and three anonymous reviewers for helpful comments.1. Cf. Bloor’s similar approach to the rift betweenWittgenstein and Durkheim. While Durkheim stillopted to except Western scientific culture from thesocial explanations he applied to primitive systemsof classification, Wittgenstein did not “lose hisnerve or betray himself in this way” (Bloor 1983:3).30
Gouldner, Coser, Shils, and Wolff, their efforts didnot provoke a distinctly Mannheimian researchtradition in the 1980s - with the significantexception of the grand editorial project carriedthrough by Kettler, Meja, and Stehr (cf. Goldman1994; Kettler and Meja 1994). For various reasons,interesting in themselves, contemporary socialtheorists such as Elias, Bourdieu, Foucault,Habermas, and Giddens have found only limited usefor Mannheim. Insofar as they have developeddistinct sociologies of knowledge, they have alsooperated in virtual isolation from radicalWittgensteinian science studies.The real action and excitement in thesociology of knowledge, on the other hand, was notgenerated by mainstream sociology but emergedfrom the new philosophy and historiography of (natural) science. The seminal work of Kuhn,insofar as philosophical sources entered into it, took its inspiration not from the sociology of knowledgetradition but from Wittgenstein and Heck, andinitially concentrated not on “soft” sociological, political, or historical thought but on the “harder”sciences of nature and medicine.
Bloor and Barnes,the progenitors of the Strong Programme, as well asCollins, Mulkay, and Lynch, followed aWittgensteinian rather than a Mannheimian track, asdid constructivists such as Knorr-Cetina, Woolgar,and Latour.
Evidently, Bloor’s reproach aboutMannheim’s “failure of nerve” concerning asymmetrical treatment of true knowledge andnatural science was considered sufficientlydamaging to turn his sociological project into a deadhorse. Henceforth, Mannheim was cited solely as atoken predecessor (cf. Knorr-Cetina 1983:115, 136;Law l986:1).
Let me at once enter some specifications thatqualify my claim about a Wittgensteinian turn inscience studies, to avoid the risk of forcefully