰁥 󰁳󰁵󰁦󰁦󰁩󰁣󰁩󰁥󰁮󰁴 󰁩󰁮󰁶󰁥󰁳󰁴󰁭󰁥󰁮󰁴 󰁳󰁯󰁰󰁨󰁩󰁳󰁴󰁩󰁣󰁡󰁴󰁩󰁯󰁮 󰁴󰁯 󰁣󰁲󰁩󰁴󰁩󰁣󰁡󰁬󰁬󰁹 󰁡󰁳󰁳󰁥󰁳󰁳 󰁴󰁨󰁥 󰁩󰁮󰁦󰁯󰁲󰁭󰁡󰁴󰁩󰁯󰁮, 󰁡󰁮󰁡󰁬󰁹󰁳󰁩󰁳 󰁡󰁮󰁤 󰁯󰁰󰁩󰁮󰁩󰁯󰁮󰁳 󰁩󰁮 󰁴󰁨󰁩󰁳 󰁲󰁥󰁰󰁯󰁲󰁴. Y󰁯󰁵 󰁦󰁵󰁲󰁴󰁨󰁥󰁲 󰁡󰁧󰁲󰁥󰁥 󰁴󰁨󰁡󰁴 󰁹󰁯󰁵 󰁷󰁩󰁬󰁬 󰁮󰁯󰁴 󰁣󰁯󰁭󰁭󰁵󰁮󰁩󰁣󰁡󰁴󰁥 󰁴󰁨󰁥 󰁣󰁯󰁮󰁴󰁥󰁮󰁴󰁳 󰁯󰁦 󰁴󰁨󰁩󰁳 󰁲󰁥󰁰󰁯󰁲󰁴 󰁴󰁯 󰁡󰁮󰁹 󰁯󰁴󰁨󰁥󰁲 󰁰󰁥󰁲󰁳󰁯󰁮 󰁵󰁮󰁬󰁥󰁳󰁳 󰁴󰁨󰁡󰁴 󰁰󰁥󰁲󰁳󰁯󰁮 󰁨󰁡󰁳 󰁡󰁧󰁲󰁥󰁥󰁤 󰁴󰁯 󰁢󰁥 󰁢󰁯󰁵󰁮󰁤 󰁢󰁹 󰁴󰁨󰁥󰁳󰁥 󰁳󰁡󰁭󰁥 󰁴󰁥󰁲󰁭󰁳 󰁯󰁦 󰁳󰁥󰁲󰁶󰁩󰁣󰁥. Y󰁯󰁵 󰁳󰁨󰁯󰁵󰁬󰁤 󰁡󰁳󰁳󰁵󰁭󰁥 󰁴󰁨󰁡󰁴 󰁡󰁳 󰁯󰁦 󰁴󰁨󰁥 󰁰󰁵󰁢󰁬󰁩󰁣󰁡󰁴󰁩󰁯󰁮 󰁤󰁡󰁴󰁥 󰁯󰁦 󰁴󰁨󰁩󰁳 󰁲󰁥󰁰󰁯󰁲󰁴, GOTHAM CITY RESEARCH LLC 󰁳󰁴󰁡󰁮󰁤󰁳 󰁴󰁯 󰁰󰁲󰁯󰁦󰁩󰁴 󰁩󰁮 󰁴󰁨󰁥 󰁥󰁶󰁥󰁮󰁴 󰁴󰁨󰁥 󰁩󰁳󰁳󰁵󰁥󰁲󲀙󰁳 󰁳󰁴󰁯󰁣󰁫 󰁤󰁥󰁣󰁬󰁩󰁮󰁥󰁳. W󰁥 󰁭󰁡󰁹 󰁢󰁵󰁹, 󰁳󰁥󰁬󰁬, 󰁣󰁯󰁶󰁥󰁲 󰁯󰁲 󰁯󰁴󰁨󰁥󰁲󰁷󰁩󰁳󰁥 󰁣󰁨󰁡󰁮󰁧󰁥 󰁴󰁨󰁥 󰁦󰁯󰁲󰁭 󰁯󰁲 󰁳󰁵󰁢󰁳󰁴󰁡󰁮󰁣󰁥 󰁯󰁦 󰁩󰁴󰁳 󰁰󰁯󰁳󰁩󰁴󰁩󰁯󰁮 󰁩󰁮 󰁴󰁨󰁥 󰁩󰁳󰁳󰁵󰁥󰁲. GOTHAM CITY RESEARCH LLC 󰁤󰁩󰁳󰁣󰁬󰁡󰁩󰁭󰁳 󰁡󰁮󰁹 󰁯󰁢󰁬󰁩󰁧󰁡󰁴󰁩󰁯󰁮 󰁴󰁯 󰁮󰁯󰁴󰁩󰁦󰁹 󰁴󰁨󰁥 󰁭󰁡󰁲󰁫󰁥󰁴 󰁯󰁦 󰁡󰁮󰁹 󰁳󰁵󰁣󰁨 󰁣󰁨󰁡󰁮󰁧󰁥󰁳. O󰁵󰁲 󰁲󰁥󰁳󰁥󰁡󰁲󰁣󰁨 󰁡󰁮󰁤 󰁲󰁥󰁰󰁯󰁲󰁴 󰁩󰁮󰁣󰁬󰁵󰁤󰁥󰁳 󰁦󰁯󰁲󰁷󰁡󰁲󰁤󰀭󰁬󰁯󰁯󰁫󰁩󰁮󰁧 󰁳󰁴󰁡󰁴󰁥󰁭󰁥󰁮󰁴󰁳, 󰁥󰁳󰁴󰁩󰁭󰁡󰁴󰁥󰁳, 󰁰󰁲󰁯󰁪󰁥󰁣󰁴󰁩󰁯󰁮󰁳, 󰁡󰁮󰁤 󰁯󰁰󰁩󰁮󰁩󰁯󰁮󰁳 󰁰󰁲󰁥󰁰󰁡󰁲󰁥󰁤 󰁷󰁩󰁴󰁨 󰁲󰁥󰁳󰁰󰁥󰁣󰁴 󰁴󰁯, 󰁡󰁭󰁯󰁮󰁧 󰁯󰁴󰁨󰁥󰁲 󰁴󰁨󰁩󰁮󰁧󰁳, 󰁣󰁥󰁲󰁴󰁡󰁩󰁮 󰁡󰁣󰁣󰁯󰁵󰁮󰁴󰁩󰁮󰁧, 󰁬󰁥󰁧󰁡󰁬, 󰁡󰁮󰁤 󰁲󰁥󰁧󰁵󰁬󰁡󰁴󰁯󰁲󰁹 󰁩󰁳󰁳󰁵󰁥󰁳 󰁴󰁨󰁥 󰁩󰁳󰁳󰁵󰁥󰁲 󰁦󰁡󰁣󰁥󰁳 󰁡󰁮󰁤 󰁴󰁨󰁥 󰁰󰁯󰁴󰁥󰁮󰁴󰁩󰁡󰁬 󰁩󰁭󰁰󰁡󰁣󰁴 󰁯󰁦 󰁴󰁨󰁯󰁳󰁥 󰁩󰁳󰁳󰁵󰁥󰁳 󰁯󰁮 󰁩󰁴󰁳 󰁦󰁵󰁴󰁵󰁲󰁥 󰁢󰁵󰁳󰁩󰁮󰁥󰁳󰁳, 󰁦󰁩󰁮󰁡󰁮󰁣󰁩󰁡󰁬 󰁣󰁯󰁮󰁤󰁩󰁴󰁩󰁯󰁮 󰁡󰁮󰁤 󰁲󰁥󰁳󰁵󰁬󰁴󰁳 󰁯󰁦 󰁯󰁰󰁥󰁲󰁡󰁴󰁩󰁯󰁮󰁳, 󰁡󰁳 󰁷󰁥󰁬󰁬 󰁡󰁳 󰁭󰁯󰁲󰁥 󰁧󰁥󰁮󰁥󰁲󰁡󰁬󰁬󰁹, 󰁴󰁨󰁥 󰁩󰁳󰁳󰁵󰁥󰁲󲀙󰁳 󰁡󰁮󰁴󰁩󰁣󰁩󰁰󰁡󰁴󰁥󰁤 󰁯󰁰󰁥󰁲󰁡󰁴󰁩󰁮󰁧 󰁰󰁥󰁲󰁦󰁯󰁲󰁭󰁡󰁮󰁣󰁥, 󰁡󰁣󰁣󰁥󰁳󰁳 󰁴󰁯 󰁣󰁡󰁰󰁩󰁴󰁡󰁬 󰁭󰁡󰁲󰁫󰁥󰁴󰁳, 󰁭󰁡󰁲󰁫󰁥󰁴 󰁣󰁯󰁮󰁤󰁩󰁴󰁩󰁯󰁮󰁳, 󰁡󰁳󰁳󰁥󰁴󰁳 󰁡󰁮󰁤 󰁬󰁩󰁡󰁢󰁩󰁬󰁩󰁴󰁩󰁥󰁳. S󰁵󰁣󰁨 󰁳󰁴󰁡󰁴󰁥󰁭󰁥󰁮󰁴󰁳, 󰁥󰁳󰁴󰁩󰁭󰁡󰁴󰁥󰁳, 󰁰󰁲󰁯󰁪󰁥󰁣󰁴󰁩󰁯󰁮󰁳 󰁡󰁮󰁤 󰁯󰁰󰁩󰁮󰁩󰁯󰁮󰁳 󰁭󰁡󰁹 󰁰󰁲󰁯󰁶󰁥 󰁴󰁯 󰁢󰁥 󰁳󰁵󰁢󰁳󰁴󰁡󰁮󰁴󰁩󰁡󰁬󰁬󰁹 󰁩󰁮󰁡󰁣󰁣󰁵󰁲󰁡󰁴󰁥 󰁡󰁮󰁤 󰁡󰁲󰁥 󰁩󰁮󰁨󰁥󰁲󰁥󰁮󰁴󰁬󰁹 󰁳󰁵󰁢󰁪󰁥󰁣󰁴 󰁴󰁯 󰁳󰁩󰁧󰁮󰁩󰁦󰁩󰁣󰁡󰁮󰁴 󰁲󰁩󰁳󰁫󰁳 󰁡󰁮󰁤 󰁵󰁮󰁣󰁥󰁲󰁴󰁡󰁩󰁮󰁴󰁩󰁥󰁳 󰁢󰁥󰁹󰁯󰁮󰁤 GOTHAM CITY RESEARCH LLC󲀙󰁳 󰁣󰁯󰁮󰁴󰁲󰁯󰁬.
O󰁵󰁲 󰁲󰁥󰁳󰁥󰁡󰁲󰁣󰁨 󰁡󰁮󰁤 󰁲󰁥󰁰󰁯󰁲󰁴 󰁥󰁸󰁰󰁲󰁥󰁳󰁳󰁥󰁳 󰁯󰁵󰁲 󰁯󰁰󰁩󰁮󰁩󰁯󰁮󰁳, 󰁷󰁨󰁩󰁣󰁨 󰁷󰁥 󰁨󰁡󰁶󰁥 󰁢󰁡󰁳󰁥󰁤 󰁵󰁰󰁯󰁮 󰁧󰁥󰁮󰁥󰁲󰁡󰁬󰁬󰁹 󰁡󰁶󰁡󰁩󰁬󰁡󰁢󰁬󰁥 󰁩󰁮󰁦󰁯󰁲󰁭󰁡󰁴󰁩󰁯󰁮, 󰁦󰁩󰁥󰁬󰁤 󰁲󰁥󰁳󰁥󰁡󰁲󰁣󰁨, 󰁩󰁮󰁦󰁥󰁲󰁥󰁮󰁣󰁥󰁳 󰁡󰁮󰁤 󰁤󰁥󰁤󰁵󰁣󰁴󰁩󰁯󰁮󰁳 󰁴󰁨󰁲󰁯󰁵󰁧󰁨 󰁯󰁵󰁲 󰁤󰁵󰁥 󰁤󰁩󰁬󰁩󰁧󰁥󰁮󰁣󰁥 󰁡󰁮󰁤 󰁡󰁮󰁡󰁬󰁹󰁴󰁩󰁣󰁡󰁬 󰁰󰁲󰁯󰁣󰁥󰁳󰁳. GO󰁔HAM CI󰁔󰁙 󰁒E󰁓EA󰁒CH LLC 󰁢󰁥󰁬󰁩󰁥󰁶󰁥󰁳 󰁡󰁬󰁬 󰁩󰁮󰁦󰁯󰁲󰁭󰁡󰁴󰁩󰁯󰁮 󰁣󰁯󰁮󰁴󰁡󰁩󰁮󰁥󰁤 󰁨󰁥󰁲󰁥󰁩󰁮 󰁩󰁳 󰁡󰁣󰁣󰁵󰁲󰁡󰁴󰁥 󰁡󰁮󰁤 󰁲󰁥󰁬󰁩󰁡󰁢󰁬󰁥, 󰁡󰁮󰁤 󰁨󰁡󰁳 󰁢󰁥󰁥󰁮 󰁯󰁢󰁴󰁡󰁩󰁮󰁥󰁤 󰁦󰁲󰁯󰁭 󰁰󰁵󰁢󰁬󰁩󰁣 󰁳󰁯󰁵󰁲󰁣󰁥󰁳 󰁷󰁥 󰁢󰁥󰁬󰁩󰁥󰁶󰁥 󰁴󰁯 󰁢󰁥 󰁡󰁣󰁣󰁵󰁲󰁡󰁴󰁥 󰁡󰁮󰁤 󰁲󰁥󰁬󰁩󰁡󰁢󰁬󰁥.
H󰁯󰁷󰁥󰁶󰁥󰁲, 󰁳󰁵󰁣󰁨 󰁩󰁮󰁦󰁯󰁲󰁭󰁡󰁴󰁩󰁯󰁮 󰁩󰁳 󰁰󰁲󰁥󰁳󰁥󰁮󰁴󰁥󰁤 󲀜󰁡󰁳 󰁩󰁳,󲀝 󰁷󰁩󰁴󰁨󰁯󰁵󰁴 󰁷󰁡󰁲󰁲󰁡󰁮󰁴󰁹 󰁯󰁦 󰁡󰁮󰁹 󰁫󰁩󰁮󰁤, 󰁷󰁨󰁥󰁴󰁨󰁥󰁲 󰁥󰁸󰁰󰁲󰁥󰁳󰁳 󰁯󰁲 󰁩󰁭󰁰󰁬󰁩󰁥󰁤. GOTHAM CITY RESEARCH LLC, 󰁭󰁡󰁫󰁥󰁳 󰁮󰁯 󰁲󰁥󰁰󰁲󰁥󰁳󰁥󰁮󰁴󰁡󰁴󰁩󰁯󰁮, 󰁥󰁸󰁰󰁲󰁥󰁳󰁳 󰁯󰁲 󰁩󰁭󰁰󰁬󰁩󰁥󰁤, 󰁡󰁳 󰁴󰁯 󰁴󰁨󰁥 󰁡󰁣󰁣󰁵󰁲󰁡󰁣󰁹, 󰁴󰁩󰁭󰁥󰁬󰁩󰁮󰁥󰁳󰁳, 󰁯󰁲 󰁣󰁯󰁭󰁰󰁬󰁥󰁴󰁥󰁮󰁥󰁳󰁳 󰁯󰁦 󰁡󰁮󰁹 󰁳󰁵󰁣󰁨 󰁩󰁮󰁦󰁯󰁲󰁭󰁡󰁴󰁩󰁯󰁮 󰁯󰁲 󰁷󰁩󰁴󰁨 󰁲󰁥󰁧󰁡󰁲󰁤 󰁴󰁯 󰁴󰁨󰁥 󰁲󰁥󰁳󰁵󰁬󰁴󰁳 󰁴󰁯 󰁢󰁥 󰁯󰁢󰁴󰁡󰁩󰁮󰁥󰁤 󰁦󰁲󰁯󰁭 󰁩󰁴󰁳 󰁵󰁳󰁥. A󰁬󰁬 󰁥󰁸󰁰󰁲󰁥󰁳󰁳󰁩󰁯󰁮󰁳 󰁯󰁦 󰁯󰁰󰁩󰁮󰁩󰁯󰁮 󰁡󰁲󰁥 󰁳󰁵󰁢󰁪󰁥󰁣󰁴 󰁴󰁯 󰁣󰁨󰁡󰁮󰁧󰁥 󰁷󰁩󰁴󰁨󰁯󰁵󰁴 󰁮󰁯󰁴󰁩󰁣󰁥, 󰁡󰁮󰁤 GOTHAM CITY RESEARCH LLC 󰁩󰁳 󰁮󰁯󰁴 󰁯󰁢󰁬󰁩󰁧󰁡󰁴󰁥󰁤 󰁴󰁯 󰁵󰁰󰁤󰁡󰁴󰁥 󰁯󰁲 󰁳󰁵󰁰󰁰󰁬󰁥󰁭󰁥󰁮󰁴 󰁡󰁮󰁹 󰁲󰁥󰁰󰁯󰁲󰁴󰁳 󰁯󰁲 󰁡󰁮󰁹 󰁯󰁦 󰁴󰁨󰁥 󰁩󰁮󰁦󰁯󰁲󰁭󰁡󰁴󰁩󰁯󰁮, 󰁡󰁮󰁡󰁬󰁹󰁳󰁩󰁳 󰁡󰁮󰁤 󰁯󰁰󰁩󰁮󰁩󰁯󰁮 󰁣󰁯󰁮󰁴󰁡󰁩󰁮󰁥󰁤 󰁩󰁮 󰁴󰁨󰁥󰁭. Y󰁯󰁵 󰁳󰁨󰁯󰁵󰁬󰁤 󰁡󰁳󰁳󰁵󰁭󰁥 󰁴󰁨󰁡󰁴 GOTHAM CITY RESEARCH LLC 󰁨󰁡󰁳 󰁡󰁮󰁤/󰁯󰁲 󰁷󰁩󰁬󰁬 󰁳󰁵󰁢󰁭󰁩󰁴 󰁯󰁵󰁲 󰁦󰁩󰁮󰁤󰁩󰁮󰁧󰁳 󰁷󰁩󰁴󰁨 󰁴󰁨󰁥 UK S󰁥󰁲󰁩󰁯󰁵󰁳 F󰁲󰁡󰁵󰁤 O󰁦󰁦󰁩󰁣󰁥, T󰁨󰁥 T󰁲󰁡󰁮󰁳󰁰󰁯󰁲󰁴 S󰁥󰁬󰁥󰁣󰁴 C󰁯󰁭󰁭󰁩󰁴󰁴󰁥󰁥, 󰁡󰁮󰁤 󰁯󰁴󰁨󰁥󰁲 󰁲󰁥󰁬󰁥󰁶󰁡󰁮󰁴 󰁲󰁥󰁧󰁵󰁬󰁡󰁴󰁯󰁲󰁹 󰁢󰁯󰁤󰁩󰁥󰁳.
 
P󰁡󰁧󰁥
3
 󰁯󰁦
74
 
󰁔󰁡󰁢󰁬󰁥 󰁯󰁦 C󰁯󰁮󰁴󰁥󰁮󰁴󰁳 I.
 
D󰁩󰁳󰁣󰁬󰁡󰁩󰁭󰁥󰁲 II.
 
󰁓󰁵󰁭󰁭󰁡󰁲󰁹 III.
 
I󰁮󰁴󰁲󰁯󰁤󰁵󰁣󰁴󰁩󰁯󰁮 I󰁖.
 
Q󰁵󰁩󰁮󰁤󰁥󰁬󰁬󲀙󰁳 A󰁮󰁯󰁭󰁡󰁬󰁯󰁵󰁳 EBI󰁔DA M󰁡󰁲󰁧󰁩󰁮󰁳 󰁖.
 
CEO 󰁒󰁯󰁢󰁥󰁲󰁴 󰁔󰁥󰁲󰁲󰁹 󰁓󰁰󰁥󰁮󰁴 󰂣12 󰁭󰁩󰁬󰁬󰁩󰁯󰁮 󰁴󰁯 B󰁵󰁩󰁬󰁤 󰁡 C󰁯󰁵󰁮󰁴󰁲󰁹 C󰁬󰁵󰁢 󰁖I.
 
Q󰁵󰁩󰁮󰁤󰁥󰁬󰁬󲀙󰁳 L󰁡󰁲󰁧󰁥󰁳󰁴 2009/2010 C󰁵󰁳󰁴󰁯󰁭󰁥󰁲 󰁩󰁳 I󰁴󰁳󰁥󰁬󰁦 (C󰁬󰁩󰁣󰁫󰁕󰁳4.󰁣󰁯󰁭) 󰁖II.
 
41% 󰁯󰁦 2011 󰁒󰁥󰁶󰁥󰁮󰁵󰁥󰁳 C󰁯󰁭󰁥󰁳 󰁦󰁲󰁯󰁭 󰁡󰁮 󰁕󰁮󰁤󰁩󰁳󰁣󰁬󰁯󰁳󰁥󰁤 C󰁵󰁳󰁴󰁯󰁭󰁥󰁲 󰁖III.
 
Q󰁵󰁩󰁮󰁤󰁥󰁬󰁬󲀙󰁳 P󰁨󰁡󰁮󰁴󰁯󰁭 A󰁣󰁱󰁵󰁩󰁳󰁩󰁴󰁩󰁯󰁮󰁳 (2011󰀭P󰁲󰁥󰁳󰁥󰁮󰁴) I󰁘.
 
󰁔󰁥󰁬󰁥󰁭󰁡󰁴󰁩󰁣󰁳 A󰁣󰁣󰁯󰁵󰁮󰁴󰁩󰁮󰁧 I󰁳󰁳󰁵󰁥󰁳 & 󰁒󰁥󰁬󰁡󰁴󰁥󰁤 P󰁡󰁲󰁴󰁹 󰁔󰁲󰁡󰁮󰁳󰁡󰁣󰁴󰁩󰁯󰁮󰁳 󰁘.
 
󰁔󰁨󰁥 D󰁡󰁲󰁫 󰁓󰁩󰁤󰁥 󰁯󰁦 Q󰁵󰁩󰁮󰁤󰁥󰁬󰁬 L󰁥󰁧󰁡󰁬 󰁓󰁥󰁲󰁶󰁩󰁣󰁥󰁳 󰁘I.
 
A󰁤󰁤󰁩󰁴󰁩󰁯󰁮󰁡󰁬 A󰁣󰁣󰁯󰁵󰁮󰁴󰁩󰁮󰁧 󰁡󰁮󰁤 O󰁶󰁥󰁲󰁳󰁩󰁧󰁨󰁴 I󰁳󰁳󰁵󰁥󰁳 󰁘II.
 
󰁖󰁡󰁬󰁵󰁡󰁴󰁩󰁯󰁮: 󰁗󰁯󰁲󰁴󰁨 N󰁯 M󰁯󰁲󰁥 󰁔󰁨󰁡󰁮 3󰁰 󰁰󰁥󰁲 󰁳󰁨󰁡󰁲󰁥 󰁘III.
 
E󰁮󰁤 N󰁯󰁴󰁥󰁳

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Peter987654321 liked this
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Rated 5/5
Live by the sword die by the sword! i don't see anyone asking long selling to be banned when theres more than 10% upswing. Desperate attempt - if you think this company is being targeted unfairly then fill your sodden boots with these obviously 'cheap shares', otherwise shut up and let the bears take their slice of the action of this so called 'multi billion market capper'....as i say - if you profit when it goes up don't cry at those who profit on the way down...hot air rises remember.
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If you feel like making a complaints to the FCA about this article please feel free to use the email below that was produced by a poster on LSE, the regulators need pressure put on them, send to market.abuse@fca.org.uk & james.evans2@fca.org.uk

Draft email

Dear Sirs,

Due to the impact caused by the unsubstantiated accusations Quindell PLC has faced (and have more than adequately responded to) and another down-swing (greater than 10%) in the share price (28th April 2014), I once again find myself having to present to you the following European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) directives: (30) (pg L 86/5) of the REGULATION (EU) No 236/2012 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 14 March 2012 on short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps, namely: (30) (pg L 86/5 ) In the case of a significant fall in the price of a financial instrument on a trading venue a competent authority should also have the ability to restrict temporarily short selling of the financial instrument on that venue within its own jurisdiction or to request that ESMA restrict such short selling in other jurisdictions in order to be able to intervene rapidly where appropriate and for a short period to prevent a disorderly decline in price of the instrument concerned. The competent authority should also be required to notify ESMA of such a decision so that ESMA can immediately inform the competent auth­orities of other Member States with venues which trade the same instrument, coordinate the taking of measures by those other Member States and, if necessary, assist them in reaching an agreement or take a decision itself, in accordance with Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010. Again for your benefit and for definition of the term "disorderly decline in price", the following applies: (5) (pg L 86/18) The fall in value shall be 10 % or more in the case of a liquid share, as defined in Article 22 of Regulation (EC) No 1287/2006. Based on those directives and the "disorderly decline in price" to which the evidence of the said share price decline can be read from Quindell's recent share price history. I will identify three days to which the ESMA Directives I have highlighted to you will apply - 22nd April, and the two consecutive trading days of 25th April & 28th April. The following two questions (and a supplementary) do NOT compromise any on-going investigation, but relate to the administration and implementation of procedural executions as defined by ESMA.

I am requesting you provide an understanding and answers as to whether, and indeed if at all, the FCA, UKLA or indeed any UK Financial Regulatory body recognises these directives (procedural executions) as laid out by ESMA and will, or has acted upon them.

On the basis that the following questions are in relation to the procedural executions as laid out and defined by ESMA, and therefore cannot compromise any on-going investigation, I demand answers please as many other investors have lost everything.

1. Has the FCA, UKLA, The Market Conduct Team or any UK Financial Regulatory body, acted upon the ESMA directives as laid out in this transcript, and suspended any or all of the short positions declared against Quindell PLC?
2. If the FCA, UKLA, The Market Conduct Team or any UK Financial Regulatory body, has NOT acted upon the ESMA directives as laid out in this transcript, and NOT suspended any or all of the short positions declared against Quindell PLC, can you explain why this hasn't been implemented?
Supplementary Q.
3.i If you deem NOT to answer either Q1 or Q2 then I request you provide a FULL explanation as to why not, and a FULL explanation as to how the implementation of ESMA Directive would be construed as to 'compromising the outcomes of other market abuse investigations'.
These are directives that must be implemented for the reasons already stated whether there is an investigation or NOT."

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