Save Darfur Coalition’s Submission to the African Union Panel on Darfur

The African Union Panel on Darfur’s study of the current dynamics of the conflict in Darfur should be welcomed by all those who desire peace, justice and reconciliation for the war-ravaged people of westernSudan. We hope that the panel has received full access to the victims of and parties to the conflict as well asother concerned Sudanese actors. Through such a process, the members of the panel certainly would haveheard narratives from Darfurians of the history of the conflict and current situation rooted in local andnational causes. The panel also has presumably heard appeals from other actors based on macro-levelregional and geo-political interests. We urge the panel to prioritize both the long-standing and urgentconcerns of the people affected by this conflict whose future can be profoundly shaped by the panel’s finalrecommendations. Indeed, when faced with a choice between the rights of African people and the interestsof African states and their leaders, the African Union should stand on the side of the people.For six years, the Sudanese government has asked African countries to ignore the crimes againsthumanity being committed in Darfur. As you know, Sudanese leaders have argued that the state’ssovereignty legitimizes all government actions within its borders and shields the state from any externalinterference. Countless times, though, the African Union has rejected this argument. Responding to reportsfrom Sudanese and independent human rights agencies, the African Union has sent humanitarian workers,monitors, peacekeepers, and mediators to help the people of Darfur and to facilitate a peaceful settlement tothe conflict. The failure of the Sudanese government to protect its own citizens necessitated all of thesecritical initiatives and missions. The conditions on the ground in Darfur have changed considerably since the beginning of the conflict. While violence against civilians has diminished and the sources of violence aremore diffuse, the Sudanese government’s commitment and ability to end the conflict, secure justice for itsvictims, and reconcile the war-affected communities remain seriously in doubt.It is for this reason that the African Union should closely coordinate its efforts to secure peace, protection and justice for Darfurians with the international community. No country or internationalorganization has the institutional capacity or required relationships with the Sudanese parties to end theconflict alone. The African Union should deepen its partnership with the United Nations for peacekeepingand peacemaking in Darfur while at the same time coordinating all of its efforts with the permanent membersof the UN Security Council, the League of Arab States, and key regional states. It is only by forging these partnerships that the international community can together muster the necessary resources to tackle fully theissues of peace, justice and reconciliation in Darfur.In this context, we submit the following recommendations to the African Union Panel on Darfur.To secure a comprehensive and inclusive Darfur peace agreement, the African Union should coordinate withthe relevant regional and international actors to:

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Provide the armed movements with support for pre-negotiations and negotiations;

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Ensure that the Darfurians feel ownership of any peace agreement;

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Support strong civil society input and presence in the peace process;

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Ensure that a Darfur peace agreement advances peace, justice and democracy for all Sudanese;

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Coordinate all support to the peace process with appropriate regional and international actors.To address the challenges of justice and the suppression of impunity in Darfur, the African Union should:

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Support the Darfur case before the International Criminal Court;

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Positively engage with the International Criminal Court;

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Support the development of local, national and regional complementary accountability mechanism;

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Ensure justice and ending impunity are essential components of any future Darfur peace agreement.

What can and should be done urgently to conclude a comprehensive and inclusive Darfur peaceagreement?

Despite predictions to the contrary, the talks between the Sudanese government and some of the rebelmovements have progressed considerably since the ICC Prosecutor requested an arrest warrant from thecourt for Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir in July 2008. In fact, at the time of the Prosecutor’sannouncement, no serious negotiations were taking place. The naming of Djibril Bassolé as AU-UNMediator that same month and the Qatari invitation to host the talks in subsequent months served asopportunities to re-launch substantive talks among the various parties. There is no doubt, though, that the possibility of Bashir’s indictment contributed to the Sudanese government’s decision to return to thenegotiating table.It has been argued that the prosecution of Bashir would only embolden the negotiating stance of the Darfurirebels. While the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) withdrew temporarily from the talks after the ICCissued indictments against Bashir in March 2009 (because the Sudanese government’s expulsion of international aid groups violated commitments that the government made in the “goodwill agreement” signedin Doha in February), their negotiating team has now returned to Doha and is in the midst of a new round of negotiations. Other movements have also joined or are considering joining the talks. Regional bodies suchas the African Union and the Arab League along with the international community should collectively urgeall movements seeking peace and justice in Darfur to send delegations to Doha as soon as possible. Thesigning of the “goodwill agreement” between JEM and the Sudanese government and the continuingnegotiations serves as evidence that the peace process has not stalled because of the ICC proceedings. Onthe contrary, the possibilities for reaching a peace agreement – while still not assured – appear closer nowthan at any point since the Abuja negotiations of 2006.At this moment, all pressure therefore should be placed on the parties at Doha to agree and adhere to a long-term ceasefire. Achieving this objective should be the main task of the mediators over the coming months. Aceasefire between the Sudanese government and any of the major movements could give necessary space andconfidence for the negotiating delegations to move to the next step of negotiating a final settlement. Thisform of trust-building will also encourage those movements resisting negotiations to eventually return to thenegotiating table. Planning and implementation of a cease-fire is no simple effort. The AU-UN Mediator should immediately being working closely with UNAMID, security experts and countries with relevantcapacities to arrange the appropriate security mechanisms for a ceasefire.Overall, the structure of the Darfur peace process should be similar to the Naivasha talks that produced theComprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), and some of the ingredients are already in place. As did KenyanGeneral Lazaro Sumbeiywo with the Naivasha process, AU-UN Mediator Djibril Bassolé should lead theDarfur process. The Joint Mediation Support Team (JMST) should work with Ambassador Bassolé on the plan for a negotiation framework, timeline for negotiations, and appropriate mechanism for shuttlediplomacy. Bassolé must also be supported by a strong team of diplomats and regional experts and backed by a small group of countries with leverage, high-level support, and full-time representation at the talks.This inner circle should include the United States, United Kingdom, France, and China. An outer circlegroup of countries and multilateral organizations (UN, AU, Arab League) should also be engaged in a formalmanner to discourage spoilers, and other key nations such as Russia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, andSouth Africa need to be thoroughly consulted.In terms of the parameters of the negotiations themselves, the international community should draw lessonsfrom the failed Abuja negotiations and the failed attempts to revive the peace process over the last threeyears:Lesson #1: Support for Movements in Pre-Negotiations and Negotiations

The movements during and after Abuja have never focused their energies on articulating their interests and positions (or those of the government) and building common platforms. Instead, they have constantly engaged intheir own internecine power struggles. For example, the final month of Abuja when both sides faced aninternational deadline revealed the extent of the imbalance in negotiating experience, as the Sudanese governmenttook advantage of the situation while the movements displayed a complete inability to negotiate effectively. Whilemediators have recognized that the rebels’ intransigence is partly due to a lack of expertise and confidence innegotiations, they have failed to provide adequate mediation support to the movements.

Recommendation:

The international community must immediately seek means to support the negotiation capacityof the rebel movements. Through the UN/AU Joint Mediation Support Team (JMST) or other actors, themovements must be given negotiation training before the talks and access to trusted technical advisors before andduring the talks. These trainings will build confidence of some of the rebel movements and will encourage them to join the talks. The JMST should aim to have all the rebel factions present at the talks within two or threedelegations, preferably with a common negotiating position.Lesson #2: Ownership of an AgreementIt must be remembered that the text of the DPA was imposed upon the movements to meet self-imposeddeadlines. As such, it created a unique situation where confidence-building between the parties had to take place after the agreement was signed, not beforehand. Finally, once a deal was struck with one of themovements, the international community rejected any mechanism to improve the final agreement and securethe signatures of the other movements. Unfortunately, since the failure of Abuja, the mediators have notgained the confidence of any of the rebel movements. Therefore, they continue to see negotiations as a trap,set by the Sudanese government or other rebel movements, rather than as an opportunity to attain their objectives through a peaceful settlement.

Recommendation:

The international community should reject deadline diplomacy and only support a peace process that gives the Darfuri movements and civil society leaders an opportunity to articulate their demandswithout undue pressure from external powers. As at Abuja and in its aftermath, there will be contentiousdebates over the specifics of the wealth, power, development, and security arrangements of any robustagreement. The mediator should consult with all the parties at the beginning of the talks on developing theagenda and a convenient timeline. In order to achieve the buy-in of the movements, the mediator mustestablish a formal process—involving envoys from the international community as well—to solicit regular feedback from key stakeholders. The international community must also denounce any signs that anagreement is being forced upon the Darfuris. A deal arising from considerable economic incentives offered by the Qataris is not necessarily a bad agreement, but the Darfuri representatives must feel comfortable withthe agreement.Lesson #3: Inclusivity/Exclusivity of the ProcessBroadening the peace process is essential to creating a sense of ownership among Darfurians. Limitedformal means have existed to date for civil society to contribute to the peace process. The previous practiceof giving seats at the table to almost any combatant has had the perverse effect of encouraging thefactionalization of armed groups and giving armed groups a greater say in determining the future of Darfur than their unarmed counterparts. To date, the concerns of disaffected Arab tribes in Darfur have also beenexcluded from the formal peace process because of the focus on only bringing officially recognized rebelmovements to the talks. A vigorous process of consultation with Darfurian civil society, including triballeaders (including Arab tribes), will ensure the talks are truly representative and limit the ability of individualrebel leaders to put their personal ambitions ahead of a broadly acceptable agreement. With such a processin place, individual leaders will abstain from the process at their political peril.

Recommendation:

The Darfur peace talks will need strong civil society representation, including women, if they are to produce a sustainable agreement. For example, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation is supporting the