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WITTGENSTEIN’S THERAPY:
MAKING PROBLEMS DISAPPEAR
by
Alan Parry, Ph.D.
Philosophical Investigations.
.............
The way to solve the problem you see in life
is to live in a way that will make
what is problematic disappear.
The fact that life is problematic shows
that the shape of your life
does not fit into life's mould.
So you must change the way you live and,
once your life does fit into the mould,
what is problematic will disappear.
Culture & Value, p. 27
Ludwig Wittgenstein
1. It is remarkable that so little effort has been made thus far to spell out
the therapeutic implications of Wittgenstein's philosophy. Newman (1996)
himself a philosopher, has addressed this subject, as has Shawver (2001) in
many of her writings and communications. Although not writing from a
specifically therapeutic position Shotter (1994, 1997) has clarified
Wittgenstein's Therapy Page 3
Wittgenstein's work in a way that makes it most helpful to therapists.
Wittgenstein himself saw connections between philosophy and therapy
stating, for instance, that: "The philosopher's treatment of a question is like
the treatment of an illness" (PI, 253). He also said: "There is not a
philosophical method, although there are indeed methods, like different
therapies" (PI, 133). Their application should result in "complete clarity"
which should then have the effect that "philosophical problems should
completely disappear" (133). Since, from Wittgenstein's perspective,
philosophical problems are problems that have to do with language and the
ways we use and misuse it, they must, of necessity, be problems in living.
Indeed, he makes it clear that he sees no reason for doing philosophy unless
it makes a difference in one's life (C & V, p. 85). "Working in philosophy . . . is
really more a working on oneself" (C & V, p. 16). He also said: "Thoughts that
are at peace. That's what someone who philosophizes yearns for" (C & V, p.
43). In that sense we must surely all, then, be philosophers!
4. When we realize this and pay attention not only to what we are saying, but
how we are saying it and what it means to the other person, says
Wittgenstein, the problematic nature of language evaporates or dissolves.
We are then able to engage in those “thoughts that are at peace” for
Wittgenstein, the aim of philosophy. The obstacle to this attainment lies in
acting as though words are sufficient and simply stand in for the objects
they presumably define (PI, 1).
8. Wittgenstein did not go into a great deal of detail as to how such rules
become established. As usual he is suggestive rather then definitive, as in
the following example:
"Doesn't the analogy between language and games throw light
here? We can easily imagine people amusing themselves in a field by
playing with a ball so as to start various existing games, but playing
many without finishing them and in between throwing the ball and
bombarding one another for a joke and so on. And now someone says:
The whole time they are playing a ball-game and following definite
rules at every throw.
And is there not also the case where we play and--make up
the rules as we go along? And there is even one where we alter
them--as we go along" (PI 83).
9. We also know from the field of group processes that when a given
interaction repeats itself without any of the parties involved objecting or
taking issue with the way the activity is performed a rule becomes
established. This does not imply that the participants have set or are even
necessarily aware of the rule they are following . Generally speaking language
games are what people are engaged in when they are performing tasks
together or are simply spending time conversing with each other. If it is a
set activity such as painting a fence the nature of the task will heavily
influence what rules are established by the participants. If it is a
predominantly social activity the rules may be made up as those involved go
along, most often by a subtle process of ongoing negotiation conveyed by
looks, gestures, expressions and tone of voice suggesting acquiescence or
varying degrees of reservation. Yet as long as the participants continue
playing without one or the other explicitly opposing or even refusing the
game will continue; challenges to the ongoing rules as are allowed, even when
they are not appreciated and may have the effect of introducing a new rule.
10. Wittgenstein describes language games, then, in terms of the rules that
govern various, more or less characteristic ways people do things together.
He wants to distinguish between the different ways words are used during
particular types of activity. He is challenging the positivist approach to
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language which he himself had been instrumental in developing through his
work with Bertrand Russell, George Moore and other language philosophers at
Cambridge. According to them words which did not refer to a specific thing in
an unambiguous way were meaningless. His first great work, The Tracatus-
Logico-Philosophicus (1922/1961) was written in this vein. His later
philosophy, by contrast, was at pains to legitimize languages that were more
elusive and ambiguous such as the characteristic language and terminology
specific to religious, artistic or everyday conversational discourses could not
be otherwise dismissed as unscientific or nonsensical. In short Wittgenstein
sought to understand language according to how humans typically and
variously speak to each other and, in so doing, seem to understand each
other quite well. Wittgenstein went from there to include not only the
languages of various specific activities, but the accompanying tone and
overall social context in which the actual words were addressed. He notes,
for instance, that: "Imponderable evidence includes subtleties of glance, of
gesture, of tone" (PI, II, p. 194)
11. Once it is understood that words are part of a social activity, which
includes their context, philosophers, for instance, could no longer accuse
theologians or even those of different approaches to philosophy of talking
nonsense. Such accusations are a product of using words independently of
the rules of their particular language game. Words thus misused could be
made into weapons to heap scorn on people we disagree with. Instead, then,
of asking how a word is properly defined it would be far more helpful to ask
how it is being used (PI 1).
13. In regard to the implications of Wittgenstein for therapy the issue for
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me relates as much to the way words are often used as when the
assumption is made that when a particular word is used within a conversation
or report of one to another, the listener understands the word in the same
way as the speaker. It is helpful, then, for a therapist to seek clarification,
particularly when the words used have an ambiguous or imprecise quality.
She will keep asking such questions as "What do you mean by that word?" or
"Just how are you using that word?" The therapists job, from a
Wittgensteinian perspective, is to help people participaate in the same
language game with each other, that is to say to 'talk the same language'
when they are attempting to come to a common understanding or achieve a
common goal. If they do not, they are apt to find themselves working at
cross purposes, antagonizing rather than supporting one another.
14. Troubles, confusion and distress arise from at least two sources. Thje
first of these occurs when the rules of particular language games are broken
or when those involved misunderstand the rules (PI, 125). The second of
these occurs when one perwson, or even both, seek to impose their
preferred and accustomed language game on the other (C, 609). To the
latter end sometimes hitherto agreed-upon rules are broken covertly so that
one may gain an advantage over the other. This frequently happens when
there is confusion or a struggle over who gets to set the rules. this
frequently happens in a family when one parent frequently undermines the
rules they were supposedly observing. At times such as this words can
disguise a covert agenda of, for instance, gaining an edge in the relationship.
It is when rules are broken covertly or there is confusion concerning the
rules of a particular game involved that problems enter our lives. This
frequently happens when there is a struggle for who gets to set the rules,
always keeping in mind that such rules are implicit, rarely explicit.
18. When Wittgenstein says that nothing is hidden he also means that our
words do not need to be seen as carrying with them hidden meanings nor are
they driven by forces at work from deep inside us. Different ways of
speaking reflect simply particular language games, ways for people to engage
Wittgenstein's Therapy Page 9
in different kinds of activity with one another. It is not necessary to look
further than the grammar or rules of a given language game to understand
what is going on. It is a descriptive and not an explanatory matter and it is
about a social activity that is there for all who would use their eyes to see.
19. Our insistence, for instance, that we think our thoughts intentionally,
hence deserve credit or blame for them, is itself a language game one,
moreover, that has given rise to the grammatical fiction of an “I” that
conjures up thoughts which it then puts into words. This misapprehension is
yet another source of confusion and misunderstanding, both for ourselves
and our activities with others. Indeed, Wittgenstein writes: "One of the most
dangerous ideas for a philosopher is, oddly enough, that we think with our
heads or in our heads. The idea of thinking as a process in the head, in a
completely enclosed space, gives him something occult" (Z, 1981, 605. 606).
A language game guided by the assumption that it is more or less separate
thinking "I"s who interact with one another is utterly misleading and gives
rise to endless confusion. The social activity between the participants is all
that is necessary to attend to. An assumption that each is acting from
behind a separate, enclosed identity cannot but give rise to a needless
speculation about who and what is behind the activity pulling the strings to
make it happen, so to speak. It introduces a separate reality where none is
needed to understand what is happening. "Don't think, but look!"
20. In most cases what is taking place between ourselves and another
proceeds spontaneously. It does not even occur to us, in such instances, to
ask ourselves what is driving either ourselves or the other person. It is only
when we are puzzled by something between us that is not adding up that we
say to ourselves, "What's going on?" Thus, Wittgenstein wonders if it is
necessary to assume, as Kerr puts it, that "what we have to do sometimes
is . . . what we have to do always" (1986/1997, p. 80), namely struggle to
understand each other. Most of the time we understand each other
remarkably well without trying or wondering what the other person is
thinking. To the extent that this does happen, however, it may be an artifact
of the assumptive belief in the Cartesian self, namely that something is
going on inside the other person's head and, in fact, that what is going on
there is the most important thing of all. But what if, indeed, what is going on
there most of the time is of little or no account? The only time there is, is
Wittgenstein's Therapy Page 10
when there is a problem, a discrepancy, a departure from the usual. That is
the "sometimes" to which Kerr refers.
21. The very assumption that what is most important are the hidden
thoughts in the other person's head creates a problem all of its own making
which we must take steps to solve. By trying to solve a fictitious problem we
then create several more, mostly by asking ourselves unanswerable
questions and then making up our own questionable answers to them and
acting on the basis of these equally fictitious conclusions. Entire schools of
therapy have been built on these unprofitable speculations.
22. This does not mean that nothing is going on within those involved in any
interaction. There is, after all, the ever abundant chatter we all engage in
with ourselves, perhaps at least partly what Wittgenstein means when he
refers to those situations in which "language takes a holiday" (PI, 37). Even
such chatter is readily available to us. It might be hidden to others, but not
to oneself except that it is often, like so much else in our gestural language,
overlooked. Thus we are still able to agree with Wittgenstein that it is not
necessary to posit some kind of additional spectral mind or an entity called
the unconscious to explain actions that seem disproportionate. To do so is
part of a language game of its own, or a manner of speaking.
23. Hence we have Wittgenstein's famous injunction: "Don't think, but look!"
(PI, 66). In other words, it is all there for our eyes to see if only we use them
for that purpose. As he also points out, "everything lies open to view" (PI,
125). Thus it might be said that for Wittgenstein the unconscious is not
hidden from view in the depths of the psyche, it is instead on the surface if
only we look and pay attention. It is only unconscious, however, in that we
overlook virtually everything about how we act except for the words we use.
26. As Wittgenstein has observed: "The human body is the best picture of
the human soul" (PI, Pt. Ii, iv). It is the embodied soul which is there for all to
see that exposes the trickery that we play on ourselves and would play on
others, It is not from within the hidden depths of an unconscious mind that
we are betrayed.
27. The therapist is to challenge with what Wittgenstein calls "charm," which
is how he describes the appeal of psychoanalysis. Its charm has to do with
its metaphorical power in the use of terms that carry with them their own
mystique, terms such as the unconscious the Oedipus Complex and later on
the ego, the super ego and, most fascinating of all, "the seething cauldron of
the id." Freud's eventual great rival, Carl Jung, if anything outdid even Freud
in the creation of an entire mythology with which to appeal to the
imaginations of his followers and patients. Currently the Australian family
therapist, Michael White, has been singularly creative in his ability to invent
imaginative words with which to appeal and persuade.
29. Participating fully in the forms of life involves simply a willingness to play
by the rules. This is never more so than in the language game of what we
might call "getting along with others." While this is implied in language games
generally, getting along necessarily gives rise to such basic rules as give and
take, taking turns, treating one another fairly, not taking unfair advantage
of one another, not ganging up on one person, in short of acting decently and
fairly with one another. Moreover such rules are, not so much extrinsic as
intrinsic and emergent in the task or situation involved.
32. The task of therapy is to address the obstacles that interfere with or
prevent such participation. It is considered a given that the goal of such a
therapy would concern the simple matter of being able to act decently and
fairly with those with whom we enter into relationship. The obstacles toward
this kind of participation might involve the usual suspects: childhood fears or
trauma, including the effects of physical, sexual or emotional abuse and
relationship histories of abuse, betrayals and disappointments. Other
obstacles involve confusion over how much can legitimately be expected of
oneself or of others in the case of children and adolescents or those
suffering from specific disabilities.
35. Wittgenstein was notoriously hard on himself and he was also demanding
of others. There is the famous story of his confessional encounters with
people he believed he had hurt in the course of his life. When he made his
confession to his friend Fania Pascal she responded with exasperation:
"'What is it? You want to be perfect?' 'Of course I want to be perfect.' he
thundered" (Monk, 1991, p. 369). This story by itself demonstrates a crucial
element in Wittgenstein's work, namely that, if one finds oneself unhappy or
beset with problems, it is up to oneself to take whatever steps are
necessary necessary to get back in step, recalling the words from the final
epigram beginning this work: "So you must change the way you live . . ." (C &
V , p. 27) Wittgenstein's therapy, then, is a demanding one. It is one that
expects people to do their part, to play the games of life by the rules that
make full participation possible. It would, moreover, trace doing anything less
to the ways language is misused, that is in this case to justify oneself in
holding back and seeking to be excused, to be made an exception when the
games of life permit no exemptions other than those graduated for children
and granted for those simply and clearly disabled from the very possibility of
full participation.
38. Adherence to 'the rules of the game' does not mean simply complying
with the conventions of the society, nor strict obedience to the family rules,
in which one lives. It does not mean mere fitting in. Wittgenstein understands
that there are different kinds of rules for different phenomena. There are
grammatical rules, mathematical rules, game rules, fixed rules and
circumstantial rules. Those governing the life forms of everyday human
interaction refer to an active and ongoing process of making up the rules as
we go along, that is to say acting with each other in an ongoing, collaborative
way in order to adapt to evolving circumstances.
39. Within this adaptational framework, however, it is the fact that certain
overarching, more or less stable rules which include give and take, taking
turns, being honest, giving the other person the benefit of the doubt are
practiced that makes it possible for those involved to hear and trust each
other sufficiently that it becomes possible to make up workable rules as we
go along. It is also through observing such basic rules of decency that it
becomes possible for creativity and innovation to arise and find a foothold in
Wittgenstein's Therapy Page 16
human affairs, thus to provide the possibility of something that Wittgenstein
valued supremely: the achievement of a fully human civilization.
42. A major factor in the increasing prevalence of the latter may be the
increasing individualism of modern society which has emerged both out of
two sources: the decline of the moral consensus that was still holding up,
albeit in rather tattered condition, perhaps until the early 1960s at least in
North America; the rise of the consumer society which made it possible for
everyone to fancy being able to gratify their own material desires. In an
individualistic world the very idea of governing one's own actions according to
various rules of the game became virtually incomprehensible. Instead the
ideal has perhaps come closer to an assumption that it was not only
desirable but possible to make up one's own rules as one goes along come
what may.
46. What he perhaps did not speak to in so doing were the ways such
conversations serve to build and maintain a self-image for purposes of
presenting ourselves in a predictable and enhanced way to others and in the
families and communities in which we live. Perhaps this had to do with the
extremely critical stance he took toward himself. Even this, however,
suggests that he had a great deal of concern both for how he appeared to
others and how he appeared to himself. Toward others he appears to have
been dubious about being seen as, for instance, the founder of a
Wittgensteinian school of philosophy. Toward himself he was painfully aware
of his personal and, above all, his moral failings. Thus his self-image, like so
much about him, comes from an earlier age when a confessional mode of
self-criticism formed the crux of one's self presentation, a far cry indeed
from the contemporary preoccupation with enhancing and polishing one's
image in the eyes of others perhaps first then of oneself.