Ekprvsiw and the goodness of god in Cleanthes

RICARDO SALLES

ABSTRACT
The kprvsiw, or worlds conagration, followed by the restoration of an identical world seems to go against the rationality of the Stoic god. The aim of this paper is to show that Cleanthes, the second head of the School, can avoid this paradox. According to Cleanthes, the conagration is an inevitable side-effect of the necessary means used by god to sustain the world. Given that this side-effect is contrary to gods sustaining activity, but unavoidable, gods rationality requires the restoration of an identical world once the conagration subsides. The paper also deals with the relation between Cleanthes and other early Stoics on the topic of conagration. In particular, Cleanthes position seems to differ from Chrysippus. For in contrast with the Cleanthean god, who causes the conagration as a sideeffect only, the Chrysippean god, according to an inuential interpretation put forward by Jaap Mansfeld, causes the conagration as his ultimate cosmological goal.

In orthodox Stoic theory, the present world (ksmow) will be destroyed by god through a mighty re or conagration (kprvsiw). Once the conagration subsides, a restoration occurs, known as the pokatstasiw. In it, god builds a new world, exactly identical to the present one. But if so, why does the Stoic god destroy the world in the rst place? In this paper, I explore one possible answer to this question that of Cleanthes, the second Head of the Stoic school (331-232 BCE). The idea of a conagration followed by a restoration poses several philosophical problems. But the one just mentioned affects the rationality and goodness of god. The problem had already been perceived by Aristotle while attacking the notion that the world is perishable (De Philosophia fr. 19c Ross = fr. 21 Rose3).
If [the new world] is like [the old], its articer will have laboured in vain (e d moiow, mataiopnow texnthw), differing in nothing from silly children, who often when playing on the beach make great piles of sand and then undermine them with their hands and pull them down again. (Barnes/Lawrence trans.)

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Phronesis L/1

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The problem relates not so much to the destruction of the world as to its destruction followed by the restoration of an identical world.1 If the new world will be identical, what does god destroy the present world for? God would have a reason to destroy it if the present world were replaced by a better one. But according to orthodox Stoicism the new world is not better.2 Thus, apparently, god is not acting fully rationally in this one instance. But this goes against the perfect rationality of the Stoic god, which is presupposed by his perfect goodness. I shall refer to this problem as the paradox of conagration. It is not the purpose of this paper to determine whether Cleanthes knew of this Aristotelian paradox nor whether, if he did, there is textual evidence that he sought to avoid it.3 The purpose of this paper is rather to address the more abstract question of whether his cosmology can avoid the paradox in a way that is philosophically satisfactory. My main contention is that it can. The elements of a solution may be gathered from a series of theses that, as I shall argue, may be attributed to him. On his view, god acts upon the world in order to sustain and preserve it. This is the ultimate cosmological goal that he pursues. However, the means he employs to sustain the world is heat. And an inevitable side-effect of heating is a gradual desiccation of the world as a whole, in which heat will end up consuming the world entirely. In effect, nothing will remain but re (relinqui nihil praeter ignem).4 The conagration, therefore, is the

Accepted July 2004 1 The section of the De Philosophia contained in fragment 19c Ross (of which the passage I quoted is a part) seeks to establish the impossibility of the worlds destruction by arguing that it is contrary to the nature of god in the following (exhaustive) cases: (a) when the destruction is not followed by the making of another world, and, (b) when it is. This latter case is divided into two sub-cases: (b1) when the other world is different from the present one and (b2) when it is identical to it. Our present passage is the argument given in connection with (b2). For discussion of the fragment as a whole, see Chroust (1977) and Mansfeld (1979) at 138-44. 2 See Sandbach (1975), 79, Mansfeld (1999), 467-8, Furley (1999), 439, and Salles (2003), 263-7. 3 It is at least possible that the early Stoics in general did know of the paradox (along with the other Aristotelian arguments against the destructibility of the world in frs. 19a-c Ross) and that they addressed it in their cosmology. For the view that this is not only possible but likely, see Mansfeld (1979) 138 and 159-72. Long (1985), 25 wholly agree[s] with Mansfeld on this particular issue (although not on others, see my section 4 below). See also Long (1998), 361-7, esp. 364 n. 15. 4 Cleanthes ap. Cicero, De Natura Deorum [ND] 2.118. I return to this passage in section 2 below.

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inevitable outcome of a certain process desiccation that is necessarily concomitant to the production of an end. But given that the conagration involves destruction (in Cleanthes at least), the conagration and the desiccation process that leads to it are contrary to gods sustenance of the world. Thus, god has a good reason to build an exactly new world once the conagration subsides. Given that the sustenance of the world is the ultimate goal he pursues, and since the conagration is disruptive of this plan, gods rationality requires the restoration of the world as it existed before the conagration. Crucial to the reconstruction I have just outlined are the two connected claims that (i) desiccation and conagration are not pursued by the Cleanthean god as ends, and that (ii) desiccation and conagration are indeed contrary to his primary end, namely, the sustenance of the world. I shall provide detailed arguments for supporting each of these claims. I begin by examining the notion of side-effect, or concomitant, as distinct from the notions of end and of means. The distinction goes back to Platos Timaeus and Cleanthes would be the rst Stoic to have used it, whether or not he knew of the distinction as drawn by Plato. An account of Platos views is nevertheless important because it will help us to shed light on how the distinction works in general. This account is provided in section 1. In section 3, I explain in detail how the notion of side-effect is used by Cleanthes in connection with the conagration. It is in section 3 that I develop more fully Cleanthes solution to the paradox. This argument is preceded in section 2 by the examination of a puzzle concerning Cleanthes theory of re. The puzzle is that the texts in which the theory is reported attribute contrary powers to the very re that is supposed to sustain the world, namely, the suns re or heat (calor): the power itself to sustain the world, on the one hand, and the power to desiccate and ultimately destroy it, on the other. These two powers are active simultaneously throughout each cosmic cycle. And this is puzzling precisely because it is one and the same entity the sun that exercises these two contrary powers. As I explain in section 3, the puzzle cannot be removed unless we assume that in Cleanthes the sustenance of the world is, and the conagration is not, an end pursued by god. The conagration is just a side-effect of the worlds sustenance, albeit an inevitable one. I conclude in section 4 with some remarks on how different his solution is from other possible Stoic solutions to the paradox.

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1. Platonic necessary concomitants It is to Platos Timaeus that we owe the distinction between ends, means and concomitants. The latter are phenomena that are neither ends nor means to an end. Yet they depend for their existence on ends and means. They do so in two complementary senses. Firstly, these concomitants would not obtain if certain ends could be achieved through other means. We may express this idea by saying that concomitants supervene on the actual means to achieve these ends. Second, given these means, the concomitants are inevitable. They do not merely supervene on these means; they are also necessitated by them. This double dependence of concomitants is illustrated through an example that Plato develops from 74e to 75d. There, our short-livedness is presented as an unavoidable side-effect of our having a thin skull, which is a necessary means for achieving intelligence (frnhsiw). I quote in Zeyls translation, slightly modied, a crucial part of the passage (75a4-c7 Burnet).
On the other hand, all those bodily parts that do possess intelligence are less [eshy], except perhaps for a eshy thing the tongue, for example that was created to be itself an organ of sensation. But in most cases it is as I said. For there is no way that anything whose generation and composition are a consequence of Necessity can accommodate ( gr j ngkhw gignomnh ka suntrefomnh fsiw odam prosdxetai) the combination of thick bone and massive esh with keen and responsive sensation. If these two characteristics had tolerated their concomitance (eper ma sumpptein yelhsthn), our heads above all else would have been so constituted as to possess this combination, and the human race, crowned with a head fortied with esh and sinews, would have a life twice, or many more times as long, a healthier and less painful life than the one we have now. As it was, however, our makers calculated the pros and cons (nalogizomnoiw) of giving our race greater longevity but making it worse, versus making it better, though less long-lived, and decided that the superior though shorter life-span was in every way preferable for everyone (pant pntvw areton:) to the longer but inferior one. This is why they capped the head with a sparse layer of bone and not with esh and sinew, given that the head has no joints. For all these reasons, then, the head has turned out to be more sensitive and intelligent but also, in every mans case, much weaker than the body to which it is attached.

In the example, the end pursued is having an intelligent life something Plato undoubtedly regards as good. The thinness of our skull is a necessary means for attaining this end. And our short-livedness is neither an end nor a means to that end, but an inevitable consequence of the means necessary for the end. In particular, our short-livedness is not a means to

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that end. For in order for something M to be a means to an end E, M should be a cause of E and, therefore, explain why E occurs (E obtains because of M should be true).5 However, it is not because we are shortlived that we are capable of intelligence: we are capable of intelligence rather because our skull is thin. Now, although our short-livedness is neither a means nor an end, it depends on means and ends in the two complementary senses I mentioned earlier. Firstly, had the thinness of our skull not been a necessary means to achieve intelligence, we would certainly have had a more resistant skull and, in effect, a longer life (75b6). In other words, we would have had a more resistant skull and a longer life had the possession of intelligence been compatible with the possession of thick skulls (which is something that Plato claims to be impossible; cf. odam prosdxetai at 75b1).6 Therefore, our short-livedness is supervenient on the actual means to achieve an end. Second, given the necessary means to achieve intelligence, namely the thinness of our skull, we are bound to be short-lived. And this is so for the simple reason that the thinness of the skull entails its fragility. Thus, the fact that we are short-lived is not just supervenient on the necessary means to achieve intelligence, but also necessitated by it. The threefold distinction end-means-concomitants is used by Plato to explain why in the ideally well-designed world described in the Timaeus we are short-lived given that a longer life is better all else being equal.7 Methodologically, the argument starts from the undeniable observable fact that our life is short and, then, seeks to explain why, despite the worlds providential order, our shortness of life is inevitable. It is thus important to stress that Platos explanation is not that our makers were mean or negligent at the time of designing us. On the contrary, our short-livedness is the result of an nalogismw, or reasoned choice, that they had to make. Each of the options they were faced with involved a compromise between longevity and the quality of life: giving our race greater longevity but
5 A locus classicus in Plato for the relation between cause and explanation is Phaedo, 92A-102A. For a recent (and partly negative) discussion of this relation see Sedley (1998), esp. 121-23. 6 See 74e8-10: our skull has to be thin because otherwise it would be unable to encase a brain as sensitive as the one we now have: its hardness would cause insensibility (naisyhsan mpoiosai); this, in turn, would make thinking less retentive and more obscure (dusmnhmoneuttera ka kvftera t per tn dinoian). 7 See Steel (2001), 107. However, for a critical discussion of the extent to which humans and their happiness are really part of gods plan in the Timaeus, see Broadie (2001), esp. 8-21.

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making it worse, versus making it better, though less long-lived (75b9c1). Far from suggesting a lack of benevolence or of rationality in our makers, the option they selected is meant by Plato at 75c3 to emphasise these two traits: it is the option that is preferable in every way (pntvw) and for everyone (pant). I shall argue that, to be consistent with the idea that god is fully rational and good, Cleanthes cosmology logically requires that the conagration and the mechanical desiccation process of which it is the ultimate outcome have the status of Platonic concomitants.8 To be sure, conagration and desiccation are not taken by Cleanthes as observable facts that require no proof. They are established through theoretical cosmological arguments. This is a signicant point of contrast with our short-livedness in the Timaeus, which is an observable phenomenon. But by analogy with our short-livedness in the Timaeus, desiccation and conagration are regarded by Cleanthes as unavoidable. Also, in the explanation given by Cleanthes, as in the one offered by Plato, the benevolence and full rationality of the deity responsible for the design of the world is not put into question. For in Cleanthes too, desiccation and conagration come out as the result of a compromise. Being inevitable side-effects of the means employed by god to sustain the world, they depend on this means in at least the second sense in which Platonic concomitants depend on means god has no choice but to let them occur in order to be able to carry out his plan (I deal with the rst sense at the end of section 3). 2. A puzzle in Cleanthes theory of re It is through reection on a puzzle posed by Cleanthes theory of re that we may come to the conclusion that he must have regarded the worlds desiccation and conagration as Platonic concomitants. This section is devoted to presenting this puzzle. As I pointed out in the introduction, the puzzle is that Cleanthes theory of re seems to attribute contrary powers to the sun: the power to sustain the world but also the power to desiccate and ultimately destroy it. However, how can one and the same entity simultaneously exercise contrary powers? To appreciate that this puzzle does arise from Cleanthes theory of re, I shall consider several texts that
Two recent studies on the structural and historical connections between the Timaeus and early Stoic physics and cosmology (but that do not mention the parallel between Plato and Cleanthes that I am drawing) are Sedley (2002) and Betegh (2003), 289-93.
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either report the theory directly or help us understand some of its aspects by comparison with the position of other early Stoics. A central passage dealing with Cleanthes theory of re is Cicero, ND 2.40-41:
40 That they [the stars] consist entirely of re (tota esse ignea) Cleanthes holds to be established by the evidence of two senses: by touch and by sight. For the heat and radiance of the sun is brighter than that of any re, inasmuch as it shines so far and wide over the vast world and the contact of its rays is of such a nature that it not only warms (tepefaciat) but often actually burns, neither of which things could it do if it were not made of re. Therefore, he proceeds, since the sun is ery and is nourished by the vapours of the ocean (for no re can endure without some sort of nourishment) it is necessary that it be either like the re that we employ for our use and maintenance or like the one contained in the body of living things. 41 Now, this re of ours, whose use is needed for life, is a destroyer and consumer of all things and also dissolves and scatters everything wherever it spreads (Atqui hic noster ignis, quem usus vitae requirit, confector est et consumptor omnium idemque quocumque invasit cuncta disturbat ac dissipat). By contrast, the bodily re is vital and salutary; it preserves all things, nourishes, fosters growth, sustains, and bestows perception (omnia conservat, alit, auget, sustinet, sensuque adcit). He therefore denies that there is any doubt which of the two kinds of re the sun is like, for the sun too brings it about that all things ourish and grow according to their species.

The passage is part of a longer text running from 2.39 to 2.42. In it, Cicero expounds an argument by Cleanthes designed to prove that the stars, including the sun, are gods (in deorum numero astra esse ducenda). The argument proceeds by claiming that (1) the sun is made out of re, and (2) the re it is made out of is of the same kind as that which is contained in the bodies of living things. As such, (3) it must be itself a living thing. But (4) the stars occupy the region of ether and, given the properties of ether, its living inhabitants, if any, must have the highest form of life. This involves the highest degree of intellect. And from this the intended conclusion follows since ex hypothesi the stars are indeed living things.9 Our passage establishes premises (1) and (2) of this argument. Given certain attributes of the sun attributes that are directly observable the sun is of a ery nature. Now, the re of the sun, as any other re, is of one of two kinds. One is the kind that we use in our daily life (i.e. ame). This is destructive and consumes everything. The other is the kind that exists in the body of living things. This takes the form of heat (calor), as

9 For a full discussion of how these four sections relate to Cleanthes earlier proof of the intelligence of the world at 2.29-30 see Hahm (1977), 267-73.

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was explicitly stated earlier in ND (2.25-30, see below), but is also suggested in this very passage through the observation that the suns re warms (tepefaciat). Unlike the other kind of re, this one is vital and salutary. It constitutes, notably, a sustaining, rather than a destructive power. The suns re, or heat, causes things to ourish and grow according to the species to which they belong. It therefore cannot be made out of the destructive kind that we use in daily life. The suns re is not ame. In consequence, the suns re is heat, which is the kind of re that exists in the body of living things. An earlier passage of this same book of the ND also refers to the idea that heat is the power that sustains the world. The views expressed there also belong to Cleanthes and they are worth considering in detail because our analysis of them will allow us later on to appreciate the contrariness of the powers that Cleanthes attributes to the sun. The passage comes in section 28:
From which we can conclude that, since all the parts of the world are sustained by heat (omnes mundi partes sustineantur calore), it is by an element either similar or identical [to re] that the world itself has been preserved for such a long time, and all the more so because it should be understood that this warm and ery entity is extended in every nature (intellegi debet calidum illud atque igneum ita in omni fusum esse natura) so as to contain the power of reproduction and the cause of generation, and to be that from which all animate things, as well as those whose roots are supported by earth, must be brought to birth and grow. There is therefore an element that holds the whole world together and preserves it (Natura est igitur quae contineat mundum omnem eumque tueatur).

Notice that heat is not just responsible for the sustenance of the parts of the world. It is also the cause of the sustenance and preservation of the world as a whole. And, as was indicated earlier, in sections 24-25, heat performs this sustaining function by pervading the whole world and penetrating all things.10 Another important feature of the present passage is the role given to reproduction in gods sustenance of the world. The

10 A similar account is found in Chrysippus, except that his view seems to have been that the all-pervading stuff through which god sustains the world, breath (pnema), is a mixture of re and air. See Galen, De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis [PHP] de Lacy 5.3.8 (SVF 2.841, LS 47H). For discussion see LS 1, 287. Long and Sedley present Chrysippus as modifying Cleanthes position on this question. As I argue in section 3, however, Chrysippus also believed that re is an element more basic than air, which resolves into re. So there is reason for thinking that the addition of air to the composition of the worlds sustaining cause does not introduce in itself any substantive difference between Chrysippus and Cleanthes.

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explanatory link suggested in the text between the reproduction of living things and this sustenance, suggests that sustenance requires the continuation of the individual natural species that compose the natural order, and that this continuation is guaranteed by the reproduction of the individual members of each species a notion that was implicitly alluded to in ND 2.41, quoted at the beginning of this section. Let us now consider the puzzle. I begin with the passage from ND 2.4041. There a distinction is established between two kinds of re, one destructive and the other constructive and benevolent. And Cleanthes classies the suns re as belonging to the constructive, benevolent kind. If we look closely at the text, however, along with the constructive ones that dene it the suns re also brings on destructive effects. Thus, the contact of the suns rays not only warms but often actually burns (non ut tepefaciat solum sed etiam saepe comburat). Similarly, and more importantly, the suns re nourishes itself from the vapours of the ocean. But, as I shall argue shortly, this process of nourishment entails a gradual desiccation of the world in which the suns re will ultimately consume the world completely. Cleanthes holds that at this stage there occurs a destruction (fyor) of the stars, and presumably of the earth itself, by the sun (Plutarch, comm. not. 1075D). The problem is that Ciceros text had identied destruction as something characteristic of the non-benevolent kind of re. It is this re, and not the suns re, which was supposed to be a destroyer or confector.11 Thus, the suns re is given contrary powers by Cicero himself: the power to sustain but also a power that was supposed to belong exclusively to the non-benevolent re.
I return to the Plutarch passage below. On fyor, see also Alex., in Ar. meteor. 61, 34-65, 7 Hayduck (SVF 2.594) where the idea is attributed to the Stoics (and Heraclitus) that desiccation is the cause of the destruction of the whole (atan enai tn to lou metaboln te ka fyorn), but without reference to the emphasis put by Cleanthes on the fact that the desiccation is itself caused by the process of nourishment of the sun. Notice that von Arnim seems to be wrong in classifying the Alexander passage under Chrysippus since Chrysippus is elsewhere reported by name to have expressely denied that the world is destroyed at the conagration. See Plut., Stoic. Rep. 1052C (SVF 2.604, LS 46E 1): the world must not be said to die, o =hton poynskein tn ksmon. See also 1053B (SVF 2.605, LS 46F 1): at the conagration the world is alive and animal (zn ka zon). The view reported by Eusebius, according to which those who believe in the dissolution into re of all things used the term destruction (fyor) in a qualied sense to mean a type of kat fsin metabol or natural change ( praep. ev. 15.18.2 Mras, SVF 2.596, LS 46K), is very probably a reection of this Chrysippean (but non Cleanthean) thesis. For discussion of this particular point, see LS 1, 278-9. The destruction of the lesser stars (who are lesser gods) by the sun is also discussed in Long (1990), 281-8.
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Evidence for this puzzle may also be gathered from other sources. Consider for instance the distinction between designing (texnikn) and undesigning (texnon) re in Zeno, the founder of the Stoic school. The central passage is in Stobaeus (ecl. 1. 213, 15-21, SVF 1.120, LS 46D):
Zeno said that the sun, the moon and each of the other stars are intelligent and prudent and have the eriness of designing re. For there are two kinds of re: one is undesigning and transforms fuel into itself (t mn texnon ka metabllon ew aut tn trofn); the other is designing, causing growth and preservation (t d texnikn, ajhtikn te ka thrhtikn), as is the case in plants and animals, where it is physique and soul respectively. Such is the re which constitutes the substance of the stars. (Long and Sedley trans. slightly modied)

At rst sight, Zenos distinction corresponds to that proposed by Cleanthes. Firstly, Zenos undesigning re does not preserve things. Nor does Cleanthes destructive re, which is said to destroy them. Second, Zenos designing re causes growth and preservation of living things. And so does the constructive re in Cleanthes. It preserves all things (ND 41: omnia conservat) and is responsible for the fact they grow ( pubescant; cf. auget). Finally, both Zenos designing re and Cleanthes constructive re are said to be that of the stars. These are three important parallels between Zeno and Cleanthes. But there are also two fundamental differences. Firstly, we do not nd in Zeno the puzzling element that we encounter in the theory of Cleanthes. For Zeno does not, either here or elsewhere, attribute to the re of the stars any effect that serves to dene his undesigning re. Second, Cleanthes does attribute to the suns re a power that is characteristic of Zenos undesigning re, as distinct from the re of the stars. It is the power of transforming other things into itself ( metabllon ew aut ). 12 For Cleanthes is reported by Plutarch (comm. not. 1075D Cherniss) to have claimed that at the conagration the sun metabale the stars into itself (pnta metabalen ew autn). It swallows up, as it were, the others stars and, thereby, causes all things to move from a state where they are differentiated from each other and from itself, to a state where they have lost this differentiation and in which nothing remains but the suns ery stuff an idea that would be parallel to the notion, reported by Cicero at ND 2.118, that nothing will remain but re (relinqui nihil praeter ignem).13
Cf. Zeno ap. Alexander Lycopolis, contra Manicheorum opiniones disputatio 19, 2-4. Brinkmann (LS 46I), not in the SVF, discussed in Mansfeld (1979), 147-9. 13 Given that the suns re is not ame but heat (calor) and that the conagration is a state where the whole is homogeneously composed of the suns re, the conagra12

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I return to this idea and to Plutarchs report below. For the moment, notice that Cleanthes attributes to the suns re a power that originally belonged to Zenos undesigning re and, therefore, a power that was perceived by the Zenonian tradition as contrary to the powers of Zenos designing re. If we go deeper into the notion of sustenance in Cleanthes, the contrariness of the effects that he attributes to the suns re may be brought out through a detailed argument. In ND book 2.40, the Latin for sustains is sustinet, a verb that is also used in section 25 (sustinetur). Now, one sentence in section 23 strongly suggests that Cleanthes is referring to the technical Stoic notion of sustaining or cohesive cause (sunektikn ation): as soon as [our inner] heat (calore) is cooled and extinguished we ourselves perish and are extinguished. For in the strict sense, a sunektikn ation is a cause of something being, and remaining, what it is. In consequence, the activity of somethings sustaining cause is temporally coextensive with the existence of that thing. In particular, the existence of the thing is brought to an end if (and only if) the activity of the cause comes to a stop, as is the case in Cleanthes example. Here is a classic text on Stoic causation that brings out this idea (Clement of Alexandria, strom. 8.9.33.1-2 Sthlin et al., SVF 2.351, LS 55I 1-2).14
When preliminary (prokatarktikn) causes are removed the effect remains, whereas a sustaining cause is one during whose presence the effect remains and on whose removal the effect is removed (o parntow mnei t potlesma ka aromnou aretai). (Long and Sedley trans.)

We may apply this causal theory to the conagration in Cleanthes and argue that, in order for the conagration to take place, the sustaining cause of the world must stop its activity, or be removed. There are two specic
tion, in Cleanthes at least, does not seem to involve ame as its main constituent. It is surprising, therefore, that Philo (SVF 1.511) seems to attribute to Cleanthes the view that at the conagration the world is transformed into ame (flj): metabllein d ew flga ew agn, ew mn flga, w eto Klenyhw, ew d agn, w Xrsippow. Cf. Cleanthes ap. Stobaeus 1.153, 8 Wachsmuth, where the conagration is a state where kflogisyntow to pantw. Notice though that the term flj does not necessarily mean ame. Cf. LSJ s. v. 3 citing Aeschylus (Per. 505 and Prom. Des. 22) where it just means heat. See also Homer, Il. 8.135 with discussion in Graz (1965), 200. 14 Cf. Plut., Stoic. Rep 1053F (SVF 2.449, LS 47M 1) and Alex., de mixtione 223, 25-36 Todd (SVF 2.441, LS 47L). For discussion and further references, see Hankinson (1987).

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reasons for this. One has to do with the notion of metabalen and, the other, with that of jomoisiw, both referred to by Plutarch at comm. not. 1075D. The text, as edited and translated by Cherniss, runs as follows:
ti tonun pagvnizmenow Klenyhw t kpursei lgei tn selnhn ka t loip stra tn lion <w gemonikn> jomoisai pnta aut ka metabalen ew autn. Cleanthes, furthermore, in his championship of the conagration asserts that the sun <as ruling faculty> assimilates to itself and transforms into itself the moon and all the rest of the stars.

Consider rst the notion of metabalen. The sun cannot simultaneously transform the stars into itself and sustain them; for in the process of being transformed into something other than themselves the stars must cease to be what they are. As regards the notion of jomoisiw the argument is similar. The sustenance of the world involves the continuation of the different natural species, as we have seen earlier in this section (ND 2.28). But the conagration is a state where the whole is homogeneously composed of re, as is implied by the concept of homogeneity contained in that of jomoisiw. The conagration thereby involves the elimination of any differentiation. Thus, in order for this elimination to occur, the sustaining cause of the world, or god, must stop its activity qua sustaining cause of the world.15 In either case, the conagration and the desiccation of which it is the ultimate outcome, are contrary to gods sustenance of the world. 3. Cleanthes solution to the puzzle: conagration and Platonic concomitants We have been dealing with a puzzle that emerges from the texts dealing with Cleanthes theory of re: the suns re seems to possess, and simultaneously to exercise, two contrary powers. There are two interpretative

15 Which does not mean that at the conagration god must stop its activity simpliciter. This would be impossible given that the Stoic god is essentially (and hence always) active. See especially ND 2.31-32 and Sextus Empiricus, adv. math. 9.75-76 (SVF 2.311, LS 44C). The idea is rather that at the conagration god ceases to sustain the world, which is perfectly compatible with his doing something else, namely, causing the conagration. I return to this issue in section 4 when I deal with the difference between Cleanthes and some heterodox Stoics who contended that god is not the cause of the conagration.

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strategies that we may use to approach the puzzle. One is to emphasise it. According to Cleanthes, heat is used by god through the sun in order to achieve different, but contrary, ends: sustenance and desiccation/conagration. This strategy presupposes the attribution to Cleanthes of a conception of god that involves a contradiction: god is an entity that pursues different ends that cannot be pursued simultaneously as ends. Of course, when an end A is contrary to an end B, the pursuit of A is not necessarily incompatible with the pursuit of B, if A and B are pursued at different times or by different agents. A conict does arise, however, when contrary ends are pursued simultaneously and by the same agent, as would be the case in Cleanthes with sustenance, on the one hand, and desiccation-conagration, on the other, if the latter were also an end that god is pursuing while sustaining the world. The other interpretative strategy seeks to remove the puzzle. In Cleanthes desiccation and conagration do not have the status of ends, but of Platonic concomitants. They are phenomena that are unavoidable given the means used by god to achieve his ultimate cosmological end. This end is the sustenance of the world as a whole. The means he employs to achieve it is heat and the gradual desiccation of things, together with the conagration, are side-effects of this means. The paradox is removed to a considerable extent. For in this case god does not pursue conicting ends. He tries to achieve a single end, even though it is one whose pursuit necessarily involves a compromise: given that the necessary means to sustain the world is also the cause of a process that will lead to its conagration, it is unavoidable that his sustenance of the world be periodically interrupted by its destruction. One could object that there is still a problem in the idea of something that god himself cannot avoid. The reply to this objection is that it leans on a problematic assumption about the nature of god. The assumption is, of course, that god is an entity that can bring about anything whatsoever, that there is no rule of logic or of physics that he cannot bend. Unless god has this unlimited power, the objection collapses. However, this assumption is not only philosophically questionable,16 but also, given the argument I present in what follows, alien to Cleanthes theology.17

For a recent discussion of this long-standing topic of theological and philosophical discussion, see Swinburne (1998), chapter 7 and Rowe (2004), chaps. 1 and 5. 17 A similar point is made by Mansfeld in connection with Zenos god (he cannot avoid that there be a limit to the duration of each conagration, see section 4 below)

16

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I shall argue in favour of the second strategy by giving evidence that in Cleanthes desiccation and conagration are indeed side-effects of heating, and that these are inevitable even for god. According to ND 2.40-41, quoted in the previous section, the sun is nourished (alatur) by the vapours exhaled from the ocean.18 As we know from elsewhere, these vapours are shed back again into the sea, but with a loss of their initial matter. Such loss, however minimal, yields a gradual process of desiccation of the earth and the ocean. And through this process the suns re ends up consuming the whole world. Consider section 118 of ND book 2.
The stars, however, are of a ery nature (natura ammeae), for which reason they are nourished (aluntur) by the vapours of the earth, the sea and the waters that are raised by the sun from the elds that it warms and from the waters. And once the stars and the whole ether are nourished and renewed they shed them back and then, back again, it extracts them from the same source with a loss of almost nothing or only a very small part that is consumed by the re of the stars and the ame of the ether (nihil ut fere intereat aut admodum paululum quod astrorum ignis et aetheris amma consumit).

The details of how desiccation and conagration are related are worth considering. They are mentioned by Cicero further in section 118:
ultimately the whole world will take re (ignesceret) because neither will the earth be able to be nourished, nor will the air circulate, its rising being unable to come about once it has exhausted all the water; thus nothing will remain but re (ita relinqui nihil praeter ignem).

in Mansfeld (1979), 161 and by Long who also agrees with Mansfeld on this particular issue (see Long (1985), 24). Also, as Long has argued elsewhere (Long (1996), 302-4 discussed in Dobbin (1998), 70-1; and Long (2002), 160-2 and 171-2, discussed in Graver (2003)) the idea that gods power is limited is prominent in late Stoicism: see Hierocles ap. Stobaeus, 1. 182, 10-12 and Epictetus (diss. 1.1.10-12 and 21-3); although cf. Seneca, ep. 65.2. 18 Cf. ND 3.37: the periodical proximity of the sun to the earth is explained by Cleanthes as something that the sun does in order not to stay too far from its food (ne longius discebat a cibo). The view that the sun is nourished by the earths humidity goes back to the earliest presocratics. See notably o per Yaln ap. Alex. in Ar. metaph. 23, 26-29 Hayduck. An extensive list of other places in which this view occurs is provided by Pease in his commentary on ND 2.40 in Pease (1958). The idea that desiccation yields conagration is also referred to in connection with the Stoics in DG 469, 12-25 (SVF 2.599), discussed in Mansfeld (1979), 155 and in Long (1985), 26. It is a view that also has its roots in presocratic philosophy. See Anaximander and Diogenes of Apolonia ap. Theophrastus ap. Alex. in Ar. meteor. 67, 1-14 Hayduck.

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Notice the use of modal terminology to describe the process: the earth will be unable to be nourished and re will be unable to rise up. This brings out the necessity by which these two events are brought about in the process of desiccation. Now, if we look back at ND 2.40-41 we may observe that necessity encompasses not just the consequences of desiccation, but the desiccation process itself. In fact, we are told that no re could ( possit) endure without some sort of nourishment. And we know that the vapours of the ocean are what nourish the sun. Thus, the sun could not bring about its constructive effects (and notably its sustenance of the world), unless it endures; it would not endure unless it nourishes itself; but given the nature of its nourishment, or fuel, the sun engages the world in a gradual process of desiccation while nourishing itself. It is for this reason that in Cleanthes the desiccation and conagration are necessary side-effects of the means that god uses to sustain the world. At this stage, one may wonder why god employs re as a means to sustain the world. Why does he, if this will inevitably cause desiccation? Given his full rationality, god would select, if he could, a different means to sustain the world one that does not bring on effects that are contrary to sustenance. The fact that he has not selected a different means is telling. For it implies that god cannot select a means to sustain the world other than re. But why cannot he? This is the fact that requires explanation. The explanation may be found in two connected claims from Stoic elemental theory. One of them is that re is the most basic of all elements; the other is that it is the thinnest. To begin with basicness, the Stoics, like many other Greeks, believed that the four elements are the basic constituents of reality. They are basic in the sense that all other things are composed by means of (sunsthke di) either one, or more than one, of them. But the Stoics also believed that the four elements are not equally basic and, in particular, that re is the most basic of all. This hierarchical conception of the four elements is attested for Chrysippus in Stobaeus, who also refers to Zeno.19 In fact, both Zeno and Chrysippus are mentioned by name (ecl. 1.129, 1-3). The part of the passage on which I should like to focus (ecl. 1.130,

19 On the reciprocal change of the elements at the cosmogony in Zeno, see Stobaeus, 1.152, 19-153, 6 (SVF 1.102), with discussion in Hahm (1977), 57-82 and in Mansfeld (1990). A detailed and extremely helpful comparison between elemental change in Zenos cosmogony and in Cleanthes (ap. Stobaeus 1.153, 7-22, SVF 1.497) is drawn in Hahm (1977), 79-81 (esp. 80 n. 64 at 90). In Hahms argument, the basicness of re is emphasised.

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1-13 Wachsmuth = LS 47A 6-9) puts forward three senses of the term element:
Element, then, according to Chrysippus has three meanings. First, it means re, because from it the remaining elements are composed by transformation (kat metaboln) and into it they get their resolution (nlusin). Secondly, it means the four elements, re, air, water, earth, since all other things are composed by means of a particular one of these or more than one of these or all of these all four in the case of animals and all terrestrial compounds, two in the case of the moon, which is composed by means of re and air, and just one, in the case of the sun, which is composed by means of re. On the third account, element is said to be that which is primarily so composed that it causes generation from itself methodically up to a terminus and from that receives resolution into itself by the like method (gnesin didnai f ato d mxri tlouw ka j kenou tn nlusin dxesyai ew aut t mo& d). (Long and Sedley trans. slightly modied.)

The reason given for the basicness of re lies in the central claim that their reciprocal change has a xed origin and direction: it is a change from re into the other elements and then back from the other elements into re. The text expresses this idea by saying that the other elements are composed from re and resolve into it. This account of the basicness of re with respect to the other elements is signicant for our present discussion. For re could not be done away with as a means to sustain the world: if god could select something other than re to sustain it, this means would have originated from re and would ultimately resolve into re. Notice that, according to the theory, it is not contingent that re be the most basic of all elements and, in particular, that re cannot resolve into one of the other three elements. The reason may be appreciated through another argument that is also implied in Stobaeus report. I call it the rst argument from thinness. We have seen that in general terms (i) element A is more basic than element B if and only if B resolves into A rather than the other way round. Now, (ii) it is by diffusion or xsiw, as opposed to transformation (metabol), that a higher element resolves into a lower one. This presupposes that (iii) the thinner an element is the less susceptible it is to being resolved into some other lower element. But (iv) re is the thinnest of the four elements. Therefore, it is also the most basic: there is no element into which it could resolve. I quote again Stobaeus in a passage where (ii) is explicitly stated and (iii) and (iv) are at least strongly implied (ecl. 1.129, 18-23 Wachsmuth = LS 47A 4).20
20

Cf. Galen, Nat. Fac. 106, 13-17 Helmreich (Scripta Minora, Teubner, vol. 3)

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The rst transformation to occur is the one from re into air by condensation (kat sstasin), and the second ensuing from this into water, and the third, with water being still more compressed (sunistamnou) on the same principle, into earth. Reciprocally, from the dissolution i.e. diffusion (p tathw dialuomnhw ka diaxeomnhw) of earth, the rst diffusion (xsiw) is into water, the second from water into air (ew ra), the third and last into re. (Long and Sedley trans. slightly modied.)

The really contentious thesis in the rst argument from thinness is that the thinner an element is the more basic it is, in the sense that it is that which these other elements change from and into. Anaximenes, for instance, the Presocratic, would concede that re is the thinnest of all elements, but deny that it is thereby the most basic. For according to him, air (r) is the most basic in the sense envisaged by the Stoics it is that from which the things that are becoming, and that have become, and that shall be, and gods and things divine, all come into being, and the rest from its products (j o t ginmena ka t gegonta ka t smena ka yeow ka yea gnesyai, t d loip k tn totou pognvn) even though it is not the thinnest since it resolves by diffusion (diaxuy) into re.21 This difference between the early Stoics and Anaximenes reveals a deeper disagreement over whether the notion of something that does not resolve into anything else is a criterion of basicness. For Anaximenes it is not. However important this polemic may be, a full discussion of it would take us too far away from our initial goal, which was to establish whether for Cleanthes it is a contingent fact that god uses re as means to sustain the world. We have seen that, given its basicness in Stoic elemental theory, it is not. Let us now consider what we may call the second argument from thinness. The very idea that re is the thinnest element is in itself (i.e. independently of its basicness) a reason for there being no means other than re that god could employ to sustain the world. A tenet of Stoic physics is that the worlds sustaining cause performs its function by physically penetrating every inch of each of the individual bodies it is composed of.

[SVF 2,406, LS 47E]. For an excellent discussion of Stoic elemental change as a change in volume and density, see Hahm (1985), 43-7. Also, at 40-2 Hahm shows very well why Stoic elemental theory departs from the Peripatetic view according to which the four elements and hence re resolve into some more basic stuff. 21 Cf. Hyppolytus, Ref. 1, 7, 1-3 at 11, 16-12, 9 Wendland (DK 13 A7, KRS 141). For the claim that air resolves by diffusion into re, see also raiomenon pr gnesyai in Theophrastus ap. Simplicius, in Ar. phys. 24, 26-25, 1 Diels at 24, 29 (DK 13 A5, KRS 140). A helpful discussion of this issue is provided in Klowski (1972).

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And in order for a body A to penetrate a body B, A must be thinner than B, the idea being that a body offers less resistance (ntitupa) to a thinner body than to a thicker one.22 This thesis is attested for Cleanthes in ND.23 Therefore, the worlds sustaining cause could not penetrate every body if it were not the thinnest of all elements. But re is the thinnest of all elements. Therefore, re, if anything, must be the worlds sustaining cause. To return to the main argument of this paper, Cleanthes can solve the Aristotelian paradox of conagration in a way that does full justice to the goodness and rationality of god. Why is it that god destroys the world to rebuild an identical one? The answer is that the destruction of the world is caused, not as an end that god would pursue simultaneously with its sustenance, but as a Platonic side-effect of this sustenance. In particular, it is necessitated by the necessary means used by god to sustain the world, which is the second sense in which Platonic concomitants may depend on means and ends. And it also depends on them in the rst sense. For if per impossibile god had not chosen re as a means to sustain the world, then, presumably, no desiccation and no conagration would occur since their actual cause has to do specically with the nature of re. The conagration, however, is clearly contrary to gods primary end. When it takes place, as it must, it is disruptive of his cosmological plan, which is to sustain the world. In consequence, his rationality, and therefore his goodness, require him to restore the world exactly as it existed before. One aspect of this interpretation that I shall emphasise in the next section is that the conagration is not the ultimate goal pursued by the Cleanthean god, which is a point of contrast between him and the Chrysippean god.

Cf. Alex. mixt. 216, 14-218, 6 Todd esp. 218, 2-6 (LS 48C12 ). Together with their lightness and tension, the thinness of re and air are presented as the reasons why they pass through the other two elements as wholes through wholes (la di lvn). See also Galen, de causis continentibus 1.1-2.4 Lyons et al. (LS 55F) esp. 1.3. For discussion see Sorabji (1988), 98-9. 23 A correlation is established between the thinness of a body and its mobility at 2.42 and between the mobility of a body and its capacity to penetrate other bodies at 2.31. For ntitupa in Cleanthes, see Stobaeus 1. 153, 7-22 (SVF 1.497) esp. at 1012: To d pantw jugranyntow t sxaton to purw, ntitupsantow at to msou, trpesyai plin ew tonanton (When the all has become wet, the outermost layer of re is turned back into the opposite direction given that the middle offers resistance to it). For extensive discussion without wholesale emendation of this extremely obscure report of Cleanthes, see Hahm (1977), 240-8. See also Mansfeld (1978), 161-2 and 165.

22

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4. The originality of Cleanthes within the Stoic tradition I conclude with some remarks on the place of Cleanthes on the map of Stoic approaches to the paradox. Cleanthes conception of the conagration as a Platonic concomitant was not a standard conception within Stoicism. In fact, different Stoics held different views regarding this phenomenon. Some gave up the very idea of conagration.24 Others preserved this idea, but denied that the conagration will be caused by god. God is responsible for the creation of the world, but not for its destruction, which is due to a kind of re that is distinct from god.25 These two positions may avoid the paradox of conagration. For the very question that motivates the paradox why does god destroy the world to rebuild an identical one? is certainly misguided if (i) there is no conagration at all or if (ii) the conagration is not caused by god. But they avoid the paradox at the cost of abandoning Stoic orthodoxy. Cleanthes did not adopt any of these positions as a way to avoid the paradox. To begin with (i), his belief in the conagration is well attested.
24 Namely, Boethus and Panaetius. Zeno of Tarsus and Diogenes of Babylon, pupils of Chrysippus, suspended judgement. For Zeno, see SVF 3 Zeno Tarsiensis 5. For Diogenes, Boethus and Panaetius, see SVF 3 Bothus Sidonius 7 followed by Diogenes Babylonius 27. The evidence is discussed in Mansfeld (1979), 156-7. Boethus position (more precisely that of o per tn Bhton) is presented in some detail in SVF 3 Bothus Sidonius 7 (Philo, aet. mundi 76): the world is not destructible because there is nothing, either inside or outside it, that could destroy it (odeman fyoropoin atan eren stin, ot ntw ot ktw, tn ksmon nele). 25 See unnamed Stoics ap. Philo in SVF 2.620: gensevw d ato yen aton, fyorw d mhkti yen ll tn prxousan n tow osi purw kamtou dnamin (of its generation, god is the cause; but of its destruction, it is no longer god, but rather the power of the tireless re that exists in individual things). Cf. Seneca, de ira 2.27 (gods are wholly good and harmful natural phenomena have their own laws: suas ista leges habent) and the evidence cited in Mansfeld (1979), 157-8. Contrary to what is implied by von Arnim (who classies 2.620 under Chrysippus), this dualistic approach cannot be Chrysippean. It may well be, as Mansfeld suggests, a heterodox view of the late Hellenistic period even though, as we have seen (see above, section 2), Zeno himself uses dualistic language in attributing harmful phenomena exclusively to his texnon re and benevolent phenomena exclusively to his texnikn re (Stobaeus, 1.213, 15-21, SVF 1.120, LS 46D). There also were some Stoics who accepted that there will be a conagration and that god will be its cause, but argued that the new world will not be identical to the present one. See the Stoics ap. Alex., in Ar. a. pr. 181, 25-31 Wallies, LS 52F2. This position may have been motivated by the desire to provide an alternative solution to Aristotles paradox of conagration (for a different interpretation, see Barnes (1978)), even though the creation of a different world would also put into question gods rationality. See Salles (2003).

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As for (ii), his god is indeed the cause of the conagration. For the conagration is caused by desiccation, which is caused by heating, which is something that god does to sustain the world. A Cleanthean solution to the Aristotelian paradox is orthodox at least in the sense that it preserves the ideas of conagration and causal monism. Even within orthodox Stoicism, however, Cleanthes position has some claim to originality. To begin, the key idea that the conagration is a Platonic concomitant is not attested for any other early Stoics. Chrysippus is reported by Aulus Gellius (Noctes Atticae 7.1.7-12 Marshall, SVF 2.1170, LS 54Q) to have explained the existence of certain phenomena such as illnesses and inrmities by using a notion of concomitant that is nearly identical to the one we nd in Tim. 74e-75d. But the Gellius passage does not cite the conagration, nor any other cosmic phenomenon, as among the things that are concomitants to something else. In addition to this argument ex silentio, there is even reason to doubt whether the doctrine that Gellius reports can be Chrysippean. I think that it cannot. Consider the last part of the report (NA 7.1.10-12):
Just as, he says, when nature was creating mens bodies, it was required for the enhancement of our rationality and for the very utility of the product that she should construct the head of very thin and tiny portions of bone, but this utility in the principal enterprise had as a further, extraneous consequence the inconvenience that the head became thinly protected and fragile to small blows and knocks (sed hanc utilitatem rei maioris alia quaedam incommoditas extrinsecus consecuta est ut eret caput tenuiter munitum et octibus offensionibusque parvis fragile) so too, illnesses and diseases were created while health was being created.

Crucial to the doctrine is a comparison between the skulls fragility, on the one hand, and illnesses and diseases, on the other. The gist of the skull example is hardly one that Chrysippus could have endorsed. It presupposes, as Plato does, that the head is the seat of the faculty of reason. Without this assumption it is not clear why any correlation should hold between the development of rationality and the structure of the skull. But we know from other sources that for Chrysippus the faculty of reason is located in the heart and that he even mounted an argument to refute the view that it is in the head.26 The originality of the Cleanthean solution may also be appreciated when we compare it to the way in which Chrysippus seems to have han26 See notably Galen, PHP 482, 12-13 de Lacy: ka toiotn tina lgon Xrsippow gracen: nya t pyh tw cuxw, ntaya ka t gemonikn: t d

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dled the notion of conagration. According to an important interpretation that has been proposed in recent years by Jaap Mansfeld,27 the Chrysippean god causes the conagration because it is a better state than the ordered world. On this view, gods ultimate cosmological goal is not the sustenance of the world, but its conagration. If so, what is paradoxical is not that god destroys the world (or that he destroys it to create a new, identical, one a notion that Chrysippus does not abandon). The paradox would be, rather, that the conagration, being the best possible state, is interrupted by the restoration of a new ordered world. And in Mansfelds interpretation, the reason is that this interruption is necessary because no re can burn forever. To do so, the re would need an innite amount fuel. But this is impossible since the quantity of matter in the Stoic world is nite. Thus, each conagration exhausts its fuel and god has to rebuild a new world to produce fuel for a new conagration, and so on ad innitum. If we follow this interpretation of Chrysippus (which has caused some polemic),28 and if my interpretation of Cleanthes is also correct, the difference between Chrysippus and Cleanthes is substantive. According to Chrysippus, the conagration is the ultimate goal pursued by god. But for Cleanthes it is not. Cleanthes does not have the view that the conagration is the ultimate end pursued by god. In fact, it is not even an end. It is merely a side-effect. Moreover, in Chrysippus, god restores the world in order to provide fuel for a new conagration. The restoration is a means to the conagration. By contrast, in Cleanthes the restoration is a means to achieve the ordered-world. But the ordered-world is not itself a means to anything further. It is an end in itself whose pursuit is periodically interrupted by the conagration, which requires, given gods full rationality, the restoration of an identical world when it subsides.29 Instituto de Investigaciones Filoscas Universidad Nacional Autnoma de Mxico
pyh tw cuxw n kard&: n tat ra ka t gemonikn (Chrysippus also wrote an argument of this kind: where the affections of the soul are, there is also the governing part; the affections of the soul are in the heart; therefore, the governing part is in it also). Cf. 154, 15-156, 9, esp. 156, 1-3 and 6-9; 176, 24-25; and 234, 16-20. 27 See Mansfeld (1979), 174-83, (1981), 304-9, and (1999), 468. See also LS 1, 278-9. 28 See Long (1985), 24-5. 29 This paper was written while I was a Fellow of Harvards Center for Hellenic Studies in Washington DC. Earlier versions of it were delivered in February 2004 at

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the Philosophy Department of the National University of Colombia in Bogot and at the Good Life conference that took place at the CHS. I wish to thank those audiences for the subsequent discussion and, especially, Alfonso Correa, Patrica Curd, Geoffrey Lloyd, Tony Long, Andrea Lozano, Greg Nagy, Germn Melndez and Thanassis Samaras. I am also grateful to Emese Mogyordi and Julie Laskaris for our conversations on ND 2.25-28 and to Marcelo Boeri and the Editors of this journal for their extremely helpful comments on the penultimate version. The paper beneted from the support of two research projects: CONACYT 40891-H and PAPIIT IN401301. I dedicate it to the memory of my dear friend Eric Lanelongue.

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