• Embed Doc
  • Copy Link
  • Readcast
  • Collections
  • CommentGo Back
Download
 
Patrick McEvoy-HalstonPhilosophy 220Jeffrey Foss04 June 2001Paradigm Shift: An Immodest ProposalI am not convinced by Kuhn’s
argument 
that scientists should relinquish their belief thatthey are getting closer and closer to an objective, complete, true account of nature. Kuhn offersus a new paradigm to understand scientific revolutions, which emphasizes discontinuity and thelosses along with the gains of new scientific paradigms. He tells us that accepting a new paradigm is a matter of persuasion, and though there are aspects of his argument which are persuasive--for instance his ability to tolerate living in a universe which is not ultimatelyunderstandable--on the whole, I do not find his argument persuasive. I sensed in it a “dishonest”quality (which I will later detail), which inspired a successful search for a conceptual paradigmsimilar in structure to his, but which does not make truth (fundamental universal laws) seemnecessarily forever beyond human apprehension (even if we cannot know, assuming they exist,and we find them, that there is something that clearly distinguishes them as “the end of the journey”). At the end of reading his piece, I cannot say, though, that I felt his
conclusion
should be dismissed--I actually would prefer that scientists not need for their research to be aboutfinding final, total truths. But I say this even if science is capable of discovering them. But because I would like to see scientists re-orient themselves as Kuhn suggests (and beyond! as youwill see) regardless of whether Kuhn’s account of science’s history is persuasive, his thesis, for my purposes, may be counter-productive. Kuhn believes that the current scientific quest should be abandoned because it cannot be realized, but he thereby leaves us with the implicit corollarythat should his own paradigm not stand the test of time, then scientists should continue as theyhad previously toward a “goal set by nature in advance” (Kuhn 1970, 171). Kuhn’s attention tothe limitations of text-book learning in science--even when used in support of a nevertheless
 
 productive scientific community--compared with the breadth of sources he sees used in history, philosophy, and the social sciences, is wonderful ammunition for a humanist argument against astrict diet of text-book learning for any student, including would-be scientists. Also, the implicitvalue of the importance of our own lives, suggested in his proposal that science should concernitself with solving current, relevant problems, is too valid to leave to the truth-value of his own paradigm of scientific development for scientists (and us) to consider a fundamental re-orientation towards how they (we) conceive of the scientific enterprise.Kuhn starts off on the wrong foot by not explicitly acknowledging the paradigmaticflavour of his own theory. He is arguing against “the most prevalent contemporary interpretationof the nature and function of scientific theory [that theories are fundamentally compatible] . . .[because it] would restrict the range and meaning of an accepted theory so that it could not possibly conflict with any later theory that made predictions about some of the same natural phenomena” (98). He argues against this contemporary “paradigm” by suggesting itsconsequences--it leaves scientists immune to attack--but, also, and more importantly, byattempting to prove that his own account of scientific revolutions, producing incompatibletheories, is more in line with historical truth than theories emphasizing continuity andcompatibility. He is attempting a paradigm shift of his own; but he leaves to us the responsibilityto recognize his argument as such. Thus he offers us: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions;and not:
 A
 
 Paradigm
of the Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Why does this matter? Because if we consider his theory as a paradigm we are morelikely to test if what he says about paradigms of science applies to his own paradigm of thenature of scientific revolutions. A scientific paradigm, says Kuhn, cannot be true because: (1) italways overreaches, nature at some point starts introducing anomalies which the paradigm
2
 
cannot account for, and which eventually lead to new paradigms to account for them; (2) becausea shift in paradigm always involves a shift in emphasis; what was previously emphasized,apparently, becomes merely the subject of sub-specialties of a new science. The loss issubstantial: with Newton’s sizes, shapes, positions, and motions, we lose Aristotle’s colours,tastes, and weights (104). Therefore, argues Kuhn, “since no paradigm ever solves all the problems it defines and since no two paradigms leave all the same problems unsolved” (110),scientific truth is always a relative thing. He proposes that scientists spend their time consideringwhich problems they should be working on, and not on an impossible quest for the holy grail of scientific research: an all inclusive, final account of nature’s laws. Yet if we consider his owntheory a paradigm we may not be of the mind to consider his “truths” as conclusive! Perhaps heis overreaching; perhaps facts, anomalies, will appear in the historical record which do notaccord well with his theory. We might imagine being drawn, after Kuhn’s theory is displaced,much as essences of material bodies, previously discarded, were popularized again with Newton,to theories of scientific theoretical development which emphasize compatibility and progressivedevelopment!There may be a reason why we should not consider what Kuhn says is true of scientific paradigms as also holding true for theories which account for the nature of scientific paradigms, but one does not come to mind. Kuhn does suggest that there is something distinctive aboutscientific paradigms that
may
not hold true for other paradigms--political science; art; etc.--buthe also tells us that what he has to say about scientific paradigms “are constitutive of nature aswell” (110). Moreover, his theory sure “looks” awfully paradigm like. It appears complete andfinal. He makes the previous theory with its emphasis on compatible change appear ridiculous;thereby enhancing the progressive flavour of his own theory. He even highlights a role for those
3
of 00

Leave a Comment

You must be to leave a comment.
Submit
Characters: ...
You must be to leave a comment.
Submit
Characters: ...