Durkheim's Epistemology: The Neglected Argument Author(s): Anne Warfield Rawls Source: The American Journal of Sociology, Vol.

102, No. 2 (Sep., 1996), pp. 430-482 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2782631 . Accessed: 21/02/2011 09:15
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucpress. . Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The American Journal of Sociology.

http://www.jstor.org

Durkheim's Epistemology: The Neglected Argument'

Anne Warfield Rawls WayneState University ofthe theargument forthesocial origins Durkheim'sepistemology, and mostneis his mostimportant categories oftheunderstanding, withhis sociolThis argument has been confused glectedargument. and Durkheim'soverallposition has been misunogyofknowledge, of a "cultural" derstoodas a consequence.The current popularity of Durkheimis as mucha misunderor "ideological" interpretation interpretation from which ofhisposition as the"functional" standing seekto rescuehim.Durkheim articulated thecurrent interpretations in the classical sense,a pointthathas a sophisticated epistemology been entirely missed. ofthecatetheargument forthesocial origins Durkheim'sepistemology, is his most important and most neglected goriesof the understanding, in thecentral The argument, whichis articulated mainly chapargument. de la vie religieuse: Le Systeme tersofLes Formeselementaires tote'mique en Australie(1912), locates the originof the fundamental categoriesof in the concrete empiricaldetails of enacted practices.Unfortuthought withDurkheim's thisepistemological has beenconfused argument nately, as an ideofknowledge, leadingto itsgeneralmisinterpretation sociology are the origins alist argument thatbeliefsand collectiverepresentations As a consequence,the epistemology of the basic categoriesof thought. The current popularity of a cultural neglected. properhas been generally
1This article In particular, from numerous comments and suggestions. has benefited comments I wouldliketo thankHarold Garfinkel and RandyCollinsforextensive and discussions. Norb Wiley,Ira Cohen,Anthony Giddens,StephenFuchs, Gary to whichI have and severalAJS reviewers also made helpful comments Shepherd, in Durkheim I thankCharlesLemert and forrenewing tried to respond. myinterest at critical encouragement points. PeterK. Manning and David Mainesforproviding Carefulreadings helpful. Lynetta J. Meehan have also been extremely by Albert obscure thanksfortireless locating workin the library Mosbydeserves particular in myDurkheim I wouldalso liketo thank seminar-ReccoRichardtexts. students AbdiKusow,EdwardMays, Gibbs, Jerry Charbonneau, son,Wendy Evans,Tyronne in these a specialnote interest issues.Finally, GaryDavid, and CareyFord-for their and John to BernardElevitchwithwhomI read the British of thanks Empiricists on the deal to their emphasis LavelywithwhomI read Kant.My workowes a great oftexts. Directcorrespondence to AnneWarfield careful Rawls,Department reading 48202. of Sociology, Detroit, Michigan WayneStateUniversity,

0002-9602/97/10202-0004$01.50 430

? 1996by The University reserved. of Chicago.All rights

AJS Volume 102 Number2 (September1996): 430-482

Durkheim'sEpistemology orsocial constructivist ofDurkheim is as mucha misunderinterpretation standing ofhisposition as thefunctional or positivist interpretation popularized by Talcott Parsons fromwhich the current seek interpretations to rescuehim. The conflicting of Durkheim'spositionas interpretations and ideologicalboth resultfroma failureto understand functional the relationship betweenhis variousarguments, his sociology of knowledge, and his epistemology. BeforeKant,epistemology witha separation between struggled thought and reality betweenthetwo: thought, occasionedby essentialdifferences and reality, conconsisting of conceptsthatare generaland continuous, Since Kant,epistemology sisting offlux. has had to deal witha separation betweenthought and realitycreatedby human understanding: natural reality is always perceivedin termsof humancategories and of thought neverin itself. In either case, humanwaysofperceiving and thinking add As a consequence, to reality thatwas nottherein theoriginal. something humanknowledge seemsnotto standin an empirically valid relationship withreality. that Duringthecourseofthe20thcentury, due to a growing consensus an argument forempirical cannotbe made, theclassicalform of validity theepistemological whichrequiredempirical has been question, validity, increasingly abandoned in favor of a social constructivist approach to knowledge, whichembracesan element of indeterminacy. On thisview, social consensusand sociallyaccepteddefinitions of meaningare treated as the truemeasuresdefining the limitsof validity. This can be seen in the growing influence of postmodern and pragmatist approacheswithin the social sciencesand humanities. According to Durkheim, thisabandonment ofclassicalcriteria ofvalidityin favorof a consensustheory oftruth, whichhad alreadybeen popularized by WilliamJamesat the turnof the century, onlyappears to be necessary because theepistemological questionhas beencast,bybothempiricists and apriorists, in individual and naturalistic terms, How can individual perceptions of naturalreality be valid knowledge of thatreality? (See Cuvillier[1955] foran extendeddiscussionof the development and influence in France during of pragmatism thisperiod.)Durkheimargued thattheemphasison theindividualand individualperception ofnatural forcesmade the epistemological problemappear unsolvable.Durkheim to replacetheindividualist sought approachoftraditional philosophy with an approachsolidlyembeddedin enactedsocial practice. Durkheimarticulated his epistemological argument in three primarily works: The ElementaryForms ([1912] 1915),2 PrimitiveClassification
2 A new translationof The ElementaryForms (Durkheim [1912] 1995) by Karen Fields

appeared while this article was already under review at AJS. Citations,therefore, are

431

AmericanJournal of Sociology (Durkheim and Mauss [1901] 1963), and Pragmatismand Sociology workedout the ([1913-14] 1955). The essay on primitive classification but failedto parameters forthe originsof the category of classification distinguish the social logic of the concept(the sociologyof knowledge) The lectureson fromits genesisin enacted practice(the epistemology). problem in somedepragmatism workedouttheclassicalepistemological solutail and critically evaluatedthepragmatist, or social constructivist, is notelaborated tionto theproblem. But Durkheim'sown epistemology in thatwork.It is onlyin his studyof elementary forms of religion that initsentirety. Therehe criticizes the Durkheim's epistemology is presented and pragmatism, which epistemological schoolsofempiricism, apriorism, werepopularat theturn ofthecentury, and presents hisownsocioempirical in thecentral chapters. epistemology as theonlyviable alternative according The problem withan individualist approachto epistemology, is thought to beginwithindividual to Durkheim, is that, whenknowledge certainproblemsarise: the thingsthat personsexperience experience, Nothingis ever change fromday to day and frommoment to moment. (ifpersonshave not exactlythe same twiceand thestreamof experience ofthought) is constantly and changing alreadyacquiredgeneral categories individualexperiundifferentiated (in a stateof flux).Even if particular on to be empirically to generalize ences are considered valid, all attempts the basis of themare invalidif what is added in the processwas not an oftheparticular What does a generalcateoriginal property experiences. the experience from of particular thatis different objects goryrepresent in the not present and events?If generalcategories something represent thatis added by the mindto separateparticular experiences, something thecollection thengeneral validity. ofparticulars, ideas have no empirical to solve theproblem through a detailedlogical Attempts by empiricists betweenobjects and thelogicalrelation analysisofindividualperception in perception concludedthat not onlylogical relationsbut all relations are properties added by themindand notpartof theperceivedobjectin its own right. to establisha directrelation Thus, the empiricist attempt endedin skepticism. between and an underlying naturalreality perception classicalempiricism for to explain Durkheim failing (1915,p. 27) criticized from of deriving even the simplestgeneralideas directly the possibility perhaps it experience:"Classical empiricismresults in irrationalism; it by thislattername."Apriorism, acto designate would even be fitting the from to Durkheim, was no alternative as it resulted accepting cording the impossibility the of generating dilemmaand thentreating empiricist theiraprioristatus. as the basis forestablishing categories empirically
from to the originaltranslationby Joseph Ward Swain. I have also translateddirectly the original French where noted. 432

Durkheim'sEpistemology Durkheimargued in his lectureson pragmatism that even James's of classical empiricism. "radicalempiricism" retainsthe problems By replacing the dualism of thought and realitywith individualaction as a dynamic connection betweenthetwo in a context ofutility, Jameshad to give up thepossibility of truth and logic.The utility of pragmatic action remained an individualutility, and Jamescould notexplain(without fallingback on either realismor idealism)how thebeliefs and practices associated withindividualutility valid can becomegeneralin an empirically bothempiricism Durkheimalso disand apriorism, way. Whilerejecting thatunlesssome commonand valid concepagreedwithJames,arguing the problemof extual basis shared by all personscan be established, plainingboth individualknowledgeand intersubjective communication will remainunsolvableand truth and knowledge will remainindeterminate. Durkheim's socioempiricism focuseson a dynamicrelationbetween in ritualsocial processesand the social group membersas participants processesthattheirparticipation enacts.While naturalforces could only be perceived as particulars, socialforces, Durkheim are inherently argued, and continuous dynamic and, whenperceivedas such by personsassembled to enact practices, provide an empiricalsource forthe categories. This way of addressing thegap betweenthought and reality replacesthe individualist approach,whichcharacterized bothempiricism and apriorism,withan epistemology thatis sociallybased. The resulting epistemolsocial processesas naturalprocesseswhose function ogy treatsconcrete is to make generalcategories ofthought humanparticiavailable to their dipants.In thisway Durkheimhoped to overcomethe epistemological lemmasresulting from individualism and to addressthe problemof muIn rejecting tual intelligibility. theindividualas a starting point,theway is opened forDurkheimto explainthe originof the necessary basic conofconcrete ceptsin terms social processes, something thathad neverbeen triedbefore. thissubstitution ofthesocial fortheindividualhas been Unfortunately, as a substitution of the ideal forthe empirical. generally misinterpreted In attempting to develop a path betweenempiricism and apriorism, the was forced to place his knower argument outsidetheemgoes,Durkheim piricalworldbecause he acceptedthe argument thatvalid categories of the understanding cannotbe generated from within empiricism. Thus, it is argued,Durkheimis forced to createan ideal worldof symbols, ideas and beliefs as an origin (representations), oftheessentialforms ofhuman thought. This is,however, a complete misinterpretation ofDurkheim's epistemologicalargument. He did notattempt to walk a middlepathbetweenempiricism and apriorism theorigin by locating ofthecategories in an ideal, 433

American Journal of Sociology timeless, and ahistorical social positionor by locatinga knoweroutside theempirical. He quiteexplicitly emphasizes theimportance ofthehistorical and the empirical.For Durkheimthe middlepath is a concrete and empirical social path composedof practices, nota system of symbols and beliefs.This concretesocial emphasisplaced individualpersonsamong theirfellowsengagedin a mutualenactment of social practices, particularlyreligious ritual, insteadofin an individualist naturalcontext, before posing the epistemological question.This allowed Durkheimto distinguishbetweenindividualsensations ofnaturalforces, whichposed problemsfor empiricism, and theexperience ofmoralforce bypersons engaged in enacting sharedpractices. He arguedthattheperceptions ofmoralforce generated wereinternal, bysharedenactedpractice and immeemotional, did notrequire diateand therefore theabstraction from a seriesofparticular perceptions, whichhad beena majorstumbling blockfor theempiricist ofgeneral ideas.3For Durkheim, explanation socialpractices are notideal, and theydo not consistprimarily of ideas, representations, and beliefs. These are merely secondary phenomena. For Durkheim, society consists first and foremost of enactedpracticesthatgive riseto real social forces in the assembledgroup experience that participants jointly.Certainof these social forcesgive rise to essentialideas experienced in common, which Durkheimrefers to as the categoriesof the understanding.4 The in humanhistory is to providethe enactedpractices purposeof religion to generate theseessentialideas. necessary The Elementary Formspresents a carefuland thorough historical and fortheempirical of six basic ideas, or catecomparative argument origin identified debate as esgoriesofthe understanding, by the philosophical sentialto epistemological causalvalidity (time, space,classification, force,
'The emotional character oftheperception ofmoralforce is an important issue.By claiminga distinction betweenemotionalperception and perceptions that come through thefivesenses, Durkheim reinforces his argument thatperception of social forces is notsubjectto thesame problems as perception ofnatural forces. Not only intheir aresocialforces continuous ownright, butthey areperceived through a differentfaculty of mind,an emotional faculty. This pointDurkheim sharesin essential respects withHume.Elsewhere (Rawls 1996b)I have provided further discussion of thispoint. 4 The article "the" inthephrase "thecategories oftheunderstanding," is nota problem ofgrammar causedbyignorance ofthedifference between French and English. Locke in 1690.As he wrote in English, usedthephrase "thecategories oftheunderstanding" there is no translation The phrase as I citeitis Kant's([1781]1965) problem involved. inLocke. andis alwaystranslated intoEnglish with thearticle as itappeared attached This is becausetheargument beingmade is nota relativistic one. It does notrefer to just anycategories ofanyunderstanding butrather to thecategories oftheunderas a constant. to the categories as "categories of understanding" standing Referring their thetext thiswaycontributes toitsmisinterpresuggests indeterminacy. Reading tation.
434

Durkheim'sEpistemology ity,and totality).5 Unfortunately, Durkheim'scommitment to empirical detail resultsin long sectionson totemism that represent essentialparts of his epistemological argument but are so long and apparently focused on totemism perse thattheir epistemological significance has beenmissed. For example,Durkheimtakes up animismin orderto argue againstan he takes up the arguments of aprioriexplanationof totems.Similarly, Frazer and Tylorin orderto argueagainsta classicalempiricist explanation. Durkheim'sconsideration of individualand sexual totemsconstiBecause tutesan argument thattotems do nothave an individualorigin. Durkheimbuilt his epistemology on details of the actual enactment of totemic rites, arguments thattreatthosedetailsas havingan individual and he mustdeal withthem. origin contradict his position, Unfortunately, theselong sectionson totems of tohave been treatedas a consideration temsin their of"conceptual own right, or as explorations systems," rather thanelaborations oftheempirical detailsofenactedpracticeas an essential part of Durkheim'sepistemology. As a consequence,mostscholarswithan interest in the epistemology have concentrated their attention on thefirst and last chapters, wherethe the epistemoepistemological argument is onlysketched, while ignoring logicalargument in thecentral chapters, and a curiousmisreading ofthe texthas resulted. The first chapteris an earlierelucidationof the arguet theoriede la ment,which appeared in 1909 as "Sociologiereligieuse
I ThatDurkheim makesempirical arguments for theorigin ofonly sixcategories (time, in The Elementary space, classification, force, cause, and totality) Formshas been missed.Commentators on theepistemology apparently do notgrasptheexclusivity in different of the list,and it is represented ways by different often commentators, withan "etc."This maybe due in partto references thatDurkheim himself makes in severalplaces to categories in theworkof Aristotle and other philosophers. The first reference inTheElementary Forms (Durkheim 1915, pp. 21-22),e.g.,is toAristotle's listof categories and includes "personality" and "number," whichdo notappear as categories inDurkheim's argument. "Number" appearsagainon p. 30 and"personall appearin theintroduction ality" againon pp. 31-32. Theseinstances where Durkheimis making reference toAristotle's listofcategories and to thegeneral philosophical problem withregard to categories. These are notthesixcategories thathe argues fortheempirical validity ofin thebodyofthetext. Durkheim also treats categories in theconclusion. loosely One result ofthismisunderstanding is thatone ofthemost important ofthesixcategories, classification, is generally treated as a survey ofclassification practices and notas a category in itsown right. One reviewer ofthisarticle commented, "The question thatnagsme most is whyDurkheim's analysis ofclassificationhas promoted so muchresearch whilehis analysisof the categories (space, totality, time, force, so little." I think causality, etc.)has promoted thequestion answers itself. as thisreviewer Just does notrecognize classification as one ofthecategories, thegeneral sociological Durkheim's ofclassifipublichas also notrecognized studies cation as having todo with hisepistemology. anything Therefore, whiletheepistemolthepartofit thatfocused ogyhas been almosttotally ignored, on classification, becauseithas beenmisinterpreted as a survey ofsymbolic has received a great systems, deal of attention.

435

American Journal of Sociology whichleaves epistemological connaissance," and sociology of knowledge issues relatively, althoughnot entirely, undistinguished (Lukes 1973,p. 408).6 The conclusion presents a similar It takesup thesociology difficulty. ofknowledge after theepistemological argument has been completed and assumes an understanding of thatargument. The epistemological argument itself appearsonlyin thecentral chapters, whichhave beengenerally in thisregard, ignored leadingscholarsto infer theepistemology from the introduction and theconclusion whereit is onlyvaguelysketched. Thus, thecareful relationship drawnbetween specific practices and specific categoriesin the centralchapters is missed,and Durkheimis interpreted instead as havingfocusedon symbolic beliefsystems. Because the epistemological significance of the centralchaptershas been missed,theepistemological has neverbeen recognized argument as such.Even thebesttreatments ofDurkheim's ofknowledge, theory David Bloor (1982) beingnotablein thisregard,treatit as an argument about the sociology of knowledgeand not an argument, in the classical sense, about thenatureof mindand theorigin of humanreason.Yet, it is quite thetextthatDurkheim clearfrom an epistemology in theclasarticulated sical senseoftheword.The sociology ofknowledge is a distinct secondary thatis meantto reston thisfoundation. In his introduction argument to the EnglisheditionofDurkheim'slectures on pragmatism, JohnAllcock (1983,p. xl) wrote that"a rounded ofDurkheim's assessment epistemology has yetto be undertaken." Allcockarguesthatdiscussions of the nature ofDurkheim'ssocial factsand his sociology of knowledge have been the focusofDurkheim primary scholarship and have been confused withhis The resulting epistemology.7 failure to understand Durkheim'sdistinction betweenmoral(or social) forceand empirical as a sourcefor perception thecategories oftheunderstanding has led scholarsto dismisstheepistemologyas untenableand focusinstead on his sociologyof knowledge. Even arguments thatpurport to addressthe epistemology often proper, continueto treatthe argument citingAllcock's remarks, as an idealist the empiricalfoundation of the argument account,entirely overlooking in concrete practices(see, e.g., Godlove 1989). As a consequence, Durkheim'sepistemology has often been interpreted as consisting of the dictumthatthe categories of the understanding, for whichhe claims empiricalvalidity, come fromsocial representations or an impossible belief whichhas led to thebelief systems, clearly argument, thatDurkheimwas ignorant of basic philosophical issues (Gehlke 1915;
on sociology section and philosophy 6According to Lukes (1973,p. 582), an earlier

from The Elementary was also omitted Forms. whileAllcock's(1983) essayis one of thebestin manyregards, 7Unfortunately, he offers thelectures on pragmatism as thebestsourcefortheepistemology. 436

Durkheim'sEpistemology Dennes 1924;Parsons[1937]1968;Lukes 1973;Mestrovic 1993;Stoneand Farberman1967; LaCapra 1972). Durkheimhas been accused of failing ofgeneral to recognize thelimitations ofan empirical theory ideas,making him appear to be a positivist, and of arguingthat the categories of the have their understanding sourcein other ideas, makinghimappear to be thatideas come an idealist.The idealistor social constructivist argument from other ideas is partofDurkheim'ssociology ofknowledge (forwhich nothis epistemology. he does notclaimempirical validity) Because ofthis it has been assumedthatDurkheimclaimedan ideal misunderstanding, source for the categoriesin collectiverepresentations when in fact he claimed forthema directoriginin the concreteexperienceof enacted practice. enterthe of the understanding Durkheimargued that the categories mindsof individualpersonsduringenactedpracticein such a way as to be empirically theprocessbywhichpractices valid. He describes generate in ofthesix categories theseideas in detail.It is thesocioempirical origin to Durkheim, allows his epistemology to enactedpracticethat,according The categories overcomethe dualityof thought and reality. correspond of social forces as generated enactedpractice. to thereality during Durkin theclassicalsensein thatitexplains heim'sargument is epistemological in such the relationship betweenperceptions, ideas, and external reality a way thatkey thoughts and conceptscan be shown to bear a valid or truerelationship to an external reality, whichin thiscase consists entirely ofsocial forces. Durkheim intended his argument to replacetheepistemological arguments of Kant, Hume, James,and theirfollowers, permanently transforming philosophical debate overthevalidity of knowledge. an empirical Providing demonstration oftheavailability to participants in sharedenactedritual(religious) practices ofthecategories oftheunderstandingwas a primary objectiveof The Elementary Forms.According to Lukes (1973, pp. 407-8, 459), the titleDurkheimoriginally proposed for The Elementary Forms in a 1908 letterto Leon, "Les Formes elede la penseeet de la pratiquereligieuse," mentaires suggests thattheinterin episestin religion serveda long-standing and moreimportant interest temologyand morals.8It is only because he believed that religious
8 Durkheim's doctoral thesis (later published as TheDivisionofLabor)originally be-

formoralphilosophy gan withan introduction outlining itsimplications (included as an appendix to theGeorgeSimpson translation [Durkheim (1893) 1933]).His Latin thesis on therelationship ofMontes([1892]1960)focused entirely between theethics quieu and Rousseauand whatDurkheim interpreted as their sociological approach ina letter tomorality. IndeedDurkheim himself toRevueneo-scholastique, November 8, 1907(see Durkheim [1895]1982, p. 259),claimsto have adopteda focus on religion in 1895onlyafter realizing thatit provided thebasisfor hisearlier attempt to ground an empirically validethics in theoriginal version ofTheDivisionofLaborin Society. 437

American Journalof Sociology practices are necessary in order togenerate valid categories ofthought that Durkheim focused on religion. Durkheim adoptedan order ofargument in The Elementary Formsthatfollows the orderof Hume's TreatiseofHumanNature([1739] 1978).It is tailored to handlean epistemological argunot a surveyof religious ment, beliefs.Durkheimwas not interested priin religious marily of belief.His interest in themoral systems was rather forces, and the categories of thought corresponding to them,that were generated by religious practices. Durkheimconsidered religious belief to be an entirely secondary phenomenawithno empiricalvalidity, and he dealt withreligious of thesociology beliefin terms of knowledge, notthe epistemology. The argument that the work of the later Durkheimshould be interpretedas takingan idealistturn,popular fromthe beginning, achieved dogmatic statusin theUnitedStatesfollowing in The Parsons's assertion Structure ofSocial Action(1968,pp. 460-65) thatthelaterDurkheim had moved dangerously close to idealismand in Europe withthe confusion byLevy-Bruhl and others ofDurkheim'ssociology ofknowledge withhis epistemology. While the argument of The Elementary Formshas consistently been interpreted as idealist,Durkheim'sdiscussionof social facts in The Rules of the Sociological Method ([1895] 1982) and in the earlier Division ofLabor in Society([1893] 1933),interpreted benefit without of his epistemology, is givena positivist interpretation, leadingto the argumentthatthere are twoDurkheims: a functionalist and an idealpositivist ist (and more recently an idealist postmodernist or pragmatist) (LevyBruhl ([1910] 1966);Levi-Strauss([1958] 1963);Parsons 1968; Stone and Farberman1967; LaCapra 1972;Lukes 1973;Alexander1988;Lehmann 1990;Mestrovic1993). The fundamental lies in failing error to distinguish Durkheim'sepistefrom his sociology of knowledge. Durkheim'sepistemology, best mology represented by the centralchaptersof The Elementary Forms,deals explicitly withthequestionofwhether thesix categories oftheunderstanding can be demonstrated to have empiricalvalidity.He arguesthat the six categories do have empiricalvaliditybecause theyare perceiveddirectly as social or moralforces of social (religious) duringthe enactment practice. Durkheim's sociologyof knowledge,on the other hand, appearing and conclusion to The Elementary mainlyin theintroduction Formsand at theend ofthelectures on pragmatism, consists oftheargument roughly thatlanguageand cultureconsistof cosmologies of ideas, whicharise as collective forsocialforces, explanations and thattheseideas becomeforces in their own right whoselogicalrelations can be studied.The cosmologies are responsive to structural inertia so that changesbut also have a certain ideas first generated ofsocialprocesses lose whatever bytheinterpretation 438

Durkheim'sEpistemology relation to social practices theymight once have had. Therefore, theydo notbear anynecessary relation to an underlying reality. Durkheim'ssociis concerned withthe logic of ideas withinsuch cosologyof knowledge mologies. There is no contradiction betweenthesetwo positions. They deal with The epistemology asks how,in thefirst different questions. place, persons ofsix empirically valid basic ideas in commonsuch developa framework to allow forthedevelthatanyideas could be sharedto a degreesufficient The of knowlof a opment cosmology (Durkheim1915,p. 30). sociology once the betweenconceptswithincosmologies edge studiesthe relations have developed.Durkheim'sepistemology categories positsa directrelationbetweena limitedset of categories and an underlying social reality. With It createsonly a small area of knowledgefreeof indeterminacy. regardto the naturalworld,the worldof science,and the bulk of social leaves intactall the probconcepts, however,Durkheim'sepistemology lems of indeterminacy that Wittgenstein ([1953] 1958), Quine ([1966] Bloor (1976, 1977), Kuhn (1962), Feyerabend(1975), and more recently 1982,1983),Fuller(1989),and Latourand Woolgar(1979)have described. Durkheimargues that "onlythe necessities of action,and especiallyof in categorical formucollectiveaction,can and mustexpressthemselves falls lae" (Durkheim1915,p. 412). Everything beyondthe six categories of knowledge. withinthe provinceof the sociology In layingouthis epistemology, Durkheim focused on religious practices in "simple"societiesprovided because he arguedthatreligious practices a sufficient theformation degreeofcollectivity to support ofgeneralcateto Durkheim, societiescould onlydevelop goriesof thought. According wheresharedenactedpractices producedcategories oftheunderstanding in common,thus enablingmembers of the same groupto communicate (Durkheim1915,p. 30). His detailedargument concerning the origins of religion as well as thedetaileddescriptions ofAustralian totemism, which have been misinterpreted as culturalsociology, or sociologyof religion, a step-by-step of the actuallyconstitute analysisof the social generation of the understanding. categories Durkheimarticulated a consistent epistemology throughout his career thatis much moresophisticated and seriousthan he is givencreditfor. This epistemology is evidentin theearlyas well as in thelaterwork:the coherence ofhisnotion ofsocial factsdepending entirely on his epistemolwithout it. The resultis an argument ogyand appearingto be positivist thatpreserves a direct(although limited) relation betweensociallygenerated categoriesof thought and social realityin general,explainingthe of the categorieswithoutinvokingthe problemsof either development or empiricism. apriorism WhileDurkheim makesrather extensive for thesocioempiriarguments 439

American Journal of Sociology cal origins ofsix categories oftheunderstanding, it is notpossibleto conin thisarticle.The arguments siderthe arguments forall six categories are the forthesocioempirical origins offorce, causality, and classification part of mostimportant. The argument forforce, however,is essentially forcausality. in theinterests ofbrevity, thisartitheargument Therefore, cle will confine forthe socioempirical itself to a sketchof the arguments of the two conceptsof causalityand classification, ultimately the origins two mostimportant from an epistemological standpoint, considconcepts critieringforceonlyas it relatesto causality.Followingthisdiscussion, cisms and misunderstandings of Durkheim'spositionwill be taken up detail. again in greater THE CATEGORY OF CAUSALITY of causality, Durkheim'sargument forthe social originof the category whichoccursin book 3, section3, is the centerpiece of The Elementary mustexplain, Forms.Causalityis thekeyconceptthatany epistemology and theearliersections ofthebook,particularly theextensive sections on whichestablish thesocial basis fortheothergeneralcategories of totems, forthesocioemand force, space,time, classification, lay thegroundwork piricalbasis of the category of causality. In spiteof theimportance forcausalityto thebook as of theargument a whole,withotherarguments leadingup to it and buildingon it, most Formsoverlook insteadon the of The Elementary discussions it,focusing of time,space, and classification. There are threereasonsfor categories ofDurkheim'streatment ofclasthis.First,thegeneral misunderstanding of ideas insteadof categories sification, time,and space as social systems in the coherence of the "systems" Durkheimis taken leads to an interest Those categories thatdo notlendthemselves to a socioltohave described. ofconcepts are ignored. of"systems" Second, ogyofknowledge comprised in culturalsystems Durkheim'sarguof ideas misinterprets thisinterest accountofknowledge, thus mentas an indeterminant social constructivist his epistemological forthe empiricalvalidityof the obscuring argument of causality.Third,thereis a generallack of familiarity among category withtheimportance oftheconceptof causalityto epistemolsociologists issues in general. ogyand of epistemological to Durkheim, and causality are bothrelations between According force thatare knownbytheir effects. theproblem Therefore, objectsor persons the of establishing the conceptof forceis similarto that of establishing forcausality the argument conceptof causality.The sectionspreceding establishthesocioempirical basis fortheconceptof force. However,cauCausalityis a necessary salitycontainsan additionalelement: necessity. relationbetweentwo objects or events.Durkheimdescribesthe percep440

Durkheim'sEpistemology of a special kind of force,which he tion of causalityas the perception refers to as necessary force or efficient force(Durkheim1915, pp. 406, 410-11, 488). Durkheimarguesthat,in orderforcausalityto have a socioempirical basis, it mustbe the case thatthereare social ritualsin whichnecessary force is an integral enactedfeature (Durkheim1915,pp. 408-13). As with available to perforce mustbe immediately theother categories, necessary of the ritualin any singlecase. It mustnot ceptionas an enactedfeature in ofsocial rituals, be a generalization drawnfrom a seriesofperceptions whichcase it would stillbe subjectto theobjectionthatgeneralconcepts of particular sensations. a collection cannotbe validlyderivedfrom his argument oftheconDurkheim focuses forthesocioempirical origin ritesof sacrifice and oblationbecause,he arcept offorceon thetotemic is reproduced gues,theseare the riteswheremoralforce (1915,pp. 31892). These arguments relating different sortsof totemic ritesto forceand ofthecommuHe arguesthatthemoralforce causalityare quitespecific. nity and ofthetotemic symbol are bothreproduced via therituals ofsacriin fice(1915, pp. 381-85). The moral forceof deitiesis also reproduced of and through ritualsof oblationin so faras deitiesare representations on social and not supernatural forces (1915, pp. 385-92). Imitativerites, the otherhand, enact the principleof necessaryforce,or causalityacto Durkheim, theseritesare thefocusofhis argucording and, therefore, and mentsforcausality(1915, pp. 393-414). Whereasritualsof sacrifice oblationachievea deepening as respect and moralsensethatis perceived ritesinvokeand producea directrelation betweenaction imitative force, the groupthatenactsthem, and effects, and recreating actuallycreating thereby achieving theconceptofnecessary force or causalityas an inherent enactedquality. Lukes (1973,p. 448) arguesthatDurkheim no evidencein The provides Formsforthecausal relation Elementary claimedbetweenparticular social practices and particular The issue is obscured "conceptualsystems." ofthenotion ofconceptual intotheequabyLukes's introduction systems of Durkheim'sargument. tion,a sociologyof knowledgeinterpretation Durkheimneverattempted to argue thatparticular social forms created specificconceptual systemsin his sociologyof knowledge.However, Durkheim's epistemological argument consists ofthemuchstronger claim thatthere is a direct relation betweenspecific sortsofsocial practices and of the understanding. Imitativeritesare the origin particular categories oftheconceptofcausality. it becomesclearthatthe Properly understood entirediscussionof totemsconsistsof evidence of just the sort Lukes claims Durkheimhas not offered. Durkheimarguesthatparticipants directly perceivenecessary force as part of theirexperienceof certainritualsbecause, as a social relation, 441

Journalof Sociology American of thoserituals.Durkheim's(1915, forceis an enactedfeature necessary ritesservesthe purposeof pp. 393-414) detaileddiscussionof imitative of ritualsthat succeed onlyby enactingthe the occurrence establishing of causality. principle and played a pivotal Causalityis an essentialconceptin philosophy causality, Without and apriorism. rolein thedebate betweenempiricism on both sides of the debate agreed,sciencewould have no philosophers of inwhichHume arguedconsists itself, foundation. Indeed,knowledge without the concept effects to causes,would be impossible ferences from in diIf Durkheim theconceptofcausality secureda basis for ofcausality. that importance ofgreat ofthesocial,heachievedsomething experience rect debates. theoretical and methodological for current implications has serious THE CONCEPT OF CAUSALITY IN CLASSICAL EPISTEMOLOGY Because Durkheimarguesthathe has founda social originforthe catehe is oftentaken to be a Kantian or neogoriesof the understanding, discussedtheproblem and apriorists Kantian.However,bothempiricists ideas. The difference general in terms ofcategories and/or ofepistemology of the origins ofthecategories, explanation betweenthetwo was in their partin theirepistemological categories playedan important not whether argument. Kant's apriormakesit quiteclearthathe does notconsider Durkheim to the of validityat all and several timesrefers ism to containcriteria at all (1915, p. 27). He writes:"To reply as "no explanation" argument was givento us a prioriis not to reply thatit [theidea of classification] at all" (1915, p. 172). He goes on to say thatthis"lazy man's solutionis ... thedeathof analysis"(1915,p. 172). Eitherone explainstheexistence cannotbe explained as Hume did,thatthey orconcludes, ofthecategories, exseeks an empirical Durkheimclearly have no validity. and, therefore, althoughby empiricalorigins planationof the originsof the categories, Durkheim'ssocioempirical in sharedenactedpractices. he meansorigins not Kant's.9 of validity, criterion Hume's empirical approachsatisfies
Whenhiscriticisms as a Kantianor neo-Kantian. interpreted is generally 9Durkheim Locke was to Locke. However, takento be referring he is often to empiricism, refer it and did notmaketheskeptical as he had presented quitehappywithempiricism of Hume are morecharacteristic cites.These arguments thatDurkheim arguments withempirinothave beenfamiliar might The argument thatDurkheim and James. tooka thefactthatDurkheim overlooks withneo-Kantians cismbecausehe studied univerA survey ofGerman Superieure. theEcole Normale inphilosophy from degree 1862to 1890(Kohnke1991,p. 249) showsthattherisein neo-Kantianism sities from and ofcourses in empiricism in and availability interest withit an increased brought to Kohnke(1991,p. 249)"theshare according thisperiod, as well.During rationalism whilethose declined, and Hegel continuously of coursesdevotedto Plato,Aristotle
442

Durkheim'sEpistemology Durkheim While he set himself to accomplishHume's task,however, apand watereddown empiricist did not intendto employa modified to fulfill all ofHume's his argument proach.On theone hand,he intended of the foundations criteria, while,on theotherhand,he feltthatshifting in an enresulted the argument from theindividualto enactedpractices, Durkheimshould not be tirely new solutionto the problem.Therefore, It followsthatthe but rathera socioempiricist. considered an empiricist beforethe problemselaboratedby Hume must be consideredcarefully and itseffectiveness can be appreciated subtlety ofDurkheim'sargument evaluated. matheHume arguedthatall knowledge couldbe dividedintotwosorts: knowledge (Hume [1777] 1975,p. maticalknowledge and moral/empirical ofpurereason knowledge was for Hume a matter 25).Whilemathematical in the mind), (because numbers are not real but are logicalconstructions ofcause and effect, ormoralknowledge depended on theconcepts empirical (Hume 1975,p. 26). "By meansofthisrelation contiguity and resemblance and alone we can go beyondtheevidenceofourmemory [cause and effect] And factare ofthesame nature. concerning senses.... All our reasonings between thepresent is a connection hereis itconstantly supposedthatthere it"(Hume 1975,pp. 26-2 7). from factand thatwhichis inferred Without causal relations betweenperceptions, theywould remainparaccording to Hume. It is theconceptofcausality ticularand unconnected thatintroduces Every inference, every orderintothe fluxof experience. theidea requires factand a prior condition, connection betweena present ofcausality. ideas out thatallows personsto pull particular It is causality of the fluxand connectthemto others. it seems obvious that Therefore, personsmake use of such a concept.The questionforHume was not whether theconceptexists, as it obviously but whereit comesfrom must, and whether or not it has empiricalvalidity(Hume 1975,p. 27). Hume from experiofcause and effect cannotbe attained arguedthatknowledge ence of a singleinstance.That would requirethat objects containand is notpossible:"No displaytheir causes,whichHume (1975,p. 27) asserts object ever discovers, by the qualitieswhichappear to the senses,either the causes whichproducedit,or the effects whichwill arise from it."In event fromits is a distinct addition,accordingto Hume, "everyeffect cause. It could not,therefore, be discoveredin the cause" (1975,p. 30).
devoted to Spinoza,Descartes, Leibniz, Lockeand Hume,as wellas to Kant,showed a continuous increase." Durkheim's neo-Kantian training increases thechancesthat withHume,whosearguments he wouldhave beenfamiliar are necessary forunderstanding Kant.Durkheim usesHume'sarguments withgreat sophistication. It is only Durkheim's sociology of knowledge thathas neo-Kantian overtones and even that shouldnotbe interpreted Durkheim's within argument separately from epistemology, in essential thecontext of whichit changes respects. 443

American Journal of Sociology Generalizationover a series of particularexperiences, on the other hand, only adds to those particulars the perceiver'sfeelings about the seriesas a series,feelings whichare not an empirical experience of cause and effect. "For as thisidea [causality] arises froma numberof similar instances, and notfrom anysingle instance, itmustarisefrom thatcircumstance,in whichthenumber ofinstances differ from everyindividualinstance.But thiscustomary or transition connexion of the imagination is In everyotherparticular theonlycircumstance in whichtheydiffer. they are alike" (Hume 1975,p. 78). Hume arguesthatall thatis added to singleinstances bytheir collection in a seriesis the feeling personsget about the series.There is nothing empirically different abouttheseriesthatis morethanthesumofitsparts. Therefore, Hume concludedthatcausalityis merely theresultof feelings thatlead to customand habit.Thereare,for Hume (1975,p. 78),no empiricallyvalid experiences corresponding to causality. "Everyidea is copied from some preceding impression or sentiment; and wherewe cannotfind any impression, we may be certainthatthereis no idea. In all singleinstancesoftheoperation ofbodiesor minds, there is nothing thatproduces norconsequently can suggest anyimpression, anyidea, ofpoweror necesof causality. saryconnexion."''0 Repetition can neverproduceknowledge It can onlyproducethefeeling or beliefthatsimilar things will keep hapand habitual,and, accordingto pening.This beliefbecomescustomary is the originof theconceptof causality: Hume, the feeling or beliefitself instancesappear, and the same object is al"But, when manyuniform the notion ways followedby the same event;we thenbeginto entertain We thenfeela new sentiment or impression of cause and connexion. ... is the originof thatidea whichwe seek for"(1975,p. and thissentiment in a feeling, notin an empirical 78). Thus, causality originates experience. has no empiricalvalidityand personsare mistaken It, therefore, when, customand habit,theybelieve the transfer of this feeling to following external relations has anyvalidity: "Andas wefeel a customary connexion that feeling to the objects; as nothing is betweenthe ideas, we transfer more usual than to apply to externalbodies every internalsensation, whichtheyoccasion"(1975, p. 78n). Hume demonstrated that causality of naturalobcannotbe explainedon the basis of individualexperience
0 In thisquote,Hume usesboththe 18th-century of"idea"or impression to meaning sense denotean exactcopyofa senseimpression or sentiment and themoremodern If an idea is a copyof a senseimpression, of an idea as a thought. it has empirical If it is a copyofa sentiment, as in thefollowing validity. quote,it is notempirically due to Hume's failure valid. Whilethe passageis somewhat to use the ambiguous he does notmeanthatpeopledo nothave and word"idea"consistently throughout, He meansthatthere use theconcept ofcausality. is no valididea or senseimpression to theconcept corresponding beingused. 444

Durkheim'sEpistemology jectsbecause causality is nota sensible qualityofnaturalobjectsand their relations that can be experienced by individualsin a singlecase. If the to believe in causalityis an instinct, or a conclusiondrawn disposition after perceiving a seriesofnaturalobjectsorevents, or a matter ofcustom, thenit is something added by the mind to perception, not part of the not empirically originalperception, and therefore valid. The significance ofHume's projectis thatit fails, or rather, thatHume showsthatan individually based empiricism couldnotexplaintheempiriA modern cal origin oftheessential general categories. social constructivist accountofthisproblem acceptsHume's conclusion thatknowledge of causalityhas no empiricalvalidity.Social constructivists thenfocuson an accountofthesocial determination ofcustomand habitthatprovides formoreconsistency betweenindividualideas than Hume's conclusion it could be arguedthatLocke's ([1690] would seemto allow for. Although 1959) "commonacceptation" is alreadyan earlyversionof a social constructivist argument (Rawls 1977). DURKHEIM'S SOCIOEMPIRICAL ARGUMENTFOR CAUSALITY While Durkheimaccepts Hume's argument thatindividualperceptions ofnaturaleventscannotgive riseto a valid idea ofcausality, he does not thatcausalitycan have no valid empirical acceptHume's conclusion origin.For Durkheim, social practices are empirical, are perceived, and can an empirically furnish validorigin for theconcept ofcausality. WhenDurkheimarguesthatthe category of causalityis not merely a generalization ofperceptions based on a series ofthesocialbut,rather, can be immediately in the singleinstance, perceivedas a generalphenomenon he is striking at the heart of the epistemological problem.When he argues that the empirical(perceivable) effects of ritualactionare morethan the sum of the individualparts (i.e., that shared ritualhas meaningand social or moral force, which the sum of its partstaken alone as particulars does not),he is again makinga significant improvement in theempiricist position." For Durkheimthe categories of the understanding and the social relations thatproducethemare not something added by the mind to a seriesof perceptions of naturalobjects and eventsbut, rather, inherent characteristics of enactedritualpractices and thereby immediately avail" This is whatDurkheim meansby insisting that"society" is morethanthesumof its parts.He is arguing a solution to theproblem of general vs. particular, a point thathas beenmissed. The "parts" are usually as individual interpreted persons, not individual perceptions, andtheconclusion generally drawn is that ifa group ofpersons is more thanthesumoftheindividuals in thegroup then Durkheim must be articulating a group-mind theory. He is not.It is rather an epistemological argument about thepossibility ofperceiving ideasorcategories oftheunderstanding inenacted general whichenactsocialforces, practices, whichare morethanthesumof their parts.

445

of Sociology Journal American who to thoseparticipants instance, in each particular able in perception, enact the ritual. Durkheimpicked up whereHume leftoffbut witha sigEssentially ofan individualacceptstheimpossibility WhileDurkheim twist. nificant he argues that the solution which Hume demonstrated, ist empiricism, enBy substituting based empiricism. can be foundin a socioempirically in and ofthemoralforces generated and perceptions acted social practice themfor enacting by the individualparticipants through thosepractices Durkheimavoids Hume's of naturalphenomena, individualperceptions skepticalconclusion.Enacted practicesdo display theircauses in their stillhave no valid applicaeffects. However,as withHume,thecategories tionto naturalscience. The generalidea of causalityis revealedby Durkheimas havingbeen all along on certainsortsof social available to perception immediately in enactedsocial practice ofparticipation occasions.It is thissubstitution that not onlyprovidesthe key to Durkheim's forindividualperception the years,in through solutionto Hume's dilemmabut also, consistently about what is distinctive comesto define spiteof themisunderstandings, has unitof analysisforsociology The primary as a discipline. sociology not been the individualbut variouspositedlevels of social organization observablesocial practice. and empirically THE ASSOCIATION OF CAUSALITY WITH IMITATIVE RITES of causalityhas its originsin those Durkheimargues that the category imitativerituals throughwhich the totemicgroup is reproducedand which the forceof the groupis achieved,enacted,and experithrough centralprinciple Durkheimargues,have as their rituals, enced.Imitative the thing something, that"like produceslike,"thatis, that,by imitating rites He arguesthattheseimitative can be caused to reproduce. imitated in a singular enact,and way; the ritesconstitute, are causallyefficacious and therefore give persons thattheyrepresent the veryforces reproduce In other force. ofnecessary words, in themtheexperience who participate is one of equivalence the relationship the ritesare what theyrepresent: or correspondence (Durkheim1915,pp. not representation and creation, 393-414). is that Durkheimfacesin makingthisargument One of the problems to his argument, whichis critical ofimitative rites, his own interpretation in his day that imitative current differs sharplyfromthe interpretation of the idea of causality.For ritesare based on a crude misapplication perspective to Durkheim (1915,p. 399),theempiricist according instance, taken by Frazer (1887, 1889, 1910 and Tylor ([1874] 1973, 1899) treats of the actual animal species the pointof the ritualas the reproduction 446

Durkheim'sEpistemology it appearsthatthememthatthetotem Giventhisperspective, represents. because thetotemic bersofthetotem have made a mistake symbol cannot cause the actual reproduction of biologicalanimals. If the riteis interpretedas having successfully reproducedthe totemicspecies only if it causes the biologicalanimal to reproduce, thenthe beliefin the causal of theceremony thatit is hard to underefficacy seemsso grossan error stand.Hume's argument thatcausalityis beyondthecapacityof thehuman mindand thatcustomary and habitualideas are beingcrudelyapplied to natural relationsin the name of causalityseems to have been supported. In orderto establishhis own position, Durkheimundertakes an elaborateand detailedconsideration of theempiricist interpretation of totems. This discussionhas been mistaken fora surveyof totemic practicesand a social constructivist instead account of the logic of totemicsymbols, of beingrecognized as an essentialpartof his epistemological argument. Durkheimagreeswiththe empiricists thatpeople are able to form crude causal connections based on faulty betweenactionsor eventsand effects generalizations fromexperience.However, more than that would be terms.Taken needed, he argues,to explain these beliefsin empiricist in classicalempiricist strictly terms, theserituals notonlylook likea false of contiguity to natural and resemblance applicationof crude principles events,as Frazer and Tylorargued,theymake primitive peoples appear to be altogether devoid of reason.Durkheimargues thatno one would believe in the literalcausal efficacy of imitative ritualsunlesstherewas moreto theritualthanthecrudeperception of custom, habit,similarity, in terms and contiguity. Personsmustgetreinforcement forthesebeliefs of some real causal efficacy of themoralforces involvedbecause thereis no literal causal efficacy withregardto naturalevents.They thenmisunderstandthe originof thiscausal efficacy and transposeit onto natural or supernatural eventsor agencies,thus,generating beliefs. religious If thetrueefficacy oftheriteis, as Durkheim says,notthereproduction of the biologicalspeciesbut rather the reproduction of the moralenergy of the group,then the beliefin the riteis explained.The ritereallyis If the ritereproduces the moralunityof the totemic causallyefficacious. group,thenit does cause the moral reproduction of the totemic species (1915,p. 400). It is theeffect on thementhemselves, their feelings ofwellthatgive themthe feeling theritehas succeeded, beingand moralunity, not any presumed magicalactionof theriteon naturalor animalobjects (1915,p. 402). Durkheim makesan important distinction betweencausalnaturaleventsthatmustbe inferred ityas a relation between from a series of incidents and causalityas a moralforceevidentin any singlecase of enactedpractice. Durkheim theprinciple ofsimilarity, or "like arguesthathiddenwithin 447

American Journal of Sociology is a principle involving produceslike,"unrecognized by the empiricists, he argues,has two sortsof creationor causality.This hiddenprinciple, and (2) to reproduce the results:(1) to reproducethe moral community rites totemic species(1915,pp. 400-401). Durkheimarguesthatimitative ofsomething new (1915,p. 399),which, concern thereproduction entirely and contiguity therefore, cannot be explainedon the basis of similarity traditional (the empiricist explanation). the resultof social practices, the Because, forDurkheim, logicis itself or not the riteis actuallycausally efficacious must questionof whether be considered an empirical matter offact, nota matter oflogic.Therefore, ofcausality is genDurkheim arguesthatthepossibility thattheprinciple eratedin and through imitative ritualsneeds to be establishedthrough in its careful examination. Instead of considering the principle empirical he writes, "let us connectit withthe system generaland abstractform, ofideas and sentiments" thatthe"rites (Durkheim1915, putintopractice" p. 400). In serviceof thisargument, discusDurkheimengagesin an extensive sion of the actual enactment of imitative rites.This discussion, like the of totems, is generally treated as a sociology ofreligion, otherdiscussions to the epistemology is missed.The purposeof this and the relationship is to establishthe conceptof causalityand demondiscussion, however, not to explorethe to particular enacted practices, strateits relationship detailsof imitative ritualsin theirown right. theanimalsorobjects imitate In imitative rituals, members ofthetotem of the totemnot members thatthetotemrepresents. Throughthe ritual, butthey "makeit"and "remake it" and reinforce thetotem, onlyrepresent "Since theyare emusor kangaroos, as a moralcommunity. theycomport liketheanimalsofthesame name.By thismeans,theymututhemselves ofthesame moralcomthattheyare all members ally show one another them.The rite and theybecomeconsciousof the kinshipuniting munity it" thiskinship; it makesit or remakes to expressing does not limititself (Durkheim1915,p. 400). idea thatbinds themtogether and thatthey Because it is the totemic all have in theirminds,it is quite naturaland necessarythat therebe of the totemaccompanying the ritual.But that should representations thatthe idea thatthesesymbolscan cause not mislead us intothinking to totemic animalsor comesfrom theirsimpleresemblance reproduction an idealistinterpretathatcausal ideas are producedby the symbolism, ritesare causallyefficacious tion.The idea thattotemic results, according is theactual to Durkheim, from thefactthatwhat thesymbolrepresents and reproducing themselves factofthemembers ofthetotem constituting and identity as a moralcommunity. through They cause theirown unity of the ritual. the enactment 448

Durkheim'sEpistemology By enacting theirbeliefin the causal efficacy of thetotemic symboldisplaying the totemic symbolto one anotheron theirbodies and acting notonly likethetotemic animalduring theritual-membersofthetotem reaffirm but actually "remake"the kinshipgroup in and throughthe ritual. It alsoexercises a profound influence overthesoulsoftheworshipers who a feeling ofwell-being whose them takepartin it.Theytakeawaywith is wellfounded. cannot causesthey clearly see,butwhich Theyfeelthat their offact, theceremony is goodfor them; and,as a matter they reforge failto givethem a in it. How couldthissortofwell-being moral nature itsetouttobe and that ithasbeenwhat that therite hassucceeded, feeling endwhich ithasattained theendsat which itwas aimed? As theonly that ofthetotemic this was thereproduction was consciously sought species, ofwhich is thus theefficacy seems to be assured bythemeans employed, proven. (Durkheim 1915, p. 402) is notmerely ofparticipants thattherite has beensuccessful The feeling sharedamongthe personal.Durkheimarguesthatit is a generalfeeling ofpractice. thathas a general sourcein themutualenactment participants of the totembecome Throughthe ritual,the participants and members in in theirtotemic forone another. Their participation stronger feelings in thetotem is strengthened. Therefore thetotemic speciesis reproduced them. it represents Because thecommunity onlyexistsin so faras thetotems are enacted,thus creatingand sustaining shared ideas and beliefs,the ritualsthat make and reinforce the feeling of the causal efficacy of the Memmake and remakethemoralcommunity. totemalso quite literally in the ritualhave been reproduced bers of the totemwho participate as of a moralcommunity. It is the resulting of well-being members feeling and moral unitythat makes participants believe the ritehas succeeded (Durkheim1915, p. 402) not the biologicalreproduction of the totemic is a social force available in direct species.The causal relation perception, not an inference concerning the relationof the ritualto a naturalevent of the species). (e.g.,the reproduction If persons enactrituals to achievemutuality, thisis something ofwhich aware. The ritualsare theirown effect. "It is theycan be immediately becausethey serveto remake individuals and groups morally thatthey are believedto have a poweroverthings" Durkheim (Durkheim1915,p. 414). "a fullconception of the causal relationis impliedin the power writes, thus attributed to the like to producethe like" (1915, p. 406). Thus, the causal relationin imitative ritesis immediately displayedin its effects, and the problemof inference fromeffects to causes that posed such a block forclassical empiricism is avoided. stumbling The causal relation involvedin imitative ritualis a verydifferent kind 449

American Journal of Sociology causal relation, and Durkheim of causal relation from a physical/natural involvedin the ritual carefully contrasts the two; the physicalgestures is purelysocial (1915, p. 402). If have no naturalefficacy; theirefficacy betweennaturaleventsor beDurkheim'sargument hingedon relations would dependon intweensocial and naturalevents, thecausal relation ference Durkheim and thusbe subjectto his own critiqueof empiricism. thatare enactedin theritual are irrelevant arguesthatthespecific gestures They have causal efficacy, not because and could be replacedby others. of magicalor scientific withwhichtheyact on objectsor aniproperties ofthesharedtotemic mals,but rather because,as enactedrepresentations thatin turncreatefeelings symbolof the group,theycreatemoralforces of moral unityin its members, strengthening the group and hence the of religious totem. "The truejustification practices does notlie in the apin the invisibleactionwhich parentends whichtheypursue,but rather effect ourmental they exercise overthemindand in theway in whichthey status"(Durkheim1915,p. 403). speaksofis a moralone thathe says The causal relation thatDurkheim states.Durkheim'sdiscussion of"feelings" and operateson our "internal" whichhas been disparagedas "internal states"as a basis forknowledge, in fact constitutes an argument of some consebad crowd psychology, and moralforceare one of the resultsof quence. Feelingsof well-being The causal effiof causality. totemic ritualsthatgive riseto the category Durkas a feeling of moralunity. cacy of the ritualis perceiveddirectly are manifest internally, theyare heimarguesthat,because thesefeelings can be knowndirectly rather than available and, therefore, immediately statesis, indirectly as withexternal objects.Knowledgeof theseinternal of external statesof afand morevalid than knowledge better therefore, fairs. an internal Hume (1975,p. 78) had also calledcausality feeling resulting in a series.Howof particulars a person'sfeeling about a collection from Durkheim werenecessarily individual. (1915, ever,forHume suchfeelings are inthatpurely p. 408) acknowledges personaland individualfeelings of moralforceand communicable. However,he arguesthatthe feelings ritualsconstitute a perception of general well-being generated by totemic ofthegroup(see Rawls 1996b).They are sharedbymembers social forces in theenactment rituals: withothers oftotemic theproduct ofcooperation in particuof anybody "Beingtheworkofall, theyare notthepossession lar" (Durkheim1915,p. 408). Causalityis actuallya qualityof the social Hume,theeffect does containand display practice itself, or,to paraphrase will feel(i.e., perceive)it thus,and all will get its cause. All participants As in Suicide ([1897] 1951),Durkheimargues the same idea or category. stateshave a commonsharedsocioempirthattheseinternal or "psychic" ical originin social factsthat explain and cause those internalpsychic 450

Durkheim'sEpistemology states.They are collective forces even though internal and psychical "social forces: life"(Durkheim1915,p. 408). theyare a part of our internal It is important to note thatnot all collective feelings are generalin this to thesix categories, whichDurkspecialsense,onlythosecorresponding heimcalls moralforces. The moralforces generated byenactedpractice are internalized as categories.They have an external social sourcein totemic ritualswhose prithesefeelings, so as to providea sharedbasis marypurposeis to generate forreason. The function of religion, accordingto Durkheim(1915, pp. The moral 465-66) is to produce this logical basis for understanding. forcesdo not have theirsource in a "mystical collectiveconscience"or groupmindoperating via somesortof constraint, as thetheory has often thepractical beeninterpreted (Nisbet 1974;Parsons1968),butare,rather, resultof concrete The feeling ofmoralunity is thepursocial practices."2 pose of the ritual.It is not in the mindand not added by the mind.The is the substanceof the ritualand therefore and feeling external, general, and individual. shared,not internal Thefeeling is a perception oftheefficacy oftheritual. Justas particular impressions ofcolorand shape are perceptions ofexternal statesofaffairs, of the creationof moral unityare also perceptions of external feelings social statesof affairs thatare quite "real" bothin substanceand effect. In thiscase, however, Durkheim treats feelings resulting from social rituals as havinggreater of external obempirical validitythan perceptions of generalsocial or moral jects because theyare immediately perceptions whichact on personsinternally, whereasperceptions of external forces, and stillrequirethe problematic objects remainparticular operationof inference to becomegeneral. This argument is of some significance to understanding Durkheim's claim thatsociallyderivedcategories are morevalid than the categories ofnaturalscienceand logic,whichappears to manycritics to be illogical, and based on a ratherfuzzypsychology unfounded, of collectiveconscience. The argumentis reallyquite logicallytight.Whereas natural forces cannotbe perceiveddirectly, social forces can, and the perception ofthem can therefore be validlysharedwithothers. The sharedperception in and through of moralforces enactedpracticeis a better sortof knowlof particularinstancesof natural edge than the individual perception forces thatnaturalscienceand naturalphilosophy mustdepend on."3
See discussion ofconstraint in n. 23 below. See Vico([1744]1948)for an earlier, also muchneglected, argument thatknowledge ofthesocialhas potentially ofnatural greater validity thanknowledge events. Howon themoralforce ever,whileDurkheim focuses ofcollective actionas thedeciding factor between thetwo,Vico focuses on immediate knowledge ofintentions, an obviouslyproblematic notion.
12 13

451

American Journalof Sociology Durkheim is left witha degreeofrelativity as thecategories mayvaryto somedegreebetweengroups, and in any case theargument onlyprovides empirical validity forsix categories-thus,his need to elaboratea sociologyofknowledge. But,according to Durkheim, thepurposeofthecategoriesoftheunderstanding was notto secureabsolutetruth or transcendental validity across groups. The categoriesdid not evolve to fulfill philosophical purposes.14The categories and thesocial practices thatproduce themcame intobeingto fulfill the social need forsharedcategories oftheunderstanding ofthesame group.He arguedthat amongmembers without sharedcategories, and social cooperation intelligibility would be "If mendid notagreeupon theseessential impossible: ideas at everymoment. . . all contactbetweentheir mindswould be impossible, and with that,all lifetogether" (1915, p. 30). This is an earlyargument that the needs ofintelligibility place demandson the development of forms of social practice. There is no reasonwhythe categories cannotexhibit a certaindegreeofvariation from place to place and stillfulfill thatsocialneed. have their However,becausethey basis in experience, translation between groupsshouldbe possibleeven wherevariationdoes occur. CLASSIFICATION Classification is an even morebasic conceptwithregardto epistemology thancausality: theproblem of identity and difference goingback at least to earlyGreekthought. Durkheim'sargument withregard Unfortunately, to classification, whileit has receivedmoreattention thanthe argument forcausality, has been understood as a social constructivist acprimarily countof the social originsof particular of classification, and its systems importance withregard to an argument fortheempirical ofclassivalidity as a category fication of the understanding has been missed.15
14Durkheim's argument thatthecategories oftheunderstanding do notoriginate for philosophical purposes shouldnotbe takento meanthatDurkheim's own argument is nota critique ofphilosophy (see,e.g.,Hilbert's [1992,pp. 79-80]misinterpretation of thispoint).Durkheim intended his epistemology to make traditional philosophy oftheunderstanding obsolete. However, thecategories thatsociety produces maynot a conventional in epistemology entirely satisfy philosophical interest becausethatis nottheir purpose. Theirpurpose is to makeintelligibility and socialcooperation possible. 15 One AJS reviewer said thatmyargument withregard to thephilosophical importanceofDurkheim's idea of"classification" was wrong because,amongother things, in theoriginal French, Durkheim used theword"genre," notclassification. The reviewer said thatattention to theoriginal edition French wouldshowthatDurkheim (1912,p. 205) usedtheword"class"onlyonce.It is sufficient to pointoutin response thatin thesection between pp. 200-22 (citedby thereviewer), whichis chap. 3 of book 2 in the original Frenchedition, Durkheim uses the Frenchterms "classification,""classe,""classee,"and "classes"(withor without accent marks)no fewer in thetext than29 times and notes. "class"and "genre" Whiletheterms appearsome-

452

Durkheim'sEpistemology The neglectof this argument may be due to the factthat Durkheim on threelevels,whichhe did notdisdealt withtheissue ofclassification tinguish clearly.First, he argued that the abilityto perceivesimilarity in crude termsthat do not have empiricalvalidityis a and difference capacitythathumanssharewithanimals(1915,p. 170).This parallelshis discussionof a similarcapacitywith regardto causality(1915, p. 410). of social systems of classifications Second, he exploredthe development on divisionsin social relations. This is a prior "cosmologies" patterned at of knowledge, and classifications maryfocusof Durkheim'ssociology thislevel are not empirically valid. Third,he arguedforthedevelopment of the category of classification the directperception of moral through forcein the enactment of thosepractices thatcreatethe binaryrelations This is his epistemological of sacred and profane, totemand nontotem. ofthecategory ofclassification argument fortheempirical validity (1915, pp. 174-75). Thereis a greatdeal ofmisunderstanding regarding Durkheim'streatmentofthecategory ofclassification, and ithas generally beeninterpreted ofthesecondofthethreelevelsas a sociology ofknowledge onlyin terms to concernedwith documenting of classification systems corresponding of culturalgroups.This misunderstanding treatsthe category particular as a group of collectiverepresentations that develop over classification thecourseofa seriesofperceptions ofcultural Because itis viewed events. in thisway,Durkheimappears to fallintothe old empiricist dilemmaof to abstract valid generalideas from a seriesofparticutrying empirically lars. The criticism thatDurkheim'sarguments fortime,space, and classification are circular,which is cited with such regularity (Dennes 1924; Schaub 1920)is based on thismisunderstanding. Durkheim is interpreted as arguing thatrepeatedperceptions of social instantiations of space and time give rise to the categories of space and timethrough a processof Because a series of particulars abstraction. cannot give rise to a valid generalidea, Durkheimis accused of philosophical naivete.In addition, critics pointout thatpersonswould need alreadyto have ideas of space and timein orderto perceivetheinstantiations of space and time,which are supposedto giveriseto thoseideas as instantiations ofspace and time. In makingthisargument, thecritics confuse thefirst and secondlevels of Durkheim'sargument withthe argument fortheempirical of validity the categories of theunderstanding. The argument thatanimalscan perceivecruderelations ofspace,time, orsimilarity and difference (first level) and theargument thattheperiodicity ofsocial rituals and social divisions
timesto be used interchangeably, Durkheim certainly meantto signify the idea of classification as a form ofthought, notjust as an idea representing a kindofthing. 453

American Journal of Sociology can be turned by thecrudecapacityto discerntime,space, and class into classifications based on social forms (second level) are not the basis for Durkheim'sargument forthe socioempirical validityof the category of classification (thirdlevel). While Durkheim(1915) allows that persons have the capacityto forminvalid generalideas beforethe development of the categories, theseinvalid forms are not the basis of the categories. A valid category of classification cannotevolve from ideas thathave no validity. An empirically valid category ofclassification onlydevelops,according to Durkheim, thatenactmoralrelationships whenpractices producefeelings of moral force.Only afterthe development and enactment of the first moraldivisionproducing moralforceis any complexlevel of social organization possible(1915,pp. 174-75). Durkheim explicitly rejected the thatvalid ideas could be abstracted argument froman accumulation of a position thathe identified particular perceptions, withclassical empiricism.A cosmology withno empiricalvaliditycould theoretically be abstractedfroman accumulationof perceptions. (1915, pp. 171-72). But, a society even then,according to Durkheim, complexenoughto generate such a cosmology would requirepriordevelopment of empirically valid which Durkheimconsidereda prerequisite forany complex categories, thecritics' social development. FromDurkheim'sperspective, own social is circular constructivist becauseitassumesthatcomplex societargument on thebasis offictive Durkheim ies are operating sharedrealities. argued that societiescannotdevelop unless theycan first solve the problemof the generation of valid categories. mutualintelligibility through as elaborating of classificaBecause he has been interpreted systems and notas arguing of knowledge fortheemtions,a sociology argument, pirical validity of the categoryof classification, Durkheim has been of the data on whichhe based heavilycriticized bothforthe inaccuracy his argument, accuracybeingin a sense the whole pointfora sociology and fornot pursuinga consistently social constructivist of knowledge, The thirdlevel of argument has been generally overlooked and position. theepistemological thatwerethe purposeofmakingthearimplications in thefirst to be dismissedwithregularity. gument place continue Thus, it is generally heldthatDurkheim'sargument does notexplaintheorigin of particular of an empirically valid category but onlythe development in various societies;a uses of conceptslooselylabeled as classifications of conceptualsystems of knowledge. or sociology sociology documentsystems of classificaDurkheimdoes elaborately Certainly tion.However,in boththeearlierworkon primitive classification (DurkForms(1915) theempirical heimand Mauss 1963)and in The Elementary detail is not aimed at elucidating various social systems of classification such classification towardevaluatingwhether per se but rather systems 454

Durkheim'sEpistemology forthedevelopment might have providedin and through their enactment of this category. The relationof the discussionof various classification systems to the category of classification is the same as thatbetweenthe of forceand causality. variousdiscussions of totemsand the categories Because an empirically valid category cannotemergeover a seriesof mustdevelopfrom a moraldivithecategory ofclassification perceptions, whichis experienced as a moralforcein sion enactedin social practice, a singleinstanceand not as a naturaldivisionperceivedover a seriesof For Durkheim thefirst moraldivisionto be enactedbecomes particulars. follow.16 thefirst binary social division from whichall other classifications Totemicpractices, according to Durkheim, enactthismoraldivisionin humansocial relations such thatpersonscan immediately perceiveit in enactedpractice. totems are a morecomplex form ofsocial diviAlthough are theclosest sionthanthefirst divisionbetween sacredand profane, they to theoriginal of thosepractices thatare stillenacted.From one original of divisionof social relations intotwo,totemand nontotem, thecategory classification and subsequentdivisionscould develop. TOTEMISM AND CLASSIFICATION In orderfortotems, or clans,to be able to providea social originforthe it mustbe the case thattotemsthemselves of are category classification, social and not individualin origin.If totemshad an individualorigin, Durkheim thought thathis argument forthegeneration oftheconceptof classification would be circularand subjectonce again to the empiricist dilemma."If [individualtotemism] was the primitive fact,we mustsay thatreligion is bornin theconsciousness oftheindividual, thatbefore all else, it answersto individualaspirationsand that its collectiveformis merely secondary" (Durkheim1915,p. 200). Consequently, Durkheim entertains an extended oftheorigins oftotemism, discussion whichhas two different objectives:first, to demonstrate thatindividualexperience is not the sourceof totemsand, therefore, that an individualistic approach to and religion in generalis invalid;and, second,that totems understanding the conceptof classification is based on totemsas enactedpracticesand is valid (in Durkheim'sspecial sense) and not circularin the therefore sense.Whenthesetwopurposes are notbothunderstood, empiricist Durkheim's elaborate argument forthe social originsof totemsseems once accountof religious instead again to be a social constructivist cosmology
16 This was the point of departure forLevi-Strauss (1963).However, he missedthe of thisbinary origin in sharedenactedpractice opposition and locatedit insteadin sharedbelief. This led himto resthis argument on a universe of belief structures, a position from whichwe are stillstruggling to disentangle ourselves theoretically.

455

American Journal of Sociology do notthemselves have an individual ofa proof thattheenactedpractices so thathe can arguefortheempirical that validity ofthecategories origin theygenerate. Durkheim developeda sociology ofknowlIn addressing thefirst point, origin edge ofclassification systems, thepointofwhichwas to show their Durkheimarguedthatas in social as opposed to individualexperience. social groupsdevelopedan internal organization, theydividedthe parts ofnature and society intoclassifications, calledtotems, whichbecamepart of the internal animal,vegetable, organization of the group.All things, and mineral, were assigneda totem: "The unity of thesefirst logicalsystemsmerely the unity of thesociety" (1915,p. 170). Religious reproduces ortotemic order does notreflect theindividual perception ofnaturalorder. diviis based on familiar Rather, theclassification ofnaturalphenomena sionsin organizedsocial life."In the Mount Gambiertribe. . . thereare ten clans; consequently the entireworld is divided into ten classes.... when brought theseten families of things make up a complete together, and systematic of the world"(1915, p. 179). representation and the diviIt is the confusion betweenthe divisionsof social forms sions of naturein the initialtotemicclassifications, accordingto Durkheim,thatfirst led to theapplicationof thisidea to nature.For instance, all thingsbelonging to the same totem(animal,vegetable,and mineral) are classified together by virtueof beingrelatedto a commonancestor, an idea clearlyderivedfrom social relations as it could have no possible of unitbasis in nature."In all probability, we would neverhave thought called classes,if intohomogeneous groups, ing thebeingsof theuniverse we had not had the example of human societiesbeforeour eyes,if we ofmen's had notevencommenced things themselves members bymaking and also if human groupsand logical groupshad not been consociety, fusedat first" (Durkheim1915,pp. 172-73). of orderis a confusion The equation of naturaland social principles because the classifications reproducesocial relationsand impose them on naturewhere theydo not belong.But it is also a usefulconfusion. The social construction of classifications providesa way of categorizing thingsin nature that is shared to a degree. As Durkheim (1915, p. 169) writes:"It is because men were organizedthat theywere able to organizethings." Withoutclassifications based on social divisions,personsmightnot to be a significant one."Men have found thecruderelation ofresemblance of arranging theirknowledgein this way if would never have thought the was. But neither what a hierarchy theyhad not knownbeforehand spectacleof physicalnaturenor the mechanismof mentalassociations a the hierarchy is exclusively could furnish themwith this knowledge, and It is onlyin societythat thereare superiors, social affair. inferiors, 456

Durkheim'sEpistemology the outlineswhich logical equals. . . . It is societythat has furnished thought has filledin" (Durkheim1915,p. 173). The abilityto perceiveresemblanceand difference betweennatural is basic, and even animals perceivethingsas being of different entities types.However, totemicclassifications introduce the idea of hierarchy, in nature.Thus, all whichis a social or moral organization not existing classifications thenotionofhierarchy musthave a social origin. involving In addressing the second point,Durkheimmakes the entirely distinct thatthecategory ofclassification as generated argument by enactedpracticesis empirically valid. The category of classification itself is not constructed on the basis of the manyand varied classifications thatappear in any givensociety but rather on thebasis offeelings ofmoralforce that the enactment of thesesocial divisionsin and through totemic ritesgive to participants. The enactment of the totemicritesby membersof the totemic groupenacts"an internal bond[which] attaches themto thegroup in whichthey are placed"(1915,p. 174).This provides theoriginal experience of a binarydivisionbetweentotemand nontotem, sacred and profane:"A bondofmystic unites each individual to those[totemic] sympathy beings,whetherliving or not, which are associated with him" (1915, p. 174). Durkheimarguesthatthe experience of social divisionas moralforce becomesthe basis forthe empirically valid logicalconstruct of classification providing the mind with a way of thinking that is not tied to the conditions of its conception: "This organization, whichat first may have 7 appearedto us as purely logical,is at thesame timemoral"(1915,p. 175). The basis forthelogicalrelation betweenbeingsin thesame classification is theirmoral relationship: the beingsin a totemare "really"the same because the same moralforcebinds themtogether. According to Durkheim, it is the focuson individualperception and theapplicationofthecategory of classification to naturalobjects,events, and forces, with regardto which it has no validity, that has made the problem ofempirical validity appear to be unsolvablebothin philosophy and sociology. This sortof individualist empiricism can onlyexplainthe of what Durkheimcalls "genericideas" in the individual development Generic organism. likeclassification imagesand "logicalsymbols" are not thesame thing. to Durkheim According (1915,p. 172),animalscan make "An animalis able to form generic representations: generic imagesthough ignorant of the art of thinking in classes and species."Only beingswho enact moralforcedevelop categories.
17 The feeling ofmoral force with regard toclassification only provides a socioempirical basisfor thevalidity oftheidea ofclassification itself. It doesnotguarantee thevalidity ofanyparticular classifications, whichare often extremely arbitrary.

457

American Journal of Sociology INDIVIDUAL PERCEPTION VERSUS THE CATEGORIES: DURKHEIM'S ALLEGED DUALISM Durkheim'sdistinction betweenthe basic abilityof individualsto notice similarity and difference thathas no empirical validity (first level of the classification argument) and empirically valid categories ofthought (third level of theclassification argument) has been interpreted by his critics as a dualist position.The chargeof dualism,however,like the charge of is based on misunderstanding. circularity, Dualism is a name forvarious arguments concerning the gap betweenthought and reality or mindand body. Generallythe argument is that the natureof mind and body,or spiritand matter, are so different as to be incompatible. For instance, in Cartesiandualismtherationalmindcan onlyhave knowledge ofwhat is rationalin the universe, not physicalmatter(unless physicalmatteris conceivedas purelyrational,an idealistposition). In sociology the term dualismis often used to denotethe gap betweenindividualand society. Durkheim'sallegeddualismis largely a result ofmisunderstanding his to distinguish thecrudeanimalability to perceivecontiguity, attempt difference, and similarity from thevalid category of classification combined withmisreadings of an earlierarticle, "Individualand CollectiveReprein which Durkheim([1898] 1953) argued against what he sentations," characterized as James's psychological of reductionism. Interpretations thisarticleconsistently confuseDurkheim'sown positionwiththe indito WilliamJames(Rawls 1996a). vidualistpositionhe attributed Durkheimallows fora basic empiricism withinindividualperception in touchwithreality. thatis not valid knowledgebut is nevertheless "It is not our intention to denythatthe individualintellect has of itself the resemblances betweenthedifferent powerof perceiving objectsof which it is conscious.Quite on thecontrary, it is clearthateven themostprimitive and simpleclassifications presupposethisfaculty" (Durkheim1915, p. 170). While this argument is generally consideredevidenceof Durkheim's Cartesian dualism (Lukes 1973), in fact,Durkheimis arguingthat the biological individual is not capable of the exerciseof reason-not a Cartesianposition at all. The Cartesianargument is thatthelogicofreason is, first of all, a given and, secondly, with completely incompatible theorganization ofthe"corruptible" worldofnaturethat (or lack thereof) ofreason.According ofthepurelight but alwaysfallsshort approximates to Durkheim,the biologicalindividualonlypossessesa basic abilityto sortperceptions to resemblance and contiguity, whichgoes no according does not produce further than Hume's customand habit and certainly valid knowledge. In addition, theargument thatpersons to form possesstheinnateability thosewho have criticized Durkgenericrepresentations oughtto satisfy
458

Durkheim'sEpistemology heim's argument as circular sinceDurkheimclearlystateshis beliefthat nonvalidideas of space, time,class, and causalityprecedethe developmentof valid categories of thought. Yet, criticswho chargeDurkheim with dualism and therefore must be familiarwith this argumentalso chargehim withcircularity. In contrast to the generalinterpretation of his positionas dualistand Durkheimin factmakesthehighly neo-Kantian, original argument that, in ritualpractices, prior to participating persons have onlythebasic abilities of animalsto make generic whichare similarto the representations, faculties thatthe empiricists the arguedfor,whereas,afterexperiencing enactment ofritualsocial practices, have empirically valid categories they of the understanding. Durkheim'sargument that categoriesof thought have an empirical is completely origin withboththeKantian incompatible and the Cartesianpositions thathave been attributed to it. While Durkheimarguesthatnaturalrelations cannotbe the originof the categories of the understanding, arguinginsteadthattheyhave their in socialrelations, he also maintains thatsocialrelations are natural origin relations of a special sortand therefore believesthatthereis no deep inbetweenreason and the empiricalworld of natureor becompatibility "If experience tween individualand society: were completely separated fromall that is rational,reason could not operateupon it; in the same way, if the psychicnatureof the individualwere absolutely opposed to thesocial life,society would be impossible" (Durkheim1915,pp. 28-29). Durkheimdoes acknowledgea gap betweenreason and perceptions of naturalforces and arguesthatcategories could notarisefrom perceptions of natural events.However, he also argues that the categoriesare not randomwithregardto naturalorder. There are two reasonsthathe gives forthis.(1) The social order, whichgave riseto thecategories, is a natural orderitself and as such obeysnaturallaws. Therefore, sociallygenerated are in somesensenaturalcategories categories (thiswould notbe truefor whichare ideal). (2) Whilethereare limits cosmologies to thecertainty of knowledgethat sense impressions can give rise to, theydo allow fora sortingof thingsby resemblance, which, while not empirically valid, places limitson the social re-creation of nature. If categories of the understanding that develop fromsocial processes are added to thenaturalability to perceiveresemblance, Durkheim (1915, is thenno reasonthatsorting p. 486) feelsthatthere could byresemblance nothave some limited withregardto naturalphenomempirical validity ena. The validitywould not be equal to thatforsocial phenomenabut not completely out of touchwithnaturalreality either. For instance, Durkheim (1915,p. 170)arguesthatthedivisionofthings into "opposites"appears in so many societiesbecause a high degreeof contrast leads to a highdegreeof naturalvisibility and "intuitions" and 459

American Journal of Sociology of affinity "feelings or of repulsion" forthe contrasts. He says there"is a certain intuition oftheresemblances and differences presented by things" and thatthishas playedan important part"in thegenesisoftheseclassifications [of opposites]"(1915, p. 170). However, the divisionby resemblanceofnatural things is notvalid knowledge. Resemblance and contiguitycan onlygive rise to an opinionor habit of thinking in a particular can onlydevelopwhenthesocialbeingjoins in assemway.The categories bly with its fellowsto witnessably enact the moral divisionsof their Critics have generally interpreted Durkheim'sdiscussions ofindividual and the distinction perceptions betweenthesocial selfand the biological as evidencethatDurkheim organism is a positivist, a dualist,a realist, or a Cartesianrationalist. However,the distinction is no moredualistthan GeorgeHerbert Mead's I versusme distinction to whichit bears striking Both Mead and Durkheimallow rudimentary parallels. abilitiesand an activeprinciple thatprecedes thedevelopment ofa socialself.Durkheim's valid categories of the pointis thatonlythe social beinghas empirically understanding. The biologicalindividualhas onlyrudimentary abilities forknowledge or mutualintelligithatcould neversupplytheframework "The feeling of resemblances is one thingand theidea of class anbility: other.The class is the external framework of whichobjectsperceivedto in part,the contents. cannotfurnish Now the contents be similarform, intowhichthey fit. theframe They are made up ofvague and fluctuating images,due to the superimposition and partial fusionof a determined on the contrary, is a numberof individualimages . . . the framework, butwhichmaybe appliedto an undeterdefinite withfixed form, outlines, minednumber of things, or not,actual or possible"(Durkheim perceived 1915,pp. 171-72). A realist ofthecategories while position wouldpositthenaturalvalidity are perceivable a rationalist wouldhold thatthey byanyindividualratioDurkheim nal mind.Durkheim deniesbothofthesepositions. arguesthat cannotlead to thedevelopofaffinity and repulsion feelings bythemselves aboutnatural ment ofthecategory ofclassification. Theyare onlya feeling thatare relations betweenparticulars, theycannotgive riseto categories and realiststreatthesefeelings of by definition general.The positivists valid and repulsionas the only possible originsof empirically affinity an antipositivist, antirealist knowledge.Durkheim'sis, rather, position and thathe positshave no empirical because thenaturalabilities validity
18 refer to a quality ofan object or as usedhere, and"witnessable," "Witnessably" is witnessed. for an object orevent Moral are not whether event, divisions, instance, orconcepts. arerendered witnessable nor arefeelings not generally witnessable, They insocial enactment their through practice.

group.18

460

Durkheim'sEpistemology cannotgive riseto categories of theunderstanding but onlyto feelings of resemblance as theydo forHume. On theother hand,whileDurkheim insists on a sociallybased rationalA Cartesian ism,he is nota Cartesianrationalist as Lukes (1973) asserts. rationalist would posita thoroughly rationaluniverseto beginwithand argue that knowledgeof that world must be derivedfroma few basic principles of reason.Durkheimarguedthatprinciples of reasonall have in the moralforces in certain whileparticipating theirorigin experienced and thatknowledge enactedpractices derivedin thisway has onlylimited when applied to the naturalworld. validity An a priori, or Kantian,explanation of thedevelopment of thecategohas in common riesoftheunderstanding withrationalism theassumption In contrast, are purelylogicalin character. Durkheim thatthe categories of the worldintototemsthat (1915, p. 175) arguesthatthe organization "appearedto us as purely logical,is at thesame timemoral."In addition, a Kantian positionassumes that the categoriesare innate and precede all understanding, whereasDurkheimallows thatbothcrudeabilitiesto and resemblance and crudesocial behaviorsprecede perceivecontiguity of the categories. are empirical thedevelopment Thus the categories hisnotlogicalnecessities. mustfollow thedeveltorical necessities Logic itself forthe statusof various opmentof the categories. Therefore, arguments ideas as categories should be made empirically and historically not logically,accordingto Durkheim.It is as enactedpracticesthattotems lead of the category of classification, to the development not as elementary of classifications. of classification, The category whichtheenactsystems mentof totemicritesgenerates, thenbecomes a basis forlogic,not the other way round, and, whileDurkheim arguesthattheconceptofclassificationprobablyneeded to come before theothercategories, he is careful and not a logicalargument to make a historical forits priority as he feels is a social product thatlogicitself and cannotbe introduced intotheargumentat thispoint(1915, p. 169).19
19For Durkheim (1912,p. 211),logicis something thatremains to be socioempirically which is whyhe doesnotmakea logical butrather established, an empirical argument forthedevelopment oflogicalcategories ofthought: "C'est la societ6 qui a fourni le la pens6e canevassurlequela travaille I usetheoriginal logique." French herebecause bothavailabletranslations obscure Durkheim's sensethatlogicis a social creation. it as "It is society Swain translates thathas furnished the outlines whichlogical in" (Durkheim has filled thought 1915,p. 173),whileFields translates it as "Society furnished thecanvason which logicalthought was worked" (Durkheim 1995,p. 149). I take Durkheim's to be thatlogicis a social creation, meaning or labor, painting, theconstraints worked within ofa socialcanvas.He certainly doesnotmeantoconvey a preexisting a social framework. entity-logic-thatworkswithin See also Durkheim's(1955)criticism ofJames formaking use oflogicin his argument whileat the thatlogicvariesfrom same timearguing to moment. moment

461

American Journal of Sociology The argument thatlogicis theresult ofa social processbeginning with the simplest totemic ritesis not Cartesianor neo-Kantian. This is an entirely new argument regarding the social origins of logic.The categories, accordingto Durkheim, servea social purposein givingriseto a shared logic,and society dependson this.Societyneedssharedenactedpractices to produce categoriesof the understanding withoutwhich cooperation and communication would not be possible(Durkheim1915,pp. 30, 465, 482, 487). The primary purposeofreligion is to providetheenactedpracticesnecessary to producethe categories (1915, p. 467). All societieswill have the categories, to Durkheim, according because,iftheycannotproduce the categories, cannot existas societies.Therefore, they wherever societies do exist, willhave generated they thesecategories: could "Society not abandon the categories to the freechoice of the individualwithout If it is to live thereis notmerely abandoningitself. need of a satisfactory moralconformity, but also thereis a minimum of logical conformity beyondwhichit cannotsafelygo" (1915, p. 30). Religiouscosmology is a way ofrepresenting moralforce, but religious practiceis a way of creating it. This is thecentraldistinction thatDurkheim makes betweenthe sociologyof knowledgeand the epistemology: thereare practices(social facts),which create categories, and thereare cosmologies (collective them. The catideas),whichexplainand represent egoriesare empirically valid. The cosmologies are not. in aboriginalsocial and Locatingthe basis forscienceand philosophy religiouspracticeleads Durkheimto a respectforwhat he refers to as "primitive whichis rare forthe periodin whichhe wrote. intelligence," Durkheim(1915, pp. 15, 166, 203, 219, 361-62, 476, 487) argues that "primitive" peoplesare notlackingin logic;theyhave their own logic.It is onlyby assuminga universalstandardof reason and logic that they to be deficient. are found This deficiency is a social construction forDurkhad difficulty heim,not reality. Levy-Bruhl Durkheimon this following to give up theprimacy oflogic,whichled himto argue point.He refused that"primitive" in essentialrespects. was deficient Even the intelligence notionof truth relativist advanced by the pragmatists findsdeficiencies in primitive of utility religion, an judgingthemby the principle without ofthesocial and epistemological of what primiappreciation importance tive ritualsachieve. NEGLECT AND DISMISSAL OF DURKHEIM'S EPISTEMOLOGY That DurkheimintendedThe Elementary Forms to forever change the faceofphilosophy an alternative, byoffering nonphilosophical (socio-logito theproblems cal), solution posed bythedebatebetweentheempiricists 462

Durkheim'sEpistemology and the apriorists is clear: "Thus renovated,the theoryof knowledge seemsdestined to unitetheopposingadvantagesofthetwo rivaltheories, their inconveniences. It keepsall theessential without incurring principles oftheapriorists; but at thesame timeit is inspired by thatpositivespirit which the empiricists have strivento satisfy" (Durkheim1915, p. 32). Durkheimexpectedthe new science of sociologyto become the center of both scientific and philosophical enterprise. Sociologywould replace this philosophy as theproper arenafor epistemological debate.Yet, clearly based on has nothappened.Sociologists continue to rely on epistemologies to criticize individualism, and philosophers continue the epistemological basis of sociology (Winch 1956; Rorty1979; Turner1994). From the beginning, the confusion of Durkheim'sepistemology with as his sociology ofknowledge has led to thedismissaloftheepistemology of a verybad argument. made claims with Durkheim empirical validity regardto his epistemology thatappear absurdwhenapplied to his sociology of knowledge.In addition,not recognizing the epistemological significanceof the extendeddiscussionof totemsleaves criticswith the impression thattheepistemological argument is scattered and brief. Gol"While denweiser (1915,p. 733),one oftheearliest American critics, wrote: theauthor'sremarks on thatsubjectare notextensive norsystematic ... the author'sattempt to deriveall mentalcategories from specific phases of social lifewhichhave becomeconceptualized, is so obviously artificial and one-sidedthat one findsit hard to take his view seriously." It was Goldenweiser'sopinionthat Durkheim'sepistemology failedbecause it presupposed a complex socialand conceptual system thatwas notavailable in all societies. Like manyearlycritics, Goldenweiser's prejudicewithreofprimitive cultures combined gardtothesophistication withhismisinterpretation of Durkheim's epistemologicalargument as it concerned conceptual systems kepthimfrom appreciating Durkheim'spoint.20
20 Goldenweiser (1915) arguesthatEskimosand otherprimitive groupsare lacking in eventherudimentary socialclassifications necessary to support Durkheim's argument. In partthisis due to a misunderstanding oftherolethattotems playin Durkheim's argument. But it also has clear overtones of a generalpresumption of the superiority of Western forms of thought. Similarly, Dennes(1924,p. 52) makesthe racist intheUnited blatantly argument thatNegroes and Eskimos States proveDurkheim'stheory wrong: "It is onlymembers of closely similar racesthatcan be transferred withsuchresults A group as Durkheim describes. ofEskimoor Negroinfants introduced intoan English community wouldnotdevelopthesamequalities ofmind and sustain thesame relations to socialcustoms and institutions thata likenumber of Germanor Frenchchildren would, as the experience of the UnitedStatesof America has shown." Therewas a general agreement amongtheearlycommentators thatDurkheim had gonetoo farin attributing a basic equality to all humanbeings. This "fault" is verymuchto Durkheim's credit. Durkheim insisted, in contrast to

463

Journal of Sociology American in whichhe A fewyearslater,Dennes publisheda muchcitedcritique circularand confused: Durkheim'sargument pronounced
oftheorigin ofthecategories dependsuponhis ambiguDurkheim'stheory of mind.If he takes mindin the Kantian sense,the sense ous conception it is of cognitive as the subject's system faculties, usual in epistemology, of the mindare in any sense transferridiculous to say thatthe categories wouldhave to exist The category ofquantity encesfrom social organization. the and to operatein orderthatan individualmindshouldever recognize one, the many,and the whole,of the divisionsof his social group.... If, ofrepremeans by minda mereaggregation on the otherhand,Durkheim ideas of time or ideas, thereis sense in supposingthatthe first sentations ideas rites, thefirst religious of primitive may have been of the periodicity is then of the divisionof the tribe,etc. But the supposition of quantity, at all. It has so faras it is of any importance merely historical importance, study or thepsychological no direct theepistemological bearingupon either of the mind.(Dennes 1924,p. 39) of the natureor statusof the categories

was onlyvalid as a theory Dennes arguedthatDurkheim'sepistemology of the of knowledge, not as a theory ofthe form or sociology of contents, a failure(Dennes 1924, p. 53). mind. He pronouncedthe epistemology It was a major influential. This analysisby Dennes has been extremely citedby on Parsons'sreadingofDurkheimand is stillregularly influence and/orsociologyof knowlon Durkheim'sepistemology commentators edge. thatDurkheimactually argument to reconcile the careful It is difficult it has generally received.One getsthe immade withthe interpretation between1910 an initial roundofmisinterpretation that, following pression was neverreevaluated(1996a). and 1925,the epistemological argument is a comconsensusis thatDurkheim'sepistemology The overwhelming who either is ofa Durkheim presented The view consistently pletefailure. his early ofknowledge contradicted neverrealizedthathis latersociology studies(Parsons1968),or ofa man who died too soon to fixthis empirical problem (Stoneand Farberman1967;Hughes[1958] 1977;Parsons1968). ofknowledge and theearthatboththesociology Thereis no recognition both.Scholthatsupersedes studiesreston an epistemology lierempirical their withwhat whendiscussing critical ars are extremely disappointment in Durkheim'swork, whichthey contradictions see as theunresolved they to philosophical article, attribute naivete.In book after book,articleafter of good theexpectations critics complainthatDurkheimhas not fulfilled scholarship. thefeeling thatthey have been letdown,thatthey Criticsoften express
thanotherhumanbeingsbut are not less intelligent that"primitives" L6vy-Bruhl, The prevareligious practices. oftheir ofthought area product their forms rather that of Durkheim's prevented an appreciation obviously lentbeliefin racial inequality of mind. in capacity insistence on a basic humansameness 464

Durkheim'sEpistemology expectedmore.Dominic LaCapra (1972, p. 287) even goes so far as to suggest thatDurkheim'sargument is "liketheconglomerate bodyofsome incredible Frankenstein Given the broadlyacknowledged immonster." ofDurkheim'swork,thefrustrated on his episteportance commentaries stand out in bold relief. mology Parsons,who obviouslyrespectedDurkheim's work,defending him and buildingstructural functionalagainstseveralprevalent misreadings of it, nevertheless ism on his interpretation and expressedexasperation over Durkheim'sepistemology: "His epistemology even embarrassment has brought the basis of human reason itselfinto the same relativistic so as to make the previousrelativism sincetherelacircle, itself relative, a productof a system of categories tivismof social typesis itself which are valid onlyfortheparticular social type.This is a doctrine whichmay be called "social solipsism."It involves all the skepticalconsequences It is in short, whichare so well knownin thecase ofindividualsolipsism. a reductio ad absurdum" (Parsons 1968,p. 447). These criticisms by Parsons of Durkheim'sepistemology as circularand solipsistic, themselves drawnfrom Dennes (1924) and Gehlke(1915),have been extremely influential. the generaltrendin failingto distinguish eitherbeLaCapra reflects tween Durkheim'ssociologyof knowledgeand his epistemology or beand collectiverepresentations, tween categories arguingthat"collective in Durkheim'susage of the term, representations," seemedto cover the gamut fromshared verbal behavior based on deeply rooted beliefs, elaborate"ideologies," to more or less sophisticated through theoretical reflections." (LaCapra 1972, pp. 265-66). LaCapra (1972, p. 281) conin confiding in something cludes:"Unfortunately, as palpablyineffective as social metaphysic, Durkheimdissipatedbothhis massiveintelligence and his genuinespiritual From him one mighthave expected intensity. a moreconvincing to forgea synthesis attempt betweenuncoordinated elements ofthemodern and theheritage ofdevalued symbolic experience forms." It is also commonto judge the epistemology on the basis of textsin whichit does not appear. The earlycritics Gehlke(1915),Schaub (1920), and Dennes (1924) based their criticisms on an article primarily published 14 yearspriorto The Elementary Forms,"Individualand CollectiveRepresentations" (Durkheim1953),whichwas a critique ofJames, nota presentationof Durkheim'sepistemology (Rawls 1996a). One of the only books devoted to Durkheim'sepistemology, Paul Hirst's (1975) Durkheim, Bernardand Epistemology, an analysisofDurkheim presents 's epistemology based on The Rules oftheSociologicalMethod,in whichDurkheim does not make an epistemological argument.Predictably, Hirst (1975, p. 5) pronounces Durkheim'spositionuntenable: "The epistemol465

American Journal of Sociology ogy developedin The Rules of the SociologicalMethod is an impossible one." Allcock(1983),one of the fewto defendDurkheim'sepistemology, argues that the practiceof deducingthe epistemology fromthe earlier empiricalworks instead of fromthe later work is prevalent.Unfortunately, Allcockhimself focuseson thelectures on pragmatism as thebest sourceforDurkheim'sepistemology insteadofon The Elementary Forms. This creates further problems as theepistemology is notpresented in these lectures. Lewis Coser (1971,p. 140)echoesthegeneral theme, arguing thatwhile "in the lightof later criticaldiscussionof the thesisit can be said that Durkheim failed to establish the social origins of the categoriesof it is important to see thathe made an important thought," contribution to thesociology ofknowledge. The consistent messageis that, eventhough Durkheimfailedmiserably in establishing an epistemology, his empirical of knowledge workand his sociology can be saved. In his introduction to The Rules, Lukes (1982) interprets Durkheim's a corresponding in as a focuson symbolswithout interest epistemology ofknowledge their hermeneutic dimension. This equationofthesociology withthe epistemology is particularly unfortunate because it leads Lukes to arguethatDurkheim ofmeaning overlooks thedimension orhermeneuas its central takes intelligibility tics. In fact,Durkheim'sepistemology problematic. His discussionof meaningdoes not become hermeneutic, because he believeshe has avoided theproblems of indetermihowever, nacyand interpretation at theepistemological levelbyestablishing empirIf thecategories ofthought. do notrequire icallyvalid categories interpreLukes (1982, p. 15) misses this point, tation,thereis no hermeneutic. interpreting Durkheim'sapproach as "dictatedby an obsessionwithan ofobjectivity, can onlybe a sterile 'absolute' conception [which] prescriptionforthe humansciences." Durkheim's"theory are friendly to what is termed Even when critics his positionin idealistsocial of knowledge," theyhave stillinterpreted ofknowledge and constructionist terms consistent onlywithhis sociology is onlydue to thefactthat nothisepistemology. Theirpositive assessment who accept the social constructivists or pragmatists theyare themselves ofknowledge. Stoneand Farberman(1967) are amongthe indeterminacy of the allegedly idealistpragmatist Durkheimin earliestsuch supporters from to makea radicaldeparture theUnitedStates.Whileclaiming previous Durkheimscholarship, Stoneand Farberman(1967,pp. 163-64) foland sociologyof low the general trendin confusing the epistemology knowledge, leadingthemto the beliefthat Durkheim"was confounded a new ontology." and gropedfora new epistemology and,implicitly, They Durkheimtowardpragmaargue that his alleged idealismwas turning tism. 466

Durkheim'sEpistemology More recently that Durkheim'salleged idealismis his this argument moreimportant contribution has becomequitepopular.It has beenwidely advocatedby Alexander (1988) and Collins(1988) withregardto cultural Lehmann(1990) studies, by Stjepan Mestrovic (1988, 1993) and Jennifer in connection withpoststructural idealism, by Godlove (1989) in religious in thesociology of science studies, and by David Bloor (1982) and others ofknowledge who interpret Durkheim'ssociology as a social constructivist precursor to modernstudiesof scientific practice. ofbothDurkheim and Harold Garfinkel Hilbert's(1992) interpretation as social constructivists thisrecent the continues trend towardembracing idealistinterpretation of Durkheim'sepistemology. to Hilbert According (1992, p. 78), it is "not at all hard to understand why Durkheimwould draw this final equivalence [betweensocietyand ideas]." For Hilbert, ideas thatconDurkheim'sepistemology involvesa setofsociallydefined strain experience. Practices, on Hilbert'sinterpretation, are no morethan "artful" linesofsocial action.Thereis no real pattern waysofconstructing in practices, onlyan apparent pattern: "we see in members' artful manageofindexical a collective ofsustaining ment expressions method thefolklore of relatively fixedunderlying patterns" (Hilbert1992,p. 51; see also pp. 56, 66, 75, 91). The fiction of a stable reality, on thisview, depends on to Hilbert, and constraint, is providedbyideal cateconstraint, according The categories are "madeup" bysociety gories. (Hilbert1992,p. 78).There is no empirical and no reality can be experireality corresponding to them, encedwithout truth is entirely to any particular them.Therefore, relative Hilbertappears to be unconcerned society'sideal categories. by the lack of any independent of truth thathis interpretation of Durkheim criteria implies.21This idealist interpretation stands in direct contradiction to Durkheim'sown epistemological argument, whichwas motivated by the need to specify truth criteria. While Collins has contributedto modern Durkheim scholarship his interactional of Durkheim'stheory of practice through interpretation and supports therelevanceofDurkheim'ssociology ofknowledge to consocial theory, he shares the idealist interpretation of Durktemporary heim'sepistemology. Collins(1988,p. 108)maintains thatTheElementary Formshas been generally overlooked byDurkheim scholars: "Whatis left out?" he writes."Generallyspeaking,what I would considerthe more valuable partsof Durkheim.His mostimportant book, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life . . . seems to be regardedas a specialized of religion, matterforsociologists thoughsome references (usuallyvery of knowledge."Like critical)are made to its social reductionist theory
21

He is equally unconcerned with theimplications ofhisinterpretation ofGarfinkel constructionist: as anidealist social aninterpretation isequally that far from the mark. 467

American Journal of Sociology Stone and Farberman,Collins considersthe epistemology to be "social reductionist," finding the value of Durkheim'swork mainlyin its relevance forculturalstudies. Even Godlove,who directly addressesDurkheim'sargument concerning the originof the categories of the understanding in The Elementary Forms,confusesthe sociologyof knowledgewith the epistemology. He argues that Durkheim's "idealist" epistemology is more sophisticated than the critics have givenhim creditforand thatDurkheimhad good reasonsfor trying to"tracethemodalstructure ofthecategories to an ideal object outside the world"(Godlove 1986, p. 385; emphasisin original). According to Godlove (1986, p. 390), Durkheim"turned to idealismas a way of overcoming what he perceivedas the empiricist-apriorist deadlock." Godlove alleges that,in the face of the empiricist critique, Durkheimconcludedthatonlya nonempirical (i.e.,ideal) origin forthecategorieswas possible. Durkheim'scritiqueof empiricism was muchmoresophisticated than Godlove realizes and his epistemology completely empiricalin that he considered social practices to be concrete witnessable and not phenomena ideal. While emphasizing the importance of distinguishing betweenthe of knowledge sociology and the epistemology, Godlove nevertheless confusesthetwo. He has interpreted theepistemology in idealistterms, as a substitution of theideal fortheempirical, whichare appropriate onlyfor the sociology of knowledge. He concludesthat"although Durkheimwas keenly aware oftheepistemological problem producedby his sociological all his attempted theory, solutionsfailedbadly"(Godlove 1986,p. 400). In a footnote to thiscitation he says"thedetailsare too well documented to bear repeating" (Godlove 1986,p. 400, n.28). THE CONTROVERSY OVER "TWO DURKHEIMS" So muchdisappointment withregardto a scholarwho has led thediscipline to expectso muchand whose workhas sustainedinterest over the courseof a century In thiscase theexplanation requiresan explanation. involvesa complexhistory of misinterpretations and reactionsto those in boththeUnitedStatesand Europe. The critics misinterpretations from the veryfirst got offon the wrongtrack,interpreting Durkheimas an idealistand confusing the epistemology and the sociology of knowledge. From there, Durkheimscholarship has consisted of debates betweenthe variousmisinterpretations, none of whichquestiontheinitialassessment of his positionas idealist. WhiletheEuropeanand American ofDurkheim'swork interpretations have formostof this century appeared to be entirely at odds withone another-the Europeansinterpreting in idealistand socialconDurkheim 468

Durkheim'sEpistemology a positivist funcstructivist terms, while,in theUnitedStatesand Britain, first tionalist interpretation based on hisearlier workdeveloped-the very Durkheimin scholarsin both Europe and the UnitedStates interpreted termsof his laterwork,particularly The Elementary Forms,whichthey consideredto be idealist or social constructivist (Dennes 1924; Schaub between 1920;Gehlke1915;Levy-Bruhl 1922).The divergence theAmerican and Europeanviewsdid notappear until the1930swhenthepositivist interpretation appeared in the UnitedStates.The original interpretation in Europe, and of Durkheim'swork as idealistcontinuedunchallenged and sociolDurkheim's influence on continental anthropology, linguistics, in terms of his alleged idealism. ogywas largely In the UnitedStates,however, Durkheimscholarship tookan entirely as thepragmatists and othersocial thinkers different trajectory who had as an idealistin the teensand twenties interpreted Durkheimprimarily to theefforts felloutoffavor(Rawls 1996a).In the1930s,due particularly the Parsons to rescue Durkheim from idealist ofTalcott earlier interpretationofhiswork, a newinterpretation ofDurkheim as a positivist functionalist became popular. Parsons (1968, p. viii; emphasis in the original) in sociologyat wrote:"In 1924-25 I spenta year as a researchstudent the London School of Economics.... Durkheimwas of course known bothin England and America,but discussions were overwhelmingly derogatory; he was regardedas the apostle of the 'unsound groupmind' theory." Parsonsheavilycriticizes Durkheim'sepistemology and sociAlthough it is notParsonswho introduced theinteras idealist, ologyofknowledge pretation of Durkheimas an idealist.Rather,in his attemptto rescue Durkheimfrom the alreadypopular idealistinterpretation, Parsons created a positivist of his work. On this view, the work of interpretation the"early" in positivist Durkheim was interpreted functionalist terms and fromhis "later"work,which continuedto be insharplydifferentiated as an idealist sociologyof knowledge.This interpretation terpreted of Durkheim'sworkas comprising an earlierpositivist and a lateridealist referred to as thetwo-Durkheim period, commonly hypothesis, effectively banished the later work fromserious consideration by scholarsin the UnitedStatesuntilrecently. From the 1930s until the 1980s, Europeans espoused one "side" of Durkheim's argument whileAmericans championed theother. Europeans interpreted Durkheimas an idealist,while Americans emphasizedwhat theyarguedwas a positivist functionalist side of Durkheim'sargument. Finally,in the 1980s,withthe declineof Parsons's influence, allegiance switchedfromthe "early"Durkheim,which Parsons had preferred, to the "later"Durkheim,which Parsons had ridiculed.This "rediscovery" in the UnitedStates of the"later"Durkheimled to an increasedinterest 469

AmericanJournal of Sociology in Durkheim'ssociology ofknowledge, or cultural sociology, and in European socialtheory, whichhad in important respects beenbuilton an idealist interpretation of Durkheim'swork.However,it did not challengeeitherParsons's two-Durkheim hypothesis or theoriginal interpretation of Durkheimas an idealist. The originalinterpretation of The Elementary Forms as idealistis at theheartof the problem. It is onlybecause of thisfirst misinterpretation in orderto avoid the thatParsonsinvented thetwo-Durkheim hypothesis ofaccepting an idealistinterpretation ofDurkheim'swork. consequences The contemporary rediscovery of a culturalDurkheimmerelyreturns to theoriginal ofhis work.Because ofthis scholarship misunderstanding interpretation, Durkheim'swork was initially rendered unacceptableto in the United States and Britain(exceptto a small groupof sociologists ofChicago).It was notuntilParpragmatist sociologists at theUniversity sons distinguished rid of the the "early"fromthe "later"work,getting ofknowledge and epistemological and creating sociology arguments a positivist thatDurkheimreallybecame popular functionalist interpretation, in the UnitedStates. In theUnitedStates,references to thetwo-Durkheim argument generally citeParsons's analysisin The Structure ofSocial Action(1968). Parsons speaks of an Anglo-American prejudiceagainstidealismin thisrebias of the main Anglo-American tradition of gard: "The individualistic has had the effect that any theory which presumed positivistic thought been brandedas 'idealistic' and to questionit has almostautomatically This has happenedin striking hencecondemned as 'metaphysical.' fashwiththeresult ion in thecase ofDurkheim, thathe is stillpredominantly of the 'unsound' and 'metaphysical'group-mind knownas the theorist concept"(Parsons 1968,p. 307). In spite of his insightinto the prejudicialnatureof the rejectionof Durkheim'sallegedly Parsonsdoes not idealisticepistemology, however, challengethe idealist interpretation. Rather,he suggeststhat the last phase ofDurkheim'sworkis onlyidealistbecause it remained incomplete due to Durkheim'spremature death(Parsons 1968,p. 304). The implicationis thatDurkheim would neverhave left theworkin thisidealistconis notconvincing, as fiveyearselapsed dition.The explanation however, ofTheElementary between thepublication Formsand Durkheim's death, to reiterate his allegedly idealistepistemologiduringwhichhe continued cal position.22 in orderto save the rest of Durkheim'soeuvre from Unfortunately, theprejudiceagainstidealism, Parsonssacrifices The Elementary Forms.
See, e.g., the lectures on pragmatism (Durkheim 1955) and "Dualismof Human Natureand Its Social Conditions" (Durkheim [1913]1960).
22

470

Durkheim'sEpistemology Parsons (1968, p. 445) arguedthatDurkheimhad "in escapingfrom the toilsof positivism overshot the markand gone clean over intoidealism." To protect sociology from thisidealistinfluence, Parsonsurgeda focuson oftheearlier whathe saw as thefunctional Durkheim positivist empirical studies."At its finalstage,Durkheim'ssociology of stood at thisparting the ways. Both paths represent escapes from positivism, but in termsof the tendency of sociologicalthought analyzedin the present study[Parin thefollowing sons's study], theidealistic especially section, phase must be regarded as an aberration, a blindalley"(Parsons 1968,p. 447). Thus, of The Elementary Formsdid nothave muchimpacton thedevelopment Americansocial theory. Parsons's attempt to separateearlierand later phases of Durkheim'sargument heavilyinfluenced subsequentreadings ofTheElementary Forms.According to LaCapra (1972,p. 5), "In hismonDurkumental TalcottParsonspresented TheStructures ofSocial Action, heim'sthought as caughtin an unresolved tension betweenearlypositivism and latter day idealism as it tortuously worked its way toward withothervoluntaristic of action." convergence theories At least since Parsons,references to "two Durkheims" have appeared in commentary on Durkheim(Parsons 1968; Stone and with regularity Farberman1967; Hughes 1977; Coser 1971; Lukes 1973; LaCapra 1972; Fenton 1984; Alexander 1988). Alexander(1988, p. 10-11) writesthat "whilesomeinterpreters stilldo notaccede (e.g.,Giddens1977 and Traugott1978),thereis an increasing agreement todaythatin thelaterperiod Durkheim'ssociology underwent a decisiveshift."23
23 Giddensis almostalone in havingcompletely of Parsons'sformulation rejected Durkheim's laterworkas making from theearlywork.Giddens a radicaldeparture (1971,pp. 65-82, 105-6, 114) challenged thetwo-Durkheim hypothesis as earlyas 1971,carefully documenting thecontinuity between arguments made by Durkheim in theearlyreview ofSchaffle and arguments thatappearin thelaterwork. As Giddensnotes, thesimilarity this between review toTheElemenearly and theconclusion tary Formsis particularly striking. In addition Giddens (1971,pp. 87-89) argues that thedivision intoan earlier and a laterDurkheim on thebasis of a changing notion of constraint is also a misconception. Othercommentators who claimto rejectthe two-Durkheim hypothesis in factmake an equallyproblematic distinction between twoforms ofconstraint. Even though Nisbetis referred to in theliterature as a supofthetwo-Durkheim porter hypothesis (e.g.,Fenton[1984,p. 32] refers to Nisbet's he bestfits two-Durkheim theory), intothe groupdistinguishing two forms of constraint. Nisbet(1974,p. 59) clearly criticizes thetwo-Durkheim position: "Thereare those whoregard thiswork[TheElementary Forms] as marking thepassageofDurkheim'smindto a moreidealistic, I or at any rateless positivistic, stageofthought. I cannot am obliged toconfess in TheSociological that find this." However, Tradition, Nisbet([1966]1993)arguesthatDurkheim underwent in thewriting a transition of TheDivisionofLabor.Thattransition, according toNisbet, hadtodo with hisrealizationthatsolidarity and collective representations neededto play a rolein modern It was not a transition society also via constraint. to idealism. Nisbet(1993,p. 87) "For too long students of Durkheim again writes: have persisted in placingthese

471

American Journalof Sociology H. StuartHughes assumesthe two-Durkheim thesisin Consciousness and Society.Hughes giveshis versionofthetransition, whichclosely follows Parsons's text:"In Durkheim'scase it [theconfrontation withreligion]markedthebeginning of a slow transition to a new and deeperunof his subjectmatter. derstanding But thistransition was completed too lateforhimto carry outin thoroughgoing fashion therevision ofhisprevious researches thathe had planned"(Hughes 1977,p. 284). The influence ofParsonson Hughes is clearin thisand in thefollowing passage,which Hughes (1977, p. 285) takes directly from Parsons:"By the same token, Durkheimwas led in effect to the assertion thatsociety existed'only in the mindsof individuals.... In escapingfrom the toilsof positivism' he 'overshotthe mark' and went 'clean over to idealism.... An ironical conclusionfor one who had firsttried to definesocietyin termsof was never resolvedby 'things'."Hughes argues that this contradiction Durkheim: histeaching Butin a more philosophical sense, gaveno clearlead.To the very end, a central contradiction remained. On theonehand, there wasthe in thestriving fora system of "imperative positivist rules" vocabulary,

whoseimplications wereobviously and pluralistic. idealist, permissive,

These two aspectsofhis doctrine Durkheim neverbrought intoanyconclusive synthesis. (Hughes 1977,p. 286; emphasisadded)

whichcritics have seenthelast tracesoftheComtianmetaphysic. And with it therewent a hankering aftersimpleand unilateral At the explanations. of social reality, same time,therewas the sweepingspiritualdefinition

Parsons had warned against following the path laid out by the later Durkheimand focusedhis sociology on what he saw as the earlierfuncThis createdan emphasisin theUnited tionaland "positivist" Durkheim.
in separate as though works intellectual categories, they marked discontinuous phases In his discussion ofhis life'slabors."Coseralso makestheconstraint distinction. of theearlier and laterDurkheim, e.g.,Coser(1971,pp. 129,132,136)argues thatthere to theinternalization from ofconstraint wereseveralchanges: external constraint as moral; from oneopinion abouttheneedfor collective conscience to another; and from externalized law to internalized rules. Parsons himself (1973)cameto accepttheconin laterlife.However, straint argument Durkheim objectedto thisinterpretation of hiswork.He considered theinterpretation ofhisposition as concerned withexternal constraint to be one "from whichmorethan one misunderstanding has resulted" (Durkheim 1915,p. 239n.). He expressed hishopethattheanalysis ofTheElementary Formswould put an end to the problem, "it has been whichhe statedas follows: to our opinion, is theessential assumedthataccording constraint for physical thing offact, it morethanthematerial social life.As a matter we have neverconsidered ofan interior and apparent and profound factwhichis wholly ideal:this expression is moralauthority" (1915,p. 239n).Durkheim goeson to arguethatthesociological problem consists ofseeking theforms ofexternal constraint whichcorrespond to the different ofmoral is precisely forms authority, which whathehas doneinTheElementaryForms. 472

Durkheim'sEpistemology Stateson the functional Durkheimwitha corresponding neglectof both his sociology of knowledgeand his epistemology. This is markedlydifferent fromwhat happened in Europe. There, in terms of what Parsonshad called Durkheim'sinfluence was primarily thelaterwork-the sociology of knowledge, thatis, thelogicof concepts ofThe Elementary as laid out in 1912in thelast chapter Forms,in 191314 in the nineteenth chapterof the lectureson pragmatism, and in the longdiscussions of classification and totemism thathave been misunderof Durkof ideas. Levy-Bruhl'sinitialinterpretation stood as "systems" of the logic of abstractconceptsinheim's epistemology as a philosophy fluencedLevi-Strauss,who in turn incorporatedthis view into his on thedevelopinfluence structuralism, whichthenbecamean important also inherits theinterprement ofFrenchstructuralism. Poststructuralism of beliefs. as a system tationof epistemology in somemeasure ofknowledge also influenced the Durkheim's sociology ofSaussure(Jameson1972;Aarsleff semiotic arguments 1982;Alexander 1988).Jameson(1972, p. 27) arguesthat Saussure's distinction between langue and parole is drawnfrom Durkheim: "thetheoretical advantages of this new model can be measuredif we compareit to what seems to have been its source in the sociologyof Durkheim." Jamesonalso cites W. Doroszewski(1933,pp. 82-91) and RobertGodel (1957,p. 282) on this on point.He writes:"not onlydoes the latter's[Durkheim's]insistence the representational natureof social factsstrongly resembleSaussure's in its atnotionof signs. . . but the verythrust of Durkheim'sthought, to separateout thepersonaland individualfrom theobjectiveand tempt social,is quite consistent withthe Saussureandistinction betweenlangue and parole"(Jameson1972,p. 29). It is thisso-calledlaterperiodin Durkheim'swork, whichalwayshad a inEurope,thathas becomethefocus ofa contemporary largeimpact revival intheUnited indisreofinterest States.Functionalism nowbeingsomewhat in theUnitedStatesis towardtreating trend pute,thecurrent theapparent idealismin Durkheim'slaterworkas the"real"Durkheim, and thelater workis nowseenas morerelevant tocontemporary thanhisearly sociology inthesocialconstructivist work.Scholars prominent approach, particularly in studiesofscienceand culture, have overthelast severaldecades begun to recognize in TheEleDurkheim's ofknowledge, as articulated sociology Formsand Primitive mentary Classification, as an important forerunner of their own position. As manysociologists in thepostpositivist periodhave turned to cultural studiesand embracedthedilemmas posed by postmodDurkheim's and semiotics, ernism, poststructuralism, arguments regarding theimportance ofcollective representations have seemedtomakethelater in a verymodern Durkheim relevant sense. Alexanderand Collins (e.g., 1988, 1990) bothargue thatit is from the 473

American Journalof Sociology laterDurkheimthattheseschoolsof thought have developed.Alexander of the crucial (1988, pp. 10-11) writes:"It is, of course,the recognition of this later work which has allowed the Durkheimian distinctiveness rootsof contemporary culturalstudiesto be traced."Alexander(1988, p. and empirical poststructural6) continues: "Both as theory investigation, ismand semiotic investigations moregenerally can be seen as elaborating one of the pathwaysthat Durkheim'slatersociologyopens up. Indeed, have demonstrated theimportance ofhis latertheory moreforcefully they in the social sciencesmorenarrowly than any discipline conceived." in Similarly, Steve Fenton(1984,p. 1) attributes therevivalof interest in the1970sand 1980sto a replacement Durkheim oftheearlier Durkheim "In earlyAmericansociology his writby thelaterin American thinking: and ings were seen as granting an undue realismto social phenomena, werethusbelievedto be antagonistic to Americanindividualism and the tradition." FentoncitesParsons(1968) and Hinkleand Hinvoluntaristic kle(1954).He continues, "The revivalhas beenmarkedbya distinct move of Durkheimas the cornerstone of social away from past interpretations thenew workhas notshedall socialconceptions conservatism, and,whilst about Durkheim'sweaknessesas a sociologist, it does see these weaknessesin a new light"(Fenton 1984,p. 1). oftheallegedly idealistside ofDurkheim's Whilethisnew appreciation overthemanyyearsofinteris in manyways an improvement argument dualist, rationalist, preting Durkheim as a positivist, functionalist, idealist, of based on the same misunderstanding and realist,it is nevertheless Durkheim's work as composed of later idealist and earlier positivist theorists was a precurphases.Whencontemporary arguethatDurkheim or pragmatism, sor of poststructuralism, theyare merely postmodernism, to its logical conclusionthe line of reasoningbegun with the following Gehlke, idealistinterpretation of Durkheimpopularizedby Levy-Bruhl, in a relatively unand Parsonsthathas continued Dennes,Levi-Strauss, brokenchain to the present.They continueto confusethe sociologyof withthe epistemology. knowledge on fascination withDurkheim's"later"work is centered The current of knowledge his epistemological arhis sociology and does notrecognize overDurkheim recurrent debatesand dilemmas gument. Consequently, Durkheim'ssociology of knowledge volve aroundweaknessesin treating forsociology foundation as an adequate epistemological (Bloor 1982;Alexander 1988; Collins 1988;Mestrovic1993),nothis functionalism, empiriThis view ofDurkheim'swork"rediscal studies, or epistemology proper. in Europe. covers"thesideofDurkheim thathas alwaysbeenemphasized Forms. theidealistinterpretation ofThe Elementary It does notchallenge of knowledge is It merely arguesthatthe lateridealismof his sociology in thanthe earlierfunctionalism. better Because of this,the new interest 474

Durkheim'sEpistemology Durkheim'ssociology of knowledge has ironically reinforced the neglect of his epistemological argument. The problem withthewholedebateis thatthere werenevertwoDurkheimsin thefirst place.24 BoththeEuropeanand American interpretations of Durkheimare merely from two sides of the same argument resulting of The Elementary Forms.Both misinterthe idealistmisunderstanding pretations result from notseeingthedistinction Durkheim'ssocibetween Durkheim's ofknowledge. oempirical and hissociology sociepistemology does ology of knowledge without a foundationin his epistemology offictive constitute an idealisttheory reality. However,Durkheim clearly intended forthesociology ofknowledge to reston his own unique epistemologicalbasis. is relevant Alexander (1988,p. 6) arguesthatwhilethelaterDurkheim to cultural thelaterDurkheim also has to acceptthesame limitastudies, tionson empiricalvalidityas culturalstudies.This is an argument that Durkheim'sown claimsconcerning the empirical vaclearlycontradicts lidity ofhiswork.Whileit is certainly has had a great truethatDurkheim and unacknowledged on the development of the sociologyof influence knowledge and socialconstructivist thinking (Bloor 1982;Alexander1988; Fenton 1984),thesearguments are quite separatefrom his epistemology, whichdoes not have to accept the same limitations and indeterminacies as culturalstudies. For social constructivists, ofknowledge a sociology thatpositsan indeterminate relationship between thought and reality and thatis notcapable is thebestsortofepistemology ofempirical validity thatcan be hopedfor. Social consensus, or sharedpractices, lead persons to structure, they argue, believecertain in certain things or think ways.Because personssharethe same beliefs, theyact in ways thatreinforce thosebeliefs.The resulting consensus createstheappearanceofa valid relation betweenthought and reality wherethere can in factbe none.This makesscientific practice and everyday understanding possiblewithincertainlimitsbut rules out the of empiricalvalidity. possibility For Durkheim, ofthecategories however, thegenesis oftheunderstanding in enacted practicesolved the problemof indeterminacy. Although Durkheim applauded thepragmatist attempt to overcome thedualismof and reality a dynamic ofaction,he did notagree thought relation through withthe pragmatist of fictive He arguedthatJames'sattheory reality. was notsuccessful tempt because theargument remained individualistic.
Durkheim himself (1982)suggests whathe calls a "watershed" in his thinking. He givestheyear 1895forthis.But he says thatwhatchangedwas his ability to deal sociologically withthequestion ofreligion, nota changein epistemology, method, or general theoretical direction as has beenasserted (Lukes 1982,p. 259).
24

475

of Sociology American Journal moment, a momentof comes a problematic Into the fluxof experience to conpersonsare brought tension. Jamesarguesthatat thesemoments sciousnessby the need to act. The action,or the need to act, converts There is no longer the fluxof empiricalrealityinto conceptualreality. and reality. They have mergedin action. a separationbetweenthought that in theargument dualismresults ofovercoming However,thismethod is because there as longas it works, whatever actionis takenis thetruth, logic,and conceptual reality. Truth, no longera relation to an underlying accordingto Durkheim,to the coherenceall give way in pragmatism, moment.Durkheimargued that action-defined truthof each particular valid knowledge could be explainedand reasonsaved but thatthiscould argument were removed onlybe achievedif thefocusof epistemological from theindividualactorand placed insteadon sharedenactedpractices focus He pointedout thatthiswas as mucha dynamic (notsharedbelief). is that,forDurkheim, theactionsare on actionas James.The difference (motions enactedby an assembled collective practices thatare inherently group),whereasforJamestheywere individual. a sociology of knowledgealong social While Durkheimdid articulate lines in the last sectionof The Elementary Forms,he did constructivist in theprior to standas hisepistemology. Rather, notintend thisargument outlinedan epistemology that 400 plus pages of that work,he carefully the empiricalvalidityof six key categoriesof the underdemonstrated standing.His sociologyof knowledgewas onlyintendedto explain the valid categories and the ofideas beyondthesesixempirically development He did notintenda thattheyconstitute. ofsocial forces direct knowledge forthecategories which basis of validity themselves, social constructivist how theyhave been understood. is nevertheless betweenthecateDurkheim'sepistemology arguesfora directrelation reality.Knowledge and truthare not fictive. goriesand socioempirical themare ultibut the social patterns underlying Cosmologiesare fictive, of empirically valid knowlmatelydiscoverablebecause the possibility of knowlthe fictive Thus, Durkheim'ssociology reality. edge underlies The "objectivity" of social edge does notreston an idealistepistemology. forthe Durkheimof The Elemenan argument factsis just as important taryFormsas it was forthe Durkheimof The Rules of the Sociological was neverpositivist, even in Method. On the otherhand, the argument the early work, as the two-Durkheim argumentassumes, because the on a foundaresting constructed phenomena "givens" werealwayssocially valid categories of thought tion of socioempirically (Durkheim1915, p. of enacted with the theory gains in sophistication 465). The argument in The Elementary Formsbut does not changein espracticearticulated to an idealistposition.There only not froma positivist sence,certainly and thesociolwhentheempirical arguments appearto be twoDurkheims 476

Durkheim'sEpistemology of his socioempirical ogy of knowledgeare not both seen in the context epistemology. CONCLUSION has imporA failure to appreciateDurkheim'sepistemological argument For sociology theimforbothsociology and philosophy. tantimplications theepistemology leads to plications are mostobvious.Misunderstanding of Durkheim's entirecorpus of work. The serious misunderstandings sense credit withbeingin someimportant thinker whommostsociologists In a founderof the disciplinehas been fundamentally misunderstood. on Durkheim's hisepistemology, thedisciworkwhileneglecting building in an untenable position, plinehas generally placed itself epistemological as philosophers have repeatedly pointedout (Winch 1958; Rorty1979; workthatDurkheim would have Turner1994).What is moreimportant, seen as centralto the discipline, forinstance,studiesof shared enacted practice(interaction) at variouslevels,has been relegated to thesidelines in thequest to uncoverallegedDurkheimian or "social facts" "structures" or,the logic of conceptualor narrative systems. The two halves of Durkheim's argument have been practicedsepain different conrately disciplines and subdisciplines and on two different It matters a great coherence. tinents, leavingbothwithout epistemological deal to the disciplineas a whole whether Durkheimsaw social factsas in their external entities own right, as his position has generconstraining or ratheras enacted practicesthat impose moral ally been interpreted, from constraints via "feelings" resulting thesharedenactment ofpractice. In the second case, the details of the enactment of shared practiceare their norms structure, nottheinvisible and rulespositedbythetraditional interpretation. Invisiblenorms and rulescan onlybe revealedvia abstract The details conceptualization, quantitative measurement, and modeling. ofenactedpractice, on theother hand,are open onlyto a detailedqualitativeapproach.The implications forboththetheoretical of understanding "structure" and forpreferred methods ofresearch are vast. In orderto be withDurkheim'sargument, consistent sociologywould have to assume an actualorderin theenactment ofeach individual case rather thantrying to establishtendencies thatmustbe modeled.25 As important as theseimplications are,theimplications forphilosophy are potentially but less clear. If it is possibleto establisha valid greater
25 See Garfinkel's (1988)discussion ofParsons's plenum for an extended consideration

ofthepractice ofmodeling a hypothetical order intraditional sociology vs.theassumptionmadeby Garfinkel thateach individual case displays a witnessable order thatis availableforresearch. 477

American Journal of Sociology epistemological argument on thebasis ofstudies ofenactedsocialpractice, in epistemology, current arguments particularly thoseof social construcin 1912.Sociology tivists, will needto be revised, as Durkheim recognized and a sociologicaltheory of shared enacted practicewould replace the current ofpracticebased on individualaction,systems vogue fortheories of belief,or collectiveparadigm,and sociologywould finditselfat the heartof the epistemological the criteria debate,determining of validity, insteadof at its periphery. Objectionsto Durkheim'sepistemology remain. will,and should, While a good case forhis position can be made,it is ultimately moreimportant to see his workas initiating an important lineofargument that, whilenot explicitly recognized, has always been criticalto the sociologicalenterprise.It would be a mistaketo evaluate the argument on the basis of a thatit was incapable of achievinggiventhe limitations completeness of research methods at thetime.Because Durkheim'sepistemology depends to a largedegreeon the empiricaldetailsof actual sharedenactedpractices-details thatconstitute thewitnessable enactment ofsocialfactsbut also details that the researchpracticesof the time shed relatively little if thereis a certainincompleteness lighton-it should not be surprising in theargument and a degreeofinaccuracy withregard to details.Modern aids to data collection of contempotechnological and the sophistication raryfieldworkwhencontrasted to such details withthelack ofattention at the turnof the century guaranteethat this will be the case. It is to modern studiesofsharedenactedpractice thatwe shouldlookforan evaluationofthepotential thatare generally seen ofDurkheim'sview,studies as havingno epistemological or generaltheoretical whatsoimplications ever,which,however,turnout to be at the centerof the Durkheimian projectproperly understood. One problem on a Durkheimian modelwill have to face any argument is the fact that the analysisdepends heavilyon the enactment of what Durkheimcalls ritualinteractions, which(at least in formal institutional industrial rolein modern terms) play a less prominent society. Contempolike Garfinkel rarytheorists (1988), Goffman (1959), and Collins (1988, local orders have replacedformal rituals 1990)have arguedthatinformal as the sourceof orderand meaningin modernsociety. Goffman can be instiinterpreted as arguing foran "interaction order" quite separatefrom tutional social practices (Rawls 1987). Garfinkelhas focused on the in and through achievement ofintelligibility local orders thatare identical withthe practicesthatenact them.Collins arguesforthe importance of whathe calls "ritual interaction chains"in sustaining social solidarity and selfhood time.Durkheim'snotionof enactedpracticemay need through to be interpreted mundaneenactments of along similarlinesas including 478

Durkheim'sEpistemology It will certainly "interaction order"in everyday life.26 need to be clearly from distinguished institutionalized beliefsystems. For Durkheim, the experience of moralforcewas the mostimportant feature ofenactedpractice forproviding direct experience ofthesix categories.Mundane enactments of local interaction orderswould seem to fulfill thisrequirement. There are moralobligations at thelevel of"interactionorder" from (as distinguished institutional levelsoforders) wherein everything dependson themutualcommitment to enactedpractice (Rawls 1987). This gives interaction a moral dimensionand implicatesshame, blame,and trustworthiness (Rawls 1990). The originalsacred character of formal of ritualpracticesmay have played a role in the development the initialcategory of classification, dividingthe world in two morally in orderthat the originaldivisionwould have moral forceand thereby ofenactedpracvalidity. However,theessential ingredient socioempirical ticewas alwaystheperception ofmoralforce whichis in by participants, principle separablefrom religious or institutional constraints. The experience of themutualcreation of moralforcein and through theenactment of mutualobligation of sharedpracticeand the experience to the enactmentare bothcharacteristics of"interaction order" practices (Rawls 1987, that professional 1990). Durkheim'sown suggestion associationsmight play a moral role in modernsocietycorresponding to totemicritualin traditional runsalong similarlines. society
REFERENCES Aarsleff, Hans. 1982.FromLocketo Saussure.Minneapolis: ofMinnesota University Press. Alexander, Jeffrey C. 1982.The Antinomies Marx and Durkof Classical Thought: heim.Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Cultural Sociology: Studies.Cambridge: Cambridge , ed. 1988.Durkheimian University Press. Alexander, Jeffrey C., and StevenSeidman,eds. 1990.Culture and Society.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Allcock, John, ed. 1983.Introduction toEmileDurkheim's Pragmatism and Sociology. Cambridge: Press. Cambridge University Bloor,David. 1976.Knowledge and Social Imagery. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. .1982. "Durkheim and Mauss Revisited: and the Sociology Classification of Knowledge." Journal oftheHistory and Philosophy ofScience 13 (4): 267-97. . 1983. Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge. New York: Columbia University Press. Interaction ordersare not random, individually or "negotiated" initiated, orders. Theyare patterned, recurring, and mutually expected theregularity orders, ofwhich is depended on by participants forachieving intelligibility (Rawls 1987).
26

479

AmericanJournal of Sociology
Pp. 107Sociology." in Conflict Tradition Randall.1988."The Durkheimian Collins, C. Alexander. Studies,editedby Jeffrey Cultural Sociology: 28 in Durkheimian Press. University Cambridge: Cambridge 12 (1): 1-32. Interaction Chains."Symbolic . 1990."RitualInteraction and Social Ideas in Historical Thought: ofSociological LewisA. 1971.Masters Coser, Context. New York: Harcourt. andSociPragmatism toEmileDurkheim's ed. 1955.Introduction Cuvillier, Armand, Press. University Cambridge Cambridge: ology. UniofGroupPsychology." and Presuppositions Dennes,W. R. 1924."The Methods in Philosophy 6 (1): 1-182. Publications versity ofCalifornia et de le de la sociologie surles rapports W. 1933."Quelquesremarques Doroszewski, 30:83-91. de Psychologie Journal et F. de Saussure." Durkheim linguistique: and Rousseau.Ann Arbor:University Emile. (1892) 1960.Montesquieu Durkheim, ofMichigan Press. Simpson. byGeorge translated .(1893) 1933.TheDivisionofLaborin Society, New York: Free Press. byW. D. Halls, translated Method, .(1895) 1982.TheRulesoftheSociological editedby StevenLukes. New York: Free Press. translated byJohn A. Spaulding . (1897) 1951.Suicide:A Studyin Sociology, and GeorgeSimpson. New York: Free Press. by translated . (1898) 1953. "Individualand CollectiveRepresentations," Ill.: Free Press. Glencoe, and Philosophy. D. F. Pocock.In Sociology Le Systeme en tote'mique de la vie religieuse: . 1912.Les Formes elementaires FelixAlcan. Paris:Librairie Australie. FormsoftheReligiousLife.New York: Free . (1912) 1915.The Elementary by Karen FormsofReligiousLife,translated . (1912) 1995.The Elementary Fields.New York: Free Press. Pp. 325.(1913) 1960."DualismofHumanNatureand Its SocialConditions." Columbus: Ohio StateUniversity editedbyKurtH. Wolff, 40 in Emile Durkheim, translated byJ. C. Whitehouse, and Sociology, . (1913-14) 1955.Pragmatism Press. University Cambridge editedby JohnB. Allcock.Cambridge: translated Classification, Emile,and MarcelMauss.(1901)1963.Primitive Durkheim, of ChicagoPress. Needham.Chicago:University and editedby Rodney and Modern Reinerand Ian Hamnett.1984.Durkheim Steve,withRobert Fenton, Press. University Cambridge Cambridge: Sociology. Method.London:NLB. Paul. 1975.Against Feyerabend, Edinburgh. JohnGeorge.1887.Totemism. Frazer, Review65:647-65. Fortnightly 1889."The OriginofTotemism." London:Macmillan. and Exogamy. 1910.Totemism San Francisco: WestofScienceand Its Discontents. Steve.1989.Philosophy Fuller, PheAccountable for Naturally LocallyProduced, Harold.1988."Evidence Garfinkel, Method, etc.,in and as oftheEssential ofOrder, Logic,Reason,Meaning, nomena 6 (1): 103-9. SociologicalTheory Society." Ordinary ofImmortal, Haecceity to Social Theory." Contribution Gehlke,CharlesElmer. 1915."Emile Durkheim's and PublicLaw 63 (1): 7-187. History, Studiesin Economics, Columbia University Camand ModernSocial Theory. Cambridge: 1971.Capitalism Giddens, Anthony. Press. University bridge of Emile Durkheim." Pp. 273-91 in . 1977."The Individualin the Writing New York: Basic Books. Studiesin Social and PoliticalTheory. du coursde linguistique to Les Sourcesmanuscrites 1957.Addendum Godel,Robert. de F. de Saussure.Geneva:Droz. generales 480
view. Press. Press.

Durkheim'sEpistemology
in Durkheim's Godlove, Terry.1986."Epistemology FormsofReligious Elementary 24 (3): 385-401. Life." Journal oftheHistory ofPhilosophy Goffman, Erving.1959.Presentation ofSelfin Everyday Life.New York:Doubleday Anchor. Forms." American Goldenweiser, A. A. 1915."ReviewofTheElementary Anthropologist17:719-35. Hilbert, Richard A. 1992.The ClassicalRootsofEthnomethodology: Durkheim, Weof NorthCarolinaPress. Chapel Hill: University ber,and Garfinkel. Hinkle,R. C., and Hinkle,G. J. 1954.The Development ofModernSociology. New York:RandomHouse. Paul Q. 1975.Durkheim, Hirst, Bernard and Epistemology. London:Routledge. Hughes,H. Stuart.(1958) 1977. Consciousness and Society.New York: Random House. Hume,David. (1739) 1978.A Treatise Oxford ofHumanNature.Oxford: University Press. . (1777) 1975.EnquiriesConcerning Human Understanding and Concerning thePrinciples Press. ofMorals.Oxford: Clarendon William. New York:Meridian Books. James, (1907) 1955.Pragmatism. Frederic. 1972.The Prison-House Jameson, ofLanguage.Princeton, N.J.:Princeton University Press. Kant,Immanuel. (1781) 1965.The Critique ofPureReason.New York:St. Martin's Press. PhiKlaus Christian. German Kohnke, 1991.TheRise ofNeo-Kantianism: Academic between IdealismandPositivism. Press. losophy Cambridge: Cambridge University Revolutions. of Kuhn,Thomas.1962.TheStructure ofScientific Chicago:University ChicagoPress. LaCapra, Dominick.1972.Emile Durkheim: Sociologistand Philosopher. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Press. University Latour,Bruno,and SteveWoolgar.1979.Laboratory Life:The Social Construction Facts. London:Sage. ofScientific Lehmann, Jennifer. 1990.Deconstructing & Kegan Durkheim. London:Routledge Paul. Lucien.(1910)1966.How NativesThink. L6vy-Bruhl, New York:Washington Square Press. . (1922) 1966.The "Soul" ofthePrimitive. Chicago:HenryRegnery. L6vi-Strauss, Claude. (1958)1963.Structural Anthropology. New York:Basic Books. Locke,John. (1690) 1959.An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. New York: Dover. Lukes,Steven.1973.EmileDurkheim: A Historical His Lifeand Work: and Critical Study.Stanford, Calif.:Stanford University Press. to Emile Durkheim's The Rules of theSociological , ed. 1982.Introduction Method.New York: Free Press. Mestrovic, Stjepan.1988. EmileDurkheim and theReformation ofSociology. Totowa, N.J.:Rowman& Littlefield. .1993. Durkheim and Poststructuralism. New York:AldineDeGruyter. Robert. Nisbet, (1966)1993.TheSociological Tradition. New Brunswick, N.J.:Transaction. .1974. TheSociology ofEmileDurkheim. New York Oxford Press. University Parsons,Talcott. (1937) 1968. The Structure of Social Action.New York: Free Press. . 1973."Durkheim on ReligionRevisited: Another Look at The Elementary Formsof theReligiousLife."Pp. 156-87 in Beyondthe Classics?Essays in the edited E. Hammond. Scientific StudyofReligion, byCharlesY. Glockand Phillip New York:Harper& Row. 481

American Journal of Sociology

Essays. Van Orman.(1966) 1977.The WaysofParadox and Other Quine,Williard Mass.: HarvardUniversity Press. Cambridge, ofJohnLocke." LanguagePhilosophy 1977."The Ordinary Rawls,AnneWarfield. Department of Sociology. WayneStateUniversity, Manuscript. Contribution to Social Goffman's OrderSui Generis: . 1987."The Interaction 5 (2): 136-49. Theory." SociologicalTheory and ofGoffman . 1989."Language,Self,and Social Order:A Re-Evaluation
Sacks." Human Studies 12 (1): 147-72. bolic Interaction 13 (1): 63-82.

A Dialecticof Commitment and Order." SymSociability: . 1990."Emergent

The InitialCritique, 1915-1924." SocioEpistemology: . 1996a."Durkheim's 38 (1), in press. logicalQuarterly and theVaand Hume's Passions:Emotion . 1996b. "Durkheim's Sentiments Department of SociWayneStateUniversity, Manuscript. lidity of Knowledge." ology. Princeton, N.J.:Princeton ofNature. Richard. 1979.Philosophy and theMirror Rorty, University Press. ofKnowledge." Philosophical Review Theory Schaub,Charles.1920."A Sociological of and the Divisionof Labor: A Reconsideration Carmen.1981."Justice Sirianni, Review32:449-70. Sociological DivisionofLabor in Society." Durkheim's Was and HarveyFarberman. 1967."On theEdge ofRapprochement: Stone, Gregory, Interaction?" Sociological of Symbolic Durkheim MovingtowardthePerspective Quarterly, pp. 147-64. Analysis, to Emile Durkheim on Institutional Traugott, Mark. 1978.Introduction of ChicagoPress. editedby MarkTraugott. Chicago:University TacitKnowledge, Tradition, ofPractices: 1994.The Social Theory Turner, Stephen. of ChicagoPress. and Presuppositions. Chicago:University Culture: intotheDevelResearches SirEdwardBurnett. (1874)1973.Primitive Tylor, London: and Custom. Art, Religion, Language, Philosophy, opment ofMythology, J.Murray. TheotoSomeModern with EspecialReference onTotemism . 1899."Remarks Institute 28:138-48. it."Journal oftheRoyalAnthropological riesConcerning Vico.Ithaca,N.Y.: (1744)1948.TheNewScienceofGiambattista Vico,Giambattista. Press. CornellUniversity & KeganPaul. Peter.1956.TheIdea ofa Social Science.London:Routledge Winch, Oxford: Investigations. LudwigJosef Johan. (1953)1958.Philosophical Wittgenstein, Basil Blackwell.
29 (4): 319-39.

482