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Metalogicon (2011) XXIV, 1

Aristotle on non-contradiction
Alessandro De Cesaris
1. A modern work on the rinci le o! non-contradiction (!rom now "#C) wo$ld $s$all% &e considered art o! the st$d% o! logic' (his last disci line is de!ined &% Imman$el )ant as an * a priori science o! the necessar% laws o! tho$ght, &$t not considering artic$lar o&+ects, tho$gh all o&+ects in general, !rom intellect to reason, &$t not in a s$&+ecti,e meaning, as to sa% &% the em irical ( s%chological) rinci les, !ollowing which the intellect thinks, &$t in an o&+ecti,e meaning, as to sa% &% the a riori rinci les according to which it has to think-1' .ogic wo$ld &e, there!or, a science, whose o&+ect is the s%stem o! the necessar% laws o! tho$ght, inde endentl% !rom the o&+ect o! tho$ght itsel!2' Aristotle did not $se the word *logicin the same wa% as we do/, &$t he was, ne,ertheless, the creator o! what we call !ormal logic, a disci line that he called analytics0'

I' )ant, Logica, translated &% .' Amoroso, in Opere, .ater1a, 2oma-3ari 1445' 2 As in modern logic hand&ooks6 see also M' Malatesta, La logica primaria, .72, 2oma 1488, ' 516 *Noi moderni definiamo le leggi logiche o tautologie come enunciati molecolari [...] sempre veri, veri in tutti I mondi possibili, cioe veri indipendentemente tanto dal senso dei singoli enunciati, quanto dal valore di verita di essi. Se poi le leggi logiche o tautologie siano leggi immutabili ed eterne che l intelletto umano scopre ma non crea, o leggi della mente, o l una e l altra cosa, o in parte l una cosa, in parte l altra, o altro ancora, e una ques! tione di filosofia della logica che non intacca l oggetto della logica sul quale tutti i logici contemporanei convengono -9 7' Aga11i, La logica simbolica, .a :c$ola, 14416 *"la logica si disinteressa quasi completamente del#contenuto$ dei discorsi argomentativi-' / :ee also I' D;ring, %ristotele, M$rsia, Milano 14<= and A' >ori, %ristotele, 3r$no Mondadori, Milano 200/, ' 5/-50' 0 :ee also A' >ori, cit. ' 50 9 &het 1/54&2<-28' 3$t o&ser,ing that the name *Anal%tics- gi,en to the works a&o$t s%llogisms is s$!!icient'

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And tho$gh Aristotelian anal%tics are essentiall% a theor% o! s%llogism and a st$d% o! the links &etween ro ositions6 what is the lace o! the "#C in this conte?t@ Answering this A$estion will make clear the meaning, and the ,al$e, o! that which the :tagirite called the *!irmest rinci le-9 i! this is onl% a law o! the logos, or i! itBs art o! a greater le,el o! his doctrine' (o this aim, IBll take into consideration the conte?t in which the "#C is treated &% Aristotle, and the meaning, to him, o! the link &etween logic and ontolog%, tho$ght and realit%' '.' (he "#C !reA$entl% a ears in AristotleCs *logic- works, collected $nder the name o! Organon' 3$t wh% does the :tagirite $se it, how does he $se it@ In (e Interpretatione it can &e !o$nd, e? ressi,el% a!!irmed, two times6 once in the twel!th cha ter, dedicated to the st$d% o! o osition &etween modal ro ositions59 another one in the !o$rteenth cha ter, that de,elo s the relation o! contrariet% &etween o inions=' In the !irst case Aristotle wants to esta&lish which is the contradictor% ro osition o! the hrase *itBs ossi&le that it is-' (his is his roced$re6 a) what is ossi&le to &e, is also ossi&le not to &e &) *itBs ossi&le not to &e- seems to &e the negation o! *itBs ossi&le to &e- c) &$t, i! these two ro ositions were contradictor%, then two contradictor% ro ositions wo$ld &e at the same time tr$e, and thatBs im ossi&le !or the "#C d) so, the contradictor% o! the anal%sed ro osition is *itBs not ossi&le, that it is-' Dere the "#C is $sed to e?cl$de the chance, !or a ro osition, to &e considered contradictor% o! another one' In the second case Aristotle $ses the "#C to show a) how two contrar% o inions cannot &e tr$e together6 in !act contrar% o inions are a&o$t the same s$&+ect, and itBs im ossi&le !or &oth the contraries to &e redicated o! the same &) how itBs not ossi&le !or the same man to ha,e sim$ltaneo$sl% contrar% o inions' (his assage
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(e int' 21&1<-186 *)**+ ,-. )/0.123. 412+ 235 )6235 )*78909:81; 2+< ).2;49;,=.1< >+:9;<= (e int' 20&46 *?,1 /@ 3A4 B./CD921; 2E B.1.2F1 GHIJD9;. 2K 1A2K -9 ItBs the statement, with which the te?t ends.

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will &e considered again<, &$t !or now I want to remark how in this te?t is attested alread% an ontological and not +$st logical $se o! "#C' In the Lategories, again, Aristotle $ses the "#C in ,ario$s occasions6 he demonstrates8 the im ossi&ilit% to consider Ereat and .ittle as contraries, &eca$se that wo$ld mean that the same s$&+ect can admit sim$ltaneo$sl% &oth contraries9 he states it again treating the di!!erent kinds o! o osition when he considers a!!irmation and negation4' In the Mirst %nalytics the "#C is e? ressl% $sed to show, in ,ario$s laces o! the te?t, the necessit% o! some im lications &etween ro ositions106 esta&lishing the de endence o! 3 !rom A, i! A is ossi&le also 3 wo$ld' *I! in !act it was im ossi&le, the same o&+ect wo$ld res$lt sim$ltaneo$sl% ossi&le and im ossi&le-11, as to sa% ossi&le &eca$se de endent !rom A, and im ossi&le as esta&lished &% the h% othesis' In the same wa%, later, in the second &ook, Aristotle states that itBs im ossi&le to o&tain !alse concl$sions !rom tr$e remises' I! the two remises *A is redicated o! e,er% 3- and *3 is redicated o! e,er% C- are tr$e, itBs necessar% !or the concl$sion *A is redicated o! e,er% C- to &e tr$e as well, or *the same determination wo$ld &elong and not &elong to the same s$&+ect-12' Dere itBs ossi&le to remark the strong relationshi that (contrar% to what do .$kasiewic1 and I' D$sic think1/) in,ol,es the s%llogistic and the "#C, s eci!icall% the scienti!ic s%llogism and the "#C' (he !irst one wants to e? ress the necessar%6 &$t i! the necessar% is that whose negation is im ossi&le, the imossi&le is the contradictor%'
<

:ee also aragra h 0'0' Lat. 5&/4-=a16 *)**N3A/@. /349O ?,1 2E B.1.2F1 BH;/CD9:81; 4 Lat. 1/&2-/6 *BHP ,Q.R. SEJ 23T2R. ).1S41O3. )9P 2U ,@. )*78@< 2U /@ V95/3< 1A2W. 9X.1;10 %n. Yr. /0a25-/09 5/&10-25 11 Aristotle, Organon, edited &% E' Colli, Adel hi, Milano 200/, ' 124 12 %n. Yr., ' 20= 1/ :ee also >' .$kasiewic1, Il principio di contraddiZione in %ristotele , F$odli&et, Macerata, 200/, '40
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In other laces o! the same work Aristotle e,okes the rinci le to sol,e some other little A$estions6 at the end o! the !irst &ook10 some ages are written to clari!% the relation o! o osition to roositions' As alread% done in (e interpretatione, Aristotle shows the di!!erence &etween *not &eing ?- and *&eing non-?-6 with the hel o! an e?am le &ased on a modal ro osition, he demonstrates that the negation o! *&eing ?- m$st &e the !irst ro osition and not the second one, or it co$ld ha en that contradictor% ro ositions &oth &e tr$e' De also $ses the so-called * s%chological !orm$lation- o! the "#C (which IBll handle address later) to demonstrate the necessit% o! the relation o! im lication &etween o inions, as it ha ens with the corres onding statements' At last, letBs remark on the strong relationshi that links the "#C to the reductio ad absurdum o! the s%llogism, where the remise is the contradictor% to the concl$sion o! the s%llogism that has to &e demonstrated' A new remise is added, too' (his will &ring to the negation one o! the remises o! the !irst s%llogism, and as this last remise is e,ident15 the negation o! the concl$sion o! the !irst s%llogism will er !orce &e $ntr$e' Ghat s$stains the demonstration is, as in the last cases, the im ossi&ilit% !or contradictor% ro ositions to &e considered &oth tr$e1=' In the Second analytics, a treatise dedicated to the *logic o! science-1<, Aristotle $ses the "#C as an e?am le &eca$se heBs tr%ing to esta&lish the nat$re o! demonstration and to anal%1e the remises o! scienti!ic knowledge' In ,ario$s laces the "#C is $sed as an e?am le o! an *indemonstra&le a?iom-189 elsewhere itBs indicated &% Aristotle as the a?iom that no one science, in its own demonstration, can e? ressl% ass$me' In the (o ics, the treatise dedicated to dialectics, Aristotle states that the chance to disc$ss, a&o$t a s$&+ect, the inherence or not o!
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%n. Yr., ' 14=-202 %n. Yr' =1&10 1= %n. Yr. =1a18-/59 see also %n. Yost. <<a2/, where this relation is e? ressl% a!!irmed' 1< A' >ori, %ristotele, cit. ' 4= 18 %n. Yost' <1a10
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a certain determination, im lies the chance to disc$ss the inherence o! the contradictor% determination too6 !or e?am le, demonstrating that a man is health% means demonstrating that that man is not sick, and in the same wa% demonstrating that a man is sick means demonstrating that that man is not health%14' .et $s remark how the "#C *reso$nds- in man% laces o! the &ook, in e?am le at 1/<a<-20, where the distinctions and the imlications that the dialectic rocess im lies o!ten recall the !irst rinci le, e,en i! not alwa%s in an e? licit wa%' In the workBs last ages20 Aristotle n$m&ers !i,e wa%s in which a dialectic o onent can ask to acce t contradictor% ro ositions, in order to kee the reader warned a&o$t similar rhetorical tricks' Ghat can &e stated, a!ter this !ast glance thro$gh the Hrganon@ Ge ha,e seen how di!!erentl% Aristotle $ses the "#C, de ending to the arg$ment and the aims he has at the moment' De $ses the rinci le to e?cl$de a&s$rd h% otheses, and to decide &etween ,ario$s alternati,es9 he $ses it as an e?am le when he talks a&o$t a?ioms and indemonstra&le rinci les9 he $ses it in the e? osition o! his s%llogistic and theor% o! demonstration9 man% times he $ses it also to anal%1e the o osition &etween ro ositions' :o itBs o&,io$s, considering the *logical- conte?t so !ar shown, that the "#C a ears strongl% linked to !ormal ro&lems6 a ,alid aid in the in,estigation o! the laws o! s eech and arg$mentation' 3$t is that reall% so@ In AristotleBs logical 7ssa%s it is alread% ossi&le to contradict this !irst im ression6 weB,e seen, in !act, that man% times he a lies the "#C not onl% to ro ositions, &$t also to things and o inions (!$l!illing so the tri artition that >' .$kasiewic1 has done o! the rinci le21)' GeB,e seen, in !act, how in the Lategories22 Aristotle negates the contrariet% o! Ereat and :mall6 itBs im ossi&le, !or the contraries, to &e a lied at the same o&+ect, and &eca$se o&+ects, that are at
14
20

[op. 112a25-1/ [op. 1=/a1/-25 21 :ee also cha ter three' 22 :ee also note 8'

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the same time small and great, e?ist, these two redicates cannot &e contraries' In (e interpretatione2/ is stated the im ossi&ilit% o! s$&sistence o! contradictor% o inions6 also here the "#C hasnBt an% logical ,al$e, &$t a s%chologicalIontological one' (he same ha ens in the Mirst %nalytics\], and in a !orm that shows the not so strong distinction that Aristotle kee s &etween the ,ario$s $ses o! the rinci le, and also his com!ort in kee ing together A$estions that we wo$ld toda% consider *logical-, and considerations that wo$ld &e meta h%sical or ontological' Jltimatel%, itBs alread% ossi&le to see how, to the "hiloso her, the "#C is not onl% a law o! tho$ght and s eech25' (his is e,ident i! we get to the most rele,ant moment o! this A$estion6 the anal%sis o! &ook IV o! ^etaphysics' (his &ook is !amo$s &eca$se in it Aristotle de!ines !irst hiloso h% as ontolog%' (his theme &elongs, an%wa%, +$st to the !irst two, short cha ters o! the treatise, that contin$es with the e? licit en$nciation o! the "#C and with its de!ense against e,ent$al o onents' It cannot &e said, howe,er, that this &ook is di,ided in two di!!erent arts, nor that in it there are onl% the answers to artic$lar A$estions o! the third &ook2=6 what clearl% a ears is not the +$?ta osition, &$t the strict interrelation &etween the di!!erent thematics o! the work' (hat shows $ltimatel% the ne?$s that links the "rinci le to Kirst "hiloso h%, and s$&tracts it !rom an% logical or dialectical inter retation' (he treatise &egins recalling the science that contem lates *&eing as &eing-, and the ro erties that &elong to it as itsel! 2<' (his science is di!!erent !rom all the others, &eca$se these, a!ter the% ha,e
2/
20

:ee also note <' ==&/5-=<a1-10' 25 It will soon &e seen, how this distinction itsel! is, in a s%stem how the one o! Aristotle, acce ta&le onl% with some s eci!ications' 2= 2egarding the ro&lem6 G' >aeger, %ristotele, :ansoni, Kiren1e 2000, ' 28=9 E' 2eale, Il concetto di filosofia prima e l$unit_ della metafisica di %ristotele , 3om iani, Milano 2008, ' 1/1-102' 2< ^et' 100/a20-21 \'`ab:2;. BH;:2c,7 2;< d 89RJ9O 2U e. f e. 41P 2E 23A2g GHIJDe.21 418$1A2Q-

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taken a art o! &eing, consider a&o$t it +$st what is accidental 28 and not what &elongs to it as &eing24' (he LM N LM is so the same as the OM PQRS QTRU6 in &oth cases we re!er to a realit% considered *&% itsel!-, in a $ni,ersal mode/0' (he rinci les (VWXQY) and the ca$ses (QZRYQ[) so$ght &% this science concern all the entities, +$st &eca$se the% *are-/1' 3eing is said in man% senses/2' (he rinci al meaning o! *&eingis \T]YQ//6 all other things are called *entities- onl% *analogicall%-, &eca$se the%Bre related to it/0' :o the relation &etween ontolog% and o$siolog% is traced6 the hiloso her looks !or the ca$ses and the rinci les o! &eings-A$a-&eings, and so itCs his d$t% to in,estigate what mostl% is, that which is \T]YQ/5' (he hiloso her, so, shall st$d% not onl% &eing, &$t also e,er%thing concerning the &eing as &eing6 the one, the l$ral, negation and ri,ation/=, the identical and the di!!erent, contrariet%/<, anterior and osterior, the genre and the s ecies/8' All these ro erties are [^[Q o! &eing as &eing6 the "#C, which Aristotle !inall%
28 24

^et. 100/a256 hH9JP 23T236 89RJ35:; 2U :6,i9i74Q<a ' ItCs ne,ertheless necessar% !or what regards onl% a art o! &eing to &e accidental' Ghat regards &eing-A$a-&eing is what necessaril% regards an%thing that is9 what regards onl% some &eings canCt &e a necessar% !eat$re o! &eing in general, and will &elong to them not &eca$se the% are &eings, &$t &eca$se the% ha,e other !eat$res and are considered !rom other stand oints (i'e' &eca$se the% are n$m&ers, lines or !ire, see also 1000&5-=)' /0 *j183*3Aa' /1 ^et. 'kkla\m!l\ /2 ^et. 'kklal\` h2U e. *CS921; H3**1DW<a. // ^et. 'kklb'n!'o6 ousia is what *is !irst, that is what all the rest de ends and is determined !rom-' /0 ^et. 'kklbm!''. /5 pet. 'kklq'o!\'` !$rther (1000a/-0) Aristotle also di,ides hiloso h% in as man% arts as the s$&stances' ItCs e,ident that the recedent disco$rse has to &e re eated, and this will ha en in the assage 1005a//-&2, where Aristotle will s eci!% how hiloso h% that st$dies the s$ reme genre o! s$&stance m$st st$d% a?ioms too' /= ^et.'kk]ao!\\ /< ^et. 'kk]a\r!\s /8 ^et. 'kkma'l!'m

<

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introd$ces in the third cha ter, is _^[\M, or * ro er-, o! it too' "hiloso h%, in !act, m$st also st$d% the so-called *a?iomata-, &eca$se the% concern all &eings/4' Hn the other side, st$d%ing "#C is recisel% !irst hiloso h%Cs d$t%' As we recedentl% had $t \T]YQ &e!ore other entities, now the s$ reme !orm o! \T]YQ is re!erred to its in!erior !orms 00' 3$t a?iomata are *the s$rest rinci les o! all &eings-A$a-&eings- ( H9JP 2W. t.2R. f t.21 2E< HE.2R. i9i1;32I21< , Met' 1005310), and so their st$d% will &elong to the hiloso her, who st$dies the eminent genre o! s$&stance' 3$t here a mark is necessar%6 !irst o! all, that \T]YQ is *eminentl%- doesnCt mean that she onl% is, and nothing more' Are *&eings-, in !act, also all things as a!!ection, corr$ tions, ri,ations, A$alities, ca$ses that rod$ce or generate \T]YQ, o&+ects who re!er to oT]YQ, negations o! \T]YQ or an% other o! these characteristics01' "#CCs !ield is not onl% \T]YQ6 it in,ests e,en not-&eing as negation o! &eing02' Moreo,er, to ri,ilege the s$ reme \T]YQ rather than the other \T]YQ[ doesnCt mean that the "#C concerns her and not in!erior \T]YQ[6 as &e!ore, itCs a necessar% meas$re, taken to esta&lish who has to st$d% the rinci le itsel!, &$t it concerns se arate \T]YQ[ as the sensi&le ones, \T]YQ[ as the ro erties o! the \T]YQ[ or their characteristics' 3$t most o! all, it has &een seen how the rinci le is a !eat$re o! &eings6 how it can &e co$nted among the o&+ects o! st$d% o! the hiloso her, and s eci!icall% o! the hiloso her who st$dies &eing in its most eminent meaning' ItCs a rinci le o! disco$rse and o! tho$ght, o! realit% and o! arg$mentation0/6 we +$st
/4

^et. 'kkkma\k!\\u'kkma\r` *v:2NBH9P /w*3. x2; f e.21 GHIJD9; Hy:; z23523 SEJ 1A23O< 2U 43;.Q.{,235 H9JP 2U e. f e. S.RJF|3.23< 41P H9JP 23T2R. B:2P. } 89RJF1-' 00 ^et. 'kkmal]!ls6 *BH9P /$~:2;. ~2; 235 >6:;435 2;< ).R2CJR z. SEJ 2; SC.3< 235 e.23< } >T:;<{,235 H9JP 235 418Q*36 41P 235 H9JP 2. HJ27. 3A:F1. 41P } H9JP 23T2R. . 97 :4CV;<-' 01 ^et. 'kklbn!'k. 02 see also 7' 3erti, (alla dialettica alla filosofia prima, 3om iani, Milano 2000, ' 058 e E' "asA$ale, Il rinci io di non-contraddi1ione in Aristotele, 3ollati 3oringhieri, (orino 2008, ' 2< 0/ "artic$larl% interesting, on this to ic, is the e? ression &% Ale?ander !rom A hrodisia6 *what has to &e ossessed as rinci le o! e,er% knowa&le thing &%

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ha,e to esta&lish i! to these di!!erent !ields &elong di!!erent rinci les, or the same' '.\. 3e!ore we roceed to a more recise anal%sis o! "#C and its !orm$lations, it can &e $se!$l to remise a general remark on the nat$re o! the relationshi &etween logics and !irst hiloso h% in AristotleCs works, a remark alread% artiall% s$ggested in the last aragra h' It has &een seen, in !act, how Aristotle $ses the "rinci le in the te?ts o! the Hrganon, and how these can &e considered works regarding $re logic' GeC,e also seen how in this works itCs alread% di!!ic$lt to disting$ish &etween a *logical- and an *ontological$se o! "#C' In tr$th, what is ro&lematic is the se aration &etween logic and ontolog% itsel!, that &elongs mostl% to modern tho$ght00' AristotleCs hiloso h% &elongs to the age o! tho$ght in which the identit% &etween *s$re- and *tr$e- r$led056 EreeksC realism consisted e?actl% in the lack o! this !ract$re &etween tho$ght and real, the order o! the things and the order o! the intellect (which, !rom an e? ression o! Isaac 3en :alomon Israeli, will &e called in the Middle Ages adaequatio rei et intellectus)' Aristotle is laced in this s irit$al atmos here0=' Kor this reason, !or a re-modern thinker as he is, the de!inition o! logic that weC,e gi,en, as a !ormal science o! the laws o! tho$ght that a&stracts radicall% !rom realit%, cannot &e ,alid0<6 AristotleCs
who wants to know an% &eing- (Alessandro dBA!rodisia, Lommentario alla ^etafisica di %ristotele, a c$ra di E' Mo,ia, 3om iani, Milano 200/, ' =/5) 00 Hn this to ic see also the !amo$s work &% 3onit1 on the categories6 D' 3onit1, Sulle categorie di %ristotele, Vita e ensiero, Milano 1445' 05 see also 7' :e,erino, Milosofia, .a sc$ola, 3rescia 1441, ' =-<9 &$t also E' G' K' Degel, ScienZa della logica, translated &% A' Moni, .ater1a, 2oma-3ari 2008, ' 25-2=' 0= (he e? ression that &est e? resses this can &e !o$nd in (e Int. 'oall6 'oall6-,3FR< 3 *QS3; )*789O< v:H9J 2E HJIS,121-' 0< D;ring, cit., ' ==6 *In linea di massima, la parola hlogicoa significa in %ris! totele che qualcosa viene discusso dal punto di vista linguistico!formale, e senZa che si tenga conto del contenuto reale -' It seems, on the &asis o! this de!inition, that Aristotle agreed with modern tho$ght on the sense o! a logical research9 &$t the distinction lies e?actl% in this word *radicall%-, as it has &een

Metalogicon (2011) XXIV, 1

logic is ontologicall% com romised08 &eca$se it wants to &e a doctrine strictl% linked to realit% and alwa%s re!erring to the real !o$ndation o! its remises6 *Ghen one aims to tr$th, he has to !o$nd his research on remises that e? ress a real inherence-04' (his doesnCt mean that Aristotle didnCt know the di!!erence &etween tho$ght and realit%, nor that he co$ldnCt recogni1e these two !ields and kee them distinct506 &$t, a art !rom the sim le ontological aim that he ass$mes in A$estions that we wo$ld considershown in the !irst note' (he o inion o! 7' Aga11i is reall% eA$ili&rated6 he, in his work La logica simbolica, on one side gi,es to Aristotle the merit o! ha,ing disting$ished the logical-ling$istic !ield !rom the ontological one, and on the other side $nderlines that this distinction is not as strong as can &e !or modern resear chers' 08 :ee also E' "asA$ale, Il principio di non!contraddiZione in %ristotele , 3ollati 3oringhieri, (orino \kks, pp. \m e l' u ^. ^alatesta, La logica delle funZioni, ^illennium &omae, &oma \kkk, ' 108 and 1116 *`abLo stagirita assunse personalmente l$impegno ontologico dal momento che richiese la condiZione h2R. e.2R.a`ab-' ItCs eno$gh to think to the o ening o! the ninth cha ter o! (e Interpretatione, where the "hiloso her e? ressl% disting$ishes &etween &eings (and ast things) and !$t$re things6 *cde fgM \hM RiM LMRjM PQe klM\fmMjM VMSkPn RoM PQRSpQ][M q RoM VdUpQ][M Vrnst q ulv^t lwMQ[ `ab' cde ^g RiM PQsBxPQ]RQ 41P ,9**Q.2R. 3AD ,3FR<-' :ee also %n. Yr. l]bm!'m !or a good e?am le on the wa% Aristotle $ses h%sical or meta h%sical considerations in logical disc$ssions' 04 %n. Yr. s'b\l!\]. 50 Lat. '\bm!'k` here Aristotle clearl% makes a distinction &etween the !ield o! logic and !ield o! realit%, &$t immediatel% shows (see also ne?t note) how the logical o osition &etween a!!irmation and negation corres onds to the real o osition &etween the things, to which a!!irmation and negation are re!erred ("asA$ali, cit., ' 206 *Secondo %ristotle l$opposiZione non solo tra le due pro! posiZioni o espressioni zquella affermativa e quella negativa{. i anche contraddiZione tra le cose che esse rappresentanoa{ ' :ee also &het' 1/54&///0, where Aristotle clari!ies that dialectics and rhetoric are a&o$t disco$rses (rUk\[), and not things (dWSkfQRQ)' :ee also 7' 3erti, (alla dialettica alla filo! sofia prima, 3om iani, Milano 2000, ' <2-<5 and =<06 *La differenZa tra il procedimento dialettico e il procedimento fis! ico, pi volte sottolineata da %ristotle mediante la distinZione tra l$indagare hdialetticamentea e l$indagare hfisicamentea, consiste nella differenZa tra il cercare spiegaZioni di tipo esclusivamente logico!linguistico e il cercare invece spiegaZioni di tipo causale. ["] Nulla vieta, tuttavia, che tale scopo [cio il reperimento di cause] venga raggiunto per meZZo di un procedimento dialet!

10

Metalogicon (2011) XXIV, 1

ate !ormal, the assages in which the connection &etween logic and realit% is e? licit are ,er% n$mero$s51' (o concl$de this !irst cha ter some s$mmari1ing remarks can &e made6 Aristotelian logic contains man% re!erences to realit%, and kee s with it a stead% and necessar% link, whose lack can comromise its rigor52' Aristotle himsel!(as we ha,e seen), o!ten $ses hiloso hical and ontological consideration as a gro$nd !or the sol$tion o! logical and dialectical ro&lems6 to se arate thess two dimensions o! the :tagiriteCs works wo$ld &e a misleading anachronism5/' Dow can this res$lt hel o$r research@ (he "#C is at the same time an a?iom o! demonstration and a *transcendental o! &eing-A$a-&eing-50' It concerns ro ositions and things, logic redication and real inherence, names and what the% mean' Jltimatel%, the treatment o! "#C &elongs to !irst hiloso h%, &$t itCs also a matter o! dialectic, &eca$se itCs co$nted as a rinci le common to all sciences' (he !o$rth &ook o! ^etaphysics states, anal%ses and de!ends it as a rinci le o! &eing9 dialectic comm$nicates with all sciences &eca$se it concerns the common rinci les o! all o! them' (hese two !ields are strictl% linked' D$ring the st$d% o! the !eat$res and !orm$lations o! the "#C, attention shall &e aid to the res$lts o! these ages, in order not to !all into the mistake o! *s litting- the rinci le in two (or three) di!!erent rinci les, linked onl% &% incl$sionIim lication relationtico-' 51 (e Int. 'sal]!lm` *9 SEJ Hy:1 412I>1:;< )HQ>1:;< )*78< V96/c<, 41P ?H1. .IS47 GHIJD9;. , GHIJD9;. ["] SEJ )*78@< 9H9O. x2; *964Q. 3A *964Q. ~:2;., ).IS47 9X.1; *964Q. 3A *964Q., 41P 9 ~:2; *964Q. 3A *964Q., )*78@< . >I.1; )H3>I.1;-9 Lat. '\b'k!'n, which !ollows the assage A$oted in the recedent note' :ee also E' "asA$ale, cit., ' 206 *L$impossibilit_ di pre! dicare predicati contraddittori del medesimo oggetto equivale all$impossibilit_ di affermare e negare una proposiZione nel medesimo tempo. uesto ci mostra l$interdipendenZa che esiste tra logica e realt_, nonostante non si possa ridurre l$una all$altra-' 52 :ee also 7' 3erti, Contraddi1ione e dialettica negli antichi e nei moderni, .B7 os, 1488, "alermo ' 10=6 *non vero che la logica di %ristotle fosse pura! mente formale, in quanto si occupava di propriet_ e di nessi reali degli oggetti -' 5/ :ee also D;ring, cit., ' == 50 7' 3erti, Lit., ' 0=<'

11

Metalogicon (2011) XXIV, 1

shi s' A similar ste wo$ld create a !ract$re &etween the two areas considered in this aragra h, and wo$ld link them onl% at the rice to admit the ma+or im ortance or riorit% o! one o! them on the other one' 2' (ime has come to !ace directl% the "#C as Aristotle has it stated' De ga,e ,ario$s !orm$lations o! it, laced in man% o! his works, and in this cha ter I want to anal%1e them se aratel% and look !or their connections' (he%Cre rinci all% two6 a ro ositional and a !$nctional !orm$lation' (he ro ositional !orm$lation corres onds to the one, thatCs $s$all% called *logical !orm$lation- o! the "#C (or logical "#C)' I re!erred to $se this name !or r$dence, &eca$se the logical nat$re o! this !orm$lation is to &e ,eri!ied' (he !$nctional !orm$lation corres onds to whatCs $s$all% called *ontological !orm$lation- o! "#C (or ontological "#C)' I called this !orm$lation *!$nctional- &eca$se itCs not a&o$t ro ositions, &$t the attri&$tion o! a redicate to a s$&+ect' Again, this choice is moti,ated &% r$dence' In order to cond$ct this research in a &etter wa%, ICd like to s eci!% what I re!er to when I write a&o$t *!orm$lations-6 the% constit$te the di!!erent wa%s Aristotle $sed to deal with the same rinci le' (heir di!!erences allow $s to $nderline some as ects o! "#C, or to s eci!% some !eat$res o! it, &$t $ltimatel% the di!!erence &etween these !orm$lations is +$st a arent6 the% are +$st a a more recise or anal%1ed ,ersion o! the other' 2'1' yUk\z Vd\pQMR[PUz (as to sa% VdUpQM][z, * ro osition-) is that to which it ertains to &e tr$e or !alse55' A sim le ro osition is a ro osition that, thro$gh the link (]vfdr\P{) &etween name and ,er&, is *signi!icant a&o$t the inherence or not inherence o! something-5=' (he ro ositional !orm$lation o! "#C negates that two contradictor% ro ositions can &e &oth tr$e' (his t% e corres onds the e?ression !rom &ook |6 *.et so the strongest notion &e this one6 that
55 5=

(e int. 'ram` *B. 2U )*789T9;. V9T/9:81; GHIJD9;-. Ib. 'ra\l!\]` h~:2; /$} ,@. H*w )HQ>1.:;< >R.c :7,1.2;4c H9JP 235 9 GHIJD9; 2; , GHIJD9;a.

12

Metalogicon (2011) XXIV, 1

contradictor% statements cannot &e tr$e together `ab has &een shown s$!!icientl%-5<' In order to $nderstand this statement, we ha,e to look at the Aristotelian theor% o! the o osition &etween ro ositions, and to consider shortl% what meaning he ga,e to tr$th and !alseness' \.'.'. (here are !o$r kinds o! o ositions6 &etween relati,es, &etween contraries, &etween ri,ation and ossess, and &etween a!!irmation and negation58' (he !irst three ones ertain to terms, the last one regards ro ositions54' Hnl% the last one, so, is in,ol,ed in this !orm$lation o! "#C' Aristotle, in !act, s eci!ies that onl% in the o osition &etween contradictor% ro ositions is it necessar% that the one is tr$e and the other one !alse, and this !or two reasons6 the !irst is that the%Cre ro ositions and not terms' Hnl% ro ositions can &e tr$e or !alse, &eca$se onl% what is said *according to connection- (PQR} ]vfdr\P{M) has this !eat$re=0' 3eca$se contrar% terms and the relationshi o! ossessionI ri,ation, also when e? ressed *according to connection- (as to sa%, the roosition on the contraries and on ossession and ri,ation) are not necessaril% one tr$e and the other one !alse, also i! the% are o osed in a wa% similar to contradictor% ro ositions' Kor e?am le, *:ocrates is health%- and *:ocrates is sick- wo$ld &e &oth !alse i! :ocrates didnCt e?ist=1' Kor ri,ation and ossession it is the same=2' (wo contradictor% ro ositions, on the contrar%, are necessaril% alwa%s one tr$e and one !alse, e,en in the case that the s$&+ect the% re!er to doesnCt e?ist=/' Ghat are, there!or, contradictor% ro ositions@
5<

^et. 'k''b'\!'n6 *x2; ,@. 3A. i9i1;32I27 /Q1 H1:W. 2U , 9X.1; )*789O< ?,1 2E< ).2;49;,C.1< >I:9;< ["] 23:1521 9Jc:8R-' 58 Lat. ''b'r!\k6 **CS921; /@ 29Jo. 2CJR ).2;49O:81; 292J1DW<, < 2E HJQ< 2;, < 2E B.1.2F1, < :2CJ7:;< 41P ;<, < 412I>1:;< 41P )HQ>1:;< -' 54 :ee also E' "asA$ale, cit' ' 2/' =0 Ib.'lb'k!'\. =1 Ib 'lb']!'s =2 Ib 'lb\k!\'. =/ Ib 'lb\r!\o6 *cde ^g kl Rtz PQRQpS]ljz PQe Rtz Vd\pS]ljz Vle, cSM Rl N cSM Rl fo N, R~ fgM xRlW\M]RQ[ ul^\z R~ ^g xRlW\M Vrnsgz-'

1/

Metalogicon (2011) XXIV, 1

Aristotle writes6 *letCs consider in !act that, among com osed roositions these are the ones that o ose each other as contradictor%, those that are ordered according to the `,er&b to &e and not to &e-=0' Kor e?am le, the contradictor% ro osition o! *Mario is good- is *Mario is not good-' 3$t here the di!!erence &etween contradictor% ro ositions and ro ositions a&o$t contradictor% terms has to &e s eci!ied (considering +$st indi,id$al, not modali1ed and not A$anti!ied ro ositions)' Contradictor% terms are, !or e?am le, *good- and *not good-' 3$t two ro ositions that state the contradictories are not contradictor%6 the% need to &e one an a!!irmation, and the other one the onl% negation ossi&le=5' 3$t the ro ositions that a!!irms o! a s$&strate the term, that is contrar% to the one a!!irmed &% another ro osition, is not a negation, &$t an a!!irmation' :o, !ollowing the indications o! the "hiloso her, we ha,e !o$r kinds o! ro osition6 a) &) c) d) X is man is white X is not man is not white X is non- man is non-white X is not non- man is not non-white

i) c) and &) are not two !orm$lations o! the same ro osition' (he !irst is an a!!irmation, the other is a negation' a) and c) are ro ositions concerning contradictor% terms' a) and &) are contradictor%' c) im lies &)6 in !act i! itCs tr$e that *not-to-&e-white- &elongs to a man, then *&eing white- doesnCt &elong to him' (he contrar%, tho$gh, is not tr$e6 in !act itCs ossi&le that what is not white doesnCt e?ist at all, and so that nothing can &e redicated o! it' Jltimatel%, the a!!irmation o! negati,e redicate s$ oses the e?istence o! the s$&strate to which itCs re!erred to ==' ItCs slightl% in=0

(e int. \'als!lo6 *lZ k}W RiM ]vfdrlP\fmMjM QRQ[ Vrr{rQ[z VMRYPl[MRQ[ Q VMR[pS]l[z, O]Q[ PQR} R~ lwMQ[ PQe fo lwMQ[ RSSRR\MRQ[-' Vedi anche 1<a/0-/56 rmkj ^g VMR[Pl]sQ[ RoM R\ QTRUT PQR} R\ QTRUT-' =5 Ib. 'rblr` h1.9JU. /$x2; 41P ,F1 )HQ>1:;< ,;y< 4121>I:9R<.a == %n pr. m'b\m6 *the being that is not equal requires a substrate, that is the unequal-' see also M' anatta, commentar% to (ella interpretaZione, 2i11oli,

10

Metalogicon (2011) XXIV, 1

e?act what Eianl$igi "asA$ale states in his &ook on the Aristotelian "#C6 the im ossi&ilit% to a!!irm and negate the same ro osition at the same time does not corres ond to the im ossi&ilit% to redicate contradictor% terms o! the same s$&+ect, &$t to the imossi&ilit% to redicate and not to redicate the same redicate o! the same s$&+ect=<' \.'.\. Ghat is le!t to &e determined is what Aristotle means with tr$e and !alse' (wo cha ters o! the ^etaphysics are dedicated to this arg$ment, the !o$rth o! &ook 7 and the tenth o! &ook ' *Is in tr$th who thinks se arated things to &e se arated, and linked things to &e linked9 is in !alseness who thinks the things to &e di!!erent to how the% act$all% are-'=8 Considering the e,ent$al middle term &etween contradictories, he writes6 *(his is e,ident, as we de!ine what tr$e and !alse is6 !alse is to sa% that &eing is not and non-&eing is9 tr$e, on the contrar%, is to sa% that &eing is and not&eing is not-=4' *3eing-, here, has an eA$i,ocal ,al$e6 it re!ers, in
Milano 2000, ' 2<=-2<8 9 and also %n. Yr. m'bm!l\, where Aristotle rigoro$sl% deals with this ro&lem and e? ressl% writes6 * On the other hand, when a !orm$lation is consolidated or demolished, thereCs a certain di!!erence &etween thinking that the e? ression Cnot to &e thisC and the e? ression Cto &e non-this-, and thinking that these two epressions has different meanings-' De will sol,e the A$estion agreeing with the second o tion, and demonstrating the inherent contradiction o! the !irst' =< E' "asA$ale, cit., ' 206 *L$impossibilit_ di predicare predicati contraddittori del medesimo oggetto corrisponde all$impossibilit_ di affermare e negare una proposiZione nel medesimo tempo -' (he critiA$e doesnCt to$ch what he states a&o$t what this im lication means !or the relationshi &etween logic and realit%9 it +$st $nderlines that in this a!!irmation can &e !o$nd a light con!$sion &etween im ossi&ilit% to a!!irm the contradictories and im ossi&ilit% to a!!irm with tr$th the contradictories (and conseA$entl%, the im ossi&ilit% !or the contradictories to &e &oth tr$e)' =8 ^et. 'km'bl!]6-Vrnsll[ fgM R~ ^[WnfmM\M \ZUflM\z ^[Wt]sQ[ PQe R~ ]vkPlYflM\M ]vkPl]sQ[, ulv]sQ[ ^g cMQMRYjz XjM q R} dWSkfQRQ-' A similar de!inition can &e !o$nd in &ook 7, 102<&20-22' Dere, howe,er, is interesting the not on the concrete things as e!!ecti,e ca$se o! tr$th and !alsit% o! a roosition' =4 ^et. 'k''b\m!\r6-/w*3. /@ HJW23. ,@. J;:1,C.3;< 2; 2U )*78@< 41P V95/3<. U ,@. SEJ *CS9;. 2Ue. , 9X.1; 2U , e. 9X.1; V95/3<, 2U /@ 2U e. 9X.1; 41P 2U , e. , 9X.1; )*78@<-'

15

Metalogicon (2011) XXIV, 1

!act, not onl% to the e?istence o! an entit%, &$t also and in artic$lar to the inherence o! a determination to a s$&strate<0' 3$t what is the relation &etween tr$thI!alseness and things@ And so, whatCs the relation &etween ro ositions and their content@ Aristotle s eci!ies that tr$e and !alse are determinations that &elong to ro ositions, and not to things<1' Hn the other hand, thereCs a strict ca$sal relationshi &etween the tr$th o! ro ositions and things' De writes that *i!, in !acts, tr$e is to sa% that (a thing) is white or not-white, itCs necessar% !or it to &e white or not-white9 and i! itCs white or not-white, it was tr$e to a!!irm or negate it- <2' 2eading this e? ression, it might seem that thereCs a relation o! *reci rocal ca$salit%- &etween tr$th o! ro ositions and act$alit% o! things' 3$t in other assages Aristotle s eci!ies that itCs the e?istence or not-e?istence o! the relation, that the ro osition a!!irms, that makes the last tr$e or !alse, and not ,ice ,ersa6* 3A SEJ /;E 2U },y< 39:81; )*78W< :9 *964U. 9.1; 9 : *964U<, )**E /;E 2U :@ 9.1; *964U. },9O< 3 >I.29< 23523 )*7893,9. -</' (he contradiction &etween the two assages is +$st a arent6 the logical im lication is, in !act, not eA$al to the ca$se-e!!ect relation' (he e?istence o! !acts is ca$se o! the tr$th o! ro ositions <06 the ro osition *the lam is t$rned on- is tr$e &eca$se the lam is
<0

Dow re,io$sl% shown, the ro osition essentiall% means the &elonging o! a redicate to a s$&+ect (that is *$nion- and *dis$nion-)6 e,en where the !orm concealed it, it co$ld &e modi!ied to make this str$ct$re e? licit' :ee also (e Int \'bo!'k` *\T^gM k}W ^[QpmWl[ lZdlM MsWjd\M Q^Yl[M q MsWjd\M Q^Y\MRQ lwMQ[-' <1 ^et. 'kk\rb\m!\n6-3A SEJ ~:2; 2U V95/3< 41P 2U )*78@< 9. 23;< HJ1S,1:;., 3;e. 2U ,@. 1S18e.)*78@<-' <2 (e int. 'salo!bl6-9 SEJ )*78@< 9H9O. x2; *964Q. 3A *964Q. ~:2;., ).IS47 9X.1; *964Q. 3A*964Q., 41P 9 ~:2; *964Q. 3A *964Q., )*78@< . >I.1; )H3>I.1;-' </ ^et. 'km'bn!o' Hn this to ic (homas is a&sol$tel% clear6 *nde qui putat di! vidi quod est divisum in rebus, verus est in sua opinione ["] Non enim ideo tu es albus, qua nos vere eistimamus te esse albumu sed e converso, ideo eistim! amus te album, quia tu es albus [...]. oc autem addit ad manifestandum quod supra dierat, quod verum et falsum est in rebus componi et dividi. Oportet enim veritatem et falsitatem, quae est in oratione vel opinione, reduci ad dis! positionem rei sicut ad causama' <0 Kor *e?istence o! !acts- I mean the act$al e?istence o! a state o! things'

1=

Metalogicon (2011) XXIV, 1

t$rned on' Hn the other hand, the tr$th o! a ro osition im lies the act$alit% o! the !act that is its content6 i! the ro osition *the lam is t$rned on- is tr$e, so the lam is t$rned on (this is &eca$se the tr$th o! a ro osition consists recisel% o! the e?istence o! the !act that it e? resses, and is this &eca$se o! the semantic link that relates a!!irmation and inherence<5)' ItCs not a onl%, one-to-one rocess, &$t two di!!erent relations<=' #ow can &e stated a concl$sion, that will &e $se!$l in the ne?t cha ters6 the tr$th o! a ro osition is not a logical, &$t an ontological matter' .ogics (Anal%tics) considers the !ormal relation &etween ro ositions, &$t their tr$th m$st &e taken !rom realit%, and !or this reason it wants to mean something real' (hat two roositions cannot &e &oth tr$e together means recisel% that, that two contradictor% !acts cannot &e together tr$e' \.'.l. 3etween two contradictor% ro ositions thereCs a relation that is not &etween other ro ositions6 contrar% ro ositions can &e, as has &een seen, &oth !alse9 other ro ositions can also &e &oth tr$e9 &$t in the case o! two contradictor% ro ositions, itCs necessar% !or one o! them to &e tr$e, and the other !alse <<' It can &e shown that this a!!irmation can &e red$ced to the ro ositional !orm$lation o! "#C' Ge need two elements6 a) (he 1/th cha ter o! (e interpretatione shows the im lication &etween the conce t o! ossi&le, contingent, necessar% and imossi&le' Dere Aristotle states in a clear wa% that it is *necessar%

<5

:ee note 1' Moreo,er, letCs consider AristotleCs statement that *disco$rses are tr$e in a similar wa%, to the wa% !acts are- *f\ejz \Z rUk\[ rnslz i]dlW R} dWSkfQRQ-' <= AristotleCs s eci!%ing on the ca$sal link &etween tr$th and !acts shows that he knew this distinction' Hn this to ic .$kasiewic1 writes that !or Aristotle there was a $rel% logical eA$i,alence, and not real, &etween e? ressions' 3$t it will &e shown that he made a con!$sion &etween two di!!erent things6 what he calls logical "#C (itCs im ossi&le that two contradictor% a!!irmations are together tr$e) and what he talks a&o$t when he shows this logical eA$i,alence (negating or a!!irming a thing)' << :ee also i'e' (e int. 'sa\s!lm'

1<

Metalogicon (2011) XXIV, 1

that something is- is eA$i,alent to *im ossi&le that something is not-<8' b) (he tr$th o! a!!irmation im lies the !alseness o! the negation, and ,ice ,ersa' As to sa%, &etween two contradictor% ro ositions thereCs a link, !or which the tr$th or !alseness o! the !irst im lies, res ecti,el%, the !alseness or the tr$th o! the second<4' Gell, letCs now take as an e?am le two contradictor% ro ositions like *Mario is good- ( ) and *Mario isnCt good- (# )6 the statement *itCs necessar% !or two contradictor% ro osition, to &e one tr$e and the other !alse- is eA$i,alent to the statement *itCs imossi&le !or two contradictor% ro ositions to &e not one tr$e and the other !alse-' (hat means that itCs im ossi&le !or them to &e &oth tr$e or &oth !alse' (he !irst case is recisel% what the "#C negates' Kor the second case6 i! we can demonstrate that &oth the !orm$lations negate that two contradictor% ro ositions can &e &oth !alse, the eA$i,alence &etween "#C and the gi,en rinci le will &e demonstrated' (he tr$th o! im lies the !alseness o! # 9 the tr$th o! # im lies the !alsit% o! ' Jsing a similar method as the one $sed &% Aristotle in some assages o! %nalytics, itCs e,ident that the !alseness o! the two ro osition im lies the tr$th o! &oth ro ositions' F# V F V# (F F# ) (V# V )80

<8

(e int. \\a\'!\\ I'e' ^et. 'kksal]!ln` here Aristotle $nderstands that esta&lishing this kind o! link &etween contradictor% ro ositions alread% means stating the "#C, and conseA$entl% !alling in a petitio principii' 80 I e? lain the $sage o! s%m&ols6 the letters written in algerian are s%m&ols o! the metalang$age that are $sed to indicate the tr$th ( V) and !alseness (F) o! a ro osition' *#- is the s%m&ol o! negation, and conseA$entl% *# - is !or *non -' (he s%m&ol * - indicates the logical eA$i,alence, and means *i! and onl% i!-9 !inall%, the s%m&ol *- means *et-, and indicates the logical rod$ct'
<4

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Metalogicon (2011) XXIV, 1

(hereCs also a sim ler wa% to demonstrate this6 the tr$th o! a!!irmation is the !alseness o! negation, and the tr$th o! negation is the !alseness o! a!!irmation' #ow, the "#C states that contradictor% ro ositions cannot &oth &e tr$e6 so neither the two artic$lar contradictor% ro ositions that are the negations o! the two gi,en statements can &e tr$e81' :o, the im ossi&ilit% !or two contradictor% ro ositions to &e &oth tr$e is eA$i,alent to the im ossi&ilit% !or them to &e &oth !alse' :o itCs necessar% !or them to &e one tr$e and the other one !alse' Ghat has &een shown is the eA$i,alence &etween the "#C and the so-called *law o! the e?cl$ded middle-6 this is o!ten resented as a *conseA$ence- o! the "#C, or as corollar%82' #e,ertheless, these two e? ositions mean e?actl% the same thing, that is that two contradictor% ro ositions cannot &e &oth tr$e or &oth !alse6 what changes is sim l% the negati,e as ect o! the !orm$lation, in one case *a!!irmati,e-, in the other one *negati,e-' In s$mmar%6 1) (he "#C, a!!irming that two contradictor% ro ositions cannot &e &oth tr$e, means a$tomaticall% that the% cannot &e &oth !alse, and so that necessaril% one o! them is tr$e, and the other !alse 2) (he .aw o! the e?cl$ded middle (.7M), a!!irming that o! two contradictor% ro ositions one is necessaril% tr$e and the other !alse, negates the chance !or them to &e &oth tr$e and &oth !alse /) In the end, it can &e said that the% are not two di!!erent rinci les &$t two di!!erent wa%s to e? ress the same rinci le' \.'.]. .etCs &rie!l% s$mmari1e what has now &een gleaned a&o$t the "#C6 1) (he ro ositional !orm$lation o! "#C states that two contradictor% ro ositions (that is a!!irmation and negation) cannot &e &oth tr$e together'

81

(his e? ression is legitimated &% ^et. 'k'\bo!'k` 9 /@ ,78@. **3 2U )*78@< >I.1; x )H3>I.1; ul^\z ]R[M*' 82 :ee also 7' 3erti, LontraddiZione e dialettica, cit. ' 115'

14

Metalogicon (2011) XXIV, 1

2) (hat means that the% also canCt &e &oth !alse' (he "#C, so, states that o! two contradictor% ro ositions one has to &e tr$e, and the other !alse' /) 3eca$se the tr$th o! a!!irmations is the e?istence o! the !acts, the "#C states, in the end, that two contradictor% !acts cannot e?ist together9 that means, that a !act cannot e?ist and not-e?ist at the same time and in the same meaning' \.\. (he !$nctional !orm$lation o! "#C is so called &eca$se it regards the relation &etween s$&+ect and redicate, that is s$&strate and attri&$te' ItCs the most known and com le? !orm$lation o! the rinci le, also &eca$se itCs the one stated and treated in the &ook | o! ^etaphysics' It reads as s$ch6 *2U SIJ 1A2U ?,1 GHIJD9;. 29 41P , GHIJD9;. )/T.123. 2K 1A2K 41P 412E 2U 1A2U-8/' I gi,e three di!!erent translations6 1) *$ impossibile che la stessa cosa, ad un tempo, appartenga e non appartenga a una medesima cosa, secondo lo stesso rispetto- (tr' 2eale) `ItCs im ossi&le !or the same thing, at one time, to &elong and not to &elong to the same thing, according to the same res ectb80 2) *$ impossibile che la stessa cosa appartenga e contempor! aneamente non appartenga alla stessa cosa e sotto lo stesso as! petto- (tr' 3erti) `ItCs im ossi&le that the same thing &elongs and at the same time doesnCt &elong to the same thing and according to the same as ectb85 3) *$ impossibile che la stessa cosa convenga e insieme non convenga ad una stessa cosa e per il medesimo rispetto - (trad' :e,erino) `ItCs im ossi&le !or the same thing to &e ro er and together not to &e ro er o! the same thing according to the same res ectb 8=
8/

^et. 'kkmb'o!\k Aristotele, ^etafisica, Vita e ensiero, 1445, ' 10/-105' 85 7' 3erti, LontraddiZione e dialettica negli antichi e nei moderni, .Be os, Milano 1488, ' 10/' 8= 7' :e,erino, %ristotele hil principio di non contraddiZionea, in Mondamento della contraddiZione, Adel hi, Milano 2005, ' 258
80

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ICll $se :e,erinoCs translation &eca$se I think itCs more literal (and so a little more r$dent)' (he &est wa% to roceed seems to &e this6 to anal%se the !orm$lation word !or word, &eca$se each o! them re,eals something o! the content and o! the meaning o! the so-!orm$lated "#C' \.\.'. /T.123.' (he meaning o! im ossi&ilit% is e? ressed &% the hiloso her o! :tageira in &ook 6 *im ossi&le is whose contrar% is necessaril% tr$e-8<' (he notion o! im ossi&ilit% is related to the notion o! necessit% and tr$eI!alse' It has &een show how in (e in! terpretatione Aristotle esta&lished the relation &etween necessit% and im ossi&ilit%889 it can &e so said that im ossi&le is that !or which itCs necessar% not to &e' (he im ossi&le is what is necessaril% !alse (and conseA$entl% whose contrar%Icontradictor%84 is necessaril% tr$e)' Aristotle $ses as an e?am le the commens$ra&ilit% o! the diagonal with the side o! a sA$are6 itCs im ossi&le, &eca$se its incommens$ra&ilit% will &e !ore,er tr$e' ItCs eas% to see, how that which +$sti!ies this meaning o! im ossi&ilit% is the "#C itsel!6 the diagonal canCt &e commens$ra&le to the side o! the sA$are &eca$se its incommens$ra&ilit% is alwa%s tr$e, i! it were it wo$ld &e commens$ra&le and not commens$ra&le at the same time' According to this e?am le, the im ossi&le is onl% a&o$t what is alwa%s6 &$t as 7' :e,erino correctl% remarked40 thatCs not tr$e' ItCs e,ident, when one re!erences the ninth cha ter o! (e interpretatione6 *it is so necessar% to &e !or what is, when it is, and not to &e !or what is not, when itCs not-41' Im ossi&le is, in this case, sim l% that something that is is not when it is (and so itCs im ossi&le !or it to &e and
8<

^et. 'k'ob\l!\]`a)/T.123. ,@. 3 2U B.1.2P3. B ).ISD7< )*78@<a. :ee also note 2/' 84 Aristotle does not alwa%s rigoro$sl% disting$ish &etween these two terms' 40 Kondamento della contraddi1ione, ' /26 *7d necessario che *!also- sia sinonimo di *im ossi&ile-, erch, anche er le a!!erma1ioni le c$i contraddittorie non sono in s a$tocontraddittorie, cio im ossi&ili, ,a detto che, sin tanto che (ossia A$ando) a : con,iene ", im ossi&ile che " non gli con,enga-' 41 (e int. 'oa\\!\l`a2U ,@. 3. 9X.1; 2U e. x21. f, 41P 2U , e. , 9X.1; )H3>I.1; , f, ).IS47a.
88

21

Metalogicon (2011) XXIV, 1

not to &e), and that something that is not is when it is not (the same)' :o, we ha,e again the "#C42, and a new meaning o! imossi&ilit% e?tended to changing things as well as to eternal ones' :o it is not onl% im ossi&le !or the same redicate to &elong and not to &elong to the same $nder the same as ect, &$t im ossi&le is recisel% this6 the "#C is a de!inition o! im ossi&le9 im ossi&le is the contradictor%4/' \.\.\. HIJD9;.' (his term is translated with *to &elong- or *to &e ro er o!-' .$kasiewic1 calls it *inherence-, meaning with this the owning o! an attri&$te &% a s$&+ect'40 (he "#C states, in this !orm$lation, that the same !eat$re cannot together &e ro er and not to &e ro er o! the same s$&strate' (here are some oints to clari!% on this element, that !or o&,io$s reasons com ose a cr$cial hase o! the e? osition o! "#C6 1) I! the dSWXl[M is o! +$st one t% e, or i! it can &e considered $nder di!!erent as ects, according to the case' 2) GhatCs the relation &etween dSWXl[M and PQRnk\WlM' In this wa% will &e ossi&le to think a&o$t the meaning o! this !orm$lation, i! is or is not solel% ontological' Hn the !irst A$estion6 Aristotle disting$ishes e,identl% two kinds o! redications, or inherence &etween s$&+ect and attri&$te' (his is im licit in his ontolog%, &ased on the di!!erence &etween ov]Q and accident (]vfllPUz)' "roceeding with the de!ense o! the rinci le, and so writing o! the inherence o! a !eat$re to a s$&+ect, the :tagirean makes a di!!erence &etween *meaning a thing- and
42

It is necessar% here to note on the link &etween "#C and rinci le o! do$&le negation' (his link will &e treated in the ne?t cha ters, with the intent to show that this is, again, a di!!erent wa% to !orm$late the same rinci le' 4/ H! the same o inion is 7' :e,erino, that takes it !rom the Aristotelian de!inition o! tr$e and !alse (Mondamento della contraddiZione, pp. l\!ll), in a wa% that identi!ies this de!inition with the !orm$lation o! "#C6 * (icendo che im! possibile che allo stesso convenga e insieme non convenga lo stesso, %ristotle dice che l$impossibile che allo stesso convenga e non convenga lo stesso -' 40 >' .$kasiewic1, (el principio di contraddiZione in %ristotele, F$odli&et, Macerata 200/, ' 14

22

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*meaning the attri&$te o! a determined thing- 45' GeC,e so two di!!erent cases6 in the !irst one itCs said, o! a thing, what it essentiall% is, in the second instead itCs said +$st a non essential, accidental !eat$re o! a thing4=' (his !ollows recisel% another distinction &% Aristotles, traced in the Lategories, &etween what is said o! a s$&+ect, and what is said in a s$&+ect 4<6 the !irst are de!initions, and so the% e? ress what the s$&+ect is9 the seconds are not-de!initor% redications, that can &e more or less accidental' 7nrico 3erti $nderlined that the di!!erence is &etween an intra-generic wa% o! redication and an e?tra-generic on6 what is said o! a s$&+ect it to it as the second s$&stance to the !irst s$&stance48' Ghat is said in a s$&+ect is to it, normall%, as the accident to the !irst s$&stance, and is the redication o! other categories to \T]YQ44' In this last case itCs an inessential redication, &eca$se, &eing the redicate not incl$ded in the essential de!inition o! the s$&+ect, the s$&+ect remains the same also witho$t the redicate (which doesnCt ha en in the !irst case, and so makes it immediatel% contradictor% to not a!!irm the de!inition o! the s$&+ect)'
45

^et. 'kknb'm!'r`a3A SEJ 23A23 );35,9. 2U . :7,1F.9;., 2U 418$9.U<a. :ee also E' "asA$ale, cit., ' 25 4< Lat. 'a\k!\\`a2W. e.2R. 2E ,@. 418$AH349;,@.36 2;.U< *CS921;, B. GH349;,C.g /@ 3A/9.F ~:2;., ["]2E /@ B. GH349;,C.g ,@. ~:2;, 418$GH349;,C.36 /@ 3A/9.U< *CS921;a. :ee also 3erti, cit., ' 2546 *La predicaZione pu avvenire sia tra termini compresi nella stessa colonna, quando ad esempio un genere si predica di una specie o di un individuo che costituiscono un suo caso particol! are, sia fra termini appartenenti a colonne diverse, quando ad esempio un genere o una specie o un individuo di una colonna si predicano rispettivamente di un genere, di una specie o di un individuo di un$altra. %ristotle ha distinto il primo tipo di predicaZione dal secondo, affermando che nel primo il predicato propriamente un predicato, cio qualcosa che detto di un soggetto, mentre nel secondo il predicato non propriamente un predicato, ma qualcosa che presente, o inerente, in un soggetto-' In 3ertiCs o inion this allows the di!!erence &etween onon%mit% and s%non%mit%' 48 Lat. \a''!\m 44 Aristotle seems to s eci!% (Lat. '%\]!\m) that what is said in a s$&+ect is not se ara&le !rom what it is in6 &$t this, in m% o inion, onl% in the meaning that s$ch a redicate canCt &e considered se aratel% !rom the s$&+ect it re!ers to' K$rther Aristotle makes the e?am le o! white, redicating it o! a &od%' H&,io$sl% he co$ldnCt think that it was im ossi&le, !or a &od%, to change colo$r'
4=

2/

Metalogicon (2011) XXIV, 1

Ge ha,e two cases6 a) !irst s$&stance-second s$&stance redication &) s$&stance-other categories redication' (he !irst is, as we saw, an essential relationshi 9 the second is an accidental relationshi 100' (he "#C in,ol,es &oth' a) (he greatest share o! the e?am les that Aristotle $ses in order to de!end the "#C in the &ook | o! ^etaphysics is o! this kind' (his also &eca$se what artic$larl% worries the :tagirean is reser,ing the distinction &etween \T]YQ and accident, s$&+ect o! redication and redicate' #egating the relation &etween something and its de!inition is immediatel% contradictor%' Hne thing has to &e clari!ied6 the essential redication is not the s$&stantial redication, that means that it doesnCt regard onl% s$&stances' (hereCs a di!!erence, so, &etween s$&stance and essence6 the !irst one is something meaning!$l, the second is a meaning, something that de!ines and determines' Aristotle writes that o! the things that are said o! a s$&+ect, also the de!inition o! them is said o! that s$&+ect' (he same is not in the case o! the de!inition o! things that are said in a s$&+ect 101' 3$t this doesnCt mean that o! the things that are said in a s$&+ect thereCs no de!inition (he "#C reser,es the essence o! s$&stance as m$ch as the essence o! accident, and &oth are non accidental102'
100

E' "asA$ale, cit., '256-%ristotle, nel suo libro delle Lategorie, distingue dieci categorie` sostanZa, qualit_, quantit_, relaZione, luogo, situaZione, tempo, movimento ecc. La prima delle categorie, la sostanZa, dice qualcosa di essen! Ziale del soggetto, mentre le altre nove categorie dicono qualcosa di acci! dentale-' It will &e shown how this is ,alid onl% !or the essential de!inition o! s$&stance' 101 Cat' 2a14-/56 6->1.9JU. /@ B4 2W. 9J7,C.R. x2; 2W. 418$GH349;,C.36 *9S3,C.R. ).1S41O3. 41P 23.3,1 41P 2U. *QS3. 4127S3J9O:81; 235 GH349;,C.36 z"{ 2W. /@ B. GH349;,C.g e.2R. BHP ,@. 2W. H*9F:2R. 329 23A.3,1 3A29 *QS3< 4127S3J9O21;-' 102 7' :e,erino is, on this to ic, reall% clear6 * Si badi` dire che la negaZione del p.d.n.c. viene ha sopprimere la sostanZa e l$essenZaa non significa che ci che viene ad essere soppresso un certo tipo di oggetti, una certa parte della realt_ fatta esclusione dell$altra zad esempio, che vengono soprressi oggetti come huomoa, hanimalea, ma non oggetti come hbiancoa, hpesantea{. Infatti, vero che oggetti come hbiancoa, hpesantea sono accidenti rispetto a questa o quest$altra realt_ corporea, ma essi stessi presentano un$essenZa, un significato

20

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&) (he negation o! the relation &etween s$&stance and accident is not immediatel% contradictor%6 itCs contradictor%, ne,ertheless, to a!!irm and to negate together this relation' :o, the "#C regards also the accidental redication10/, that means the e?tra-generic, and this !or ,ario$s reasons6 the !irst one is that Aristotle e? ressl% makes a arallel &etween VdUpQM][z and dSWXl[M6 (he !irst means the &elonging or not &elonging o! something to something 100 ' 3$t consisting the ro osition in redication, according to a s$&+ect, o! an% o! the ten categories (the * redica&les-, recisel%), itCs sel!-e,ident that the meaning o! dSWXl[M is not limited to the essential, or intra-generic relation' Moreo,er, Aristotle e? ressl% !orm$lates e?am les &ased on the relation &etween s$&stance and accident1056 !alling in a well canCt &e at the same time good and not-good, or the same o&+ect canCt &e at the same time (and $nder the same as ect) sweet and not-sweet10=' Concl$ding the remarks on the !irst A$estion, the "#C concerns6 a) the s$&stance-essence relation &) the accident-essence relation c) the s$&stance accident relation' Kor this reason the thesis o! "asA$ale, according to which the aim o! "#C is to reser,e the $nit% o! s$&stance and o! accident, is incom lete10<' Hn the second A$estion6 !rom what stated alread% roceeds the com lete corres ondence &etween redication and inherence (in
essenZiale- (cit. ' 2=4)' And !$rther6 *Loncepire ogni realt_ come accidentale lo stesso che non conferire significato alle parole che si usano z"{. Se infatti dopo aver detto che Socrate bianco, si volesse sapere che cosa significahbi! ancoa, rispondere che hbianco a non sarebbe, per coloro che sostengono tutto essere accidentale, un fornire il significato di hbiancoa, giacch anche ha dovrebbe valere come accidente di bianco- ( ' 2<0)' 10/ :ee also E' Mo,ia, IntroduZione ad Alessandro dBA!rodisia, Lommentario alla metafisica di %ristotele, 3om iani, Milano 200< ' .XXV' 100 :ee also note 2' 105 ^et. 'kksb'r!\k 10= In an% case e?am les like this are n$mero$s in AristotleCs other works, like Lategories and (e interpretatione' 10< "asA$ale, cit. ' 2<'

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the meaning o! PQRnk\WlM and dSWXl[M)' It has &een seen how, in the ro ositional !orm$lation o! "#C, the tr$th o! the ro osition consisted e?actl% in the e?istence o! the !act that it e? ressed' In the !$nctional !orm$lation, instead, the &elonging o! something to a s$&+ect consists recisel% in its &eing redicated (with tr$th) o! that s$&+ect' Aristotle, letCs remark that again, knew the di!!erence &etween terms and things, &$t didnCt lose the a&sol$te corres ondence o! these two worlds' Vario$s aristotelic assages witness this link6 at the &eginning o! the Lategories Aristotle writes e? ressl% that the things that are said o! a s$&+ect are OMRQ, real entities and not +$st words 108' (he word itsel!, that Aristotle $ses to indicate the s$&+ect o! ro osition (d\PlYflM\M) is $sed in &oth meanings, logical (in the Lat! egories) and ontological (in the ^etaphysics, as s$&strate)104' Hther assages show the dee entwining o! the two dimensions6 *And, &eca$se itCs im ossi&le !or the contradictories, re!erred to the same thing, to &e together tr$e, itCs e,ident that neither the contraries can &e together in the same o&+ect-110' Dere Aristotle shows the a&sol$te corres ondence &etween Vrnsll]sQ[ and dSWXl[M' Ghen Aristotle writes that *itCs im ossi&le !or the contradictories to &e redicated together-111, he means recisel% that itCs im ossi&le !or two contradictor% attri&$tes to &e redicated o! the same s$&strate' \.\.l. A2Q' .ooking !or the meaning o! this term means also to disco,er, $ltimatel%, what are the ossi&le s$&+ects o! the redication and the ossi&le redicates on which the "#C has e!!ect' It has &een seen how the "#C has e!!ect on all the entities indi!!er108 104

Lat. 'a\k`a2W. e.2R., 2E ,@. 418$GH349;,@.36 2;.U< *CS921;a. (alking a&o$t the di!!erence &etween \T][Q and accident, Aristotle writes6 *qut if all things are said as accident, it ill be nothing that is first subect of accidents, and accident alays is a predicate z4127S3J;1.{ of a subect -' In a sentence like this itCs reall% di!!ic$lt to $nderstand i! Aristotle is talking a&o$t terms or real attri&$tesI&eings' In !act, these two realities are so strictl% linked, that the A$estion is not im ortant' 110 Met' 1011&1<-206 *BH9P /$)/T.123. 2. ).2F>1:;. ?,1 )*789T9:81; 412E 235 1A235, >1.9JQ. x2; 3A/@ 2).1.2F1 ?,1 GHIJD9;. B./@D921; 2K 1A2K-' 111 ^et. 'kkrb's` h)/T.123. ?,1 4127S3J9O:81; 2E< ).2;>E:9;<a.

2=

Metalogicon (2011) XXIV, 1

entl%' A great art o! the res$lts can &e e?tracted !rom the recedent aragra h6 1) (he s$&+ect o! the "#C can &e6 a' A \T]YQ, !irst or second &' An accident(meant in an essential sense) c' A de!inition d' A meaning!$l term 2) (he redicate o! "#C can &e6 a' A \T]YQ, !irst or second(in the !irst case we ha,e an identit%, in the second case we ha,e the redication o! a s$&+ect)' &' An accident (also meant as a sim le a!!ection o! the \T]YQ, as to sa% as a redication in a s$&+ect) c' A de!inition (he "#C is rinci le o! all &eings6 it re!ers to what is, and not to what is not' 3$t weC,e seen (s$ ra, '0) that *&eing- is an eA$i,ocal term, and that it can &e re!erred to \T]YQ as to its a!!ection and negation, and that o! non-&eing itsel! is said, that it is9 !or this reason is ,alid what alread% stated that o! two contradictor% roositions one is necessaril% tr$e e,en in the case o! a non-e?istent s$&+ect' (he king o! Krance can &e &ald or not &e &ald, &$t not &oth or none o! the two' I! the king o! Krance doesnCt e?ist, o! him cannot &e redicated the &eing-&ald' Again, the "#C in its strongest !orm$lation is not a&o$t the inherence o! contradictor% redicates, &$t the attri&$tion or not o! the same redicate112' DereCs the ossi&le cases in which the "#C has e!!ect611/
112

E' "asA$ale anal%ses ,er% well the di!!erence &etween o osition &etween contraries and o osition &etween contradictories' 3$t then he states that * il soggetto che il principio protegge dalla contraddiZione un soggetto esistente (cit. '25)' 3$t itCs e,ident that i! the "#C was not ,alid also !or the non-e?ist ing s$&+ect, there wo$ldnCt &e the chance to disting$ish the contrar% ro osition !rom the contradictor% ones6 the !irst ones, in !act, co$ld &e &oth !alse &eca$se the s$&+ect doesnCt e?ist, and so the second ones, &eca$se the "#C is a&o$t &eings, &$t &eings analogicall% considered, &eca$se o! an% thing it can &e said, in a certain meaning, that it is6 !or an% o! these cases the "#C will ass$me a di!!erent ,al$e, &$t will not lose is strength' 11/ It can &e alread% remarked that some o! these cases can &ring the "#C to a

2<

Metalogicon (2011) XXIV, 1

1) Hv][Q \T]YQ6 ItCs im ossi&le !or :ocrates to &e and not to &e :ocrates9 itCs im ossi&le !or the man to &e and not to &e a man9 itCs im ossi&le !or :ocrates to &e and not to &e a man' 2) T]YQ accident6 ItCs im ossi&le !or the man to &e and not to &e good, itCs im ossi&le !or :ocrates to &e and not to &e good' /) T]YQ de!inition6 ItCs im ossi&le !or the man to &e and not to &e a rational animal' 0) Accident accident6 ItCs im ossi&le !or the white to &e and not to &e white (the white, not +$st white) 5) Accident de!inition6 ItCs im ossi&le !or the white to &e and not to &e the &rightest colo$r' =) De!inition de!inition6 ItCs im ossi&le !or the de!inition *rational animal- to &e and not to &e the de!inition *rational animal-' <) (erm term6 ItCs im ossi&le !or the term *man- to &e and not to &e the term *man-' 8) (erm de!inition6 ItCs im ossi&le !or the term *man- to mean and not to mean *rational animal-' \.\.]. ,1' (he meaning o! this word has a ,er% im ortant role in the !orm$lation o! the "#C6 the tem oral meaning o! the rinci le' As can &e seen in the &eginning o! the aragra h 2, the $s$al translation o! the rinci le e? resses fQ as *at the same time-' (hat means to red$ce the sense o! the term to a tem oral meaning, and to link the "#C to time' 3$t what does *fQ- !or Aristotle mean@ (he answer is e? ressl% gi,en in the Lategories, in the ostraedicamenta section6 *And so ,are sim$ltaneo$s !or nat$re all those things that are correlati,e according to the conseA$ence o! e?isting, &$t that in no wa% one is ca$se o! the otherCs e?istence9 and those that !rom the same genre can &e di,ided in corres ond!orm$lation o! the rinci le o! identit%' (his one is considered as not !orm$lated &% Aristotle, and this will &e disc$ssed' Kor now, letCs remark that the statement &% Aristotle that *e,en o! non-&eing is said that it is- ( ^et' 100/&10-11) is a demonstration that what we call rinci le o! identit% is e?tended to a dimension o! &eing that is greater o! the one o! \T][Q'

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ence one with another' In an a&sol$te meaning, are said sim$ltaneo$s those things, whose generation ha ens in the same time-110' In an a&sol$te meaning, there!or, the word has a tem oral ,alidit%' #e,ertheless, it re!ers also to things that are sim l% correlati,e, witho$t introd$cing an% tem oral ne?$s' It can &e stated, $ltimatel%, that i! itCs tr$e that the "#C negates the ossi&ilit% !or the same redicate to &elong and not to &elong to the same s$&+ect at the same time, itCs also tr$e that in a world witho$t time the rinci le wo$ld not onl% kee itCs ,al$e, &$t wo$ld ha,e it in an e,en stronger wa%' (he meaning o! *sim$ltaneo$sl%- to which Aristotle re!ers is mostl% tem oral, &$t not onl%1156 itCs s$!!icient to thing to logical or mathematical ro ositions, in which itCs im ossi&le to $se the conce t o! time (!or Aristotle itCs a h%sical conce t)' \.\.m. j12I' Ingemar D;ring $nderlined the im ortance o! the Aristotelian $se o! *as- (A$a)11=, ro&a&l% re!erring to the *N110

Lat. 'mas!'\6-?,1 3. 2 >T:9; *CS921; x:1 ).2;:2JC>9; ,@. 412E 2. 235 9X.1F )41*3T87:;., ,7/1,W< /@ 12;3. 2U 29J3. 2K 2CJR 235 9X.1; ~:2;., 41P 2E B4 235 16235 SC.36< ).2;/;7J7,C.1 )**c*3;< ,H*W< /@ ?,1, . } SC.9:;< B. 2K 1A2K DJQ.R-' 115 :ee also "asA$ale, cit. ' //6 *[empo e spaZio sono dimensioni entro le quali ci rappresentiamo il divenire e la molteplicit_ dell$essere. [uttavia, esse non sono affatto essenZiali per il concetto metafisico del divenire, perch la scienZa dell$essere in quanto essere si occupa della differenZa tra esseri nel loro modo di essere. Nella formulaZione del YNL, il concetto di tempo non , dunque, una parte essenZiale del principioa. :e,erino zcit. \ms{ e?cl$des the article !rom the gro$ o! the *meaning!$l- elements o! the rinci le, and incl$des the temoral ,al$e o! the "#C in the notion o!*res ect-' Dere fQ ro&a&l% e? resses a generic sense o! sim$ltaneit%, where the e? ression *PQRQ 2U 1A2Qa takes also the tem oral meaning o! !orm$lation' Hn the other hand, there are man% laces in AristotleCs work where the aristotelian attention to the tem oral element in the determination o! the "#C is e? licit (ma%&e !ollowing what "lato, i'e' in Sym! posium, had a!!irmed)' I'e' see also ^et' 10=1&/=6 *418$.1 41P 1A2Q. DJQ.3.*' In the end, letCs s eci!% that the meaning o! :e,erinoCs statement a&o$t the deendence o! the "#C !rom the tem oral !actor doesnCt regard the A$estion o! fQ, &$t a theoretical disagreement &etween :e,erino and Aristotle that is &e%ond the sco e this essa%' 11= I' D;ring, cit', ' 286 hl$espressione hin quantoa, raramente usata da Yla! tone, fu da lui sviluppata fino a diventare uno strumento che gli dava la possib!

24

Metalogicon (2011) XXIV, 1

article, !reA$entl% $sed &% the "hiloso her' (he link &etween PQRS and this word (and the identit% o! their meanings) is e,ident in the !irst cha ter o! the &ook | o! ^etaphysics6 *there iss a science that st$dies the &eing-A$a (N)-&eing and the ro erties that &elong to it as (PQRS) &eing-11<9-necessaril% these elements werenCt elements o! the &eing as accident (PQR} ]vflnPUz), &$t as (N) &eing-118' Gith this e? ression Aristotle wants to s eci!%, against ossi&le so histical attacks, that itCs not eno$gh, !or the same attri&$te, to &elong and not to &elong to the same thing9 it has to &elong and not to &elong to the same thing, !rom the same stand oint, in the same case, in the same meaning and considering the same as ect o! the mentioned thing6 three is greater than two and smaller than !o$r, &$t itCs not greater and smaller than !o$r9 a cake is good &eca$se itCs tast% and not good &eca$se itCs not ,irt$o$s, &$t itCs not ,irt$o$s and not ,irt$o$s, or tast% and not-tast%' As witnessed !rom what !ollows the !orm$lation o! the rinci le 114, this e? ression is a de!ense against the r\k[PQY ^v]XlWlYQ[, the ling$istic di!!ic$lties that can com romise a correct inter retation o! the rinci le' \.l. (he !orm$lations o! the "#C that weC,e considered $ntil now ha,e the same ,alidit%6 which is to sa% that the% are di!!erent wa%s to !orm$late the same rinci le' (he%Cre not one the conseA$ence o! the other, and neither one a artic$lar case o! the other' Moreo,er, the%Cre two strict !orm$lations that e? ress the rinci le in the totalit% o! its meaning and its im lications' (here are, ne,ertheless, other Aristotelian a!!irmations that !ollow !rom the "#C, or that can &e considered artic$lar cases o! it'
ilit_ di isolare un aspetto di una parolau quanto grande sia l$importanZa di questa struttura linguistica dimostrato, per esempio, dalla definiZione del concettto di inesisu il ieland dice giustamente che la scoperta aristotelica dell$ hin quantoacostituisce de facto una scoperta del concetto-' 11< ^et. 'kkla\k!\'' 118 Ib. 'kklalk!l. 114 *PQe O]Q rrQ dW\]^[\W[]QeflsB M, ]Rj dW\]^[jW[]fmMQ dW~z R}z r\k[PSz ^v]XlWlYQz-'

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(he%Cre not as strict as the ones considered &e!ore, the% donCt ha,e all the conseA$ences that the !irst ha,e, and $ltimatel% the% sa% less that what the two strict !orm$lations sa%' 3eca$se Aristotle seems to $se them as !orm$lations o! the "#C, the% co$ld &e called its *weak- !orm$lations' Aristotle $ses them where this ,ersion o! the i9i1;32I27 )JDc is s$!!icient to demonstrate what he states' (he rinci al o! these !orm$lations is the !ollowing6 *itCs imossi&le !or the contraries to &elong to the same s$&+ect-' It can &e !o$nd, !or e?am le, in Met' 1005&2=-2<6-,c B./CD921; ,1 GHIJD9;. 2K 162K 21.1.2F1 zHJ3:/;RJF:8R /$,O. 41F 21T27 2 HJ32I:9; 2I 9;8321{- `It s not possible for the contraries to be! long together to the same zand let s add to this premise the usual specifications{b120' In order to anal%1e com letel% this !orm$lation, two things m$st &e done6 a) we m$st de!ine contrariet% and the other kinds o! o ositions that in the recedent aragra hs we didnCt consider &) we m$st $nderstand what kind o! link there is &etween the "#C in its strict !orm$lation and this kind o! statement' a) In the aragra h 2'1'1121 we considered what Aristotle states a&o$t the contradictor% o osition o! a!!irmation and negation, the onl% one regarding ro ositions9 now we ha,e to consider the o ositions &etween terms, that !or Aristotle can &e o! !o$r kinds6

120

:ee also anche ^et. 'k'oa\m!\n. 7' :e,erino takes this as another !orm$lation o! the "#C (Mondamento della contraddiZione, ' 254)' (his thesis is right onl% as long as itCs s eci!ied that itCs a less strong and strict !orm$lation o! the rinci le6 &eca$se, in !act, "#C and law o! e?cl$ded middle are two di!!erent wa%s to e? ress the same rinci le, itCs e,ident that this !orm$lation, &eing not at the same time a !orm$lation o! the law, is not as com lete as the recedent' As it will &e said, that two contraries canCt &elong to the same s$&+ect doesnCt im l% that one o! them m$st necessaril% &elong to it' 121 :ee also ' 1-2

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ositions &etween relati,es, contraries, ossession and ri,ation , and contradictories12/' (he relati,e o osition is &etween s$&+ects that are correlated, and that can &e de!ined one thro$gh the other1206 !or e?am le, the !ather is !ather o! a son9 the son is son o! a !ather9 the great is great when com ared to small, and the small is small when com ared to the great' As E' "asA$ale correctl% remarked in his essa%125, the o osition &etween relati,es is not a&o$t the "#C, &eca$se itCs a&o$t two s$&+ects, not one single term12=' (he o osition &etween contraries is o! two kinds6 thereCs contraries with a middle &etween them, and contraries with no middle 12< ' Contrariet% is a er!ect di!!erence 128, as it is a di!!erence &etween e?tremes, that donCt ha,e an%thing &e%ond them' ItCs recisel%, the o osition &etween those things, that are most di!!erent
122

122

Lat. ''b'r!'s`a*CS921; /@ ~29J3. B2CJg ).2;49O:81; 292J1DW<, < 2E HJQ< 2;, < 2E B.1.2F1, < :2CJ7:;< 41P ~;<a. (hereCs not a word on contradictories, &eca$se itCs s$&stit$ted &% the treatise o! a!!irmation and negation' :ee also ^et. 105<a/=-/<' 12/ Hn this to ic Aristotle shortl% writes in &ook and artic$larl% I o! ^eta! physics' 120 Lat. ''bl\!lm6-x:1 3. ).2F49;21; < 2E HJQ< 2; 1A2E ?H9J B:2F 2W. ).2;49;,C.R. HR:/cH329 HJU< **7*1 *CS921;` 2E /@ < 2E B.1.2F1, 1A2E ,@. ?H9J B:2F. 3A/1,R< HJU< **7*1 *CS921;, B.1.2F1 ,C.23; )**c*R. *CS921;*' 125 E' "asA$ale, cit. ' 146-Il YNL definisce il soggetto in relaZione a se stesso e afferma del soggetto che impossibile predicare predicati contraddittori nella medesima relaZione e nel medesimo tempo. Invece, l$opposiZione di termini re! lativi rientra nella relaZione reciproca che esiste tra due soggetti, per esempio tra padre e figlio. uindi, l$opposiZione dei termini relativi un$opposiZione sulla quale il YNL non influisce n obiettaa. 12= Jltimatel%, itCs not contradictor% !or the same man to &e at the same time !a ther and son' (his doesnCt e?cl$de that itCs contradictor% !or the same man to &e and not to &e !ather, or to &e and not to &e son' 12< Lat. ''bls!'\a'6-t:1 /@ 2W. B.1.2FR. 23;152I B:2;. v:29 B. 3< HC>649 SFS.9:81; -. 417S3J9O21; ).1S41O3. 1A2W. 8I29J3. GHIJD9;., 23T2R. 3A/@. ~:2;. ).E ,C:3.. . /@ S9 , ).1S41O3. 8I29J3. GHIJD9;., 23T2R. ~:2; 2; ).I ,C:3. HI.2R<-' 128 *;1>3JI 29*9O3<-'

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in the same genre1246 t% ical e?am les are white and &lack, health% and sick, good and e,il, rett% and $gl%' (he o osition &etween ossession and ri,ation is not as !ormal as the recedent, and im lies more h%sical and nat$ral considerations' Di!!erentl% !rom the relati,es, ri,ation and ossession are said o! the same thing, and not one o! the other1/0' (hatCs how Aristotle de!ines the two terms6 *o! all o! the things that are a&le to ossess an%thing, we sa% that itCs de ri,ed when that that sho$ld &e in something &% nat$re, and that at that time &% that something is &% nat$re ossessed, doesnCt e?ist in an% wa%-1/1 ' It is, there!ore, a relation that regards a s$&+ect that, &% nat$re, sho$ld &e a&le to ossess the gi,en determination' (he link &etween ri,ation, contrariet% and contradiction is s eci!ied &% Aristotle in the tenth &ook o! ^etaphysics6 ri,ation is a certain contradiction, &$t doesnCt e?cl$de a&sol$tel% the middle as the last' ItCs necessar% sa%s Aristotle !or the same thing to &e eA$al and not eA$al, &$t not eA$al and $neA$al (&eca$se onl% what can &e $neA$al can also admit eA$alit%)1/2'
124 1/0

^et. 'k'sa\r!\s6-2E H*9O:23. /;1>CJ3.21 2W. B. 2K 1A2K SC.9;-' Lat. '\a\n`a2CJ7:;< /@ 41P ;< *CS921; ,@. H9JP 21A2Q. 2;a. Ivi , 12&1=186-x2; /@ } :2CJ7:;< 41P } ;< 3A4 ).2F49;21; < 2E HJQ< 2;, >1.9JQ.` 3A SEJ *CS921; 1A2Q xH9J ~:2; 235 1.2;49;,C.36 -' 1/1 Lat. '\a\o!l'. 1/2 ^et. 'kmmbl!''' "asA$ale (cit. ' 2/) writes on the to ic6 * $ chiaro, quindi, che l$opposiZione di possesso e privaZione non la stessa che fra termini contraddittori. Nell$opposiZione di possesso e privaZione, il soggetto, nono! stante manchi di qualcosa che gli appartiene per natura, rimane invece sempre essenZialmente lo stesso e conserva la sua identit_. Invece, i predicati contrad! dittori influenZano l$esistenZa o la non!esistenZa del soggetto. Se il soggetto essenZialmente % non pu essere essenZialmente non!% -' (his consideration !alls into an essentialist inter retation o! the "#C, according to which this wo$ld regard onl% essential redication, and not the accidental one' A little !$rther Aristotle writes that e,er% contrariet% is a ri,ation, &$t not e,er% ri,ation is a contrariet%, &eca$se there can &e contrar% o osition onl% &etween e?tremes, &etween which thereCs no mo,ement' Dere itCs e,ident that the "hiloso her (as he s eci!ies) is talking a&o$t contraries, contradictories and ri,ation in a certain meaning6 itCs alread% ossi&le to see that i! e,er% contrariet% is a ri,ation, and e,er% ri,ation is a contradiction, then e,er% contrariet% is a contradiction, e,en i! contrariet% and contradiction are not the same thing'

//

Metalogicon (2011) XXIV, 1

Aristotle writes a&o$t contradictor% words in the &ook A o! ^etaphysics, &$t &rie!l% and not ,er% strictl% (VMRYpQ][z is, !or the "hiloso her, strictl% the o osition &etween a!!irmation and negation)' A good de!inition o! this o osition &etween terms can &e taken !rom the con!rontation with the contraries6 $nlike these ones, the contradictor% terms canCt ha,e a middle &etween them' 3eing one the sim le negation o! the other, the% &oth incl$de the whole $ni,erse6 e,er% &eing necessaril% is ? or is not ?, witho$t e?ce tions1//' I! the contraries &elong together to the same genre, the contradictor% instead &elong to di!!erent genres, re resenting an a&sol$te di!!erence, witho$t an% ossi&le oint in common6 !rom here the idea that mo,ement is &etween contraries, not contradictories1/0' Ghat mostl% ertains to this essa% is that the contraries are artic$lar contradictories6 Aristotle sa%s so e? ressl% in ,ario$s assages' In the !irst assage, taken !rom the !o$rteenth cha ter o! (e inter! pretatione (2/&<-2<), Aristotle writes a&o$t contrariet% &etween o inions' GhatCs rele,ant a&o$t the ro&lem o! the link &etween contraries and contradictories is this assage6*I! good is &oth good and not &ad, and the !irst thing is as itsel!, the second !or accident (&eca$se it ha ens to it, not to &e &ad), and o! e,er% thing is tr$er the o inion relati,e to the itsel!, s$ch an o inion is also !alser, i! itCs also tr$er `ab (he o inion that the good is &ad is com le?, &e-

1//

^et. 'kmmb'!l`a).2;>I:9R< /@ ,7/@. ~:2; ,921Th.#' 3o&&io clari!ied this distinction in man% o! his works' 1/0 Aristotle e? ressl% states that mo,ement is &etween things o! the same genre, and not &etween things o! di!!erent genre (see also Yhys, I, 5)' #e,ertheless, &eca$se the contraries are artic$lar contradictories (as it will &e demonstrated), onl% in a artic$lar sense this thesis is tr$e6 in the assage o! ^etaphysics 1011&/0-/5 Aristotle e? ressl% states that &ecoming is &etween contradictories (!rom good to non-good and ,ice ,ersa)' E' 2eale translates the term 1.2;49;,9.1 with *contrari-, &$t *contrario- is 9.1.2;e.. MR[Pl[flMLM is $sed &% Aristotle to talk o! o osition in a generic meaning (i'e' in the Lategories)' :ee also (e int' 2/&10, where Aristotle writes that mo,ement is &etween o osites, and not contraries'

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ca$se ma%&e itCs necessar% !or the same thing to s$ ose that the good isnCt good-1/5' DereCs alread% e,ident the incl$sion o! contrariet% in contradictoriet%6 the contrar% is a s ecial contradictor%, so as good is a s ecial *not-&ad- (to &e recise, the !airest *not-&ad- that there is)1/=' (he second assage can &e !o$nd in the &ook | o! ^etaphysics6 *And, &eca$se itCs im ossi&le !or the contradictories, re!erred to the same thing, to &e tr$e together, itCs e,ident that the contraries canCt also &e together in the same s$&+ect' In !act, one o! the contraries is not onl% a contrar%, &$t also a ri,ation' #ow, ri,ation is the negation o! a s eci!ic genre o! ro erties o! the s$&stance- 1/<' (hat *one o! the contraries is also ri,ation- means, in the elastic and not alwa%s strict lang$age o! Aristotle, that o! two contraries one alwa%s e? resses the negation o! the other (e?actl%, *the nega1/5

* ,@. 3. x2; 3A4 )S18Q. 2U )S18Q. 235 418$1A2Q GHIJD3.23< V96/c<, } /@ 235 x2; 414Q. 235 412E :6,i9i74Q<, v:29 ,I**3. . 97 V96/< 235 )S1235 } 2w< )H3>I:9R< } 235 B.1.2F36 ["] } /@ 235 x2; 414Q. 2U )S18Q. :6,H9H*9S,C.7 ~:2;.. j1P SEJ x2; 3A4 )S18Q. ).IS47 :R< GH3*1,iI.9;. 2Q. 1A2Q.-' 1/= :ee also, on the to ic, 7' :e,erino, cit' ' 2=-2<, and artic$larl% ' 2=6 * solo perch si pensa che il bene non bene si pu pensare che sia quel certo non bene che il male-' :e,erino has remarked a artic$lar meaning o! contradiction &etween terms that doesnCt re,ent to redicate the contradictories o! the same s$&+ect6 h impossibile che ci che uomo non sia uomo, ma non im! possibile che ci che uomo sia non!uomo zappunto in quanto hbuonoa, hgrandea, ecc., che si predicano di huomoa, sono hnon uomoa{. NegaZione della proposiZione h uomoa non infatti h non uomoa, bens h non uomo- (cit. ' 2==)' Krom this note deri,es the interesting (and alread% a!!irmed) concl$sion that the "#C doesnCt regard contradictor% redicates, &$t contradictor% ro ositions' (here are man% assages in which Aristotle makes e?am les o! the "#C $sing this !orm (that is &eing ? and non-? !or the same s$&+ect)9 o&,io$sl% this doesnCt acc$se Aristotle o! oor rigor or contradictoriet%6 it has sim l% to &e known that when he $ses this !orm$la to talk a&o$t the "#C, he re!ers to a certain meaing o! *&eing non-?-, that is that meaning that im lies *not &eing ?-' 1/< ^et. 'k''b'm!\k6-BH9P /$)/T.123. 2. ).2F>1:;. ?,1 )*789T9:81; 412E 235 1A235, >1.9JQ. x2; 3A/@ 2).1.2F1 ?,1 GHIJD9;. B./@D921; 2K 1A2K`2W. ,@. SEJ B.1.2FR. 8I29J3. :2CJ7:F< ~:2;. 3AD 223., 3A:F1< /@ :2CJ7:;<. /@ :2CJ7:;< )HQ>1:;< ~:2;. )HQ 2;.3< J;:,C.36 SC.36< -' (his assage is !$ll o! meaning and will &e $sed also as a ti !or a critiA$e o! .$kasiewic1'

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tion o! a recise genre o! ro ert% o! the s$&stance-)' (his is another wa% to sa% that the contraries are s ecial contradictories, considering that the% alwa%s are re-connecta&le to the !$ndamental contradictor% o osition, o! which the% are e?tremes1/8' &) (he last thing le!t to do, is to esta&lish the nat$re o! the relationshi &etween these two !orm$lations o! the "#C, and to show wh% the second one, +$st anal%1ed, m$st &e considered *weaker- than the !irst one' (he "#C, in its strict !orm$lation, states that the same redicate cannot &elong and together not &elong to the same s$&+ect $nder the same as ect' (he weak !orm$lation o! "#C, instead, states that itCs im ossi&le !or the contraries1/4 to &elong together and $nder the same as ect to the same s$&+ect' (hese are the !$ndamental di!!erences6 1) (he strict !orm$lation regards the &elonging and the not&elonging9 the weak !orm$lation regards di!!erent &elongings' Jsing an alread% cited Aristotelian assage, we can sa% that the !irst !orm$lation is a&o$t contradiction itsel!, the second is a&o$t contradictions !or accident' Gith that is esta&lished, $ltimatel%, that the "#C in its strictest !orm$lation doesnCt re!er to two di!!erent redicates (contraries, contradictories, relati,es or else), &$t to the same redicate, and to its inherence and not inherence to a s$&strate' 2) Eoing !$rther with the !irst oint, the strong !orm$lation o! the "#C can &e reconnected immediatel% and er!ectl% to the roositional one' (hat the same redicate canCt &elong and together not &elong to the same s$&+ect means that two contradictor% ro1/8

(he translation o! the assage &% I' D;ring ( cit. ' =8=) is not correct !rom this stand oint, &eca$se it doesnCt kee an e%e on the recision that Aristotle kee s in disting$ishing the ,ario$s kinds o! o osition &etween terms' Also E' "asA$ale (cit. ' 18) doesnCt $nderstand the meaning o! this assage, &eca$se he agrees with the s%non%mo$s $sage o! these two terms &% Aristotle, where he wanted to disting$ish them and to show their relationshi ' 1/4 It has &een s eci!ied, in the &eginning o! the aragra h, that there are ,ario$s weak !orm$lations o! the "#C' ItCs ossi&le to s$&stit$te *contraries- with *contradictories- or *o osites-'

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ositions canCt &e &oth tr$e' (he same is not !or the weak !orm$lation6 translated in a ro ositional !ield it wo$ld regard contrar% ro ositions, &$t not contradictor%, e,en i! the contrariet% o! the ro ositions im lies their contradictoriet% (see re,io$s note)100' /) (he strict !orm$lation o! the "#C means e?actl% what is meant &% the law o! the e?cl$ded middle' ItCs not the same !or the weak !orm$lation, and thatCs eas% to show' ItCs certainl% tr$e that two contrar% redicates cannot &elong together to the same s$&+ect9 &$t !rom this doesnCt !ollow that o! the two one m$st necessaril% &elong to the s$&+ect itsel!' (he same man canCt &e together good and e,il, &$t he m$st not necessaril% &e good or e,il9 a &$ilding canCt &e together white and &lack, &$t not necessaril% m$st it &e either white or &lack' 0) :$&stantiall%, the weak !orm$lation o! the "#C is a artic$lar case o! the strong !orm$lation' (he%Cre not eA$i,alent !orm$lations, and the% donCt ha,e the same meaning, nor the same ,alidit%' (he !act, that o!ten Aristotle $ses the weak !orm$lation o! the "#C in order to de!end it, doesnCt mean that he identi!ied them, &$t sim l% that in the artic$lar conte?t, in which he was, that !orm$lation was s$!!icient !or was he needed to demonstrate' 3. In 1410 the !amo$s logician >an .$kasiewic1, well known !or his historic and not onl% technical knowledge o! logics, wrote an essa% on the * rinci le o! contradiction- in Aristotle, meaning with this e? ression what here is called the "#C 101' (he te?t is ins ired &% the agreea&le rinci le that *itCs a &ad thing that in hiloso h% there are $nto$cha&le rinci les-102, and !or this reason itCs a&o$t one o! the great rinci les o! the histor% o! western tho$ght,
100

Hn this regard see also the cha ter !o$rteen o! (e Interpretatione'

101

>' .$kasiewic1, (el principio di contraddiZione in %ristotele, F$odli&et, Macerata 200/' .etCs remark that in the ast this rinci le was called the * rinci le o! contradiction-, that is the rinci le on which one !alls in contradiction' #ow the more acc$rate denomination o! * rinci le o! non contradiction- is re!erred' Hn this to ic see also as a s ecimen E'G'K' Degel, ScienZa della logica, trad' Di A' Moni, 3ari, .ater1a, 14=8, 2 ed', ' 0=/9 A' 2osmini, Logica, a c$ra di 7' (roilo, Milano, Kratelli 3occa, 1402, XX, Vol' I, ' 1/<' 102 Ivi, ' 15

/<

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that, in the a$thorCs o inion, were ne,er taken into consideration with an original s irit o! critiA$e, &$t onl% with dogmatic de,otion' (he nat$re o! this essa% is do$&le6 on one side itCs an historical work, in which .$kasiewic1 anal%ses the Aristotelian e? osition o! the rinci le and the wa% in which Aristotle de!ends it9 on the other side itCs a te?t that !eat$res strong theoretical and critical oints' In these oint, the a$thor *tests- the "#C !rom a modern stand oint, and shows not onl% its weak as ects, &$t also the *li,ing- and still $se!$l as ects o! it' A!ter the anal%sis o! the last cha ters, tho$ght, the concl$sions o! the resent essa% seem to contrast with the ones o! the "olish logician' A com arison &etween the arg$ments o! &oth essa%s can &e $se!$l to $nderline some s ecial !eat$res o! the "#C, which ha,enCt &een considered %et, or at least to con!irm the ,alidit% o! the arg$ments e? osed in the recedent ages with the s$ ort o! a !$ndamental (e,en i! old) te?t on the theme' (he main criticism that .$kasiewic1 e? resses against the rinci le is that it at the same time needs to &e demonstrated, and is not a&le to &e demonstrated10/' (his as ect, with others, will &e considered in the !ollowing cha ters9 !or now itCs im ortant to anal%1e the statements o! the "olish logician on the Aristotelian !orm$lation o! the "#C' (he% can &e s$mmari1ed in three oints6 1) (hereCs not onl% one "#C, nor di!!erent !orm$lations o! the same rinci le, &$t three di!!erent rinci les6 the ontological, logical, and s%chological rinci le o! non contradiction100' (he !irst one is the !ollowing6 *#o o&+ect can own and not own the same attri&$te at the same time-' (he logical rinci le is *ItCs im ossi&le
10/

Ivi '506-Il principio di contraddiZione un giudiZio generale ed esprime la relaZione tra un dato oggetto e la propriet_ di non poter possedere e non possedere contemporaneamente lo stesso attributo. La verit_ di questa relaZione non sta in se stessa, ma esige incondiZionatamente una prova. Yerfino quei filosofi che ritengono ovvio il principio di contraddiZione, fondano la sua verit_ non su di esso, bens sull$evidenZa, ossia su un fatto psichico che per! cepiscono di fronte a tale principio ' Il principio di contraddiZione dunque non ultimo, e chiunque lo accetti oppure voglia convincere altri ad ammetterlo, deve dimostrarlo.100 Ivi, ' 206 *ale tre formulaZioni non rappresentano un unico principio, es! presso con delle parole diverse, ma sono tre principi diversi -'

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to &e &oth tr$e !or two statements, o! which the !irst gi,es to the o&+ect the attri&$te, that the second negates to it-' (he s%chological rinci le is6 *(wo con,ictions, to which contradictor% statements corres ond, cannot &e together in the same mind-105' 2) (he "#C is not the *$ltimate rinci le-, &eca$se itCs !o$nded on the rinci le o! identit%, and the rinci le o! identit%, again, is !o$nded on the de!inition o! tr$e +$dgement10=' 3) (he "#C and the so-called * rinci le o! do$&le negation- are two di!!erent rinci les, the% canCt &e identi!ied so as the three di!!erent rinci les o! non-contradiction10<' #ow we can consider se aratel% the three arg$ments, and ,iew the im act and the ,alidit% that the% ha,e in the Aristotelian e? osition o! the "#C' l.'. *Aristotle !orm$lates the rinci le o! contradiction in an ontological, logical and s%chological meaning, e,en i! he ne,er e?ressl% states these distinctions108-' Kor the moment we wonCt take into consideration the s%chological rinci le6 in the !ollowing cha ter it will &e seen how the introd$ction o! it is ca$sed, in .$casiewic1Cs essa%, &% a s$&stantial mis$nderstanding o! the Aristotelian te?t' (he other two rinci les are le!t to the e?amination and in order to consider them, we m$st introd$ced the de!inition that .$kasiewic1 gi,es o! s%non%mit%' Are s%non%mo$s two +$dgements that e?ress with di!!erent words the same tho$ght@ (he two +$dgements *" has c- and *F has d- are s%non%mo$s i! F and " mean the
105
10=

Ivi, ca ' I, ' 14-21' Ivi, '056*[ra i giudiZi generali esiste un principio che, ancor pi_ del princi! pio di contraddiZione, possiamo considerare ultimo` il principio di identit_a. p. m'` hIl principio di identit_ non definitivo, perch lo si pu dimostrare in base a un altro principio, che ne la ragione` tale principio la definiZione di giudiZio vero-' 10< Ivi, '0=6*Yossiamo provare che nessuno di questi tre principi` di identit_, di contraddiZione e di doppia negaZione, esprime lo stesso pensiero e di con! seguenZa sono tutti eteronimici-' 108 Ivi, '15'

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same thing, and c and d mean the same ro ert% 104' (wo s%non%mo$s +$dgments are alwa%s eA$i,alent (the% im l% each other), &$t two eA$i,alent +$dgements are not also alwa%s s%non%mo$s' (he logical and the ontological rinci le o! contradiction are, !or .$kasiewic1, not s%non%mo$s6 *In the ontological rinci le o! contradiction itCs talked a&o$t o&+ects, in the logical one o! +$dgements-150' (he% are, ne,ertheless, eA$i,alent, and .$kasiewic1 demonstrates that $sing the assage 18a/4-18&2 o! (e interpreta! tione6 *In tr$th, i! itCs tr$e to sa% that an o&+ect is white or that itCs not white, it will necessaril% &e white or not white'''i! `an o&+ectb is white or isnCt white, it was tr$e to a!!irim or to negate it-' A !ew words later he s eci!ies, tho$gh, that *Aristotle wo$ld ha,e called this a logical and not a real eA$i,alence-, A$oting the assage o! ^etaphysics 10, 1051&=46 *#ot &eca$se we think %o$ white, %o$Cre reall% white, &$t &eca$se %o$ are white we, that a!!irm that, sa% the tr$th-' (he concl$sion o! the "olish logician is the !ollowing6 *3eing is a logical reason o! the tr$th o! +$dgements, and a real ca$se o! their en$nciation9 the tr$th o! +$dgements is, instead, onl% a logical reason and not a real ca$se o! &eing-'151 #ow we ha,e all the instr$ments to consider this theor%' Kirst o! all, itCs necessar% to make recise that the notion o! s%non%mit% $sed &% .$kasiewic1 is not Aristotelian6 !or Aristotle the s%non%mit% was &etween terms, not &etween ro ositions' Moreo,er, it has to &e s eci!ied that sa%ing that *the logical rinci le re!ers to +$dgements, the ontological one to terms-, is not !$ll% correct6 itCs nat$rall% tr$e, &$t weC,e alread% seen that the "#C is not a&o$t o&+ects, &$t their own or not s eci!ic determinations' In order to &e correct, so, the *logical- "#C treats o! the tr$th o! +$dgements9 the *ontological- "#C treats o! the &elonging o! the attri&$tes to the o&+ects' :o, it has alread% &een stated how &etween these mo104

Ivi, '2/' K$rther in the age there seems to &e a de!inition o! s%non%mit% &etween +$dgements, &$t ro&a&l% the te?t o! the olish logician is oorl% translated, or .$kasiewic1 made a mistake' (he de!inition that he gi,es is, in !act, the de!inition o! eA$i,alence, and not o! the conce t o! s%non%mit%' (he str$ct$re o! the te?t, an%wa%, makes an editing error ro&a&le' 150 Ivi, '20' 151 Ivi, ' 2=

00

Metalogicon (2011) XXIV, 1

ments thereCs a greater link than the one that .$kasiewic1 shows6 the tr$th o! a +$dgements means the e?istence o! a !act, that is the &elonging o! an attri&$te to a s$&+ect' :a%ing o! a ro osition that itCs tr$e, or !alse, is not a A$estion o! logics, &$t o! ontolog% (or its region, thatCs interested to the kind o! &eing that is s$&+ect o! the ro osition)152' (hat these two statements are not s%non%mo$s, in the meaning that .$kasiewic1 gi,es to the term, doesnCt im l% that the% canCt sa% the same thing6 thatCs in a reall% similar wa% to the one that allows to heteromor h e? ressions to ha,e the same meaning, or $n-identical logical ro osition to e? ress the same content (according to the rinci le o! e?tentionalit%)' An e?am le is artic$larl% $se!$l6 letCs take the two statements *the en is on the ta&le- and *the statement *the en is on the ta&le- is tr$e-' (he !irst statement gi,es an attri&$te to a s$&+ect, the second one gi,es a tr$th ,al$e to a ro osition6 s$ er!iciall% these two ro ositions seem to re!er to di!!erent domains, and conseA$entl% to ertain to di!!erent !ields' (he !irst one is an *ontological- ro osition' 3$t can it reall% &e said, that the !irst is a *logical- ro osition@ ItCs e,ident that these two ro ositions want to e? ress recisel% the same content, and itCs also e,ident that their tr$th de ends !rom the same !act15/'
152

3anall%, an a!!irmation that didnCt state that the ro osition *water &oils at /0 degrees- is alwa%s !alse wo$ld not &e a ro osition on logics, &$t on h%sics' 15/ (o clari!% all this it one can $se the distinction, made &% I' M' 3ochenski, &etween *logical- and *metalogical- !orm$lation o! the "#C6 * % hole boo of ^etaphysics z{ is devoted to the principle of contradiction ["] and there are numerous formulations of it in his other ors. [hose formulations may be divi! ded into logical and metalogical- (I' M' 3ochenski, %ncient formal logic, #orth-Dolland $&lishing com an%, 1451)' .etCs remark that also 3ochensk% talks a&o$t di!!erent !orm$lations o! the same principle' (his &eca$se, e?actl%, changing the !orm o! the e? osition, what lasts is the !$ndamental meaning o! the rinci le' ItCs ossi&le to create in!inite metalogical !orm$lations o! the "#C6 this, ne,ertheless, wo$ldnCt change its $nit%' (he religio$s olish man, an%wa%, seems to agree with .$kasiewic1 when he writes ( La logica formale, 7ina$di, (orino 14<1, ' 8=) that Aristotle was conscio$s o! the di!!erences &etween the two !orm$lations o! the rinci le o! non contradiction' Ghether he agreed or not, this doesnCt change that he has e?actl% written6 Aristotle well knew that words are not things' 3$t the distinction doesnCt a!!ect the a&sol$te $nit% o! the two !orm$lations'

01

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It has to &e remarked, tho$gh, that thereCs a di!!erence &etween this e?am le and the logical "#C6 in the !irst case itCs a sim le a!!irmation, in the second case itCs a ro er law, that r$les a determined as ect o! the connection &etween a!!irmations and o! the attri&$tion to them o! tr$th ,al$es' H$r e?am le can &e reconnected to the domain o! realit%, &$t in the case o! the logical "#C we ha,e a !ormal, logical a!!irmation, that has nothing to do with ontolog%150' (his is recisel% the o inion o! .$kasiewic16 Aristotle has !orm$lated a law o! &eing and a law o! tho$ght, and admitted that &etween them thereCs a reci rocal im lication155' Kor the "olish logician itCs ossi&le to demonstrate that !rom the logical rinci le deri,es the ontological one and ,ice ,ersa, e,en i! he remarks that Aristotle ga,e more im ortance to the ontological one' ItCs o&,io$s that this o inion is ossi&le onl% i! one thinks to deal with two di!!erent rinci les' And itCs con!$ta&le6 the *logicalrinci le canCt lead to the ontological one as .$kasiewic1 sa%s' Kor him, *that two contradictor% attri&$tes &elong to the same o&+ectis im ossi&le, &eca$se that wo$ld im l% that two contradictor% statements &oth &e !alse, and this is e?actl% im ossi&le15=' 3$t itCs Aristotle itsel! (in a assage A$oted &% .$kasiewic1 too) that s eci!ies that itCs not realit%, that is !o$nded on .ogos, &$t the .ogos, that is !o$nded on realit%6 itCs im ossi&le !or two contradictor% +$dgements to &e &oth tr$e &eca$se world is not contradictor% (and these two a!!irmations sa% the same thing), &$t itCs not im ossi&le !or the world to &e contradictor% &eca$se thereCs a law o! the .ogos that re,ents that15<' As the "#C is s lit in two, and !rom one o! the two rinci les is taken awa% its ontological ,al$e, the eA$i,alence is no longer ossi&le' (he relation o! *logical reason- that
150

In s$mmar%, .$kasiewic1 treats the logical rinci le as something * ost$lated-, an a?iom in the meaning o! the modern !ormal logic, something that, in act$alit%, has nothing to do with' 155 Ivi, ' 20-25' 15= Ivi, ' 25' 15< Ma%&e it co$ld &e said that the "hiloso her wo$ldnCt ha,e hesitated to &$ild a contradictor% logic i! he saw contradiction in realit%' Moreo,er, he ne,er inter rets the "#C as .$kasiewic1 does, as i! it was one o! the !$ndamental sentences o! an a?iomatic s%stem' ItCs eno$gh to note that the onl% a?iomatic s%stem &$ilt &% Aristotle, his s%llogism, doesnCt ha,e the "#C as an a?iom'

02

Metalogicon (2011) XXIV, 1

the "olish logician esta&lishes &etween &eing and tr$th is $nnecessar% and ,icio$s158' (hat Aristotle didnCt se arate the two rinci les, and that he &elie,ed in their s$&stantial $nit%, is witnessed &% ,ario$s assages o! its (*his-@)works' GeC,e alread% seen, in the !irst cha ter, the conte?t o! man% $ses o! the "#C6 well, itCs sing$lar, i! we acce t the arg$ment o! .$kasiewic1, that Aristotle o!ten $ses, in the Hrganon, the ontological !orm$lation o! the "#C to sol,e logical and ro ositional ro&lems, or to clari!% some assages o! its s%llogistic' 3$t the assage in which the identit% &etween the two rinci les is e,ident is in the ^etaphysics, and has &een alread% A$oted6 *and &e ca$se itCs im ossi&le !or the contradictories, re!erred to the same thing, to &e tr$e together, itCs e,ident that neither the contraries can &e together in the same o&+ect' In !act, one o! the two contraries, more than contrar%, is also ri,ation-' 154 (he main error in the inter retation o! this assage is to &elie,e that it ertains to the im lication &etween logical and ontological as ect' 3$t here Aristotle wants to sol,e the A$estion o! the relation &etween contraries and contradictories, and to do that $ses indi!!erentl% the *ontological- and the *logical- !orm$lation o! the "#C, as i! it was e?actl% the same rinci le' Concl$ding6 it has &een alread% s eci!ied that Aristotle knew the di!!erence &etween logic and realit%' (he !ormal as ect o! its logic consists ne,ertheless in his s%llogistic, that is di!!erent !rom the treatment o! "#C' (he "#C is a law o! realit%, a rinci le that concerns the whole &eing6 that im lies that it concerns also the correct wa% o! reasoning, &eca$se the correct wa% o! reasoning mirrors the &eing, and the tho$ght, &eca$se tho$ght is a art o! &eing' (his art o! AristotleCs logic (or, we co$ld sim l% sa%, the Aristotelian logic) is a logic that is modeled $ on realit%, or at least
158

Vicio$s e?actl% &eca$se according to Aristotle a *logical "#C- co$ldnCt &e something ass$med inde endentl% !rom the o&ser,ation o! realit%, and wo$ld so &ecome something ded$ced !rom the ontological "#C, and that wanted to ded$ce it itsel!' 154 ^et. 'k''b'm!'o.

0/

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aims to &e modeled $ on it1=0' I! we take the so-called * ro ositional !orm$lation- o! the "#C as a law o! lang$age or o! tho$ght standing &% itsel!, we ha,e to acce t that itCs a law &ased on the ontological !orm$lation o! the "#C' I! instead, as in this essa%, we take the two !orm$lations ( ro ositional and !$nctional) as two wa%s to e? ress the same rinci le, then itCs ossi&le to $nderstand how two di!!erent e? ositions o! a law o! the real that, conseA$entl%, is also a law o! tho$ght and o! correct arg$mentation' l.\. (he second oint on which the "olish logician arg$es with the "hiloso her is in cha ters VII and VIII o! his essa% on the rinci le o! contradiction6 according to .$kasiewic1, as alread% &rie!l% said, the "#C is not the $ltimate rinci le, &eca$se it reA$ests another rinci le &e!ore it, witho$t which it wo$ld not ha,e meaning6 itCs the rinci le o! identit% (!rom now "HI)' :econdl%, in the !ollowing cha ter .$kasiweic1 adds that the "HI itsel! is not $ltimate, &$t is !o$nded on the de!inition o! tr$e +$dgement, that is the a$thentic *$nconditioned- in the Aristotelian logic str$ct$re 1=1 .$kasiewic1Cs arg$mentation in,ol,es also the so-called * rinci le o! do$&le negation-6 &$t o! it will &e s oken in the ne?t aragra h' Dere weCre going to anal%se +$st the !irst two arg$ments, re!erring to what can &e !o$nd in AristotleCs works' a) Aristotle ne,er !orm$lates the "HI1=2, at least not e? ressl%6 ne,ertheless, ,ario$s assages o! his works can &e taken as s$!!icient !orm$lations o! it, so that the% can &e $sed to ,eri!% .$kasiewic1Cs thesis' Kor e?am le, the statement that *itCs neces-

1=0

I sim l% mean that aristotelian logic is &ased on a certain interpretation o! realit%' 1=1 Kor re!erence see also note 88' 1=2 :ee also .$kasiewic1, cit., ' 05, e I' M' 3ochenski, cit. ' /86 *ae find no principle of identity in the preserved ritings of %ristotle -'

00

Metalogicon (2011) XXIV, 1

sar% !or &eing to &e when it is, and not to &e when it is not- 1=/' (he critiA$es o! the "olish logician are as !ollows6 1) (he "HI is resented, $s$all%, as the * ositi,e side- o! the "#C' 3$t itCs im ossi&le !or a negati,e +$dgement to &e s%non%mo$s o! a ositi,e +$dgement1=0' In this case itCs $se!$l to re eat what alread% stated !or the !orm$lation o! the "#C6 that two !orm$lation are heteron%mo$s (in the meaning in which .$kasiewic1 $ses this term) doesnCt e?cl$de that the% can ha,e the same meaning, that is that the% sa% the same thing' It has to &e considered, moreo,er, that .$kasiewic1 $ses $re logical arg$ments, &$t the logic str$ct$re o! AristotleCs s eech is not !ormali1ed6 this is im ortant to note in order to di!!erentiate &etween the *historical- assages o! .$kasiewic1, and his theoretical critiA$es1=5' ItCs ossi&le, an%wa%, to re eat the critiA$e alread% e? ressed against .$kasiewic1Cs conce t o! s%non%mit%6 &asing on it, stating *220- is di!!erent !rom stating *itCs im ossi&le !or the res$lt o! the o eration C22C not to &e 0-'
1=/

(e int. 'oa\l!\]6 *U ,@. 3. 9X.1; 2U e. x21. 7, 41P 2U , e. , 9X.1; x21. , , .IS47-' Hn this a!!irmation as a !orm$lation o! "#C see also :e,erino, cit., ' =<6 *[enendo presente che '{ questa affermaZione si riferisce all$ente in quanto ente ze cio si riferisce anche agli enti eterni, per i quali la necessit_ di essere hquandoa sono non limitata ad un certo tratto finito del tempo{ u che \{ la necessit_ propria dei principi o di ci che da essi discende u che l{ tale affermaZione enunciata come qualcosa che non ha bisogno di dimostraZione, e quindi la sua la necessit_ dei principi e non delle loro conseguenZeu e che ]{ nel linguaggio di %ristotle l$essere dell$ente tanto l$essere esistenZiale quanto l$essere copulativo con predicato sottinteso` tenendo presente questo insieme di consideraZioni consentito affermare che il passo ora riportato una for! mulaZione esplicita di ci che stato chiamato principio d$identit_ -' 7arlier ( ' //) :e,erino reconnected to the "HI what .$kasiewic1 also called *de!inition o! tr$e +$dgement-' In order to a,oid mis$nderstandings, this wonCt &e $sed' 1=0 .$kasiewic1, cit. ' 0=' 1=5 Kor a com lete demonstration o! the semantic $nit% o! "HI, "#C and law o! the e?cl$ded middle see M' Malatesta, Sulla formulaZione unica dei principi di identit_, non contraddiZione e terZo escluso nella logica proposiZionale , I, "i11i, 2eggio Cala&ria 14<49 II, (i ogra!ia artigianale, .atina 14<49 III, Eiannini, #aoli 1481

05

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2) .$kasiewic1 e? resses the "HI and the "#C as h% othetical rinci les' (he% are6 "HI6 I! " has c, then " has c'' "#C6I! " is an o&+ect, that " canCt ha,e c and together not ha,e c' (he critiA$e o! the "olish logician is the !ollowing6 in the "#C we !ind the term *o&+ect-, &$t this doesnCt ha en in the "HI' :o, the "#C canCt e? ress the same meaning o! the "HI' (his is the answer to the critiA$e6 at the &eginning o! his essa%, .$kasiweic1 states to re!er, with the term *o&+ect-, to an%thing that is not nothing'1== *H&+ect-, in the end, means *&eing-' :o, it has &een seen in the !irst cha ter how Aristotelian logic is a logic o! what is, and not o! what isnCt' ItCs necessar%, conseA$entl%, also !or the "HI to &e re!erred to &eings, and not to not-&eings9 itCs necessar% !or the term *o&+ect- to &e incl$ded in its de!inition6 *I! " is an o&+ect and i! " has c, then " has c-'1=< Another critiA$e o! .$kasiewic1 on the $nit% o! "HI and "#C is the !ollowing6 the second $ses two notions, logical rod$ct and negation, that are not $se!$l !or the !orm$lation o! the "HI' 1=83$t we ha,e to remem&er the wa% in which Aristotle *!orm$lates- the "HI6 itCs necessar% !or what is to &e, and !or what is not to not &e' Gell, the notion o! necessit% im lies the notion o! negation 1=4 (ne1==

.$kasiewic1, cit. ' 146 hIntendo per oggetto qualsiasi cosa che sia #qual! cosa$ e non #un niente$a'(here is a certain am&ig$it% in the $sage o! the term *something- &% .$kasiewic1' "ro&a&l% he $ses it as s%non%mo$s o! *something signi!icant-' Krom this stand oint a $nicorn wo$ld &e *something-, that is an o&+ect' 1=< More than this, the &anal remark that in order to ha,e an attri&$te " m$st &e an o&+ect' (his is said &% .$kasiewic1 himsel! (cit. ' 216 *intendo per attributo tutto ci che si pu dire di un oggetto-), !alling e,identl% into contradiction' 1=8 .$kasiewic1, cit. '08 1=4 A !$ndamental ro&lem is determining the conce t o! negation can &e seen in these ages' At age =0 o! his essa%, .$kasiewic1 seems to re!er to a meaning o! negation, according to which it doesnCt *remo,e-, or doesnCt e?cl$de, a!!irmation' (he statement o! the negation wo$ldnCt remo,e the statement o! a!!irmation' 3$t in m% o inion is this sense o! negation is meaningless, and th$s the

0=

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cessar% im ossi&le that not not ossi&le that not1<0), con!$ting conseA$entl% the !irst art o! this second critiA$e' 2egarding the second art, stating the necessit% o! identit% means stating that itCs im ossi&le !or &eing not to &e identical with itsel!1<1' #ow, in order to e? ress the non-identit% o! a &eing with itsel! itCs necessar% to $se the logical rod$ct' In !act, i! itCs necessar% !or ", that has c, to ha,e c, then itCs im ossi&le !or ", that has c, to not ha,e c, which is to sa% that itCs im ossi&le !or " to ha,e and not to ha,e c' In this case the $se o! logical rod$ct is necessar%, &eca$se itCs onl% when and i! " has c that itCs necessar% !or it to ha,e c' I!, " not ha,ing c, didnCt " ha,e c an%more, the "HI wo$ldnCt &e negated' ItCs e,ident,conseA$entl%, that i! on the s$r!ace the two rinci les sa% di!!erent things, in their concrete !orm, that is in their semantic wholeness (totalit% o! meanings e? ressed and im lied) the% sa% e?actl% the same thing' (hat co$ld &e e? ressed, sa%ing that the "#C is not reall% the "#C i! it doesnCt contain semanticall% (means) the "HI, and ,ice ,ersa' :$mmari1ing6 a!!irming that, i! " has c, then necessaril% " has c, means to a!!irm that itCs im ossi&le !or " to ha,e and not to ha,e c9 on the other hand (also considering the alread% stated $nit% o!
corres onding meaning o! a!!irmation9 &$t this doesnCt ertain to this work' In this note I sim l% want to s eci!% that the term *negation- is meant in its gen$ine sense, according to which the statement o! the negation remo,es the statement o! the corres onding a!!irmation' Hn this to ic see also E' "riest, Lhe c$ di male nelle contraddiZioni, in AA' VV', Scenari dell$impossibile, ' 00-016 *%sserire una negaZione non necessariamente formulare un diniego zas! serZione della negaZione{ " si pu formulare il diniego di qualcosa senZa as! serire una negaZione-' Kor the american logician the critiA$e is e?actl% the same, and itCs not tr$e that this ro&lem is *a ro&lem o! the classical logician as o! the dialectic logician (negator o! "#C)-' (his last m$st e? lain what this new meaning o! negation means, &eca$se he introd$ces it' 1<0 :ee also (e int', ch' 1/' 1<1 Ghate,er is the sense $sed to inter ret negation, what is s$re is this6 the necessit% o! identit% o! &eing with itsel! means that itCs something that canCt &e re mo,ed' #ow, whate,er the meaning o! negation is, it will &e necessar% to deal with this remo,ing and it will &e e?actl% this remo,ing to remain $nto$cha&le &e%ond e,er% determination o! the conce t o! negation (and we ha,e alread% said that this e? lanation is not something the researcher o! the "#C m$st do)'

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"#C and law o! e?cl$ded middle) stating that " canCt ha,e and together not to ha,e c means that ", as long as it has c, m$st ha,e c, that is to sa% that canCt not ha,e c'1<2 ? ? #( ? # ?)1</ Krom all this deri,es that "HI and "#C are two $nitar% rinci les, so that the% ha,e the same meaning6 the "#C canCt &e e? ressed witho$t e? ressing the "HI, and ,ice ,ersa'1<0 Closing this !irst art on identit%, some consideration' Kirst o! all, itCs e,ident that the $nit% o! "HI and "#C can &e stated onl% in a conte?t that makes a *classical- $se o! negation' Ghat .$kasiewic1 states man% times in his essa%, that is that the a!!irmation *i! " has c, " necessaril% has c- doesnCt im l% *itCs imossi&le !or " to ha,e and not to ha,e c-, can &e ,alid onl% i! the o osition &etween a!!irmation and negation is re+ected1<5' Ghat
1<2

(his eA$i,alence &etween identit% and do$&le negation is ossi&le on the &asis o! the re+ection o! the .$kasiewic1Cs conce t o! s%non%mit%' Ge m$st s eci!% that the $se made &% the "olish logician o! negation is $se!$l in a sit$ation in which is not acce ted the classical (aristotelian) $se o! negation 1</ I e? lain again the $sage o! s%m&ols6 * - is a ,aria&le that can mean an% !eat$re, that the o&+ect ? owns' * ?- conseA$entl% means *the !eat$re &elongs to the s$&+ect ?-9 * - is the im lication s%m&ol' All the other s%m&ols kee their meanings' 1<0 Hn this to ic a s eci!ication a&o$t the osition o! :e,erino on the link &etween the two rinci les is reall% $se!$l6 :e,erino ( cit. ' =8) states the eA$i,alence &$t the non-identit% o! "HI and "#C' (his is agreea&le in this essa%, &$t onl% as long that means that the two rinci le donCt epressly sa% the same thing' 3$t :e,erino himsel! con!irms what was said, when he states the necessit% o! their $nion, and writes that *il principio pi saldo non il p.d.n.c., separ! ato dal principio d$identit_, e nemmeno viceversa-' (his e?actl% means that stating the "#C, as se arated !rom the "HI, is in its a&stract !orm semanticall% incom lete and not a&sol$tel% ,alid' Jltimatel%6 s$ er!iciall% the "#C and the "HI o&,io$sl% state di!!erent things' 3$t the semantic content o! "#C in its concrete !orm is the same o! the "HI, in its concrete !orm, and this &eca$se the "#C, concretel% considered, states also the "HI, and ,ice ,ersa (see also M' Malatesta, cit., arte III ' /5 e 00)' (his also is er!ectl% com ati&le with aristotelian tho$ght' 1<5 An%wa%, &eca$se the o osition &etween a!!irmation and negation is also their incom ati&ilit%, and &eca$se the "#C is the a$thentic meaning o! this in-

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has to &e esta&lished, and it will &e done in the anal%sis o! the Aristotelian de!ense o! the "#C, is i! the re+ection o! the o osition &etween a!!irmation and negation can resist to the rinci le' 3$t more than this, it has to &e s eci!ied that the critiA$es o! .$kasiewic1 donCt consider the gro$nd o! the Aristotelian e? osition, and come !rom a theoretical atmos here that is com letel% di!!erent !rom the one o! Aristotle' (his means that .$kasiewic1 writes a&o$t a "HI that is not AristotleCs "HI' Moreo,er, the thesis o! 7' 3erti is ,alid, according to which itCs not correct to sa% that the "HI is a rereA$isite o! "#C, &eca$se the last one reA$ires onl% the notion o! *identical- (QTRU), that has nothing to do with the "HI'1<= &) Krom all this itCs ossi&le to ded$ct that the "HI canCt &e a rereA$isite o! the "#C, &eca$se 1) itCs onl% a di!!erent !orm$lation o! it 2) this last statement reA$ires the notion o! identit%, &$t not the "HI' #ow we ha,e to consider the second art o! .$kasiewic1Cs thesis, according to which the "HI is &ased on the de!inition o! tr$e +$dgement6 that means, on the &asis o! what alread% said, that "HI and the "#C are &ased on it' (wo re arator% considerations6 the !irst is how is the identit% *reA$ired- !rom the "#C +$st a notion, and not a rinci le' (he same is !or the tr$th o! +$dgements' Krom this stand oint, the "#C is not
com ati&ilit%, negating the o osition &etween a!!irmation and negation means to negate the "#C (and !or this reason is said that in the aristotelian de!ence o! the "#C the ,alidit% o! this theoretical ost$late is ro,ed)' Ghat is im ortant is that, reliminaril% negating this o osition, itCs alread% a "HI that is a&stracted &% the "#C, se arated !rom it, and conseA$entl% a "HI and a "#D that are not the ones o! Aristotle' Moreo,er, in order to a,oid mis$nderstandings, itCs e,ident that the $sage o! this o osition in the e? lanation o! the meaning o! the "#C can &e considered a petitio principii onl% as long as the e? ositions o! these two rinci les are se arated and not sim$ltaneo$s moments' 1<= 7' 3erti, cit. ' 1106 hNon si pu nemmeno dire che il p.d.n.c. aristotelico supponga il principio d$identit_, almeno quello formulato nella maniera tradiZ! ionale, sia perch %ristotele stesso lo considera come abbiamo visto, il primo fra tutti gli assiomi, e dunque tale da non supporne altriprima di s, sia perch ci che esso suppone la noZione di identit_, cos come suppone altre noZioni zimpossibile, appartenere, tempo, aspetto, ecc.{, cio delle noZioni primitive, non dei principi , ossia non una proposiZione, una regola, una legge.-

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&ased on the notion o! *tr$e- more than on the notion o! *together-, *im ossi&le-, *&elong-1<<' (he second consideration is that i! the de!inition o! tr$e +$dgement was something anterior to the "#C and to the "HI (and th$s not s$&+ected to them), it co$ldnCt &e the de!inition o! tr$e +$dgement' 3eca$se it aims to &e itsel! and to e?cl$de its not-&eing-itsel!, the de!inition o! tr$e +$dgement is alread% s$&+ected to the "#C (that is *transcendental-)1<8' .astl%, a consideration on the wa% in which .$kasiewic1 tries to demonstrate the "HI on the &asis o! the tr$e +$dgement' I A$ote the assage in order to disc$ss it6*the +$dgement that assigns to an o&+ect the attri&$te that it owns is tr$e9the +$dgement that negates to an o&+ect the attri&$te that it doesnCt own is tr$e' Krom these de!inition !ollows directl% that i! an o&+ect owns an attri&$te, so itBs tr$e that it owns it9 and i! it doesnCt own it, so itCs tr$e that it doesnCt own it' (hese ro ositions are tr$e, &eca$se I e?actl% in this wa% de!ine tr$th-1<4' Man% concl$sions can &e taken6 !irst o! all, in order to sa% *I! " has c, then itCs tr$e to sa% that " has c-, itCs necessar% to admit that *i! " has c, " has c- and *i! itCs tr$e that " has c, than itCs tr$e than " has c-' (his &eca$se, i! not, we wo$ld deal with a " that co$ld not ha,e c, and the tr$th o! the whole ro osition co$ld &e comromised' 3$t more than that, this demonstration can &e considered a !orm$lation o! the "HI1806 we alread% saw how the !acts
1<<

See also qerti, cit. p. ''k :ee also :e,erino, cit. ' =4-<06 *qasti richiamare che se il principio di identit_ [e quindi il YNL] fosse ccos fondato, la #definiZione di giudiZio vero$, precedendo concettualmente il principio d$identit_, non potrebbe avvalersene, cio non potrebbe essere una definiZione che necessario che sia una definiZ! ione di giudiZio verou ossia non potrebbe escludere di non essere una siffatta definiZione-' 1<4 LuasieicZ, cit. p. m'. 180 It co$ld also &e said that the de!inition o! tr$e +$dgement is a !orm$lation o! the "HI, as i'e' !ather Ea&r%l and :e,erino think' Kor this last, the de!inition o! tr$th is a !orm$lation o! the "HI e?actl% &eca$se tr$e is thinking the identit% &etween what is connected and its &eing-connected, and what is se arated and its &eing-se arated' :hortl%, itCs not tr$e o! e,er% " to state that it has c, &$t onl% o! that " that has C6 conseA$entl% tr$e is not *" has C- &$t *", that has C, has C-'
1<8

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are ca$se o! the tr$th o! a!!irmation, &$t not ,ice ,ersa' According to that, the im lication that .$kasiewic1 makes &etween tr$th and &eing when he writes that *i! itCs tr$e that it owns it, that it owns it- is right onl% i! itCs admitted that *" has c- and *itCs tr$e that " has c- e? ress the same meaning1816 *ItCs tr$e that " has c- doesnCt e? ress a logical or ling$istic meaning, &$t an ontological one' 182 (he demonstration o! .$kasiewic1 wo$ld then &ecome the !ollowing6 *I! an o&+ect owns an attri&$te, then itCs tr$e that it owns it, that is to sa% that it owns it9 and i! it doesnCt own it, than itCs tr$e that it doesnCt own it, that is to sa% that it doesnCt own it-' ItCs e,ident that this is no longer a demonstration, &$t a sim le a!!irmation o! "HI'18/ l.l. Another critical oint o! .$kasiewic1Cs essa% is the relation &etween the "#C and the so-called * rinci le o! do$&le negation("D#)' ItCs im ortant to clari!% this relation, &eca$se in the histor% o! tho$ght man% hiloso hers ha,e $sed the "D# as as s%non%m !or the "#C180' Moreo,er, Aristotle itsel! seems to $se the two !or181

(his on the &asis o! the same rinci le re,io$sl% stated, that *the en is on the ta&le- and *the sentence Cthe en is on the ta&leC is tr$e- e? ress the same meaning' 182 All this o erates on the &asis o! the gi,en de!inition o! tr$e and !alse6 i! tr$e is the $nion o! what is not $nited, stating the tr$th o! $nion is stating the $nion, and stating the tr$th o! +$dgements means stating the e?istence o! the corres onding !act' (o a&stract these two moments, as i! the% were two connected &$t di!!erent hases, means losing the sense o! tr$th (see also (ommaso dBAA$ino, Sulla verit_, 3om iani, 2005, ' 11=6 h%ugustinus in libro Soliloquiorum dicit quod verum est id quod estu sed id quod est nihil est nisi ensu ergo verum signi ! ficat omnino idem quod ensa)' 18/ ItCs good to s eci!% the thesis o! .$kasiewic16 he doesnCt e?actl% state that the "HI is &ased on the de!inition o! tr$e +$dgement, &$t that itCs ossi&le to demonstrate it on the &asis o! this de!inition (that is what has &een con!$ted)' Gas it not so, and did he not mean that, it co$ld &e sim l% answered to him that the !orm$lation o! the "HI doesnCt make $se o! the notion o! tr$th' 180 Kor e?am le )ant (Lritica della ragion pura, ' ), Eentile ( Sistemi di logica come teoria del conoscere, .e lettere, 200/, ' 181 ), :e,erino (Monda! mento della contraddiZione, cit. ' 258 n'19 ssenZa del nichilismo, Adel hi, Milano 2005, ' 00 9 La struttura originaria, Adel hi, Milano 200<, ca ' 1)

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m$lations as s%non%ms185, artic$larl% in the de!ense o! the rinci le' .$kasiewic1Cs critiA$es are in the cha ters VII and X o! his essa%, and can &e s$mmari1ed in the !ollowing oints6 1) (he "D# is not a negati,e !orm$lation o! the "HI, &eca$se, as .$kasiewic1 thinks to ha,e demonstrated at the &eginning o! his work, a negati,e +$dgement can ne,er &e s%non%mo$s o! a ositi,e +$dgement18=' 2) (he "D# $ses the conce t o! *negation-, which the "HI doesnCt need6 conseA$entl%, the% are not s%non%mo$s rinci les18<' 3) As !or the relation &etween "HI and "#C, the "D# doesnCt $se the conce t o! *o&+ect- nor the one o! *logical rod$ct-'188 4) (he !irst elenctical roo! o! Aristotle de!ends the "D#, &$t not the "#C9 &eca$se the%Cre not s%non%mo$s' In !act, itCs ossi&le to !ind a case in which the "D# is ,alid and the "#C is not6 itCs the case o! e,er% contradictor% o&+ect184' Dere are the answers6
185

Kor e?am le d$ring the e? osition o! lrlkX\z' see also ^et. 100<a2/-206-9 SEJ 9:21; 2; 3H9J 1.8JRHR 9X.1;, 23A23 3A4 9:21; , 1.8JRHR 9X.1; 7 , 9X.1; 1.8JRHR*' :ee also :e,erino, cit. ' 2=8' 18= .$kasiewic1, cit. ' 0=6 *Nel capitolo II ho gi_ menZionato che nessun giud! iZio affermativo sinonimo del giudiZio negativou l$affermativo potrebbe essere al massimo equivalente di quello negativo, ma l$equivalenZa e la sinonimia sono concetti diversi. Non dunque ammissibile l$idea secondo la quale le for! mule` #a a$ e #a non non!a$ siano sinonimiche ed esprimano lo stesso princi! pio-, and ' 2/6 *Nessun giudiZio negativo sinonimo del giudiZio affermativo, perch l$affermaZione significa una cosa diversa dalla negaZioneu una altret! tanto semplice quanto l$altra, e nessuna si lascia ricondurre all$altra -' 18< Ivi ' 086 *Yossiamo inoltre esprimere il principio di identit_ senZa ricorrere al concetto di negaZione, mentre invece non possiamo formulare il principio di contraddiZione [e il Y(N] senZa questo concetto'188 Ibidem` *senZa ausilio di due giudiZi costituenti un prodotto logico, si pos! sono formulare sia il principio di identit_ che il principio di doppia negaZione -' 184 Ivi, ' =/6 *%ristotle nella prima prova elenctica dimostr al massimo il principio di doppia negaZione, ma non dimostr il principio di contraddiZione ["] sistono casi in cui il principio di doppia negaZione vero e il principio di contraddiZione non applicabileu diciamolo pure, falso. Yer trovare questi strani casi, dobbiamo esplorare gli oggetti contraddittori-'

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1) (he osition o! .$kasiewic1 on s%non%mit% has alread% &een critici1ed' As alread% said, this strict se aration &etween a!!irmation and negation deri,es !rom the im licit re+ection, &% the "olish logician, o! the o osition &etween a!!irmation and negation, and o! their incom ati&ilit%' 3$t e,en i! the link &etween these two elements is c$t, e,en i! a di!!erent meaning is gi,en to negation, in order to make it com ati&le with the corres onding a!!irmation (so A$estioning the s%stem o! o ositions and im lications $s$all% ossi&le &etween them), what is alwa%s tr$e is that the a!!irmation has to e?cl$de its own e?cl$sion6 what canCt &e $t aside is that, inde endentl% !rom the meaning o! negation gi,en, the a$thentic meaning o! negation as e?cl$sion and remo,ing cannot &e a,oided, and that !rom this negation the a!!irmation m$st &e rotected in order to remain itsel!' In a logical conte?t, in which the negation doesnCt e?cl$de the a!!irmation, a!!irmation and do$&le negation are not s%non%mo$s6 &$t doesnCt e?cl$de that the a!!irmation is an%wa% the e?cl$sion o! its own e?cl$sion, and conseA$entl% negation o! that artic$lar meaning o! negation, according to which the a!!irmation is e?cl$ded' 2) Also here itiCs ossi&le to recall the distinction &etween a&stract and concrete "HI' In the wholeness on its semantical content, the "HI is also negation o! non-identit%9 the necessit% o! &eing-itsel! !or e,er% &eing is its im ossi&ilit% not to &e itsel!, according to a meaning o! negation as e?cl$sion (and this meaning m$st &e conser,ed, in order to make the "HI, "#C and "D# concrete and not a&stract rinci les140)' :a%ing that *A is A- means also to sa% that *A is not non-A-, as long as this means *A e?-

140

(he distinction &etween a&stract and concrete can seem a heritage o! the idealistic and neo-idealistic tradition (!rom Degel to :e,erino) and artic$larl% the $se o! this distinction in the e? osition o! the three rinci les is ins ired &% the works o! 7' :e,erino (see also on the to ic La struttura originaria, ssenZa del nichilismo, essa%s &itornare a Yarmenide and , and [autotes)' #e,ertheless, this doesnCt mean that Aristotle didnCt mean the rinci les e?actl% in this wa%6 he $sed negation in a classical meaning, as an e?cl$sion' ConseA$entl%, a "HI that doesnCt e?cl$de its own negation is not the "HI o! Aristotle, &$t a rinci le that doesnCt sa% all that it sho$ld sa%, an abstract rinci le'

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cl$des the e?cl$sion o! its &eing-A-' (hat then another sense o! negation is introd$ced, itCs not im ortant141' 3) (hat the "D# doesnCt $se the conce t o! logical rod$ct and o! o&+ect is onl% a arentl% tr$e' (he elementar% r$le is that, i! two elements are a!!irmed, the logical rod$ct o! the two elements can &e a!!irmed too' (he "D# a!!irms that ", that ha,e c, canCt not ha,e c' 3$t it a!!irms that onl% as long as " has c6 that is to sa% that it a!!irms the im ossi&ilit% o! the logical rod$ct o! the owning and not owning o! c !or "142' Hn the A$estion o! the $se o! the term *o&+ect-, it can &e re eated what was alread% said a&o$t the "HI6 Aristotelian logic is a&o$t e?istent things, and onl% them' Moreo,er, in order to ha,e a redicate " m$st &e an e?istent o&+ect (and this is stated &% .$kasiewic1 himsel!) 14/' ItCs conseA$entl% e,ident that the "D# makes im licit $se o! the remise *I! " is an o&+ect-, like e,er% other logical rinci le' Its com lete e? osition is6 *I! " is an o&+ect and i! " has c, " canCt not ha,e c-' 4) (he ro&lem o! e?istence o! o&+ect is e?tended also to the last A$estion6 according to .$kasiewic1 the case o! contradictor% o&+ects is the onl% case in which the "D# is ,alid and the "#C is not' An e?am le o! the "olish logician is the ) circle6 it sho$ld at the same time ha,e and not ha,e a !eat$re *&- (the ossess o! sides, that can &e meas$red mit an alge&ric n$m&er)' I A$ote the assage in order to disc$ss it6 *) has to ha,e &, that means it m$st ha,e sides, that can &e descri&ed with an alge&ric n$m&er' *It m$st
141

(his on a historical and theoretical !ield' Distorical, &eca$se Aristotle meant negation in a s eci!ic sense, and we ha,e to kee the e%e on it9 theoretical, &eca$se &e%ond e,er% determination o! the sense o! negation thereCs also that artic$lar meaning o! negation that is the e?cl$sion o! the a!!irmation' 142 ItCs tr$e, howe,er, that this arg$ment is not e? ressl% made &% them, who $se the "D# as a s%non%m o! the "#C' It co$ld &e said that the "D# re!ers onl% to o&+ects that own attri&$tes, the "#C re!ers instead to o&+ects o! e,er% genre, inde endentl% !rom their owning or not a certain attri&$te' (he answer is sim le6 the !orm$la o! the "D# is * ? ## ?-' 3eca$se itCs ossi&le to s$&stit$te e,er% ,aria&le with another ,aria&le in all cases, the !orm$la can &e s$&stit$ted with *# ?### ?-, that means *i! ? doesnCt ha,e , ? canCt not not ha,e , that is ha,e -'
14/

:ee also supra, ' 14 n' 104'

50

Metalogicon (2011) XXIV, 1

ha,e- means *it canCt not ha,e-' :o, ) canCt not ha,e &' Gho $ses the rinci le o! do$&le negation, m$st take !or tr$e these two +$dgements #e,ertheless, itCs not tr$e that ) canCt at the same time ha,e and not ha,e &6 on the contrar%, ) has & and at the same time doesnCt ha,e &-' (he ossi&ilities are two6 a) .$kasiewic1 doesnCt notice the mistake he !alls in when he writes that in this case the "D# is ,alid' In !act, i! it a!!irms that itCs not ossi&le that ) doesnCt ha,e the redicate &, then the contradictor% o&+ect ) doesnCt res ect the "D#' &) .$kasiewic1 $ses two di!!erent meanings o! negation, the !irst one &eing the normal sense o! *e?cl$sion-, the second &eing not s eci!ied, &$t necessaril% resent in order to &e a&le to a!!irm that the o&+ect ) can res ect the "D#' It seems to &e the second case6 &$t i! itCs so, the "D# and the "#C are &oth ,alid, &eca$se the !eat$re *not to ha,e &- is made according to a meaning o! negation that sim l% doesnCt regard the two rinci les, &eca$se the% re!er (and this is admitted &% .$kasiewic1 himsel!) to a sense o! negation that e?cl$des the corres ondent a!!irmation1409 or &oth the rinci les are !alse, $nless one o! the $ses the negation in a di!!erent meaning than the other (in that case the% wo$ldnCt &e s%non%mo$s !or o&,io$s reasons, &$t one o! them wo$ldnCt either &e the rinci le considered &% Aristotle and this essa%)' Ghate,er the case, the remise is ,alid6 AristotleCs logic is a&o$t &eings' .$kasiewic1 himsel! admits that his arg$ment is meaning!$l onl% i! ) is recogni1ed as an o&+ect, as to sa% something meaning!$l145' (he ossi&ilit% o! s$ch an attri&$tion o! meaning to *contradictor% o&+ects- ertains to the anal%sis o! elenchos, that is le!t to a !$t$re work'
References

140

(his di!!erence co$ld &e e? ressed as also stating that in a meaning negation is ri,ation o! a!!irmation, and in another meaning itCs a second element that is added to it witho$t re!erring to it' 145 (his strongl% agrees, !or e?am le, with the ontolog% o! :e,erino, according to which the stat$s o! *&eing- is determined onl% &% the criterion o! signi!icance'

55

Metalogicon (2011) XXIV, 1

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

Aa',,', Scenari dell impossibile. La contraddiZione nel pensiero con! temporaneo, Il "oligra!o, "arma 2008 Aga11i 7', La logica simbolica, .a :c$ola, 3rescia 1440 Alessandro dCA!rodisia, Lommentario alla h^etafisicaa, a c$ra di E' Mo,ia, 3om iani, Milano 200< Aristotele, %nalitici primi, a c$ra di M' Mign$cci, .o!!redo, #a oli 1445 Aristotele, %nalitici secondi, a c$ra di M' Mign$cci, in Hrganon, ,ol' IV, .ater1a, 2oma-3ari 1444 Aristotele, LonfutaZioni sofistiche, a c$ra di M' anatta,2i11oli, Milano 1445 Aristotele, (ell interpretaZione, a c$ra di M' anatta,2i11oli, MIlano 1442 Aristotele, L anima, a c$ra di E' Mo,ia, 3om iani, Milano 2001 Aristotele, La Misica, a c$ra di .' 2$ggi$, Mimemis, Milano 2008 Aristotele, Le categorie, a c$ra di M' anatta, 2i11oli, Milano 1484 Aristotele, ^etafisica (2 ,oll'), a c$ra di M' anatta, 2i11oli 2004 Aristotele, ^etafisica (/ ,oll'), a c$ra di E' 2eale, Vita e "ensiero, Milano 1445 Aristotele, ^etaphysics (2 ,oll'), c$red and commented &% :ir G' D' 2oss, )essinger "$&lishing, 2008 Aristotele, Organon, a c$ra di E' Colli, Adel hi, Milano 200/ Aristotele, &etorica, a c$ra di M' Dorati, Mondadori, Milano 144= 3erti 7' (a c$ra di), uida ad %ristotele, .ater1a, 2oma-3ari 200< 3erti 7', %ristotele' (alla dialettica alla filosofia prima, 3om iani, Milano 2000 3erti 7', LontraddiZione e dialettica negli antichi e nei moderni, .Ce os, "alermo, 148< 3erti 7', Nuovi studi aristotelici (,ol' I), Morcelliana, 3rescia 2000 3erti 7'9 Centrone 3'9 Kait "'9 %ristotele e l ontologia, Al&o,ersorio, Milano 200< 3erto K', La dialettica della struttura originaria, Il "oligra!o, "arma 200/ 3ochenski I' M', %ncient formal logic, #orth-Dolland $&lishing coman% 1451 3ochenski I' M', La logica formale, a c$ra di A' Conte, 7ina$di, (orino 14<1 3onit1 D', Sulle categorie di %ristotele, a c$ra di E' 2eale,Vita e ensiero, Milano 1445

5=

Metalogicon (2011) XXIV, 1

25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36.

37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47.

D;ring I', %ristotele, translated &% "' Donini, M$rsia, Milano 14<= Eentile E', Sistemi di logica come teoria del conoscere (2 ,oll'), .e lettere, Kiren1e 200/ Eiordani A', [empo e struttura dell essere. Il concetto di tempo in %ris! totele e i suoi fondamenti ontologici,Vita e "ensiero, Milano 1445 Degel E' G' K', ScienZa della logica, translated &% A' Moni (ri,' da C' Cesa), .ater1a, 2oma-3ari 2008' D$sserl 7', &icerche logiche (2 ,oll'), a c$ra di E' "iana, Il saggiatore, Milano 2005 >aeger G', %ristotele, :ansoni, Kiren1e 2000 >ori A', %ristotele, Mondadori, Milano 200/ )ant I', Lritica della ragion pura, translated &% "' Chiodi, J(7(, (orino 2005 .$kasiewic1 >', (el principio di contraddiZione in %ristotele, a c$ra di E' Kranci e C' A' (esti F$odli&et, Macerata 200/ Malatesta M', La logica delle funZioni, Millenni$m 2omae, 2oma 2000 Malatesta M', La logica primaria, .72, 2oma 1488 Malatesta M', Sulla formulaZione unica dei principi di identit_, non contraddiZione e terZo escluso nella logica proposiZionale, I "i11i, 2eggio Cala&ria, 14<4 9 II, (i ogra!ia artigiana, .atina, 14<49 III, Eiannini, #a oli, 1481 Migliori M'9 Kermani A' (a c$ra di), Ylatone e %ristotele. (ialettica e logica, Morcelliana, 3rescia 2008 "asA$ale E', Il principio di non!contraddiZione in %ristotele, 3oringhieri, (orino 2008 "latone, Sofista, a c$ra di K' Kronterotta, 2i11oli, Milano 200< "latone, [eeteto, a c$ra di M' Valmigli e A' M' Io olo, .ater1a, 2oma-3ari 1444 2eale E', Il concetto di filosofia prima e l unit_ della ^etafisica di %r! istotele, 3om iani, Milano 2008 :e,erino 7', lenchos, in Il problema del fondamento e la filosofia italiana del Novecento, Aracne 2oma 200= :e,erino 7', ssenZa del nichilismo, Adel hi, Milano 1482 :e,erino 7', Mondamento della contraddiZione, Adel hi, Milano 2000 :e,erino 7', La Struttura Originaria, Adel hi, Milano 1481 :e,erino 7', La tendenZa fondamentale del nostro tempo, Adel hi, Milano 1488' :e,erino 7', [autotes, Adel hi, Milano 1445

5<

Metalogicon (2011) XXIV, 1

48.

(ommaso dCAA$ino, Lommento alla ^etafisica (/ ,oll'), trad' it' di .' "erotto, 7:D, 3ologna 2000

58

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