"Lies Borne Out by Facts, If Not The Truth" (September 11, 2009)

―LIES … BORNE OUT BY FACTS,
IF NOT THE TRUTH‖

Senator James Webb, Thom Shanker & The New York Times and the
Whitewash of General McChrystal’s Role in the Aftermath of Pat Tillman’s Death
By GuyMontag425, feralfirefighter.blogspot.com
September 11, 2009
―Allegations, lies, denials, dissembling, distortions … And all the while they secretly
whispered to the media … And the media gave them their forum, always ascertaining
beforehand that their allegations were borne out by facts, if not the truth.‖
--- James Webb, ―Something to Die For‖ (1991)

September 11, 2009
Clark Hoyt,
In the accompanying binder, ―Lies … Borne Out by Facts, If Not the Truth,‖ I argue that
Washington Pentagon Reporter Thom Shanker (and his NYT editors), whitewashed
General McChrystal‘s central role in orchestrating the cover-up of Pat Tillman‘s 2004
friendly fire death.
Instead of an objective search for the truth (―without fear or favor‘) of General
McChrystal‘s actions, The New York Times displayed its stenographical willingness to
parrot official government positions ―borne out by facts, if not the truth.‖ Once again, as
with their coverage of the Jessica Lynch case, the Times has published coverage (or lack
thereof) that brings into question the integrity of its journalism and its ability to use a
―mountain of evidence to arrive at an honest or even sensible conclusion.‖
Accompanying this cover letter are two binders that present my detailed arguments:
At the end of May, I sent my binder, ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖-- Senator
James Webb, General Stanley McChrystal, and the Betrayal of Pat Tillman, to both
Senator Webb and NYT Pentagon reporter Thom Shanker. This binder presents the case
that Congress and the top leadership of the Army acted to shield General McChrystal‘s
actions in the cover-up of Pat Tillman‘s fratricide from public scrutiny and acted to
protect him from punishment.
Last week, I completed the second binder, ―Lies … Borne Out by Facts, If Not the Truth‖
-- Senator James Webb, Thom Shanker & The New York Times, and the Whitewash of
General Stanley McChrystal.‖ This binder explores in detail the role of Thom Shanker
(& his NYT editors) in ―clearing‖ McChrystal of any wrongdoing in the Tillman case and
whitewashing McChrystal‘s central role in orchestrating the cover-up of Pat Tillman‘s
2004 friendly fire death.
As Public Editor, I believe you should question Thom Shanker (and his editors) about
their coverage of General McChrystal and the Tillman case. Those involved should be
held accountable for whitewashing McChrystal‘s role in the cover-up of Pat Tillman‘s
fratricide, and the New York Times should publish a detailed correction.
Please feel free to contact me for follow-up with any questions or comments about my
work.
Sincerely,
―LIES … BORNE OUT BY FACTS, IF NOT THE TRUTH‖
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PDF Page #:
September 11th 2009 Letter to New York Times Public Editor Clark Hoyt 4
...
Thom Shanker & The New York Times, and the Whitewash of General 17
McChrystal‘s Role in the Aftermath of Pat Tillman‘s Death
Rebuttal of Thom Shanker‘s Pre-Hearing NYT Article: 35

―Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander Revives Questions in Tillman Case‖
Rebuttal of Thom Shanker‘s Post-Hearing NYT Articles: 60

―Nominee to Command U.S. Afghanistan Forces Stresses Civilian Safety‖
& ―U.S. Report Finds Errors in Afghan Airstrikes‖
...
Senator James Webb and the Whitewash of General Stanley McChrystal‘s Role 77
in the Aftermath of Pat Tillman‘s Death
May 25th 2008 Letter to Senator James Webb (from ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?) 89
April 3rd 2008 Letter to Senator James Webb (from larger untitled document) 99
APPENDICES:
A: ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖ (refer to separate Volume II binder):
Operational & Administrative Chain of Command (from IG Report)

Fratricide Investigation Flowchart (Appendix C, IG Report)
Casualty Reporting and Next of Kin Notification Flowchart (Appendix D, IG Report)
Timeline of Tillman Fratricide Notification (GuyMOntag425 5-17-08)
Transcript of General McChrystal‘s June 2nd 2009 Senate Testimony

Senate ASC 6-02-09 Confirmation Hearing (from ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?)
B: E-Mail Correspondence Between Guy Montag & The New York Times 101
C: New York Times Articles about General Stanley McChrystal:
(5-12-09) ―Pentagon Ousts Top Commander in Afghan War‖

(5-13-09) ―A General Steps from the Shadows‖
(5-14-09) ―New Commander for Afghanistan‖ (NYT Editorial)
(5-15-09) ―Afghan Villagers Describe Chaos of U.S. Airstrikes‖
(5-26-09) ―Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander Revives Questions in Tillman Case‖
(6-01-09) ―Questions for General McChrystal‖ (NYT Editorial)
(6-02-09) ―Nominee to Command U.S. Afghan Forces Stresses Civilian Safety‖
(6-02-09) ―U.S. Report Finds Errors in Afghan Airstrikes‖
D: ―5 Years Ago: When the Pentagon and Media Lied About Jessica Lynch Rescue‖
―They ought to make a movie about this. Mr. Smith comes to Washington.‖ ―Yeah, I called my pa last night
and he says, Judd boy, you been up there with them muck-a-mucks two days, now. Did they teach you how to
lie yet?‖
-- James Webb, ―A Country Such As This‖ (1983)
―Allegations, lies, denials, dissembling, distortions … And all the while they secretly whispered to the media
… And the media gave them their forum, always ascertaining beforehand that their allegations were borne out
by facts, if not the truth.‖
-- James Webb, ―Something to Die For‖ (1991)
...
September 11, 2009
To: Public Editor Clark Hoyt, The New York Times
Re: ―Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander Revives Questions in Tillman Case‖ (5-26-09)
Clark Hoyt,
I‘m writing to express my concerns about The New York Times coverage of General Stanley
McChrystal‘s role in the aftermath of Pat Tillman‘s death.
In my letter (and attached supporting documents) I argue that Washington Pentagon Reporter
Thom Shanker, and his New York Times editors, whitewashed General McChrystal‘s central
role in orchestrating the cover-up of Pat Tillman‘s 2004 friendly fire death.
Thom Shanker wrote his May 26th article, ―Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander Revives
Questions in Tillman Case,‖ clearing General McChrystal of wrongdoing in the Army‘s handling
of Tillman‘s fratricide. However, although Shanker‘s article was full of official government
―facts,‖ my own review showed that his none of his substantive assertions were truthful.
Thom Shanker failed to further investigate the Tillman case or write a follow-up article
correcting his mistakes, even after he (and the NYT editors) received my 100 page document
(that Shanker said was ―impressive,‖ ―exhaustive‖ and ―well-researched‖). Thom Shanker‘s
articles covering the confirmation hearing did not incorporate my new disclosures, but merely
recycled his ―facts‖ clearing McChrystal of wrongdoing.
I believe you should question Thom Shanker and his NYT editors about their coverage of
General McChrystal‘s handling of the Pat Tillman fratricide and of his confirmation hearing.
...
On May 12th, President Obama nominated General McChrystal to be his new Commander of the
Afghan War. On May 14th, The New York Times expressed their concerns about his nomination
in their editorial, ―New Commander for Afghanistan,‖ writing ―… it was General McChrystal
who approved the falsified report that covered up the 2004 friendly-fire death of Cpl. Pat …
senators must assure themselves that he …will insist on lawful treatment of detainees and candid
military reporting.‖
On May 26th, after his review of investigative documents, Thom Shanker wrote his NYT article,
―Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander Revives Questions in Tillman Case,‖ that concluded
General McChrystal had been cleared of wrongdoing in the handling of Pat Tillman‘s fratricide.
However, my review (of the same documents) found General McChrystal had played a central
role in the Army‘s cover up of Pat Tillman‘s friendly fire death; none of Thom Shanker‘s
assertions clearing McChrystal of wrong doing held up under close scrutiny.
On May 28th, I emailed Thom Shanker documents from my 100 page binder, ―Did They Teach
You How to Lie Yet – Senator James Webb, General Stanley McChrystal and the Betrayal of Pat
Tillman,‖ that laid out the evidence that Congress and the senior leadership of the Army had
acted with a series of ―investigations‖ to shield General McChrystal‘s actions from close scrutiny
and to protect him from punishment for his central role in orchestrating the cover-up of Pat
Tillman‘s fratricide. On May 29th, Thom Shanker received my Fed-Exed paper copy.
However, Thom Shanker failed to further investigate McChrystal‘s role in the Tillman case or to
write a follow-up article incorporating my new disclosures and correcting his erroneous ―facts‖
contained in his May 26th article.
On Monday June 1st, the NYT published their editorial ―Questions for General McChrystal.‖
Aferwards, I wrote to the Editorial Page Editor (and seven other NYT editors and newsrooms)
expressing my surprise that, after I had sent Thom Shanker my new disclosures, their editorial
didn‘t mention McChrystal‘s role in the handling of Pat Tillman‘s fratricide.
Was their omission because Shanker‘s May 26th review had―cleared‖ General McChrystal of any
wrongdoing?
On June 2nd, The Senate Armed Services held a ―pro forma confirmation‖ and the Senators did
not ―rigorously question― McChrystal during the hearing. Thom Shanker failed to incorporate
any of my new disclosures about General McChrystal‘s central role in the cover-up of Tillman‘s
fratricide in ―Nominee to Command Afghanistan Stresses Civilian Safety‖ and recycled the
same false assertions that McChrystal was ―cleared of any wrongdoing.‖ In addition, Thom
Shanker failed to note three new key revelations from McChrystal‘s testimony further showing
his complicity in the cover-up.
Obviously, the real Senate confirmation hearing took place last year behind closed doors. Why
didn‘t Thom Shanker follow-up and ask what the Senators learned when McChrystal‘s actions
were ―discussed in detail‖ during the secret ―executive session‖ on May 15th 2008?
By that evening, Shanker‘s article had disappeared from the NYT website. It had been replaced
by ―U.S. Report Finds Errors in Afghan Airstrikes‖that discussed mistaken U.S. airstrikes in
Afghanistan and included only a couple of token lines about the hearing at the very end of the
article. Why did Thom Shanker‘s original article disappear?
On June 5th, I emailed Thom Shanker and asked why ―my document wasn‘t sufficient to prompt
you to write a follow-up to your May 26th article? Or at least include some of my findings in
your June 2nd article about the hearing as a counterpoint to the official government position?‖
But, despite Thom Shanker‘s praise for my document as "exhaustive", "impressive", and "well
researched,‖ he never answered my question. He never responded to my last email on June 7th.
...
Note: Following is an ―executive summary‖ that presents a more detailed outline of my

arguments. The following sections in Binder I: ―Lies … Borne Out By Facts, If Not the Truth‖
provide an even more detailed argument and supporting documents.
Binder II: ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖ is the document sent to Thom Shanker
(portions were also emailed to the NYT editors). This binder lays out the case that Congress
(House & Senate) and the top leadership of the Army acted to shield General McChrystal‘s
actions in the cover-up of Pat Tillman‘s fratricide from public scrutiny and protected him from
punishment. Portions of Binder II are included in the Appendices to Binder I.
...
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
On May 12th 2009, President Obama nominated General Stanley McChrystal for promotion to
four-star general and to become his new Commander of the Afghanistan War. The following
day, President Obama gave a commencement address at Pat Tillman‘s alma mater inside Sun
Devil Stadium without once mentioning Tillman‘s name. Afterwards, Bob Young (Arizona
Republic) wrote:
‖Why the omission? … ―Perhaps Obama was sensitive to the fact that the speech came
shortly after the announcement that Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal would become the top
American commander in Afghanistan. McChrystal was deemed by a Pentagon
investigation to be responsible for inaccurate information from the Army about Tillman's
death, and the Tillman family has been critical of what it believes was his role in a cover-
up of the real events that took place.‖
On May 14th, The New York Times expressed their concerns about McChrystal‘s nomination in
their editorial, ―New Commander for Afghanistan‖:
―And it was General McChrystal who approved the falsified report that covered up the
2004 friendly-fire death of Cpl. Pat Tillman in Afghanistan. … Before confirming him in
his new command, senators must assure themselves that he …will insist on lawful
treatment of detainees and candid military reporting.‖
Five years prior to McChrystal‘s nomination, Pat Tillman‘s family were handed a tarnished
Silver Star. I felt it would be a travesty of justice if McChrystal was confirmed by the Senate,
promoted to the Army‘s highest rank, and handed his fourth star. So, I once again took out my
box of Tillman documents, and closely reviewed General McChrystal‘s actions in the aftermath
of Tillman‘s death.
...
After completing my review, I concluded that Congress and the top leadership of the Army had
acted to shield General McChrystal from close scrutiny and to protect him from punishment for
his central role in orchestrating the cover-up of Pat Tillman‘s fratricide:
General William Wallace‘s final Army review singled out General Kensinger as the
scapegoat, while clearing General McChrystal of wrongdoing. However, McChrystal
was guilty of the same charges for which Kensinger was blamed!: McChrystal received
confirmation of Tillman‘s fratricide within two days yet didn‘t send his ―timely‖ P4
memo until a week later, had the responsibility to notify the family & chose not to do so
(the family wasn‘t told until 35 days later), and personally led the packaging of the
fraudulent Silver Star recommendation (with a false narrative and fabricated witness
statements).
Congressman Waxman‘s House Oversight & Reform Committee conducted a pro forma
investigation into the Tillman fratricide. Waxman‘s decision to narrow the scope of his
investigation to only ―look up‖ the chain of command took the focus off General
McChrystal. And he allowed General McChrystal to ―decline‖ to appear before the
Committee and took his name off the list of those scheduled to testify.
During May 2008, Chairman Carl Levin asked Senator James Webb to conduct a secret
review of General McChrystal‘s actions in the aftermath of Tillman‘s death for the
Senate Armed Services Committee. On May 15th 2008 the Committee met in a closed
―executive session‖ where McChrystal testified ―in detail‖ about his actions in the
Tillman case. On May 22th 2008, McChrystal was unanimously confirmed by the
Committee. Shortly afterward, the full Senate promoted him to Director of the Joint
Staff.
Note: for more details, refer to the binder ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖
Senator James Webb, General Stanley McChrystal and the Betrayal of Pat Tillman‖
...
James Webb had been a hero of mine for three decades. I hadn‘t always agreed with his
positions, but I had never before doubted his integrity or his sense of honor. I‘d read his novels
that dealt with themes of honor, loyalty, integrity, and betrayal for thirty 30 years; long before he
became a U.S. Senator from Virginia in 2006.
With Webb‘s background as a decorated Vietnam Marine, I believed he would feel a sense of
kinship with Pat Tillman and his family. But, shortly after I asked Senator Webb in April 2008
to become Mary Tillman‘s Senate advocate (and while Mary Tillman was in Washington DC on
her book tour) Senator Webb conducted the secret Senate review that shielded General
McChrystal‘s role in the cover-up of Tillman‘s fratricide from public scrutiny! And instead of
punishing McChrystal for his actions, the Senate promoted him!
But, perhaps, even after his secret ―review,‖ Senator Webb wasn‘t fully aware of McChrystal‘s
complicity. Or, perhaps I thought I could shame him into finally doing the right thing for the
Tillman family: ―I‘d like to think that after three years in Congress you haven‘t yet learned the
lesson your grandmother Hodges asked of you decades ago when you first worked in
Washington DC, ―Did they teach you how to lie yet?‖
Note: for more details on Senator Webb‘s role in this story, refer to ―Senator James Webb and
the Whitewash of General Stanley McChrystal‘s Role in the Aftermath of Pat Tillman‘s Death‖
...
On May 27th, I was finishing my letter to Senator Webb that asked him to place a ―hold‖ on
McChrystal‘s confirmation. In my 100 page document, ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet –
Senator James Webb, General Stanley McChrystal, and the Betrayal of Pat Tillman,‖ I argued
Congress and the senior leadership of the Army had acted with a long series of ―investigations‖
to shield General McChrystal‘s actions from close scrutiny and to protect him from punishment
for his central role in orchestrating the cover-up of Pat Tillman‘s fratricide.
That evening, I read the NYT article, ―Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander Revives
Questions in Tillman Case.‖ (5-26-09), written by Thom Shanker (NYT Washington Pentagon
Reporter).
Thom Shanker wrote that General McChrystal had been cleared of wrongdoing in the Army‘s
handling of Pat Tillman‘s fratricide: McChrystal was not responsible for investigating the
fratricide and notifying the family, had sent a ―timely‖ P4 memo to warn his superiors, and had
merely signed off on Tillman‘s misleading Silver Star citation without firsthand knowledge.
However, my analysis (of the same investigative reports Thom Shanker reviewed) found
General McChrystal had played a central role in the Army‘s cover up of Tillman‘s friendly fire
death; none of Thom Shanker‘s assertions clearing McChrystal of wrongdoing held up under
scrutiny!: McChrystal received confirmation of Tillman‘s fratricide within two days yet didn‘t
send his ―timely‖ P4 memo until a week later, had the responsibility to notify the family and
chose not to (the family wasn‘t told until 35 days later), and personally led the packaging of the
Silver Star recommendation (with a false narrative and fabricated witness statements).
Note: For a very detailed, point-by-point refutation of Shanker‘s assertions, see

―Rebuttal of Thom Shanker‘s Pre-Hearing Article: ―Nomination of U.S. Afghan
Commander Revives Questions in Tillman Case‖
I e-mailed Thom Shanker that evening. I wrote that my document discussed in detail every point
raised in his article and I described the highlights of my new information about the Tillman case
not addressed in his article. Shortly afterwards, Thom Shanker replied: ―Please feel free to send
me your material, as I would be eager to review it.‖
The following morning, on the 28th, I sent Shanker an email containing the Word documents
from ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet‖ and an email with much of the Appendices
material. That afternoon, I sent a hard-copy of my document by Federal Express to both Thom
Shanker and Senator James Webb. Thom Shanker received my document on Friday the 29th at
9:38 AM. That afternoon, he replied to my follow-up email: ―Yes, it arrived. I will review your
documents this weekend. Thanks.‖ But, I was concerned that Shanker hadn‘t contacted me with
questions about my document. And why was he waiting so long to review my materials? Was
he sitting on the story?
...
On Monday June 1st, I awoke to read the NYT Editorial ―Questions for General McChrystal.‖
The editors wrote that General McChrystal ―needs to be rigorously questioned‖ and ―The Senate
owes the American people more than a pro forma confirmation of Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal.‖
But, why didn‘t the editors mention General McChrystal‘s actions in the aftermath of Pat
Tillman‘s death? (In their May 14th editorial, they had raised concerns about McChrystal‘s
―falsified report‖ and his less-than ―candid military reporting‖). Was this omission due to Thom
Shanker‘s May 26th review that had ―cleared‖ General McChrystal of any wrongdoing?
I immediately emailed Thom Shanker, ―Why isn't there any mention of McChrystal's role in the
handling of the Tillman case? … Will the NYT be publishing a follow up to your May 26th
article before the confirmation hearing?‖
Shanker replied: ―… any question about an editorial should be directed to The Times editorial
board, and not to a newsroom reporter.‖ … ―Do you have any sense at all that Senators will be
pressing on the Tillman case?‖ … Again, thanks for the very detailed and voluminous file you
sent. It was very well researched and quite thorough.‖
Well, it‘s always nice to receive praise, but why wasn‘t Thom Shanker ―pressing‖ the Senators
on the Tillman case? Why wasn‘t Shanker questioning his Congressional sources? Why wasn‘t
he doing anything to follow up on the revelations in my document?
Later that morning, I tried again: ―Could you please answer my question? Are you going to
publish a follow-up to your May 26th piece based on my document or any other information
you've received? If not, why not? Why did you even bother to raise questions about McChrystal
and Tillman in your May 26th article?‖
Thom Shanker replied: ―At this point there will not be a follow-on story on the Tillman
investigation prior to the hearing, although we will see what the hearing brings up tomorrow.‖
―See what the hearing brings up‖? Couldn‘t Shanker play a more active role? He was very
familiar with the Tillman case after writing his May 26th article (which I had discredited). Why
wasn‘t he doing further investigation?
...
I decided to take Thom Shanker‘s advice that ―any question about an editorial should be directed
to The Times editorial board, and not to a newsroom reporter.‖ On Monday afternoon, June 1st,
I sent the following email to the NYT editors (Letters to the Editor, Editorial Page Editor, News
Dept., the Executive Editor, the Managing Editor, News-Tips, National Newsroom, and the
Washington Newsroom. Unfortunately I neglected to email the Public Editor):
I was surprised that your editorial today, ―Questions for General McChrystal,‖ did not
mention General McChrystal‘s role in the aftermath of Pat Tillman‘s fratricide.
I‘ve been corresponding with Thom Shanker, your NYT Pentagon correspondent, since
last Wednesday in reference to his May 26th article ―Nomination of US Afghan
Commander Revives Questions in Tillman‘s Case.‖ Last Thursday, I FedExed my 100
page document to him detailing new disclosures of General McChrystal‘s central role in
the whitewash of Tillman‘s death.
However, it doesn‘t appear that Thom Shanker is following up with another article. I
think the NYT editorial board would find it useful to speak with him and get a copy of
this document before tomorrow‘s June 2nd confirmation hearing of General McChrystal
before the Senate Armed Services Committee (or read my letters below and attachments).
Below, you can read my May 27th letter to Thom Shanker and my letter to Senator Webb.
If you would like more information, I‘ve also ―attached‖ many of the documents in the
package I sent to Thom Shanker.
I never received a response to my email from any of the editors at The New York Times (At the
time, I hoped that an editor might prod Shanker into a follow-up story on the Tillman case).
...
On June 2nd 2009, the Senate Armed Services Committee held General McChrystal‘s
confirmation hearing. However, the hearing was just a ―pro forma confirmation‖ and the
Senators did not ―rigorously question― McChrystal. David Corn commented on PBS‘s News
Hour: ―And so the Pat Tillman questioning … I thought, seemed very orchestrated and didn't
give a full airing … a lot of what happened today made it clear to me that Democrats and
Republicans had both decided, "He's our guy in Afghanistan‖
Note: For more detailed information on the Confirmation hearing, refer to the Appendices:
―Senate ASC 6-02-09 Confirmation Hearing‖ (from ―Did They Teach You How to Lie
Yet?) and ―General McChrystal‘s Testimony at Senate ASC 6-02-09 Confirmation
Hearing‖ and ―Rebuttal of Thom Shanker‘s Post-Hearing Article: ―Nominee to
Command U.S. Afghanistan Forces Stresses Civilian Safety‖
Shortly after the hearing ended, Thom Shanker‘s article covering the hearing, ―Nominee to
Command Afghanistan Stresses Civilian Safety,‖ appeared on the NYT‘s website. However,
Shanker failed to incorporate any of my new information about General McChrystal‘s central
role in the Army‘s cover-up of Tillman‘s fratricide into his article. Instead, Shanker merely
recycled his same rebutted assertions (from his 5-26-09 article) that McChrystal was ―cleared of
any wrongdoing.‖
In addition, Thom Shanker failed to note three new revelations from McChrystal‘s testimony:
1. McChrystal‘s new account of when and where he first learned of Tillman‘s fratricide
contradicted his previous testimony and the testimony of General Abizaid and COL
Nixon. Their accounts over the course of several investigations simply didn‘t match up.
McChrystal, Abizaid, and/or Nixon gave false testimony before the investigators and/or
Congress.
2. General Wallace cleared McChrystal since he only ―signed off‖ on the Silver Star
recommendation and ―had no reasonable basis to question the recommendation.‖ But,
McChrystal testified he was in Afghanistan and led the Ranger officers during the Silver
Star recommendation process! He didn‘t just sign off on a piece of paper that just
dropped onto his desk!
3. General McChrystal publicly confirmed the existence of last year‘s secret review prior
to his 2008 confirmation hearing: ―You gave me the opportunity to discuss in detail one
of those failures, Corporal Pat Tillman, in closed session with this committee a year ago,
in advance of my confirmation as Director of the Joint Staff …‖
Obviously, the real confirmation hearing took place last year behind closed doors. Why didn‘t
Thom Shanker (or any other reporter) follow-up and ask the Senators what the Senators learned
during last year‘s ―executive session‖ when McChrystal‘s actions were ―discussed in detail‖?
...
Later that evening, I was unable to find Thom Shanker‘s article. It had disappeared from the
NYT website sometime after 4 PM! (Luckily, I was able to find a copy of the original version
that had fortuitously been posted onto the Internet).
―Nominee to Command Afghanistan Stresses Civilian Safety‖ that provided coverage of the
hearing had been replaced by a drastically different article, ―U.S. Report Finds Errors in Afghan
Airstrikes.‖ This article focused on mistaken U.S. airstrikes in Afghanistan and included
literally only a couple of token lines about McChrystal‘s hearing at the very end of the article:
Why did Thom Shanker‘s original article disappear? Perhaps one of my emails sent to the NYT
editors had been read by someone in the editorial food chain who made the decision to
―disappear‖ Thom Shanker‘s article?
...
After cooling off for a few days, on June 5th, I emailed Thom Shanker and asked why he never
did a follow up on the Tillman case using my new information:
… I still don‘t understand why you didn't write a follow-up to your article last week
―Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander Revives Questions in Tillman Case.‖ You wrote that
―Unless new information on General McChrystal‘s role in the episode emerges between now and
his confirmation hearing, set for June 2nd, the question is not expected to figure heavily in the
Senate debate." …
Could you please explain to me why my document wasn‘t sufficient to prompt you to
write a follow-up article? Or at least include some of my information in your June 2nd
article about the hearing? I would welcome any criticism from you of my arguments or
facts contained in my document.
Thom Shanker replied:
Thank you for your note. Your research is exhaustive and impressive. My question back
to you would be:
Why are even senators who were most outspoken in criticism of the handling of the
Tillman case -- in particular Senator Webb, who has figured extensively in your research
and in comments by the Tillman family -- now expressing satisfaction with the public
resolution of the inquiries and now, apparently, ready to confirm General McChrystal
next week? Remember, as I know you do, that the legislative branch is a key check and
balance not only of the executive, but of the military. It controls funding and
confirmation to senior general officer jobs.
Again, thanks for sharing your impressive work with me.
On June 6th, I once again tried to get an answer from Thom Shanker as to why he didn‘t follow-
up on my disclosures:
… I would guess that Webb, and the other senators, think McChrystal is the best man to
lead the Afghan escalation and are willing to forgive his central role in the cover-up of
Tillman's fratricide. And they all know that McChrystal was just obeying orders from
Rumsfeld and the White House to get out good PR at a bad time (Abu Gharib, etc.).
Besides, now the senators are stuck with the "hot potato." They're the last link in the
chain of "investigations" into the handling of the Tillman case. They've got to cover their
own ass now.
But my question for you still remains unanswered. Despite your praise for my document
as "exhaustive", "impressive", and "well researched" none of my findings appeared in
your following articles concerning the Tillman case. Wouldn't my 100 page document
qualify as "new information"? (or are only official government leaks considered
authoritative enough to appear in print?) Could you please explain to me why my
document wasn‘t sufficient to prompt you to write a follow-up to your May 26th article?
Or at least include some of my findings in your June 2nd article about the hearing as a
counterpoint to the official government position?
I never received a response from Thom Shanker. Perhaps I shouldn‘t have needled him a little
with my with my ―government leaks‖ remark (referring to Thom Shanker‘s NYT coverage of the
Jessica Lynch coverage in 2004).
...
―Lies … Borne Out by Facts, If Not The Truth‖

Despite Thom Shanker‘s praise for my document, ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖ as
"exhaustive", "impressive", and "well researched", he never used it‘s revelations to follow-up on
his deeply flawed May 26th review ―Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander Revives Questions
in Tillman Case‖ that supposedly ―cleared‖ General McChrystal of any wrongdoing. Why not?
I suspect that Thom Shanker and the editors of the NYT were not interesting in exploring
disclosures that would be embarrassing to the leadership of the Army, Congress, and the
Presidency. And embarrassing to Shanker and the NYT since his May 26th article was full of
inaccuracies (based largely upon on his own inadequate review of the Tillman investigation
documents).
I‘m still puzzled as to who was responsible for posing the ―questions [that] have surfaced again
after General McChrystal‘s nomination to be the top American commander in Afghanistan.‖?
Who at the NYT prompted Thom Shanker to write his May 26th article?
Was there was a bit of in-fighting at the NYT among the editors? Perhaps the Editorial Page
side raised the ―questions that have surfaced again.‖ Whereas the News Editors told Shanker to
write his article to ―clear‖ McChrystal of wrongdoing, sat on the new disclosures contained in
my document, and disappeared Shanker‘s initial coverage of the Senate Hearing?
...
General McChrystal acknowledged during his testimony that he and the Army had ―failed the
family‖. In Senator James Webb‘s 1983 novel, A Country Such As This, Congressman Judd
Smith argued: ―And no, the military isn‘t just fine. The point is, it isn‘t corrupt. It‘s a system
with human failures.‖
But when ―human failures‖ systematically extend up every single link in the chain-of-command
(to include the Chair of the Joint Chiefs, Army Chief of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense) up
to and including the White House, how is this not a corrupt country? Every single institution in
this country has failed the Tillman family, including the Army leadership, Congress, White
House and the mainstream media.
In the Tillman case, Thom Shanker and The New York Times bear the dishonor of playing the
final role in the Tillman cover-up story. The New York Times laid the topmost layer upon the
tall stack of Army and Congressional cover-ups (‗investigations‖) of the Tillman fratricide.
...
During Kevin Tillman‘s testimony before a 2007 House hearing, he said:

―… while each investigation gathered more information, the mountain of evidence was
never used to arrive at an honest or even sensible conclusion … Writing a Silver Star
award before a single eye witness account is taken is not a misstep. Falsifying soldier
witness statements for a Silver Star is not a misstep. … Discarding an (15-6)
investigation that does not fit a preordained conclusion is not an error in judgment. These
are deliberate acts of deceit. This is not the perception of concealment. This is
concealment.‖
At McChrystal‘s confirmation hearing, Senator James Webb read from a 2005 letter from Pat
Tillman, Sr. (Pat‘s father):
―No investigator worth a damn would have made the presentation I sat through unless
they had an agenda different from the truth. … No one has been confronted with their
conduct. The issue of importance is the integrity of the military from the lieutenant
colonel on the ground all the way up and past General Jones [3rd investigator].‖
Once again, as in the Jessica Lynch case, The New York Times has provided coverage (or lack
thereof) that brings into question the integrity of its journalism and its ability to use a ―mountain
of evidence to arrive at an honest or even sensible conclusion‖.
Instead of an objective search for the truth of General McChrystal actions in the aftermath of Pat
Tillman‘s death, The New York Times has displayed its stenographical abilities to parrot the
official government position borne out by the ―facts,‖ if not the truth.
I believe you should question Thom Shanker and his NYT editors about their coverage of
General McChrystal‘s Senate confirmation hearing and his handling of the Pat Tillman fratricide.
They should be held accountable for their actions in whitewashing General McChrystal‘s role in
the cover-up of Pat Tillman‘s friendly fire death.
Sincerely,
SSG, Co. ―F‖ (Ranger), 425th Infantry MI ARNG 1983 – 1991
P.S. Who am I? What‘s my agenda? Here are some remarks based on my October 2005
newspaper editorial, ―Remember the Iconoclast, Not the Icon‖:
I‘ve taken the cover-up of Pat Tillman‘s death a bit personally. Like Stan Goff, I feel a sense of
kinship with Pat Tillman. In 1983, when I was ―young and dumb,‖ I enlisted with an Airborne
Ranger Long-Range Recon Patrol (LRRP) company. I grew up in the Army, enjoyed the
camaraderie and the challenges. But, the lies of the first Gulf War were the last straw. After
eight years, I finally left the Army in March 1991, and have been a firefighter the past 18 years.
Four years ago, I believed Pat Tillman was a patriotic ―dumb jock‖. I refused to watch any of
the flag waving coverage of his memorial service. It seemed like a sideshow distraction to the
Abu Gharib story.
But, the reality of Pat was much deeper than his iconic image. In October 2005, I read David
Zirin‘s article, ―Our Hero.‖ I discovered a side of Pat Tillman not widely known –a fiercely
independent thinker, avid reader (a favorite author was Noam Chomsky), and critic of the Bush
administration and the Iraq war (―…this war is so fucking illegal‖). Pat was a remarkable man
who was driven by a core of honesty and integrity, led by personal example, and lived his life
intensely.
I was angered that the truth about Pat‘s life and death had been buried by the media and
government. Tillman was enshrined as an icon while the man fell by the wayside, his parents
used as props at his funeral. Pat‘s family still don‘t have the meager consolation of knowing the
truth about his death. ―The truth may be painful, but it‘s the truth,‖ his mother said. ―If you feel
you‘re being lied to, you can never put it to rest.‖
Let us honor Pat Tillman‘s memory by honoring the man, not the myth. The iconoclast, not the
icon. As his mother said, ―Pat would have wanted to be remembered as an individual, not as a
stock figure or political prop. Pat was a real hero, not what they used him as.‖
Pat Tillman, never at a loss for words himself, is now silent. Of the many tragic aspects
surrounding his death, one is that he cannot define his own legacy. Now, it‘s been up to his
family and friends to reclaim the truth and integrity of Pat‘s life and death.
THOM SHANKER, THE NEW YORK TIMES, AND THE
WHITEWASH OF GENERAL MCCHRYSTAL’S ROLE IN THE
AFTERMATH OF PAT TILLMAN’S DEATH
―Ron Holcomb [Secretary of Defense] never told a lie, at least not in the way he could be caught in it. …As a
consequence, his remarks were a mix of bald truth, diplomatic half-truths, and what Holcomb had privately called
‗necessary, unconfirmable distortions.‘ Nonetheless, they would become the government‘s official
pronouncement on the day‘s action.‖
―Allegations, lies, denials, dissembling, distortions … And all the while they secretly whispered to the media …
And the media gave them their forum, always ascertaining beforehand that their allegations were borne out by
facts if not the truth.‖
--- Senator James Webb, ―Something to Die For‖ (1991)

―Allegations, lies, denials, dissembling, distortions … And all the while they secretly whispered to the media … And
the media gave them their forum, always ascertaining beforehand that their allegations were borne out by facts if not
the truth.‖
--- Senator James Webb, ―Something to Die For‖ (1991)
THOM SHANKER, THE NEW YORK TIMES, AND THE

WHITEWASH OF GENERAL MCCHRYSTAL’S ROLE IN
THE AFTERMATH OF PAT TILLMAN’S DEATH
During the summer of 2008, I reviewed the Tillman investigation documents and found
General McChrystal had played a key role in the Army‘s cover-up of Tillman‘s friendly fire death:
McChrystal received confirmation of Tillman‘s fratricide within two days from the investigating
officer (―I‘m certain, I‘m sure), had the responsibility to tell Tillman‘s family about the fratricide
but decided not to tell the family, he waited a week before sending his ―timely‖ P4 memo to
supposedly warn his superiors of ―potential fratricide‖, and he personally led the Ranger officers
while they wrote the ―misleading‖ Silver Star recommendation (with a false citation and tampered
witness statements).
Note: For a detailed account of my review of the Tillman documents and Senator Webb‘s
role in the Tillman case, refer to the section titled, ―Senator James Webb and the
Whitewash of General Stanley McChrystal‘s Role in the Aftermath of Pat Tillman‘s
Death.‖
...
The following year, on May 12th 2009, President Obama nominated General Stanley McChrystal
for promotion to four-star general and commander of the Afghanistan War. Five years ago, Pat
Tillman‘s family were handed a tarnished Silver Star. I felt it would be a travesty of justice if
McChrystal was confirmed by the Senate, promoted to the Army‘s highest rank, and handed his
fourth star!
So, I decided to take a closer look at General McChrystal‘s actions in the aftermath of Tillman‘s
death. I started writing a letter to Senator Webb that asked him to place a ―hold‖ on McChrystal‘s
confirmation. During the last two weeks of May 2008, this letter became the introduction to my
document, ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖ – Senator James Webb, General Stanley
McChrystal, and the Betrayal of Pat Tillman‖ (with fifty pages of text and 50 pages of supporting
investigative documents).
In ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖ I wrote that Congress and the senior leadership of the
Army had acted to shield General McChrystal‘s actions from close scrutiny and to protect him
from punishment for his central role in orchestrating the cover-up of Pat Tillman‘s fratricide:
On July 31st 2007, Secretary of the Army Pete Geren and General Cody presented the
findings of General William Wallace‘s review. General McChrystal received no
reprimand. Instead, Wallace singled out General Kensinger as the scapegoat. However,
their defense of McChrystal doesn‘t hold up under scrutiny.
General McChrystal was guilty of the same charges for which Kensinger was scapegoated!
That is, General McChrystal was required to ―inform the family about friendly fire,‖ failed
to ―inform the family about friendly fire in a timely manner,‖ failed ―to inform the acting
Secretary of the Army [his chain of command] of the fratricide investigation,‖ and
(arguably) made ―false official statements.‖
From April 2007 through July 2008, Congressman Waxman‘s House Oversight & Reform
Committee conducted a perfunctory investigation and held two hearings on the Tillman
fratricide. Chairman Waxman‘s decision to narrow the scope of his investigation to only
―look up‖ the chain of command took the focus off General McChrystal.
And the Committee permitted General McChrystal to ―decline‖ to appear and they never
interviewed him later. After raising questions about the Silver Star, they didn‘t look into
McChrystal‘s role in approving the Silver Star with a fraudulent citation, justification and
altered witness statements. The Committee never questioned the ―timeliness‖ or
misleading contents of General McChrystal‘s P4 memo.
During May 2008, the Senate Armed Services Committee conducted a secret review of
General McChrystal‘s role in the Tillman case. On May 15th 2008 they met in closed
session to question McChrystal‘s actions during the aftermath of the Tillman fratricide.
On May 22th 2008, McChrystal was unanimously confirmed by the Committee and
promoted to Director of the Joint Staff.
Note: To read my detailed argument that Congress and the senior leadership of the Army
acted to protect General McChrystal, refer to the separate binder, ―Did They Teach You
How to Lie Yet?‖ – Senator James Webb, General Stanley McChrystal & the Betrayal of
Pat Tillman.‖ Some sections from this binder have been placed into the Appendices.
Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander Revives Questions in Tillman Case
On May 27th 2009, I was finishing my document ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖ and
preparing to send a copy to Senator Webb. That evening, I checked the news and read The New
York Times article ―Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander Revives Questions in Tillman
Case.‖ (5-26-09). Thom Shanker (NYT Washington Pentagon Reporter ) wrote:
The death of Corporal Tillman, the handling of his Silver Star commendation and the
initial, false information released to the family and the public were the subjects of multiple
investigations. … The four-star general [William S. Wallace] who was the final judge of
the case ordered punitive action against seven officers … General McChrystal was among
the three cleared of wrongdoing. … But questions have surfaced again after General
McChrystal‘s nomination to be the top American commander in Afghanistan …
A review of the voluminous documents, transcripts and findings … showed that General
McChrystal was cleared in part because he was not serving in the chain of command …
responsible for investigating Corporal Tillman‘s death and notifying the family and the
public of details.
General McChrystal‘s [P4] memorandum, sent a week after the episode, warned that ―it is
highly possible that Corporal Tillman was killed by friendly fire,‖ … [and] asked his three
superiors to warn President George W. Bush and the acting Army secretary ―about
comments they might make in speeches to preclude embarrassment if the public found out
friendly fire was involved.‖ … General Wallace … said that General McChrystal
responded ―reasonably and quickly‖
Initially, the Pentagon inspector general‘s inquiry criticized General McChrystal for
signing a Silver Star commendation that ―erroneously implied that Corporal Tillman died
by enemy fire‖ … But the final judgment by General Wallace concluded that General
McChrystal ―had no reasonable basis to call into question the recommendation that came
up endorsed by the commanders in the field who were there and had firsthand knowledge
of the circumstances of his death and his heroic actions.‖
The Senate last year confirmed General McChrystal to a three-star job in a vote taken long
after the inquiries were complete. In explaining why the Tillman case was not expected to
affect the general‘s new confirmation, Congressional officials said senators would have to
explain why they confirmed him then but were challenging his qualifications now to
receive a fourth star and take over the Afghan mission absent new disclosures.
Unless new information on General McChrystal‘s role in the episode emerges between
now and his confirmation hearing, set for June 2, the question is not expected to figure
heavily in the Senate debate, Congressional officials said.
Wow! The New York Times had actually published an investigative piece on the Tillman case.
But who was responsible for posing the ―questions [that] have surfaced again after General
McChrystal‘s nomination to be the top American commander in Afghanistan.‖? Perhaps the same
editors who had written the May 14th NYT Editorial ――New Commander for Afghanistan‖:
―it was General McChrystal who approved the falsified report [Silver Star citation?] that
covered up the 2004 friendly-fire death of Cpl. Pat Tillman in Afghanistan. … Before
confirming him in his new command, senators must assure themselves that he has learned
the hard lessons from these mistakes and will insist on lawful treatment of detainees and
candid military reporting.‖
Wow! The New York Times had actually published an investigative piece on the Tillman case.
But who was responsible for posing the ―questions [that] have surfaced again after General
McChrystal‘s nomination to be the top American commander in Afghanistan.‖? Perhaps the same
editors who had written the May 14th NYT Editorial ――New Commander for Afghanistan‖:
...
Thom Shanker wrote that General McChrystal had been cleared of wrongdoing in the Army‘s
handling of Pat Tillman‘s fratricide: McChrystal was not responsible for investigating the
fratricide and notifying the family, had sent a ―timely‖ P4 memo to warn his superiors, and had
merely signed off on Tillman‘s misleading Silver Star citation without firsthand knowledge.
However, my review found that none of Thom Shanker‘s assertions clearing McChrystal of
wrongdoing held up under scrutiny! General McChrystal played a central role in the Army‘s
cover up of Tillman‘s friendly fire death: McChrystal received confirmation of Tillman‘s
fratricide within two days yet didn‘t send his ―timely‖ P4 memo until a week later, had the
responsibility to notify the family and chose not to, and personally led the packaging of the Silver
Star recommendation (with a false narrative and fabricated witness statements). Although
Shanker and I had both reviewed the same investigative documents from the Tillman case, we
arrived at opposite conclusions!
Why did our conclusions differ so dramatically? First, Thom Shanker had failed to review
General Jone‘s 2004 15-6 Report which contains the key testimony that confirmed fratricide was
passed up the chain of command to McChrystal just two days after Tillman‘s death. Second,
Shanker‘s review of the IG report failed to notice the IG conclusions did not always match the
IG‘s own findings; especially as outlined in their process flowcharts in Appendix C & D of the IG
Report. Third, Shanker appeared to uncritically accept the assertions of General Wallace and the
Inspector General (IG) without checking their assertions against other evidence.
Note: For a very detailed, point-by-point discussion of Shanker‘s assertions, see ―Rebuttal of
Thom Shanker‘s Pre-Hearing Article: ―Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander Revives
Questions in Tillman Case‖
May 27th Letter to Thom Shanker with Tillman Disclosures
The evening of May 27th, I e-mailed Thom Shanker and told him I‘d been working on a long letter
to Senator Webb that discussed in detail every point raised in his article and contained new
information about the Tillman case not found in his article:
This past week I‘ve been working on a long letter to Senator James Webb. I write that
Congress and the senior leadership of the Army have shielded General McChrystal from
close scrutiny and protected him from punishment. I review and critique Senator Webb‘s
Armed Services Committee review, General Wallace‘s review, and Congressman
Waxman‘s House Oversight & Reform Committee investigation.
I‘d like to send you a copy of my letter. My letter discusses in some detail every point
raised in your article. In addition, I‘ve uncovered new information about the Tillman case
not mentioned at all in your article.
Here‘s a preview of some of the information (without details or documentation):
1. Senator Webb did a ―thorough review‖ last year of the aftermath of the Tillman
fratricide at the request of Chairman Carl Levin for the Senate Armed Service Committee.
(In retrospect, I realize this was part of the vetting process for McChrystal‘s confirmation
last year as Director of the Joint Staff). Webb mentioned this review May 27th 2008 on
the Diane Rhem NPR radio show (about 40 minutes into show). When I tried to follow up,
Webb‘s Military Affairs aide, Gordon Peterson, stonewalled me and referred me to Gary
Leeling 202-224-9339 (legal counsel for Senator Levin)
2.) Congressman Waxman ―invited‖ McChrystal to testify on August 1st 2007. The
Committee permited McChrystal to ―decline‖ to appear at the hearing despite his key role
in notifying senior leadership, writing the misleading P4 memo, and approving the
fraudulent Silver Star. And the Committee never interviewed McChrystal during the next
year until their report was issued. .
3.) General Kensinger was blamed for failing to notify the family because he supposedly
had the ―administrative‖ responsibility to do so. Yet, if you look at ―Appendix D: Casualty
Reporting & Next of Kin Notification Process‖ in the IG report, the flowchart clearly
shows that McChrystal had that responsibility (and it‘s noted both he and his Chief of Staff
failed to make that notification despite knowing about fratricide NLT April 25th.
4). There was nothing ―potential‖ about Tillman‘s friendly fire death. Most of the troops
on the ground knew immediately what had happened. On the 23rd word was passed up
―70% sure‖ to Nixon. But, if you look at the IG report‘s ―Appendix B: Chronology,‖ its
noted that LTC Bailey tells COL Nixon of potential fratricide on the 23rd yet Nixon
supposedly only tells McChrystal of Tillman‘s ―death‖ (no mention of fratricide). How is
that possible? And then supposedly McChrystal tells General Abizaid only of Tillman‘s
death. It looks as though Abizaid wasn‘t being truthful when he testified before Congress
about when he learned about fratricide.
5.) And on the 24th, the initial investigating officer CPT Scott passed on confirmation
(―I‘m certain, I‘m sure‖) to LTC Bailey, who then called COL Nixon (McChrystal was
next in the chain of command). The Army knew of confirmed FF two days after Tillman‘s
death!
6.) McChrystal is praised for his ―timely‖ P4 memo to alert his superiors on the 29th.
There was nothing timely about it. Even if you accept his own testimony at face value, he
knew about friendly fire on the 23rd, 24th, or 25th. Yet he didn‘t send out his P4 until the
29th? How is waiting four to six days ―timely‖?
7.) No one seems to have carefully read McChrystal‘s P4 memo. The contents are
damning. For example, He says ―IF the circumstances of CPL Tillman‘s death become
public.‖ Not when, IF.
Note: see ―E-Mail Exchanges Between NYT Pentagon Reporter Thom Shanker and David
Parish‖ for the unabridged versions of the email correspondence between Shanker and
myself.
...
Shortly afterwards, Thom Shanker replied: ―Please feel free to send me your material, as I would
be eager to review it. Above is my direct e-mail address. Thanks for writing.‖
...
I stayed up very late that night finishing my document ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖
and gott it ready to copy and send by Federal Express the following day to Thom Shanker.
―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖ Fed-Exed to Thom Shanker
Thursday May 28th, first thing in the morning, I sent Shanker an email containing the Word
documents comprising my binder ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet‖. Shortly thereafter, I
sent him a download of most of the Appendices.
That afternoon, I sent a hard-copy of my document to Thom Shanker and Senator Webb by
Federal Express.
I was a bit surprised that Shanker hadn‘t emailed me sometime during the day for clarification or
questions about my emailed material. Perhaps he was waiting to receive my hardcopy materials?
...
On Friday morning May 29th, I emailed Shanker:
―I sent my document ―Did They Teach You to Lie Yet?‖ by Fed Ex yesterday afternoon.
It‘s supposed to get to your office around 10:30 Friday morning. This is a hard-copy of
what I emailed yesterday, with a numbered Table of Contents and the full set of
appendices. ….‖
I sent a follow-up email later that afternoon:
―I just checked Fed Express. My package was delivered this morning at 9:38 AM. Just
thought I'd pass this information on in case the package hasn't yet made it to your desk.‖
Late Friday afternoon, Thom Shanker replied:
―Yes, it arrived. I will review your documents this weekend. Thanks.‖
...
―I will review your documents over the weekend‖? Why was Shanker waiting so long? I thought
that I had certainly provided Shanker with enough ―new information on General McChrystal‘s role
in the episode‖ to pursue a follow-up article prior to his confirmation hearing.
Wouldn‘t Shanker have been doing some digging into the Tillman story (e.g. re-questioning his
Congressional sources, checking out my facts, etc.)
I was a bit surprised that Thom Shanker was going to wait until the weekend to review my
documents. Shanker didn‘t appear to be very enthusiastic about my revelations. Was he doing
anything to follow-up? Was he just sitting on the story?
June 1st NYT Editorial: ―Questions for General McChrystal‖
On Monday, June 1st, I awoke to read the New York Times Editorial ―Questions for General
McChrystal‖ (6-01-09):
―The Senate owes the American people more than a pro forma confirmation of Lt. Gen.
Stanley McChrystal … General McChrystal, who goes before the Armed Services
Committee on Tuesday, built an impressive reputation as commander of the Pentagon‘s
Joint Special Operations teams … But there are other, more disturbing aspects of that
record that the Senate also must consider. [i.e. torture by JSOC special operations] … The
overall performance of the Special Operations Command under General McChrystal‘s
leadership — both acts of heroism and acts of abuse — is an essential part of measuring
General McChrystal‘s fitness for his new assignment. He needs to be rigorously
questioned.‖
In their previous NYT editorial, just two weeks prior, the editors had written ―McChrystal who
approved the falsified report that covered up the 2004 friendly-fire death of Cpl. Pat Tillman in
Afghanistan‖ and the ―senators must assure themselves that he has learned the hard lessons from
these mistakes and will insist … on lawful treatment of detainees and candid military reporting.‖
I agreed with the NYT editors that General McChrystal ―needs to be rigorously questioned‖ and
that ―The Senate owes the American people more than a pro forma confirmation of Lt. Gen.
Stanley McChrystal.‖ But, why was there no mention of General McChrystal‘s actions in the
aftermath of Pat Tillman‘s death in their editorial just prior to his hearing?
Why were the editors no longer asking the Senate to question McChrystal about the Tillman case?
Was it because Thom Shanker‘s May 26th review had ―cleared‖ General McChrystal of any
wrongdoing in his actions in the afterman of the Tillman fratricide?
...
Monday morning, on June 1st, I emailed Thom Shanker and asked, ―Why isn't there any mention
of McChrystal's role in the handling of the Tillman case? … Will the NYT be publishing a follow
up to your May 26th article before the confirmation hearing?‖
Thom replied:
―As such a careful reader of the paper, you are no doubt aware of the strict and important
institutional divide between the newsroom and those who write editorials. Thus, any
question about an editorial should be directed to The Times editorial board, and not to a
newsroom reporter.
Do you have any sense at all that Senators will be pressing on the Tillman case?
Again, thanks for the very detailed and voluminous file you sent. It was very well
researched and quite thorough.‖
Well, praise for my ―detailed‖, ―very well researched and quite thorough‖ document was fine, but
why wasn‘t Shanker doing anything with my information? And, how would I have ―any sense at
all that Senators will be pressing on the Tillman case?‖ Wouldn‘t that be the job of a NYT
Pentagon reporter to question his sources in Congress using my revelations? Couldn‘t the NYT
press the Senators to take a closer look at McChrystal before confirming him?
...
Later that morning, I tried again: ―Could you please answer my question? Are you going to
publish a follow-up to your May 26th piece based on my document or any other information
you've received? If not, why not? Why did you even bother to raise questions about McChrystal
and Tillman in your May 26th article?‖
Thom replied:
―At this point there will not be a follow-on story on the Tillman investigation prior to the
hearing, although we will see what the hearing brings up tomorrow.‖
―See what the hearing brings up‖? Obviously, Thom Shanker wasn‘t going to use the revelations
contained in ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‘ to do any sort of follow-up investigation into
McChrystal‘s role in the Tillman case.
...
So, I decided to take Thom Shanker‘s advice that ―any question about an editorial should be
directed to The Times editorial board, and not to a newsroom reporter.‖
I decided to write a letter to the editor. To as many editors as I could!

June 1st Letter to the New York Times Editorial Board
Monday afternoon, on June 1st, I sent the following letter by email to as many NYT editors that I
could find on the website (except, unfortunately the Public Editor). I also ―attached‖ to the emails
the same Word documents from ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖ that I had sent to Thom
Shanker the previous week.
Note: See the Appendices to refer to a copy of my email and my ―Sent Items‖. I sent this email
and attachments to the following editors: Letters to the Editor, Editorial Page Editor,
News Department, the Executive Editor, the Managing Editor, News-Tips, National
Newsroom, and the Washington Newsroom.
However, it doesn‘t appear that Thom Shanker is following up with another article. I think
the NYT editorial board would find it useful to speak with him and get a copy of this
document before tomorrow‘s June 2nd confirmation hearing of General McChrystal before
the Senate Armed Services Committee (or read my letters below and attachments).
Note: The May 27th email to Thom Shanker outlining my new information in the Tillman case
and my May 25th Letter to Senator Webb appeared in the body of this email to the NYT
editors. Refer to the Appendices to view the contents of those documents.
...
I never received a response to my email from any of the editors at The New York Times
―Nominee to Command U.S. Afghan Forces Stresses Civilian Safety‖
On June 1st 2009, the editors of the NYT wrote, in their editorial ―Questions for General
McChrystal,‖ that he ―needs to be rigorously questioned‖ and that ―the Senate owes the American
people more than a pro forma confirmation of Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal.‖
On the following day, June 2nd 2009, the Senate Armed Services Committee held the confirmation
hearing for General McChrystal‘s promotion to four-star general and commander of the
Afghanistan War. However, the Senators did not ―rigorously question― McChrystal, and the
hearing was very much just a ―pro forma confirmation‖.
As David Corn commented on PBS‘s News Hour:
―And so the Pat Tillman questioning, the questioning about detainee abuse, I thought,
seemed very orchestrated and didn't give a full airing to these very, I think, hot-button
issues‖. … ―You know, he came up with what sounded to be a plausible explanation, but,
again, a lot of what happened today made it clear to me that Democrats and Republicans
had both decided, "He's our guy in Afghanistan‖
Note: For more detailed information on the Confirmation hearing, refer to the Appendices:
―Senate ASC 6-02-09 Confirmation Hearing‖ (from ―Did They Teach You How to Lie
Yet?) and ―General McChrystal‘s Testimony at Senate ASC 6-02-09 Confirmation
Hearing‖
In his June 1st email, Shanker had written ―there will not be a follow-on story on the Tillman
investigation prior to the hearing, although we will see what the hearing brings up tomorrow.‖ So,
I was surprised to see that shortly after the hearing ended, Thom Shanker‘s article covering the
hearing, ―Nominee to Command Afghanistan Stresses Civilian Safety,‖ appeared on the NYT‘s
website.
Note: For a very detailed, point-by-point discussion of Shanker‘s confirmation hearing

Coverage of the Tillman case, see ―Rebuttal of Thom Shanker‘s Post-Hearing Article:
―Nominee to Command U.S. Afghanistan Forces Stresses Civilian Safety‖
Shanker merely recycled the same discredited arguments (from his 5-26-09 article) to assert that
McChrystal was ―cleared of any wrongdoing‖ in the Tillman case. He failed to include any of my
new information about General McChrystal‘s central role in the Army‘s cover-up of Tillman‘s
fratricide.
Note: For a very detailed, point-by-point discussion of Shanker‘s ―discredited arguments‖, see
―Rebuttal of Thom Shanker‘s Pre-Hearing Article: ―Nomination of U.S. Afghan
Commander Revives Questions in Tillman Case‖
In addition, Thom Shanker failed to notice two new revelations from McChrystal‘s testimony
during the Senate Hearing that provided further evidence of his complicity in the Tillman
fratricide cover-up:
1. ―Corporal Tillman was killed on the 22nd of April … I arrived back into Afghanistan
from a meeting in Qatar with General Abizaid on about the 23rd, and I was informed, at
that point, that they suspected that friendly fire might have been the cause of death, and
that they had initiated what we call a 15-6, or an investigation of that.‖ (p.18 transcript)
McChrystal‘s new account of how he first learned of Tillman‘s fratricide contradicted his
own previous testimony and the testimony of Abizaid and Nixon. Their accounts simply
don‘t match up. McChrystal, Abizaid, and/or Nixon gave false testimony before the IG
investigators and/or Congress.
2. “I sat down with the people [Ranger Regiment officers] who recommended it [Silver
Star]. … and we went over a whiteboard, and we looked at the geometry of the battlefield,
and I queried the people to satisfy myself that, in fact, that his actions warranted that, even
though there was a potential that the actual circumstances of death had been friendly
fire.” (p. 18 transcript)
General Wallace cleared McChrystal of wrongdoing since he only ―signed off‖ on the
Silver Star recommendation and ―had no reasonable basis to question the recommendation
that came up endorsed by the commanders in the field who were there and had firsthand
knowledge of the circumstances of his death and his heroic actions.‖
But, General McChrystal was in Afghanistan with the Ranger officers discussing what
happened! McChrystal led the Silver Star approval process! McChrystal wasn‘t far
removed from the process. He didn‘t just sign off on a piece of paper that just dropped
onto his desk! He was intimately involved with the process and had firsthand knowledge.
...
Further, Thom Shanker failed to mention that both Chairman Carl Levin and General McChrystal
publicly confirmed the existence of last year‘s secret confirmation hearing:
General McChrystal said ―You gave me the opportunity to discuss in detail one of those
failures, Corporal Pat Tillman, in closed session with this committee a year ago, in advance
of my confirmation as Director of the Joint Staff, which I appreciated. I stand ready to
answer any additional questions you may have.‖
Obviously, the real confirmation hearing took place last year, behind closed doors, with no
accountability whatsoever. Wouldn‘t you think someone in our intrepid watchdog media (perhaps
Thom Shanker and the NYT) would follow-up on this disclosure? Perhaps ask the Senators about
last year‘s ―executive session‖ during which McChrystal‘s actions were ―discussed in detail‖?
―U.S. Report Finds Errors In Afghan Airstrikes‖
The Senate Armed Services Committee held their confirmation hearing for General McChrystal
on June 2nd 2009. Within an hour, Thom Shanker‘s article ―Nominee to Command Afghanistan
Stresses Civilian Safety‖ appeared on the NYT‘s website.
Later that evening, I was unable to find the article. It had disappeared from the NYT website
sometime after 4 PM! Unfortunately, I neglected to print or save the article when I first read it
shortly after the hearing. Luckily, I was able to find a copy of the original version that had
fortuitously been posted onto the Internet.
Shanker‘s first article that covered the confirmation hearing had been replaced by a 2nd version,
―U.S. Report Finds Errors in Afghan Airstrikes.‖ Version #2 had been drastically revised,
focused not on the Senate hearing, but about mistaken U.S. airstrikes in Afghanistan. The second
version deleted nearly all references to the Tillman case and the Senate confirmation hearing. The
extent of the NYT‘s hearing coverage about McChrystal‘s role in the Tillman case was only the
following lines at the very end of the article:
―Under questioning, General McChrystal also acknowledged that the Army had ―failed the
family‖ in its mishandling of the friendly-fire death of Cpl. Pat Tillman, the professional
football star who enlisted in the Army after the attacks on Sept. 11, 2001.‖
―A final review by a four-star Army general [Wallace] cleared General McChrystal of any
wrongdoing, but punished a number of senior officers [eg Kensinger] who were
responsible for administrative mistakes in the days after Corporal Tillman‘s death.
Initially, Army officials said the corporal had been killed by an insurgent ambush, when in
fact he had been shot by members of his own Ranger team.‖
...
Why did the original article disappear?
On June 1st, I had sent an email to the NYT editors that included my May 27th letter to Thom
Shanker and my May 25th letter to Senator Webb with my disclosures about McChrystal‘s central
role in the cover-up of the Tillman fratricide.
Perhaps, someone in the editorial food chain finally saw my email and made the decision to back
off the NYT‘s initial (and full of error) coverage of the hearing. Include just a couple of token line
so they could still say they covered the hearing?
―Why Didn’t You Write a Follow-Up to Your Article?‖
After cooling off for a few days, I finally emailed Thom Shanker again on June 5th:
First, I thought I‘d pass on my comments about General McChrystal‘s testimony at his
confirmation hearing. For what it matters, General McChrystal just dug himself a deeper
hole with his own words on Tuesday:
Note: Here followed four points about McChrystal‘s testimony that were the basis for my
―Rebuttal of Thom Shanker‘s Post-Hearing Article: ―Nominee to Command U.S.
Afghanistan Forces Stresses Civilian Safety‖]
Finally, I still don‘t understand why you didn't write a follow-up to your article last week
―Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander Revives Questions in Tillman Case.‖ You wrote
that ―Unless new information on General McChrystal‘s role in the episode emerges
between now and his confirmation hearing, set for June 2nd, the question is not expected to
figure heavily in the Senate debate."
Yet, last week I provided you with a copy of my document ―Did They Teach You To Lie
Yet?‖ (with 50 pages of text and 50 pages of Appendices) describing ―new disclosures‖
about McChrystal‘s role in the Tillman case.
Could you please explain to me why my document wasn‘t sufficient to prompt you to write
a follow-up article? Or at least include some of my information in your June 2nd article
about the hearing? I would welcome any criticism from you of my arguments or facts
contained in my document.
Thom Shanker replied:
Thank you for your note. Your research is exhaustive and impressive. My question back to
you would be:
resolution of the inquiries and now, apparently, ready to confirm General McChrystal next
week? Remember, as I know you do, that the legislative branch is a key check and balance
not only of the executive, but of the military. It controls funding and confirmation to senior
general officer jobs.

On June 6th, I once again tried to get an answer from Thom Shanker as to why he didn‘t follow-up
on my disclosures:
You asked why even Senator Webb has expressed satisfaction with the public resolution of
the inquiries into the Tillman case and is now ready to confirm General McChrystal?
I would stress "public" inquiries. General McChrystal appeared in "executive session" (i.e.
closed, secret) during the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 15, 2008 for
his confirmation to Director of the Joint Staff. I would assume he was a bit more frank
with the senators during that discussion. I talked to Gerald Leeling on June 1st about that
meeting. He would say nothing in response to my questions except "it was in executive
session" and "we did as thorough a review given the information available to us at the
time." I would assume Senator Webb knows McChrystal and the Army have been lying
about their handling of the Tillman case.
But, I would guess that Webb, and the other senators, think McChrystal is the best man to
Besides, now the senators are stuck with the "hot potato." They're the last link in the chain
of "investigations" into the handling of the Tillman case. They've got to cover their own
ass now.
But my question for you still remains unanswered:
Despite your praise for my document as "exhaustive", "impressive", and "well researched"
none of my findings appeared in your following articles concerning the Tillman case.
Wouldn't my 100 page document qualify as "new information"? (or are only official
government leaks considered authoritative enough to appear in print?)
Could you please explain to me why my document wasn‘t sufficient to prompt you to
write a follow-up to your May 26th article? Or at least include some of my findings in
your June 2nd article about the hearing as a counterpoint to the official government
position?
...
I never received a response from Thom Shanker.
Perhaps I shouldn‘t have needled him with my ―or are only official government leaks considered
authoritative enough to appear in print?‖ comment? I was trying to make a subtle reference to
Thom Shanker‘s role in the Jessica Lynch coverage as described by Greg Mitchell‘s April 4th 2008
article ―5 Years Ago: When the Pentagon and Media Lied About Jessica Lynch Rescue.‖
The New York Times and the Whitewash of General McChrystal’s Role
I‘m still puzzled as to who was responsible for posing the ―questions [that] have surfaced again
after General McChrystal‘s nomination to be the top American commander in Afghanistan.‖?
Who at the NYT prompted Thom Shanker to write his May 26th article?
Perhaps there‘s a bit of in-fighting at the NYT among the editors; perhaps those writing the NYT
Editorials raised the ―questions that have surfaced again‖ while the editors on the news side of the
NYT had Shanker write his article to ―clear‖ McChrystal of wrongdoing and later sat on my
revelations contained in my document?
Despite Thom Shanker‘s praise for my document, ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖ as
"exhaustive", "impressive", and "well researched", he never used it‘s revelations to follow-up on
his deeply flawed May 26th review ―Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander Revives Questions
in Tillman Case.‖ Why not?
I suspect that Thom Shanker and the editors of the NYT were not interesting in exploring
disclosures that would be embarrassing to the leadership of the Army, Congress, and the
Presidency. And embarrassing to himself and the NYT since his May 26th article was full of
inaccuracies (based largely upon on his own inadequate review of the Tillman investigation
documents).
In any case, Thom Shanker and The New York Times bear the dishonor of playing the final role in
the Tillman cover-up story, and laid the topmost layer upon the tall stack of Army and
Congressional cover-ups of the Tillman fratricide.
...
General McChrystal acknowledged during his testimony that the Army had ―failed the family‖.
However, the Army wasn‘t the only institution that failed the Tillman family:
The House Oversight Committee‘s ―investigation‖ was pro forma and protected
McChrystal actions covering up Tillman‘s fratricide from public scrutiny.
Senator Webb conducted a secret review of the Tillman case prior to the Senate Armed
Services Committee‘s 2008 confirmation hearing.
The New York Times Pentagon reporter Thom Shanker (and presumably his editors) failed
to follow-up on their receipt of my ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖ showing
General McChrystal was a central figure in the cover-up of Pat Tillman‘s death.
It appears that even President Obama nominated McChrystal to be his new Afghan
commander knowing of McChrystal‘s complicity in the Tillman case!
...
In Senator James Webb‘s 1983 novel, A Country Such As This, Congressman Judd Smith argued:
―And no, the military isn‘t just fine. The point is, it isn‘t corrupt. It‘s a system with
humanfailures.‖
But when ―human failures‖ systematically extend up every single link in the chain-of-command
(to include the Chair of the Joint Chiefs, Army Chief of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense) up to
and including the White House, how is this not a corrupt country? Every single institution in this
country has failed the Tillman family, including the Army leadership, Congress, White House and
the mainstream media.
Perhaps Senator Rowland, in Senator Webb‘s novel, Something to Die For, hit the nail on the
head:
―How lofty it must have been to have burnt with the purity of the Revolution! Before the
days of multi-million dollar election campaigns that brought politicians to their knees
before the monied temple of the contributors. Before the time of computerized politics that
cause them to await the wisdom of those oracles known as pollsters before they spoke. Or
maybe it had been trash from the get-go, myths to feed the public.‖
May 26, 2009
Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander

Revives Questions in Tillman Case
By THOM SHANKER New York Times
Note: See my following rebuttal of Thom Shanker‘s assertions that General McChrystal
was ―cleared of wrongdoing‖ in the handling of the Tillman fratricide. I dispute the truth
of every substantive assertion Thom Shanker made in his article.
Each assertion discussed in my rebuttal has been high-lighted and numbered for easy
reference (Italics within bold-face are mine).
...
WASHINGTON — One was a football hero who roused the nation when he quit
a high-paying job as star safety for the Arizona Cardinals to join the Army and
become a Ranger after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.
The other is a three-star Special Operations general who has spent most of his
career in the shadows, commanding secret counterterrorism missions carried out
by the military‘s most elite capture-or-kill units.
But the lives of Cpl. Pat Tillman and Lt. Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal became
entwined in a most public way after Corporal Tillman died in Afghanistan in
2004. [2] General McChrystal, commander of a Special Operations task
force in Afghanistan at the time, was among 10 officers singled out for
scrutiny after details belatedly emerged that Corporal Tillman was killed
not by an insurgent ambush, as the Army originally asserted, but by fire
from his own team of Rangers.
The four-star general who was the final judge of the case ordered punitive
action against seven officers, including four generals. General McChrystal
was among the three cleared of wrongdoing.
[3] But questions have surfaced again after General McChrystal’s

nomination to be the top American commander in Afghanistan, the latest
step in an urgent effort by the Obama administration to put together a new
strategy and salvage the faltering mission.
[1] The death of Corporal Tillman, the handling of his Silver Star
commendation and the initial, false information released to the family and
the public were the subjects of multiple investigations. Among them were
inquiries by the Army’s Criminal Investigation Command, the Defense
Department’s inspector general and a Congressional committee, as well as
the final four-star review by Gen. William S. Wallace, then in charge of the
Army’s Training and Doctrine Command.
[11] Initially, the Pentagon inspector general’s inquiry criticized General

McChrystal for signing a Silver Star commendation that ―erroneously
implied that Corporal Tillman died by enemy fire.‖
[12] But the final judgment by General Wallace concluded that General
McChrystal ―had no reasonable basis to call into question the
recommendation that came up endorsed by the commanders in the field
who were there and had firsthand knowledge of the circumstances of his
death and his heroic actions.‖
[7] General Wallace also said that General McChrystal responded

“reasonably and quickly” — being the first to alert the three generals who
were his superior officers at Central Command, Special Operations
Command and Army Special Operations Command that there was
emerging evidence that Corporal Tillman had been killed by fellow Rangers.
[6] General McChrystal’s memorandum, sent a week after the episode,

warned that ―it is highly possible that Corporal Tillman was killed by
friendly fire,‖ according to the Pentagon inspector general’s report.
[9] In his message from the field, General McChrystal also asked his three
superiors to warn President George W. Bush and the acting Army secretary
―about comments they might make in speeches to preclude embarrassment
if the public found out friendly fire was involved.‖
[10] General McChrystal’s message was sent not through standard
reporting channels, but through a ―Personal For‖ message system.
Investigators ruled that while it was an unusual choice for communications,
the general could reasonably have assumed that this specialized report
would be acted upon urgently.
[8] ―General McChrystal did exactly the right thing: he sent a timely
message in a timely fashion through the most secure channels,‖ said Gen.
John P. Abizaid, then the top officer of Central Command, overseeing
forces in the Middle East. He spoke during 2007 testimony to the House
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.
Even so, Corporal Tillman‘s family was not informed of the true cause of death
until 35 days after he was killed, and some family members voiced doubts that
the full truth had emerged about who in the Pentagon knew what, and when.
The puzzle was compounded by the fact that it took three years and three months
for the Army and the Defense Department to finish the array of investigations
and mete out punishment for the events, which took place outside Manah,
Afghanistan, on April 22, 2004.
Even the Army‘s top civilian conceded at the conclusion of the investigations in
July 2007 that damage had been done to the service‘s reputation. Pete Geren, the
Army secretary, voiced regret for the ―errors and failures of leadership that
confused and misinformed the American people and compounded the grief
suffered by the Tillman family.‖
[5] A review of the voluminous documents, transcripts and findings made

public after the inquiries showed that General McChrystal was cleared in
part because he was not serving in the chain of command for personnel issues
or administration, the part of the Army responsible for investigating Corporal
Tillman’s death and notifying the family and the public of details.
[4] Officers in administrative headquarters of the Army were most severely

criticized and punished for the confusion and incorrect information released
to the family and the public.
[5] In contrast, General McChrystal was part of the separate, war-fighting
Army in the field, with responsibilities for commanding Corporal Tillman’s
Ranger unit and other Special Operations forces in combat — but not for
the administrative actions faulted by investigators.
A detailed forensics inquiry by the Army‘s Criminal Investigation Command

found that Corporal Tillman‘s death came after a day of heavy combat in eastern
Afghanistan. Hobbled by a broken-down vehicle and faulty radios, the Rangers
had split into two groups, and in the chaos of combat one team of Rangers fired
on the other, killing Corporal Tillman and an Afghan soldier.
[14] Unless new information on General McChrystal’s role in the episode

emerges between now and his confirmation hearing, set for June 2, the
question is not expected to figure heavily in the Senate debate,
Congressional officials said.
[13] The Senate last year confirmed General McChrystal to a three-star job in
a vote taken long after the inquiries were complete. In explaining why the
Tillman case was not expected to affect the general’s new confirmation,
Congressional officials said senators would have to explain why they
confirmed him then but were challenging his qualifications now to receive a
fourth star and take over the Afghan mission absent new disclosures.
...
Timeline: A General‘s role in the Aftermath of a Famous Corporal‘s Death:
http://www.nytimes.com/imagepages/2009/05/26/world/26command.grafic.ready.html
REBUTTAL OF SHANKER’S PRE-HEARING ARTICLE:
―NOMINATION OF U.S. AFGHAN COMMANDER

REVIVES QUESTIONS IN TILLMAN CASE‖
(NEW YORK TIMES, 5-26-09)
In his May 26th NYT article, ―Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander Revives Questions
in Tillman Case,‖ Thom Shanker argued that General McChrystal was cleared of
wrongdoing for his role in the handling of Pat Tillman‘s fratricide.
However, in the following rebuttal, I argue that none of Thom Shanker‘s assertions
clearing McChrystal of wrongdoing hold up under scrutiny. For example:
McChrystal did not ―reasonably and quickly‖ alert his superiors of fratricide. He
received fratricide confirmation from the investigating officer (―I‘m certain, I‘m
sure‖) just two days after Tillman‘s death. Yet, McChrystal did not immediately
notify the Army Safety board and (supposedly) did not notify his superior General
Abizaid to initiate the required safety and legal investigations. Instead, he
supposedly waited a week before he finally sent his misleading P4 memo, just after
the Silver Star award had been approved.
Thom Shanker reviewed the investigative documents and concluded that

McChrystal was cleared of ―administrative mistakes‖ because he was not serving in
the administrative chain of command responsible for investigating the fratricide
and notifying the family. However, Shanker‘s analysis is incorrect. Although
General Wallace, General Cody, and Secretary Geren asserted otherwise, the
process flowchart (IG Report Appendix D) shows that McChrystal failed to submit
the required supplementary casualty report to notify the family of fratricide. In
addition, McChrystal was in the operational chain of command and failed in his
responsibility to quickly notify CENTCOM (Abizaid) to initiate the legal and
safety investigation into Tillman‘s death (see IG Report Appendix C).
McChrystal did not merely sign off on the Silver Star without firsthand knowledge
of the circumstances, he personally led the Ranger officers who wrote the Silver
Star package (with a false narrative and fabricated witness statements).
First, Thom Shanker had failed to review General Jone‘s 2004 15-6 Report. Granted
Jone‘s 15-6 2000 page report, with all the names and ranks ―redacted‖ is difficult to read
and understand.
But I was able to find the key testimony where the investigating officer confirmed
fratricide (I‘m certain, I‘m sure) just two days after Tillman‘s death and this confirmation
was immediately passed up the chain of command. Once you understand confirmed
fratricide went up the chain of command on the 24th, all the assertions by the Army that
they were waiting for confirmation until they told the family or not including fratricide in
the Silver Star are obviously false.
And Jone‘s 15-6 contains McChrystal‘s testimony which contradicts his later testimony
before the Senate and leads to my finding that General McChrystal, General Nixon, and/or
General Abizaid lied to investigators or Congress.
Second, Thom Shanker appeared to uncritically accept the assertions of General Wallace
and the Inspector General (IG). Upon examination, I found several instances where the
conclusions of the IG did not match their own findings. For example, McChrystal‘s
responsibility to notify the family and initiate the legal investigation are laid in the IG
report appendices.
And, I would speculate that the IG did not include most of the adverse findings against
McChrystal in their report, where the logic of the evidence would indicate such findings;
where COL Nixon or General Kensinger were held accountable for their actions, when
General McChrystal was between those two in the chain of command.
On May 27th, I sent Shanker an email outlining my disclosures that General McChrystal
was at the center of the cover-up of Pat Tillman‘s fratricide. On the morning of the 28th ,
he received my email documents via attachments. On the morning of May 29th, Shanker
received my 100-page binder ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖ that laid out the
case that the Army leadership, House, and Senate acted to shield General McChrystal‘s
actions in the cover-up of Tillman‘s fratricide from public scrutiny.
However, Shanker failed to follow up on my new disclosures before the June 2nd Senate
hearing. And, he didn‘t use my disclosures when he wrote his post-hearing articles. In
fact, he merely repeated the same discredited assertions.
I suspect that Shanker was not interesting in exploring disclosures that would be
embarrassing to the leadership of the Army, Congress, and the Presidency. And
embarrassing to himself since his May 27th article was full of inaccuracies (based largely
upon on his own inadequate review of the Tillman investigation documents).
Note:
Quotations from Shanker‘s 5-26-09 article are bold-faced & numbered They correspond
to the boldfaced & numbered quotes in the copy of the original article.
All italics have been added and any content in [ ] was added for clarification.
Much of the content of my rebuttal consists of quotes from the binder ―Did They Teach
You How to Lie Yet?‖ I included these quotes so the reader could easily compare the
disclosures Shanker received from me prior to hearing to the contents of his 5-26-08 NYT
article.
The binder ―Did They Teach You to Lie Yet?‖ is not included in this binder ―Lies …
Borne Out by Facts, If Not The Truth‖. It is enclosed in the same package as this binder.
Portions of the ―Did They Teach You to Lie Yet?‖ are included in the Appendices.
CONGRESS AND THE SENIOR LEADERSHIP OF THE ARMY HAVE
SHIELDED GENERAL MCCHRYSTAL FROM CLOSE SCRUTINY AND
PROTECTED HIM FROM PUNISHMENT FOR HIS CENTRAL ROLE IN
ORCHESTRATING THE COVER-UP OF PAT TILLMAN’S FRATRICDE:
1.) The death of Corporal Tillman, the handling of his Silver Star commendation and
the initial, false information released to the family and the public were the subjects of
multiple investigations. Among them were inquiries by the Army’s Criminal
Investigation Command, the Defense Department’s inspector general and a
Congressional committee [House Oversight & Government Reform], as well as the
final four-star review:
It‘s important to realize that none of the multiple ―investigations‖ reached their findings
and conclusions based upon an honest evaluation of the evidence. As Kevin Tillman said
before the April 2007 House hearing: ―… while each investigation gathered more
information, the mountain of evidence was never used to arrive at an honest or even
sensible conclusion.‖
The only open Congressional investigation of the Army‘s handling of the Tillman case was
held by Waxman‘s House Oversight Committee. The Committee held two hearings in
2007 and released their final report in July 2008. However, the Committee failed to
scrutinize McChrystal‘s key role in the handling of Tillman‘s fratricide and conducted a
half-hearted, perfunctory ―investigation.‖
(p.28, ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖):
Overall, it appears Waxman‘s Oversight & Reform Committee acted to protect

McChrystal from close scrutiny of his central role in the cover-up of Pat Tillman‘s
fratricide:
Chairman Waxman narrowed the scope of his investigation to exclude examination of

McChrystal, permitted him to refuse to testify at the hearing, and never interviewed
McChrystal despite his central role in the handling of the Tillman fratricide.
Waxman‘s Committee never questioned the ―timeliness‖ of General McChrystal‘s P4

memo. Although McChrystal was informed of confirmed fratricide just two days after
Tillman‘s death, he decided not to inform the Tillman family.
The Committee never took a hard look at the contents, and forthrightness of
McChrystal‘s misleading P4 memo or McChrystal‘s role in approving the Silver Star
package containing a fraudulent citation and altered witness statements.
Why did Congressman Waxman narrow the scope of his investigation to only ―look up
the chain of command‖? McChrystal was the key link in the chain of command
between Col. Nixon (Ranger Regiment) and General Abizaid (CENTCOM), he wrote
the controversial P4 memo, approved the false narrative of the Silver Star citation, and
made the decision not to notify Tillman‘s family about his friendly fire death.
2.) General McChrystal … was among 10 officers singled out for scrutiny after
details belatedly emerged that Corporal Tillman was killed not by an insurgent
ambush … but by fire from his own team of Rangers. ... The four-star general
[William S. Wallace] who was the final judge of the case ordered punitive action
against seven officers, including four generals. General McChrystal was among the
three cleared of wrongdoing.
Although Wallace, Secretary Geren and General Cody asserted that McChrystal was
cleared of wrongdoing, their assertions don‘t withstand scrutiny. And it‘s important to
realize that Wallace didn‘t conduct an investigation of his own. General Wallace‘s report,
―Executive Summary, Army Action – DoDIG Report Related to the Death of Corporal
Patrick D. Tillman‖ (undated), was never released to the public so we could examine
Wallace‘s evidence and reasoning for ignoring the findings of the IG investigation.
Wallace ―cleared‖ McChrystal of wrongdoing. But Wallace merely reviewed the

previous investigations, and then asserted McChrystal‘s innocence despite ample
evidence to the contrary. Yet, a close look at the DoD IG report shows that
McChrystal was at the center of the Army‘s cover-up of Tillman‘s fratricide. (It‘s
important to realize that even the IG report wasn‘t an ―honest‖ investigation. Although
most of their facts are correct, it appears that the many of the IG‘s conclusions
inexplicably do not draw the logical conclusions from their own findings and
evidence).
p.17, ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖):
During the question and answer period of the press conference, Secretary Geren and
General Cody defended General McChrystal‘s handling of the Tillman fratricide.
However, their defense of McChrystal doesn‘t hold up under examination. In fact,
although General Kensinger was culpable, I believe General McChrystal was guilty of
exactly those same charges for which Kensinger was scapegoated!
p.20, ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖):

Overall, General Wallace‘s review was merely the final layer of the Army‘s cover-up
of the handling of Pat Tillman‘s fratricide. A cover-up of the cover-up. Although
Wallace singled out General Kensinger as a scapegoat, it‘s clear that General
McChrystal was guilty of failing to ―inform the family about friendly fire in a timely
manner‖, failing ―to inform the acting Secretary of the Army [his chain of command]
of the fratricide investigation,‖ and ―made false official statements.‖
3.) But questions have surfaced again after General McChrystal’s nomination to be
the top American commander in Afghanistan, the latest step in an urgent effort by
the Obama administration to put together a new strategy and salvage the faltering
mission.
Who raised these questions? What or who prompted Thom Shanker to write the article?
The NYT May 15th editorial said ―it was General McChrystal who approved the falsified
report that covered up the 2004 friendly fire death of Cpl. Pat Tillman.‖
But after Shanker‘s article appeared on the 26th, the NYT editorial of June 1st, ―Questions
for General McChrystal,‖ did not have any further questions about McChrystal‘s role in
the Tillman fratricide. Was that because Thom Shanker‘s review of the Tillman case had
―cleared‖ McChrystal of wrongdoing?
Was the agenda of the NYT editors (like the Army, Congress, and President) to shield
General McChrystal from public scrutiny of his role in the cover-up of Pat Tillman‘s
fratricide?
GENERAL KENSINGER WAS THE SCAPEGOAT, GENERAL MCCHRYSTAL
WAS ALSO RESPONSIBILE FOR NOTIFYING FAMILY OF FRATRICIDE AND
INVESTIGATING THE FRATRICIDE:
4.) Officers in administrative headquarters [i.e.General Kensinger] of the Army were

most severely criticized and punished for the confusion and incorrect information
released to the family and the public.
General Kensinger was singled out as the scapegoat responsible for the public
believing the Army covered up Tillman‘s fratricide. Secretary of the Army Pete Geren
said: ―General Kensinger failed in his duty to his soldiers, and the results were a
calamity for the Army …‖ He ―failed in his duty to inform the family about the
friendly fire incident in a timely manner …‖, ―failed to inform the acting Secretary of
the Army [his chain of command] of the fratricide investigation‖ and ―made false
official statements.‖
During the question and answer period of the press conference, Secretary Geren and
General Cody defended General McChrystal‘s handling of the Tillman fratricide.
However, their defense of McChrystal doesn‘t hold up under examination. In fact,
although Kensinger was culpable, I believe General McChrystal was guilty of exactly
those same charges for which Kensinger was scapegoated!
5.) A review of the voluminous documents, transcripts and findings made public after
the inquiries showed that General McChrystal was cleared in part because he was not
serving in the chain of command for personnel issues or administration, the part of the
Army responsible for investigating Corporal Tillman’s death and notifying the family
and the public of details. … General McChrystal was part of the separate, war-
fighting Army in the field, with responsibilities for commanding Corporal Tillman’s
Ranger unit and other Special Operations forces in combat — but not for the
administrative actions faulted by investigators.
Thom Shanker‘s conclusion that McChrystal was not responsible for the failure to notify
his family of fratricide was incorrect.
A more careful review of the IG report reveals that McChrystal was responsible for
sending a supplemental report to notify Tillman‘s family of the fratricide investigation.
The process flowchart in Appendix D of the IG report clearly shows that notification of
friendly fire should have flowed from Nixon to McChrystal to Kensinger. In fact,
Tillman‘s initial KIA report followed exactly that notification chain (p. 42 IG report).
When asked why McChrystal couldn‘t have just called Tillman‘s family about
potential fratricide, General Cody replied that ―in the casualty reporting business … we
do not encumber the JSOC commander with all of that … that‘s done by the regiment
and done by the Army through SOCOM.‖ Secretary Geren added, ―So it was General
Kensinger‘s responsibility.‖
However, if you look at Appendix D: ―Casualty Reporting & Next of Kin Notification
Process‖ [p.80, DoD IG report], you‘ll see that McChrystal‘s Chief of Staff was
responsible for sending a supplemental casualty report to USASOC [General
Kensinger] after learning of friendly fire.
It‘s also noted on the flowchart that both McChrystal and his Chief of Staff knew about
the fratricide by the 25th and yet did not send the required report as required by
regulations (this finding is not included in the IG Report conclusions).
Furthermore, McChrystal himself told General Jones that ―there was a conscious
decision on who we told about that potential [fratricide] because we did not know all
the facts. … I believe that we did not tell the family of the possibility because we did
not want to give them some half-baked finding.‖ Shortly afterwards, he contradicted
himself, saying, ―I did not know there was a decision not to tell the family. They had
another [son] in the firefight.‖
...
Thom Shanker‘s conclusion that McChrystal was not responsible for the failure to properly
investigate Tillman‘s fratricide (an ―administrative mistake‘) was incorrect.
After the Senate Hearing, I conducted a more careful review of the IG report and found
that McChrystal was serving in the operational chain of command which was responsible
for the legal investigation of Tillman‘s fratricide.
The process flowchart in Appendix C of the IG report and a careful reading of the IG
Report (especially pp. 2, 6 – 27, and 59) shows that General Abizaid at CENTCOM was
the GCMA and the ―Combatant Commander‖ responsible for the legal investigation:
In cases of ―Friendly Fire, the combatant commander will convene a legal

investigation‖ (p. 7). The IG Report Appendix C ―Fratricide Investigation Process‖
flowchart shows that the combatant commander was Abizaid (CENTCOM), in
McChrystal‘s operational chain of command. And the IG report found that
―Commander [Abizaid], CENTCOM, who was charged by DODI 6055.7 to
convene the legal investigation into a friendly fire incident. (p. 27)
Regulation AR 15-6 ―directs that only a general court-martial convening authority

(GCMA) may appoint an investigation or board for incidents resulting in the death
of one or more persons.‖ (p.8) Once again, the flowchart in Appendix C shows
Abizaid was the GCMA in the operational chain of command responsible for the
legal investigation.
...
Notification of friendly fire should have flowed quickly through the chain of command to
Abizaid and to the Army Safety Center. That is, from Bailey to Nixon to McChrystal to
Abiziad. However, the IG report conclusions only faulted Nixon for his failure to notify
CENTCOM (i.e. Abizaid) of friendly fire. But Nixon had notified McChrystal. Yet
McChrystal was not held accountable by the IG for his failure to immediately notify
Abizaid!
AR 385-40 ―Accident Reporting and Records‖ states that ―Fratricide … must be

reported promptly and investigated thoroughly with both a safety investigation …
and a legal investigation.‖ … ―and requires the commander who first becomes
aware of any Army Class A accident to immediately notify, through the chain of
command, the Commander, Army Safety Center.‖ (p. 9)
It‘s important to realize the IG report Conclusions sometimes contradict their own findings
and process flowcharts! It appears that Nixon and Kensinger‘s wrongdoing was
emphasized, and McChrystal‘s role omitted by the IG, even though McChrystal was the
man in the middle of the reporting chain!
For example, the IG found that ―COL Nixon failed to initiate, through his chain of
command, timely notification to the Army Safety Center and CENTCOM of suspected
friendly fire‘ (p.59) However, the IG neglected to mention that Nixon did tell McChrystal
of fratricide on the 23rd. McChrystal was responsible for notifying Abizaid (CENTCOM),
not Nixon
Also, ―COL Nixon was accountable for his decision to delay notification to the primary
next of kin until the completion of the friendly fire investigation.‖ (p. 60). Yet, once again,
the IG report neglected to mention that Nixon did tell McChrystal of fratricide on the 23rd.
McChrystal was then responsible for passing the supplementary casualty report on to
Kensinger at USASOC. Further, McChrystal even testified in the Jones 15-6 that he made
the decision not to notify the family of fratricide!
After being notified of fratricide on the 23rd, McChrystal failed to immediately notify his
chain of command, Abizaid (as discussed in the following section, McChrystal claims he
waited a week until he tried to notify Abizaid with the P4). Yet the IG conclusions do not
fault McChrystal. Instead, they blame Nixon and Kensinger for delaying notification to the
next of kin.
In actuality, McChrystal promptly passed up probable fratricide on the 23rd and

confirmation on the 24th to Abizaid. Either Abizaid or McChrystal lied in Congressional
testimony about when they learned about the fratricide.
GENERAL MCCHRYSTAL’S PREVARICATING P4 MEMORANDUM:
6.) General McChrystal’s [P4] memorandum, sent a week after the episode, warned
that ―it is highly possible that Corporal Tillman was killed by friendly fire,‖
according to the Pentagon inspector general’s report.
I want to emphasize there was nothing ―potential‖ or ―suspected‘ about Tillman‘s

fratricide. Confirmation of Tillman‘s fratricide was passed up the chain of command
to McChrystal just two days after his death by the first investigating officer!:
The Army leadership claimed they waited to inform the Tillman family of fratricide
until they were sure of the facts. COL Nixon said it took a ―considerable time to get
the truth‖. General Abizaid testified before Congress, ―But it is clear that all along
fratricide was called as early as the 29th of April, and that on the 28th of May we
conclusively stated it was fratricide … in terms of fratricide investigations, by the way,
that‘s not a slow investigation. That‘s a fast investigation.‖
Yet, the day after Tillman‘s death, on the 23rd, CSM Birch was ―70% sure‖ and LTC
Bailey ―was certain‖ it was fratricide. CPT Scott, the first 15-6 investigating officer,
confirmed Tillman‘s fratricide just two days after Tillman‘s death (not five weeks), and
immediately passed that information up the chain of command to LTC Bailey who told
Col. Nixon:
―And certainly, by the next day [24th] when we did the investigations, I [ Bailey]
confirmed it. Because I called him [Nixon] back within a day or two and said, ―Sir, I
want you to know now, after getting the first five interviews‖ in fact, that was, I guess,
the next day.‖ … ―So, after [Scott] did his first five interviews, he came back to me and
said, ―Sir, I‘m certain. I‘m sure.‖ And then I called [Nixon]. … I think it was the 24th.
(p. 53).
General McChrystal was next in line in the chain of command, then Abizaid.
7.) General Wallace also said that General McChrystal responded ―reasonably and
quickly‖ — being the first to alert the three generals who were his superior officers
at Central Command, Special Operations Command and Army Special Operations
Command that there was emerging evidence that Corporal Tillman had been killed
by fellow Rangers.
―Emerging evidence‖? As noted above, McChrystal was told of confirmed fratricide a

week before he sent his P4 memo!
General Wallace asserted that McChrystal acted ―reasonably and quickly‖ when he
alerted his higher headquarters about the fratricide investigation. Secretary Geren said
―General McChrystal, when notified of the friendly fire incident, he alerted, through
his P4 … his chain of command …‖:
Response:
There was nothing ―timely‖ about McChrystal‘s P4 memo! Secretary Geren implies
that McChrystal learned about potential fratricide on the 29th, then sent the P4 to alert
his superiors.
However, on April 23rd (NLT 25th), COL Nixon told McChrystal about probable
fratricide and the 15-6 investigation. How can waiting six days to send a P4 be
considered ―quickly‖? And on the 24th, McCrystal received verbal confirmation of
fratricide from Nixon.
8.) ―General McChrystal did exactly the right thing: he sent a timely message in a
timely fashion through the most secure channels,‖ said Gen. John P. Abizaid, then the
top officer of Central Command, overseeing forces in the Middle East. He spoke
during 2007 testimony to the House Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform.
During the Waxman Hearing, General Abizaid said: General McChrystal did exactly
the right thing. He sent a timely message [P4] in a timely fashion through the most
secure channels‖ and ―… it is clear that all along fratricide was called as early as the
29th of April, and that on the 28th of May we conclusively stated it was fratricide … in
terms of fratricide investigations, by the way, that‘s not a slow investigation. That‘s a
fast investigation.‖
Response:
There was nothing ―timely‖ about McChrystal‘s P4 memo supposedly alerting his
chain of command! General Abizaid asserts that McChrystal learned about potential
fratricide on the 29th, then immediately sent his P4 to alert his superiors.
… the DoD IG Chronology (Appendix B) asserts that after Nixon was told of
suspected fratricide on the 23rd, he then told McChrystal only of Tillman‘s death,
which McChrystal passed onto General Abizaid. Yet, McChrystal testified in General
Jones 15-6 that he was told of possible fratricide by Nixon ―… about a day [23rd] or
two [24th] after the incident. No more than three days later [25th].‖
Note: McChrystal testified on 6-02-09 that he was notified of possible fratricide on the
23rd after returning to Afghanistan from a meeting in Qatar.
Somebody is lying here. Nixon, McChrystal, or Abizaid (or all three).
In actuality, McChrystal quickly notified his chain of command. McChrystal told

General Abizaid of probable fratricide on the 23rd, and updated Abiziad with
confirmation on the 24th. Five weeks later the Army announced Tillman ―probably‖
died from friendly fire!
9.) In his message from the field, General McChrystal also asked his three superiors
to warn President George W. Bush and the acting Army secretary ―about comments
they might make in speeches to preclude embarrassment if the public found out
friendly fire was involved.‖
Chairman Waxman said ―Much of our focus will be on a ―Personal For‖ message …
that MG McChrystal sent on April 29th 2004.‖ General Abizaid testified that ―General
McChrystal reported the incident in a forthright and timely fashion.‖
Response:
Chairman Waxman never focused on the content of McChrystal‘s P4 memo. If you

carefully read it, the memo was anything but ―forthright‖. As Mary Tillman said in an
interview (8-10-07) with Mike Fish:
"That memo is damming as hell. And yet, nothing happens to [McChrystal]. He is

writing fraudulent language in that memo. He is giving examples of how they can
script the Silver Star award, even though Pat was killed by fratricide. And he is
saying we need to keep our leadership abreast of things so they don't embarrass
themselves, IF the circumstances of Pat's death should become public … He should
be saying 'We're going to have to put a hold to the silver star and we're going to
have to notify the family [of suspected friendly fire].' That is what he would say if
he was innocent, but he is not. He is trying to find a way that they can continue this
false, elaborate story of theirs. And the fact that he is off the hook is atrocious."
And Mary wrote in her book ―Boots on the Ground by Dusk‖:
―Not only is he [General McChrystal] lying about the circumstances surrounding

Pat‘s death, … he is proposing false language for the Silver Star narrative. … His
statement [P4 memo] indicates that no one had any intention of telling us, or the
public, that Pat was killed by fratricide unless forced to do so.‖
John R. Reed does a hilarious job of tearing apart the P4 memo point-by-point in
his article ―Lessons to Be Learned from Pat Tillman‘s Death.‖ For example,
―McChrystal is absolutely certain about Tillman deserving the Silver Star, which
normally requires a highly subjective assessment. However, he has to await the
outcome of an investigation to determine whether Tillman was killed by friendly
fire, which was a no brainer in this case. Apparently, public-relations efforts like
awarding dubious medals require virtually no investigation or thought, but
revealing unattractive truth, well, we gotta do a whole formal ―15-16 investigation‖
before such an unnatural act.‖
Here‘s s few of my additional comments on the P4 memo:
―It is anticipated that a 15-6 investigation nearing completion will find that it is
highly possible that CPL Tillman was killed by friendly fire‖:
How is it ―nearing completion‖ when Scott‘s 15-6 was a ―Final Report‖?

(And how was it ―nearing completion‖ when Nixon ―officially‖ started the
15-6 on the 29th?) Scott‘s report concluded friendly fire; ―highly possible‖
means ―definitely.‖ Of course, in reality, General McChrystal was told of
probable friendly fire on the 23rd and confirmed fratricide on the 24th!
If McChrystal is waiting for the completion of the 15-5 investigation,

wouldn‘t it make sense to wait until it is complete to forward the Silver Star
package?
―I felt it was essential that you received this information as soon as we detected it
in order to preclude any unknowing statements by our country‘s leaders which
might cause public embarrassment if the circumstances of CPL Tillman‘s death
becomes public‖:
Note the ―if‖. Not when! And McChrystal‘s concern is for embarrassment
of his bosses, not to ensure his family knows or that the Secretary of the
Army knows before approving the Silver Star!
Why did McChrystal send the P4 memo on the 29th? Well, on the 29th CPT Scott
submitted his 15-6 ―Final Report‖ concluding friendly fire. It‘s interesting to note
that COL Nixon ―officially‖ appointed Scott on the 29th (even though Scott began
work on the 23rd). Perhaps Nixon was creating a paper trail to show friendly fire
wasn‘t suspected and an investigation begun until after he approved the Silver Star
package on the 28th?
I believe McChrystal sent the P4 memo to provide a paper trail he could use later, if
necessary, to cover his butt. The P4 provides a paper trail that he told his superiors
about fratricide, it allows him to argue that he thought Tillman deserved the Silver
Star even if it was from friendly fire. And he could argue that he had approved the
Silver Star before he was informed about possible friendly fire.
10.) General McChrystal’s message was sent not through standard reporting
channels, but through a ―Personal For‖ message system. Investigators ruled that
while it was an unusual choice for communications, the general could reasonably
have assumed that this specialized report would be acted upon urgently.
A P4 is not the most ―timely‖ or ―secure‖ fashion to send a message. How about
simply picking up the telephone? That‘s how all the earlier notifications by
McChrystal and the other officers were done!
MCCHRYSTAL’S FRADULENT SILVER STAR RECOMMENDATION:
11.) Initially, the Pentagon inspector general’s inquiry criticized General McChrystal
for signing a Silver Star commendation that ―erroneously implied that Corporal
Tillman died by enemy fire‖
(p.17, ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖)
… General Wallace disregarded the findings of the Department of Defense Inspector

General (DoD IG) review which found General McChrystal ―accountable for
inaccurate and misleading assertions contained in the award recommendation package‖
and ―accountable for not notifying the award processing channels [Secretary of the
Army] that friendly fire was suspected to ensure that the recommendation was
considered based on accurate information.‖
12.) But the final judgment by General Wallace concluded that General McChrystal
―had no reasonable basis to call into question the recommendation that came up
endorsed by the commanders in the field who were there and had firsthand knowledge of
the circumstances of his death and his heroic actions.‖
Another reporter asked why McChrystal received no punishment after being singled
out in the DoD IG report for inaccurate Silver Star award information. Secretary
Geren replied that McChrystal ―reasonably and appropriately‖ presumed the Silver Star
packet presented to him for his signature was accurate. He said that McChrystal was
aware it was friendly fire when he approved the award and that he ―had no reasonable
basis to call into question the recommendations that came up endorsed by the
commanders in the field …‖
Note: McChrystal testified before the 6-02-09 that he actually personally led the Silver
Star recommendation process. It didn‘t just land on his desk!
Wouldn‘t General McChrystal have a ―reasonable basis‖ to question a Silver Star

package containing no mention of friendly fire after he had been informed of
confirmed fratricide? The Silver Star narrative justification and citation bore little
resemblance to reality and were carefully edited to imply Tillman died by enemy
fire.
General McChrystal testified he relied on four factors to conclude that Tillman
deserved the Silver Star. Yet the DoD IG report states he ―did not directly, or
clearly, state these four factors in the award recommendation.‖ .‖ And if
McChrystal only knew what was in the recommendation presented to him for his
signature, how could he know about these four factors!
Both of the Silver Star witness statements were altered to remove any mention of
friendly fire and contained inaccurate statements. Inspector General Gimble said
this was done ―somewhere in the approval chain‖ but refused to ―speculate‖ who
was responsible. It appears that COL Nixon, Nixon‘s XO, and/or General
McChrystal were involved.
Even if you take the P4 at face value, that McChrystal first learned of suspected
fratricide on the 29th after he had sent up his Silver Star recommendation, why
didn‘t he directly warn the Secretary of the Army about fratricide before the
Secretary approved the award?
SECRET 2008 SENATE CONFIRMATION OF GENERAL MCCHRYSTAL:
13.) The Senate last year confirmed General McChrystal to a three-star job in a vote
taken long after the inquiries were complete. In explaining why the Tillman case was
not expected to affect the general’s new confirmation, Congressional officials said
senators would have to explain why they confirmed him then but were challenging his
qualifications now to receive a fourth star and take over the Afghan mission absent
new disclosures.
Actually, ―the inquiries‖ were not yet complete. The House Oversight Committee didn‘t
issue their report until a couple of months later. And Shanker doesn‘t mention that
McChrystal‘s previous hearing was held in ―executive session‖ (i.e. in secret).
Last year, the Senate Armed Services Committee conducted a secret review of General
McChrystal‘s role in the Army‘s handling of the Tillman fratricide. On May 15th 2008
the Senate Armed Services Committee met in ―executive‖ (closed) session to consider
McChrystal‘s nomination. On May 22th 2008, General McChrystal was unanimously
confirmed by the Committee and promoted to Director of the Joint Staff.
Last year, I spoke with you [Senator Webb] on the Diane Rhem NPR radio program
(May 27th 2008; at 40:56). You said he ―went through a fairly thorough review of that
process [what happened in the aftermath of his death] at the request of the Chairman of
the [Senate] Armed Services Committee [Senator Levin].‖ … ―the Army knew that this
was a friendly fire incident fairly quickly, they did not tell the family, they allowed a
ceremony to go forward which implied otherwise…I‘m not sure where responsibility
for that decision really lies, in terms of the chain of command, how it was handled
publicly… You cannot help but still feel angry about how his death was used.‖
I was surprised to learn of Senator Webb‘s review. Although I was familiar with
Congressman Henry Waxman‘s (House Oversight & Reform Committee) hearings on the
Tillman fratricide, I was unaware that any sort of Senate review had also been conducted.
When I attempted to follow up to find out more about the Senate review, I was stonewalled
by Senator Webb‘s Military Legislative Aide Gordon Peterson:
―Regarding your questions about the radio interview, I‘m not in a position to
elaborate. I did not participate in the review that Senator Webb mentioned and have
no information to provide to you. The senator‘s involvement occurred in his
capacity as a member of the Senate Committee on Armed Services. I checked with
Senator Webb, and he has nothing more to add to what he said last week. If you
have any additional questions you should contact a representative for the
Committee -- Gary Leeling, 202 224-9339. He is out of the office until next
week.‖
To my regret, I never followed up with Gary Leeling (Legal Counsel for Senator Carl
Levin). I was very busy with life (and had just spent far too much time on the Tillman
case) and figured I was just getting blown off.
A year later [2009], after General McChrystal‘s nomination as the new commander of the
Afghanistan War, I finally realized Senator Webb‘s review was for the previous Senate
confirmation of General McChrystal. On May 15th 2008 the Senate Armed Services
Committee met in ―executive‖ (closed) session to consider McChrystal‘s promotion. On
May 22th 2008 General McChrystal was unanimously confirmed by the Committee. The
following month McChrystal was promoted to Director of the Joint Staff by a Senate voice
vote.
14.) Unless new information on General McChrystal’s role in the episode emerges
between now and his confirmation hearing, set for June 2, the question is not
expected to figure heavily in the Senate debate, Congressional officials said.
Wouldn‘t you think that Thom Shanker would have considered receiving my 100 page
binder ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖ to be ―new information‖? But Shanker
never wrote a follow-up to his May 26th article prior to the hearing and apparently never
went back to his Congressional sources to ask follow up questions. I suspect that Shanker
was not interesting in revisiting the Tillman case and exploring questions that would be
embarrassing to the leadership of the Army, Congress, and the Presidency (not to mention
himself and The New York Times!)
POSTSCRIPT: REBUTTAL OF ―A GENERAL’S ROLE IN THE
AFTERMATH OF A FAMOUS CORPORAL’S DEATH
The graphic timeline, ―A General‘s Role in the Aftermath of a Famous Corporal‘s Death,‖
accompanied the text of Thom Shanker‘s 5-26-09 NYT article ―Nomination of U.S.
Afghan Commander Revives Questions in Tillman Case‖. Initially, I overlooked this
graphic when I first read Shanker‘s article on May 27th. I finally read the article early on
May 30th, and sent Thom Shanker the following email with my comments correcting his
timeline:
I overlooked your graphic showing a timeline of McChrystal's role in the aftermath

of Tillman's death. If you look in my Appendices, I've included a "Timeline of
Tillman Notification" which compares the IG timeline to my own (my Fratricide
Notes has supporting details). I just wanted to point out a couple corrections:
1.) April 23rd, Nixon is told Tillman "may have" been killed by own troops. He
informs McChrystal:
"may have": CSM Birch was "70% sure", LTC Bailey was "certain".
"informs McChrystal": According to the IG chronology, Nixon tells McChrystal

only of "death". I overlooked this at first, but according to the IG timeline, Nixon
didn't mention potential fratricide to McChrystal, and then McChrystal told Abizaid
only of "death"! Not likely.
And if McChrystal did learn of fratricide on the 23rd and told Abizaid, then
Abiziad lied in testimony before the IG and Congress. (A look at the IG interviews
of Nixon, McChrystal, and Abizaid might be illuminating).
2.) May 16th, "investigation concludes Tillman killed by friendly fire:
This is the 2nd 15-6 investigation by LTC Hodne. The first 15-6 was done by CPT
Scott who verbally passed confirmation of FF to LTC Bailey on the 24th who
passed it onto COL Nixon. CPT Scott submitted his "15-6 Final Report" on April
29th concluding friendly fire. Nixon said this report was only a "draft:. (Scott's
15-6 disappeared, there is no copy! Although the IG said they managed to
reconstruct it somehow.)
You noted that the "Source" for the graphic is the DoD IG and the report of General
Wallace. Do you have a copy of the Wallace Report. I wasn't able to find it. I'd
appreciate you sending me a copy if possible.
Thom Shanker didn‘t reply to my email correcting his timeline.

Note: During May 2008, I constructed my own detailed timeline of the Tillman case
(focusing especially on when the chain of command first learned of fratricide).
Refer to Appendix B, ―Timeline of Tillman Fratricide Notification & Notes‖ located in the
second binder ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet? – Senator James Webb, General
Stanley McChrystal, and the Betrayal of Pat Tillman‖
** link to marked timeline

...
Later, I wrote a series of short corrections on the binder copy of the timeline to mark the
errors in Shanker‘s timeline; every one of Shanker‘s assertions was incorrect!:
1. April 24th the investigating officer notified his chain of command of confirmed
fratricide Scott  Bailey  to Nixon  McChrystal  Abizaid
2. Nixon told by Bailey ―certain‖ it was fratricide.
3. IG Report says Nixon did not notify McChrystal on 23rd (contradicts McChrystal‘s
testimony)
4. McChrystal follows Nixon in chain of command. McChrystal was responsible to notify

the family and Army Safety Center of fratricide.
5. ―suggesting‖? The IG report said anyone reading citation would assume KIA.
6. McChrystal was told of confirmed fratricide on the 24th; how is waiting a week to
―warn‖ his superiors ―timely notification‖?
7. The IG Report Appendix D flowchart shows it was McChrystal‘s responsibility to

inform the family and he failed to do so.
8. General Wallace said McChrystal was ―cleared of wrongdoing.‖ Saying something

doesn‘t make it so!
9. Incorrect. McChrystal‘s operational chain of command was responsible for notification

and the legal investigation, not the administrative chain of command.
10. McChrystal did more than ―approve‖, just sign off, he personally led the Ranger
officers packaging the Silver Star package.
―Nominee To Command U.S. Afghanistan Forces
Stresses Civilian Safety ―
New York Times June 2nd 2009, Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt
2009-06-02 16:02:50 (18 hours ago)

Posted By: Intellpuke
(Read 59 times || 0 comments)
[Note: This article was changed before the evening of June 2nd to the version that appears
on June 3rd, ― U.S. Report finds Errors in Afghan Airstrikes‖. This is a cached copy from a
website.]
Submit to Digg
The Special Operations general nominated to be commander of American and allied
troops in Afghanistan testified on Tuesday that coalition forces must reduce civilian
casualties, a step that is ―essential to our credibility.‖
The commander, Lt. Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, said that ―how we conduct operations
is vital to success,‖ and warned that any victory would be ―hollow and unsustainable‖ if
allied operations created popular resentment among Afghanistan‘s citizens.
In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General McChrystal said
the measure of American and allied effectiveness would be ―the number of Afghans
shielded from violence,‖ not the number of enemies killed.
Even so, strikes by warplanes and Special Operations ground units would remain an
essential part of combat in Afghanistan, said General McChrystal. He pledged to make
sure these attacks would be ordered only based on solid intelligence, and would be as
―precise‖ as possible.
General McChrystal formerly served as commander of the Joint Special Operations

Command, whose hunter-killer units scored significant successes in Iraq and Afghanistan,
and he was questioned about reports of abuse of detainees held by his commandos.
When he took command of these units in 2003, the general said, the Special Operations
detention facilities in Afghanistan were limited and disorganized, and the forces involved
in the detention mission lacked experience.
Under questioning by Senator Carl Levin, the Michigan Democrat who is the committee
chairman, General McChrystal said that he ―was uncomfortable‖ with some of the harsh
techniques that were officially approved for interrogations. At the time, the approved
techniques included placing detainees in stress positions, sleep deprivation and use of
attack dogs.
He said that while he was in command, all reports of abuse were investigated, and all
substantiated cases resulted in disciplinary action. He pledged to ―strictly enforce‖
American and international standards for treatment of battlefield detainees if he is
confirmed to the post in Afghanistan.
―I do not and never have condoned mistreatment of detainees, and never will,‖ said
General McChrystal.
―Unfortunately, criminal acts take place on the battlefield, just like they do in normal
society,‖ General McChrystal said in separate, prepared answers to questions submitted by
the committee. ―Fortunately, through improved training and education, substantiated
allegations of abuse have decreased over time.‖
If confirmed, General McChrystal said, he would take a number of steps to improve

detention operations.
Among them, he said, would be efforts to ―separate and segregate the extremists,‖ and to
―impart basic education and vocational skills‖ to detainees. Troops would be ordered to
―develop a moderate understanding of Islam,‖ the general said, and he would continue the
use of extended family members and tribal groups ―to aid in a released detainee‘s
abstention from violence.‖
Under questioning from Sen. John McCain, of Arizona, the committee’s ranking
Republican, General McChrystal discussed his actions following the friendly-fire
death of Cpl. Pat Tillman, the professional football star who enlisted in the Army
after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.
General McChrystal expressed his ―deepest condolences‖ to the Tillman family and
to Corporal Tillman’s fellow Rangers, and acknowledged that he would do things
differently if presented again with such a tragedy.
[1] A four-star Army review cleared General McChrystal of any wrongdoing, but it
punished a number of senior officers who were responsible for administrative
mistakes in the days following the death of Corporal Tillman.
[2] General McChrystal explained that he signed a Silver Star recommendation, even
though he already suspected death by friendly fire, because Corporal Tillman’s valor
in the field earned him the honor regardless of the manner of his death. However, the
general acknowledged that the recommendation produced confusion.
[3] At the time, Army policy was to rush those medals of valor so they could be
received by the family at the time of the honored soldier’s funeral; that policy has
been changed to allow more thorough evaluations.
[4] General McChrystal said that within a week of Corporal Tillman’s death, he sent
an urgent message to his three senior commanders specifically to inform them of
mounting evidence of death by friendly fire, and to push the Army to quickly halt any
misinformation regarding Corporal Tillman’s death.
[5] Sen. James Webb, a Virginia Democrat who has championed the Tillman’s family
case, returned to the topic late in the hearing during a heartfelt exchange in which the
Senator chastised the Army for its initial incorrect reports that Corporal Tillman was
killed in an insurgent ambush, and not by fire from his own Ranger unit.
―The Army failed the family,‖ said Senator Webb.
[6] ―We failed the family,‖ General McChrystal agreed. ―I was a part of that, and I
apologize,‖ but the general repeatedly stated that any errors committed by soldiers
and officers in the field of combat in Afghanistan ―were not intentional,‖ and he
added, ―I didn’t see any activities by anyone to deceive.‖
Senator Levin called for strong cooperation between General McChrystal and Adm. James
G. Stavridis, who also testified Tuesday; the admiral has been nominated to become
NATO's supreme allied commander and commander of American forces in Europe. If
confirmed, Admiral Stavridis would be the first Navy officer to hold that position.
NATO supplies the majority of the nearly 35,000 non-American troops in Afghanistan, but
Senator Levin said that ―only a portion are in the fight where the fight mainly is - in the
south and east of Afghanistan.‖
The NATO contribution to the Afghan mission ―remains inadequate,‖ Senator Levin said.
He urged Admiral Stavridis to do all he could to press ―NATO and other allies in Europe
to do their share for the Afghanistan mission.‖
Under President Obama's new Afghan strategy, the number of American troops in the
country will double to about 68,000 this year.
Intellpuke: You can read this article by New York Times staff writers Thom Shanker and
Eric Schmitt, reporting from Washington, D.C., in context here:
www.nytimes.com/2009/06/03/world/asia/03military.html?_r=1&hp
June 3, 2009
U.S. Report Finds Errors in Afghan Airstrikes
By ERIC SCHMITT and THOM SHANKER
Note: Eric Schmitt probably provided most of the content of this NYT article ―U.S.
Report Finds Errors in Afghan Airstrikes‖ (6-02-09); Version #2 of Thom Shanker‘s Post-
Hearing articles. Thom apparently just worked in a few references to the Senate hearing
into the body and a short summary at the end.
WASHINGTON — A military investigation has concluded that American personnel made

significant errors in carrying out some of the airstrikes in western Afghanistan on May 4
that killed dozens of Afghan civilians, according to a senior American military official.
The official said the civilian death toll would probably have been reduced if American air
crews and forces on the ground had followed strict rules devised to prevent civilian
casualties. Had the rules been followed, at least some of the strikes by American warplanes
against half a dozen targets over seven hours would have been aborted.
The report represents the clearest American acknowledgment of fault in connection with
the attacks. It will give new ammunition to critics, including many Afghans, who complain
that American forces too often act indiscriminately in calling in airstrikes, jeopardizing the
United States mission by turning the civilian population against American forces and their
ally, the Afghan government.
Since the raid, American military commanders have promised to address the problem. On
Tuesday, Lt. Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, nominated to be the American commander
in Afghanistan, vowed that reducing civilian casualties was ―essential to our credibility.‖
Any American victory would be ―hollow and unsustainable‖ if it led to popular resentment
among Afghanistan‘s citizens, General McChrystal told the Senate Armed Services
Committee during a confirmation hearing.
According to the senior military official, the report on the May 4 raids found that one plane
was cleared to attack Taliban fighters, but then had to circle back and did not reconfirm the
target before dropping bombs, leaving open the possibility that the militants had fled the
site or that civilians had entered the target area in the intervening few minutes.
In another case, a compound of buildings where militants were massing for a possible
counterattack against American and Afghan troops was struck in violation of rules that
required a more imminent threat to justify putting high-density village dwellings at risk,
the official said.
―In several instances where there was a legitimate threat, the choice of how to deal with
that threat did not comply with the standing rules of engagement,‖ said the military
official, who provided a broad summary of the report‘s initial findings on the condition of
anonymity because the inquiry was not yet complete.
Before being chosen as the new commander in Afghanistan, General McChrystal spent
five years as commander of the Joint Special Operations Command, overseeing
commandos in Iraq and Afghanistan. Special Operations forces have been sharply
criticized by Afghans for aggressive tactics that have contributed to civilian casualties.
During his testimony, General McChrystal said that strikes by warplanes and Special
Operations ground units would remain an essential part of combat in Afghanistan. But he
promised to make sure that these attacks were based on solid intelligence and that they
were as precise as possible. American success in Afghanistan should be measured by ―the
number of Afghans shielded from violence,‖ not the number of enemy fighters killed, he
said.
The inquiry into the May 4 strikes in the western province of Farah illustrated the difficult,
split-second decisions facing young officers in the heat of combat as they balance using
lethal force to protect their troops under fire with detailed rules restricting the use of
firepower to prevent civilian deaths.
In the report, the investigating officer, Brig. Gen. Raymond A. Thomas III, analyzed each
of the airstrikes carried out by three aircraft-carrier-based Navy F/A-18 strike aircraft and
an Air Force B-1 bomber against targets in the village of Granai, in a battle that lasted
more than seven hours.
In each case, the senior military official said, General Thomas determined that the targets
that had been struck posed legitimate threats to Afghan or American forces, which
included one group of Marines assigned to train the Afghans and another assigned to a
Special Operations task force.
But in ―several cases,‖ the official said, General Thomas determined either that the
airstrikes had not been the appropriate response to the threat because of the potential risk to
civilians, or that American forces had failed to follow their own tactical rules in conducting
the bombing runs.
The Afghan government concluded that about 140 civilians had been killed in the attacks.
An earlier American military inquiry said last month that 20 to 30 civilians had been
killed. That inquiry also concluded that 60 to 65 Taliban militants had been killed in the
fight. American military officials say their two investigations show that Taliban fighters
had deliberately fired on American forces and aircraft from compounds and other places
where they knew Afghan civilians had sought shelter, in order to draw an American
response that would kill civilians, including women and children.
The firefight began, the military said, when Afghan soldiers and police officers went to
several villages in response to reports that three Afghan government officials had been
killed by the Taliban. The police were quickly overwhelmed and asked for backup from
American forces.
American officials have said that a review of videos from aircraft weapon sights and
exchanges between air crew members and a ground commander established that Taliban
fighters had taken refuge in ―buildings which were then targeted in the final strikes of the
fight,‖ which went well into the night.
American troop levels in Afghanistan are expected to double, to about 68,000, under
President Obama‘s new Afghan strategy.
In his previous job as commander of the Joint Special Operations Command, General
McChrystal oversaw units assigned to capture or kill senior militants. In his
appearance before Congress on Tuesday, he was questioned on reports of abuses of
detainees held by his commandos.
Under questioning by Senator Carl Levin, the Michigan Democrat who is the committee
chairman, General McChrystal said he was uncomfortable with some of the harsh
techniques that were officially approved for interrogation. At the time, such approved
techniques included stress positions, sleep deprivation and the use of attack dogs for
intimidation.
He said that all reports of abuse during his command were investigated, and that all
substantiated cases of abuse resulted in disciplinary action. And he pledged to ―strictly
enforce‖ American and international standards for the treatment of battlefield detainees if
confirmed to the post in Afghanistan.
[1] Under questioning, General McChrystal also acknowledged that the Army had
―failed the family‖ in its mishandling of the friendly-fire death of Cpl. Pat Tillman,
the professional football star who enlisted in the Army after the attacks on Sept. 11,
2001.
[2] A final review by a four-star Army general cleared General McChrystal of any
wrongdoing, but punished a number of senior officers who were responsible for
administrative mistakes in the days after Corporal Tillman’s death. Initially, Army
officials said the corporal had been killed by an insurgent ambush, when in fact he
had been shot by members of his own Ranger team.
REBUTTAL OF THOM SHANKER’S POST-
HEARING NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLES
Version #1: ―Nominee To Command U.S. Afghanistan
Forces Stresses Civilian Safety ―
(New York Times, June 2nd 2009, Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt)
The Senate Armed Services Committee held their confirmation hearing for General
McChrystal on June 2nd 2009. Within an hour, Thom Shanker‘s article ―Nominee to
Command Afghanistan Stresses Civilian Safety‖ appeared on the NYT‘s website.
Thom Shanker did not incorporate any of the disclosures from ―Did They Teach You How
to Lie Yet?‖ into his Senate hearing coverage. Instead, he merely repeated the same
discredited arguments that McChrystal was cleared of any wrongdoing in the Tillman case
used previously in his 5-26-09 article.
In addition, Thom Shanker failed to note two new key bits of information that came out of
the Senate Hearing:
McChrystal‘s new account of the circumstances when he first learned of Tillman‘s

fratricide contradicts his previous testimony and appears to indicate that McChrystal,
Abizaid, and or Nixon gave false testimony before investigators and/or Congress.
General Wallace cleared McChrystal of wrongdoing since he only ―signed off‖ on the
Silver Star recommendation. However, McChrystal testified that he was intimately
involved in Silver Star award recommendation process in Afghanistan!
Note: Quotations from Shanker‘s article are bold-faced and correspond to the numbers I
added to the original articles contained in Appendix D. All italics have been added and
any content in [ ] was added for clarification.
Much of my rebuttal content consists of quotes from the ―Senate Armed Services
Committee June 2nd Confirmation Hearing‖ chapter in my binder ―Did They Teach You
How to Lie Yet?‖ Shortly after the hearing, I wrote that chapter as my response to Thom
Shanker‘s coverage of the Senate hearing.
1. A four-star Army review [Wallace] cleared General McChrystal of any
wrongdoing, but it punished a number of senior officers [e.g. General Kensinger] who
were responsible for administrative mistakes in the days following the death of
Corporal Tillman.
See my comments from the Pre-Hearing Rebuttal:
Point #2 for ―cleared of wrongdoing‖
Points #4 & #5 for ―administrative mistakes.‖
2. General McChrystal explained that he signed a Silver Star recommendation, even

though he already suspected death by friendly fire, because Corporal Tillman’s valor
in the field earned him the honor regardless of the manner of his death. However, the
general acknowledged that the recommendation produced confusion.
(Post-Hearing: p. 15.4, ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖):
1. McChrystal said that he first learned of suspected fratricide and the 15-6 investigation
after returning back to Afghanistan from a meeting in Qatar with General Abizaid on
about April 23rd:
“Corporal Tillman was killed on the 22nd of April … I arrived back into Afghanistan from
a meeting in Qatar with General Abizaid on about the 23rd, and I was informed, at that
point, that they suspected that friendly fire might have been the cause of death, and that
they had initiated what we call a 15-6, or an investigation of that.” (p.18 transcript)
But during the Jones 15-6 McChrystal said that he "was in Qatar when I was told,
about a day or two after the incident NLT the 25th...". [OK, that matches the 23rd,
but was he in Qatar or Afghanistan?].
During his DoD IG interview General Abizaid said "Gen McChrystal informed him
of CPL Tillman's death while they were in Qatar in a meeting .... he received no
details and did not know friendly fire was suspected." [So we're supposed to
believe McChrystal didn't tell Abizaid about fratricide while they were together in
Qatar on the same day! Or, Abizaid lied about not being told about fratricide.]
And during his Congressional testimony on 8-01-07, General Abizaid said "on
about the 23rd, Gen McChrystal called me and told me that CPL Tillman had been
killed in combat and that the circumstances his death were heroic." [So was he told
―no details‖ or ―heroic‖?]
But the DoD IG Chronology (Appendix B) states that after COL Nixon was told of
possible fratricide and the 15-6 on the 23rd, Nixon only told McChrystal of the
"death" of Tillman and then McChrystal told Abizaid only about Tillman's
"death". [But McChrystal said during Tuesday‘s hearing he was told of fratricide
on the 23rd!]
McChrystal either failed to tell Abizaid about fratricide, or Abizaid lied about not
being informed about it. And Nixon lied about telling McChyrstal about Tillman‘s
―death‖ and/or McChrystal lied about Nixon telling him only of ―death‖.]
So, McChrystal, Nixon, and/or Abiziad lied about when they learned about
―suspected‖ fratricide during their interviews with the DoD Inspector General and
before Congress. A look at their IG interviews would be illuminating and resolve
this question [Scott Laidlaw at AP got these interviews through FOIA, but I haven‘t
seen them].
...
(Post-Hearing: p.15.7, ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖)
4.) General Wallace cleared McChrystal of wrongdoing because McChrystal only “signed
off’ on the Silver Star and “had no reasonable basis to question the recommendation that
came up endorsed by the commanders in the field who were there and had firsthand
knowledge of the circumstances of his death and his heroic actions.”:
But during Tuesday's hearing, McChrystal said he sat down with the officers (i.e. Nixon,
Kauzerlich, Hodne, Bailey) and went over Tillman's actions on a whiteboard to satisfy
himself that Tillman's actions merited a Silver Star!:
“I sat down with the people [Ranger Regiment officers] who recommended it [Silver Star].
… and we went over a whiteboard, and we looked at the geometry of the battlefield, and I
queried the people to satisfy myself that, in fact, that his actions warranted that, even
though there was a potential that the actual circumstances of death had been friendly
fire.” (p. 18 transcript)
So, General McChrystal was in Afghanistan with the Ranger officers discussing what
happened! McChrystal led the Silver Star approval process! McChrystal wasn‘t far
removed from the process. He didn‘t just sign off on a piece of paper that just dropped
onto his desk! He was intimately involved with the process.
―Potential… friendly fire.‖ As previously mentioned, all the Ranger officers and
McChrystal had been told of confirmed friendly fire on the 24th!
5.) McChrystal said that the Silver Star citation wasn't well written and that he didn't read
it close enough to catch that it could "imply" Tillman wasn't killed by friendly fire:
“… my own mistakes in not reviewing the Silver Star citation well enough and making sure
that I compared it to the message [P4 memo] that I sent were mistakes.” (p. 48
transcript). “… in retrospect, they [Silver Star and P4 memo] look contradictory,
because we sent out a Silver Star that was not well written – and, although I went through
the process, I will tell you now I didn’t review the citation well enough to capture – or, I
didn’t catch that if you read it, you can imply that it was not friendly fire.” (p.18
transcript)
Absolute bull. The IG report said that anyone reading the citation would assume
Tillman was killed by enemy fire: ―we concluded that an uninformed reader could
reasonably infer that CPL Tillman had been killed by enemy fire although a careful
review of the narrative and citation show no direct assertion that he was killed by
enemy fire. As a result, the narrative justification and citation were misleading.‖
(p.55 IG report)
In fact, Maj. Hodne even said that he edited the narrative to ensure it didn't mention
friendly fire!: ―Maj.[Hodne] testified that he carefully prepared the narrative to
avoid stating that the enemy had killed CPL Tillman and distinctly remembered
removing a phrase asserting that CPL Tillman ‗died by enemy fire.‖(p.51 IG
report).
And the witness statements were altered by "someone in the approval chain" (i.e.
Nixon, McChrystal, and/or Kauzerlich). ―PFC [O‘Neal] stated that he did not sign
the valorous award witness statement .. also pointed out parts he knows he did not
write and parts that were not accurate.‖ … Sgt [Weeks?] also pointed out parts that
were inaccurate, in that he was unable to see CPL Tillman‘s actions from his
location.‖ IG Gimble preferred not to ―speculate‖ as to who was
responsible while testifying before the House Oversight Committee in April 2007.!
―… we were not able to identify the specific drafter.‖ (p.53 IG report).
3. At the time, Army policy was to rush those medals of valor so they could be
received by the family at the time of the honored soldier’s funeral; that policy has
been changed to allow more thorough evaluations.
Incorrect. There was no Army regulation requiring medals of valor to be awarded prior to
the memorial service. Supposedly, the Ranger Regiment had an ―unwritten‖ policy to
award medals of valor before the memorial service as a matter of practice.
4. General McChrystal said that within a week of Corporal Tillman’s death, he sent
an urgent message to his three senior commanders specifically to inform them of
mounting evidence of death by friendly fire, and to push the Army to quickly halt any
misinformation regarding Corporal Tillman’s death.
(Post-Hearing: p.15.5, ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖):
McChrystal said there was speculation early on that Tillman was killed by friendly fire, but
that he and others were waiting for the outcome of an "initial review" [Scott’s 4/29 15-6]
before coming forward with that information [sending P4]:
“And so, we initially were waiting for the outcome of that initial review [CPT Scotts 15-6]
before we went forward with any conclusions. So, it was a well-intended intent to get some
level of truth before we went up.” (p. 18 transcript)
There was never anything speculative or ―potential‖ or "suspected" about Tillman‘s

friendly fire death. The Rangers on the ground being shot at knew immediately
what had happened. On the 23rd word was passed up ―70% sure‖ by the CSM to
LTC Bailey and on to COL Nixon. And on the 24th, the initial investigating officer
CPT Scott passed on verbal confirmation (―I‘m certain, I‘m sure‖) to LTC Bailey,
who then called COL Nixon (McChrystal was next in the chain of command).
McChrystal knew of confirmed FF just two days after Tillman‘s death! (If this
isn‘t ―some level of proof‖, what is?) Or, are we to believe Nixon never told
McChrystal of confirmation during the following days they were working together
on the Silver Star package?
McChrystal‘s ―outcome of an initial review‖ refers to CPT Scott‘s ―15-6 Final

Report‖ dated April 29th. Isn‘t it curious the 29th‘s the same date as McChrystal‘s
P4? And further, that Nixon only officially appointed Scott on the 29th as well?
Why? Perhaps, McChrystal could say he just got some ―emerging evidence‖ and
started the investigation after he approved the Silver Star on the 29th? And then
CPT Scott‘s April 29th 15-6 report literally disappeared!
3.) McChrystal said that he sent his P4 message to inform his chain of command that he
believed friendly fire was a possibility before the memorial service “which in retrospect
looks contradictory.” (After the Wallace report came out, McChrystal was praised by the
Secretary of the Army for acting "reasonably and quickly" by sending his “timely” P4
memo to alert his superiors on the 29th):
“I also sent a message informing my chain of command that we believed it was fratricide,
and we did that when we were told there were going to be fairly high-profile memorial
services.” And “… when I sent the message, the intent entirely was to inform everyone up
my chain of command so that nobody would be surprised.’ (p. 18 transcript).
During the hearing McChrystal said he was told of suspected fratricide and the 15-6
investigation on the 23rd . Yet he didn‘t send out his P4 until the 29th? How is
waiting six days considered ―timely‖? [and as I pointed out, he actually had verbal
confirmation of fratricide on the 24th!] Of course, in reality McChrystal told
Abizaid on the 23rd, and then it was passed onward to the Secretary of Defense and
White House.
And notice that McChrystal wasn‘t concerned about Tillman‘s family being
surprised. He wrote in his P4, ―I felt it was essential that you received this
information as soon as we detected it in order to preclude any unknowing
statements by our country‘s leaders which might cause public embarrassment if the
circumstances of Corporal Tillman‘s death become public.‖ (P4 Memo)
Note the ―if‖ not ―when‖ it becomes public. And how is sending the P4 on the 29th
―as soon as we detected it‖ when McChrystal said he was told on the 23rd?
Further, McChrystal wasn‘t concerned with correcting the Silver Citation he had
just forwarded to the Secretary of the Army the previous day and that had already
been approved.
5. Sen. James Webb, a Virginia Democrat who has championed the Tillman’s family
case, returned to the topic late in the hearing during a heartfelt exchange in which the
Senator chastised the Army for its initial incorrect reports that Corporal Tillman was
killed in an insurgent ambush, and not by fire from his own Ranger unit. “The Army
failed the family,” said Senator Webb.
But I would argue that the Army wasn‘t the only institution that failed the Tillman family.
The House Oversight Committee‘s ―investigation‖ was perfunctory and half-hearted.
Webb reviewed the Tillman case for the Senate Armed Services Committee secret
confirmation hearing. The New York Times Pentagon reporter Thom Shanker (and
presumably his editors) failed to follow up on my information showing McChrystal played
a central role in the cover-up of Tillman‘s fratricide.
And I wouldn‘t exactly call Senator Webb a ―champion‖ of the Tillman family:
Note: Senator Webb has never spoken with Mary Tillman. Mary has spoken only with
Gordon Peterson (Webb‘s Military Affairs staff assistant). I mentioned in the previous
chapter how Peterson stone-walled my attempts to learn more about the 2008 Hearing. As
a ―gate keeper,‖ he probably never passed on my letters to Senator Webb.
Committee -- Gary Leeling, 202 224-9339. He is out of the office until next
week.‖
case) and figured I was just getting blown off).
A year later, after General McChrystal‘s nomination as the new commander of the
Afghanistan War, I finally realized Senator Webb‘s review was for a previous Senate
May 22th 2008 General McChrystal was unanimously confirmed by the Committee and
(p.15.2, ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖)
Note: It‘s curious that both Chairmen Levin and McChrystal both specifically mentioned
this secret hearing at the beginning of their remarks:
From Chairman Senator Levin‘s opening remarks (p.3 transcript): ―You

[McChrystal] may want to address … the Tillman matter in your opening
statement. Both subjects were discussed in executive session of the Armed
Services Committee last year in connection with your nomination to your current
position as director of the Joint Staff.
From General McChrystal‘s opening remarks (p.10 transcript): ―You gave me the
opportunity to discuss in detail one of those failures, Corporal Pat Tillman, in
closed session with this committee a year ago, in advance of my confirmation as
Director of the Joint Staff, which I appreciated. I stand ready to answer any
additional questions you may have.‖
Perhaps Levin and McChrystal mentioned the closed hearing to avoid the allegation they
were keeping even the existence of the previous hearing secret? The night before the 6-02-
09 hearing, I finally spoke briefly with Gary Leeling (legal counsel for Senator Levin). He
implicitly confirmed the existence of the closed hearing, but would say nothing further in
response to my questions except ―it was in executive session.‖
Obviously, the real confirmation hearing took place last year, behind closed doors, with no
accountability whatsoever. Wouldn‘t you think someone in our intrepid watchdog media
would follow-up on this disclosure? Perhaps ask the Senators a few questions about their
findings during last year‘s ―executive session‖ during which McChrystal‘s actions were
discussed in detail?
6. ―We failed the family,‖ General McChrystal agreed. ―I was a part of that, and I
apologize,‖ but the general repeatedly stated that any errors committed by soldiers
and officers in the field of combat in Afghanistan ―were not intentional,‖ and he
added, ―I didn’t see any activities by anyone to deceive.‖
Perhaps Kevin Tillman said it best in his testimony before Congress:
never used to arrive at an honest or even sensible conclusion. … The handling of the
situation after the firefight was described as a compilation of ‗missteps, inaccuracies and
errors in judgment which created the perception of concealment.‘‖
―Writing a Silver Star award before a single eye witness account is taken is not a misstep.
Falsifying soldier witness statements for a Silver Star is not a misstep. … Discarding an
(15-6) investigation that does not fit a preordained conclusion is not an error in judgment.
These are deliberate acts of deceit. This is not the perception of concealment. This is
concealment.‖
REBUTTAL OF THOM SHANKER’S POST-
HEARING NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLES
Version #2: “U.S. Report Finds Errors in Afghan

Airstrikes”
(New York Times, June 3rd 2009, Eric Schmitt & Thom Shanker)
The Senate Armed Services Committee held their confirmation hearing for General
McChrystal on June 2nd 2009. Within an hour, Thom Shanker‘s article ―Nominee to
Command Afghanistan Stresses Civilian Safety‖ appeared on the NYT‘s website.
Later that evening, I was unable to find the article. It had disappeared from the NYT
website. Unfortunately, I neglected to print or save the article when I first read it shortly
after the hearing. Luckily, I was able to find a copy of the original version that had
fortuitously been posted onto the Internet.
Shanker‘s first article that covered the confirmation hearing had been replaced by a 2nd
version, ―U.S. Report Finds Errors in Afghan Airstrikes.‖ Version #2 had been drastically
revised, focused not on the Senate hearing, but about mistaken U.S. airstrikes in
Afghanistan. The second version deleted nearly all references to the Tillman case and the
Senate confirmation hearing. There were only two lines, at the very end of the article,
about the Tillman case!
Why? The day before the hearing I had sent an email to the NYT editors with attachments
that included much of my disclosures about the Tillman case. I would speculate that
someone in the editorial food chain made the decision to back off and eliminate
commentary about McChrystal‘s confirmation hearing and the Tillman case.
A few days after the hearing, I emailed Thom to ask why he hadn‘t followed up on his
initial article and asked him to point out any errors in my argument that McChrystal played
a central role in the Army‘s cover-up of the Tillman fratricide. Shanker never answered
my questions despite his praise for my binder ―being very well researched and quite
thorough‖
1. Under questioning, General McChrystal also acknowledged that the Army had
“failed the family” in its mishandling of the friendly-fire death of Cpl. Pat Tillman,
the professional football star who enlisted in the Army after the attacks on Sept. 11,
2001.
See Point #6 from Version #1 Rebuttal
2. A final review by a four-star Army general [Wallace] cleared General McChrystal

of any wrongdoing, but punished a number of senior officers [eg Kensinger] who were
responsible for administrative mistakes in the days after Corporal Tillman’s death.
Initially, Army officials said the corporal had been killed by an insurgent ambush,
when in fact he had been shot by members of his own Ranger team.
See Pre-Hearing Rebuttal, Point #2 for ―cleared of wrongdoing‖
See Pre-Hearing Rebuttal, Points #4 & #5 for ―administrative mistakes‖

SENATOR JAMES WEBB AND THE WHITEWASH OF GENERAL
STANLEY MCCHRYSTAL’S ROLE IN THE AFTERMATH OF PAT
TILLMAN’S DEATH
―… we have all been betrayed. It isn‘t just our family. Every time they betray a soldier, they
betray all of us.‖ … ―We had officers that we trusted. We had high regard for them. … in your
heart they are your kids and you turn them over, and we trusted. … we knew they [Pat & Kevin]
could die or they could come back wounded … But we never thought that they would use him the
way they did …‖
-- Mary Tillman, House Oversight & Reform Committee Hearing (4-24-07)
―I found myself awash with a sense of injustice that I could not define. Or perhaps it was merely
that I was young. I had never seen with such clarity that … courage could destroy one man while
flight could make another man king.‖
-- James Webb, ―The Emperor‘s General‘ (1999)
―They ought to make a movie about this. Mr. Smith comes to Washington.‖ ―Yeah, I called my pa
last night and he says, Judd boy, you been up there with them muck-a-mucks two days, now. Did
they teach you how to lie yet?‖
-- James Webb, ―A Country Such As This‖(1983)
―They ought to make a movie about this. Mr. Smith comes to Washington.‖ ―Yeah, I called my pa last night
and he says, Judd boy, you been up there with them muck-a-mucks two days, now. Did they teach you how
to lie yet?‖
SENATOR JAMES WEBB AND THE WHITEWASH

OF GENERAL STANLEY MCCHRYSTAL’S ROLE IN
THE AFTERMATH OF PAT TILLMAN’S DEATH
April 3rd 2008 Letter to Senator James Webb

Military service was prevalent and respected in the Tillman family. Mary Tillman‘s uncles
were at Pearl Harbor, her brother was a Marine, and her father was a Marine during the
Korean War. As Mary Tillman wrote in her book ―Boots on the Ground by Dusk: The
Life & Death of Pat Tillman‖:
―From the time I was very little, I was aware of my father‘s pride in being a
Marine. When I was three years old … I would stand between my parents, feet
digging into the soft leather of the big front seat, and sing the entire Marine Corps
Hymn at the top of my lungs.‖
I‘ve read the novels of James Webb over the past thirty 30 years, long before he became a
U.S. Senator from Virginia in 2006. His novels have dealt with themes of honor,
integrity, loyalty and betrayal. With Senator Webb‘s background as a decorated Vietnam
Marine, I believed he would feel a sense of kinship with Pat Tillman and his family.
On April 3rd 2008, I sent a letter to Senator Webb asking him to become a Senate advocate
for Mary Tillman‘s struggle to learn the truth about her son‘s death. I asked Webb to meet
Mary during the Washington stop of her May book tour.
On April 29th 2008, Senator Webb‘s Military Legislative Affairs Assistant Gordon
Peterson replied to my follow-up email: ―I have alerted the senator‘s scheduling director
to the information on the Washington leg of her tour and provided her with your letter to
the senator.‖
However, Senator Webb didn‘t meet Mary Tillman when she was in Washington on May
12th at Olsson's - Penn Quarter bookstore. I don‘t know if Webb ever actually read my
letter.
Timeline of Pat Tillman Fratricide Notification Up the Chain of
Command
On May 8th 2008, after speaking with Mary Tillman during her book signing in Detroit, I
decided to take a more detailed look through the voluminous Tillman investigative
documents. On May 20th 2008, I finished my review and constructed a detailed timeline
showing when the Army chain of command learned about Tillman‘s fratricide. On May
25th 2008, I sent a copy of my findings to Scott Laidlaw at The Associated Press:
―A couple of weeks ago, while reading your article, ―Pat Tillman‘s Mother Recalls
Journey for Facts‖ (5-13-08), you mentioned AP had obtained new documents
under FOIA … Do your FOIA documents also include testimony from GEN
McChrystal and General Abizaid? Why? Well, I plowed through the GEN Jones
15-6 report, the DoD IG Report, and transcripts from the Waxman hearings to put
together a ―Timeline of Tillman Fratricide Notification‖. I spotted testimony that
suggest Gen. Abizaid gave false testimony to the IG and Congress, that Tillman‘s
fratricide was confirmed only two days after his death (not five weeks), and that
Gen. McChrystal‘s P4 message wasn‘t very ―timely.‖ … Perhaps you could
resolve (or confirm) these apparent contradictions using the documents you
obtained under FOIA? ―
Senator Webb Mentions Senate Tillman ―Review‖ on the Diane Rhem

Show
Just a couple of days later, on May 27th 2008, I spoke briefly with Senator Webb on NPR
radio during the call-in portion of ―The Diane Rhem Show‖ (40:56). During his response,
Webb mentioned a recent Senate review of the Tillman fratricide:
―I just went through a fairly thorough review of that process at the request of the
Chairman of the [Senate] Armed Services Committee [Senator Levin] … What we
do know … is that the Army knew that this was a friendly fire incident fairly
quickly, they did not tell the family, they allowed a ceremony to go forward which
implied otherwise … I‘m not sure where responsibility for that decision really lies,
in terms of the chain of command, how it was handled publicly, but it was really
wrong. … You cannot help but still feel angry about how his death was used.‖
I‘ve followed the Tillman case very closely during the past four years. Although I was
familiar with Congressman Henry Waxman‘s House Oversight & Reform Committee‘s
Tillman investigation, I was surprised to hear about Senator Webb‘s ―review‖. I hadn‘t
read anything at all in the news about a Senate investigation.
And I shared Senator Webb‘s anger about how Pat Tillman‘s death was used. But I didn‘t
understand why Webb was ―not sure where responsibility for that decision really lies‖! I
doubted that Senator Webb actually conducted a ―fairly thorough review‖ of how the
Army handled Tillman‘s fratricide. My own review of the investigative documents,
completed just before I spoke with Senator Webb, revealed that General McChrystal had
played a key role in the Army‘s cover-up of Tillman‘s friendly fire death: McChrystal
received confirmation of Tillman‘s fratricide within two days from the investigating officer
(―I‘m certain, I‘m sure), had the responsibility to tell Tillman‘s family about the fratricide
but made the decision not to tell the family, and he personally led the Ranger officers as
they assembled a ―misleading‖ Silver Star package (with a false citation and tampered
witness statements), and then he waited a week before sending his ―timely‖ P4 memo to
supposedly warn his superiors of ―potential fratricide‖!
On May 30th 2008, I emailed Gordon Peterson to try to learn more about Webb‘s Senate
review:
―As Senator Webb‘s Military Affairs Legislative Assistant, I assume you took the
lead in in conducting that review process. What is the status of that process? What
were your findings? Could send me a copy of your findings?‖ …―… I believe that
responsibility ultimately lies at the top of the chain of command, with Rumsfeld
and/or the White House (It would be interesting to hear Scott McClellan‘s take on
his role in the Tillman case). But, I haven‘t seen a paper trail to directly support
my belief.
However, there is a paper trail that indicates false testimony by either COL Nixon,
GEN McChrystal, or GEN. Abizaid … I‘ve appended my supporting timeline and
notes at the end of this letter. Hopefully, this information may be useful for you
during your review of how the Tillman fratricide was handled by the Bush
administration.‖
However, Gordon Peterson stone-walled my attempts to learn more about the Senate
review. Later that day, he replied:
Committee -- Gary Leeling [Lead Counsel for the Personnel Subcommittee of the
Senate Armed Services Committee] , 202 224-9339. He is out of the office until
next week.‖
I didn‘t immediately follow up with Gary Leeling (Legal Counsel for Senator Carl Levin).
I was very busy with life (and had just spent far too much time on the Tillman case) and
figured I was just getting blown off again by Gordon Peterson.
Note: Although Senator Webb has spoken with Pat Tillman, Sr., he has never spoken with
Mary Tillman. Mary Tillman wasn‘t able to get past Gordon Peterson to speak directly
with the Senator.
House Oversight Committee Investigation Protected General McChrystal
On July 14th 2008, Congressman Henry Waxman‘s House Oversight & Reform Committee
finally issued their report ―Misleading Information from the Battlefield: The Tillman and
Lynch Episodes.‖ The Committee concluded:
―the pervasive lack of recollection and absence of specific information makes it

impossible for the Committee to assign responsibility for the misinformation in
Corporal Tillman‘s and Private Lynch‘s cases…‖
But after reviewing the Committee‘s report, I realized their perfunctory investigation had
served to protect General McChrystal from close scrutiny and was just another layer upon
the previous investigative cover-ups of the Tillman fratricide. On July 26th 2008, I sent an
email to Mike Fish (investigative reporter for ESPN):
―After reading your article, ―House Calls Out Government in Tillman Friendly Fire
Death‖ (ESPN 7-14-08), I wasn‘t particularly surprised at the White House‘s ―lack
of recall‖ about Pat Tillman‘s fratricide (although I did find myself wishing that
Scott McClellan had been put on the spot during his book tour circuit!).
However, after reading Waxman‘s House Oversight Committee‘s report, I was

surprised to learn the Committee never interviewed General McChrystal!
McChrystal was the key link in the chain of command between Col. Nixon (Ranger
Regiment) and Abizaid (CENTCOM), he wrote the P4 memo, and he approved the
false narrative of the Silver Star citation. Initially, McChrystal was scheduled to
appear before the Committee, but he ―declined‖ to appear at their August 2007
hearing. Why didn‘t the Committee follow up? Were they (and the Army)
protecting McChrystal? Was the Waxman report just the final layer upon the
cover-up of the Tillman fratricide?
―Last August, General Kensinger was singled out as the primary reason many
people believe the Army covered up Tillman‘s fratricide … However, I believe
General Kensinger was merely the scapegoat for the sins of the Army and Bush
administration. I would argue that General McChrystal, COL Nixon, and GEN
Abiziad were just as guilty of the same charges for which Kensinger was singled
out.‖
...
After the House Oversight Committee issued their report, the Tillman story was
pretty much laid to rest. Tillman‘s name was rarely mentioned, even when
Tillman‘s NFL football team, the Arizona Cardinals, played at the Superbowl.
Obama Nominates General McChrystal to Become Afghan Commander
On May 12th 2009, President Obama nominated General Stanley McChrystal for
promotion to four-star general and commander of the Afghanistan War.
The following day, on May 13th, President Obama gave the commencement address for
Arizona State University inside Sun Devil Stadium without once mentioning Pat Tillman‘s
name! (in the very stadium in which he played college football!) Why the omission?
In his May 17th column, ―Obama‘s Big-time Fumble,‖ Bob Young (The Arizona
Republic) speculated that Obama was sensitive to the fact that his speech was the day after
his nomination of General McChrystal:
―knowing what a big sports fanatic Obama is … we were shocked that he passed up
a wide-open opportunity. … He encouraged ASU's graduates not to chase "the
usual brass rings" … He told them such an approach elevates "appearance over
substance, celebrity over character, … and said it's just the sort of thinking today's
young people must end. … With apologies to all whom Obama cited … is there
any better example of character over celebrity and substance over appearance than
Pat Tillman, the guy who made his name in the very stadium where Obama stood?
Tillman literally stopped chasing the brass ring and gave up millions and an NFL
career to join the Army's elite Rangers and fight in Afghanistan. He died there, the
victim of friendly fire.‖
―Maybe it simply was an oversight that Obama forgot Tillman, although we were
told Sunday that Obama was staged inside the Arizona State football locker room
before his speech - where there is a photo of Tillman. And he walked right up and
out of Tillman Tunnel to reach the stage.‖
―Perhaps Obama was sensitive to the fact that the speech came shortly after the
announcement that Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal would become the top American
commander in Afghanistan. McChrystal was deemed by a Pentagon investigation
to be responsible for inaccurate information from the Army about Tillman's death,
and the Tillman family has been critical of what it believes was his role in a cover-
up of the real events that took place.‖
… ―Obama had a wide-open opportunity to remind us that Tillman could be the

best example in our lifetimes of someone who eschewed popularity and personal
advancement to devote himself to a bigger purpose. For some reason, the
president passed.‖
I think Bob Young hit the nail on the head. President Obama didn‘t want to risk once
again raising the issue of McChrystal‘s handling of Pat Tillman‘s fratricide by even
mentioning Tillman‘s name!
Has Congress Been Protecting General McChrystal? – Diane Rhem Show
Five years ago, Pat Tillman‘s family was handed a tarnished Silver Star. I felt it would be
a travesty of justice if McChrystal was confirmed by the Senate, promoted to the Army‘s
highest rank, and handed his fourth star!
On May 15th 2009, I managed to (once again) call into the NPR Diane Rhem radio show
during her Friday News Round-up program. General McChrystal‘s recent nomination was
a topic of conversation for her guest panelists:
―Good morning Diane, I‘d like to raise the following question for your guests: has
Congress been protecting General McChrystal from hard scrutiny into his central
role in the Army‘s cover up of Pat Tillman‘s friendly fire death?
Senators Levin and McCain don‘t foresee any problem with General McChrystal‘s
confirmation as the new commander of the Afghanistan War. But, in her book,
Mary Tillman strongly criticized McChrystal: ―Not only is he lying about the
circumstances surrounding Pat‘s death, … he is proposing false language for the
Silver Star narrative. … His statement indicates that no one had any intention of
telling us, or the public, that Pat was killed by fratricide unless forced to do so.‖
Last May, McChrystal‘s role in the handling of Tillman‘s fratricide was reviewed
by the Senate Armed Services Committee. Shortly afterward, about a year ago, I
spoke to Senator Jim Webb here on The Diane Rhem Show: Webb said, ―… the
Army knew that this was a friendly fire incident fairly quickly, [but] they did not
tell the family, … I‘m not sure where responsibility for that decision really lies, in
terms of the chain of command … You cannot help but still feel angry about how
his death was used.
‖I share Senator Webb‘s anger. But, I don‘t understand why Webb was unable to
determine ―where responsibility … really lies.‖
[Note: unfortunately, Diane Rhem cut me off here, the following was not on the air]
―General McChrystal was the central figure in the Tillman cover up and made the
decision to withhold knowledge of Tillman‘s fratricide from his family. And I
don‘t understand why Congressman Henry Waxman allowed McChrystal to refuse
to testify at the House Oversight Committee‘s 2007 Tillman Fratricide Hearing.
Five years ago, Pat Tillman was awarded a tarnished Silver Star. I believe it will
be a travesty if McChrystal is confirmed by the Senate, awarded his fourth star, and
promoted to the Army‘s highest-rank.‖
NYT Editorial Reveals Secret 2008 Confirmation Hearing
On May 14th, The New York Times published their editorial, ―New Commander for
Afghanistan‖:
―Less impressively, some of his commando units were implicated in abusive

interrogations of Iraqi prisoners. And it was General McChrystal who approved the
falsified report that covered up the 2004 friendly-fire death of Cpl. Pat Tillman in
Afghanistan. These issues came at the time of his confirmation last year for his
present job as director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Before confirming him in his
new command, senators must assure themselves that he has learned the hard
lessons from these mistakes and will insist on lawful treatment of detainees and
candid military reporting.‖
―These issues came at the time of his confirmation last year‖! After reading the editorial
on about May 16th, I finally realized the ―review‖ Senator Webb‘s mentioned last year on
the Diane Rhem Show was part of General McChrystal‘s previous Senate confirmation
process.
Sure enough, when I checked the Senate Armed Services Committee‘s website, I found the
full committee had met on May 15th 2008 to consider ―pending military nominations‖ in
―executive session‖ (―executive session‖: secret, closed hearing with no transcript). The
following week, on May 22nd, General McChrystal was unanimously confirmed by the
Committee. Shortly thereafter, General McChrystal was promoted by the full Senate to
Director of the Joint Staff.
[Note: My speculation was confirmed by McChrystal‘s June 2nd 2009 testimony: ‖You
gave me the opportunity to discuss in detail, one of those failures, Corporal Pat Tillman, in
closed session with this committee a year ago, in advance of my confirmation as Director
of the Joint Staff …‖]
So, shortly after I asked Senator Webb in April 2008 to become Mary Tillman‘s Senate
advocate, and while Mary Tillman was in Washington DC on her book tour, Senator Webb
participated in a secret Senate review that protected General McChrystal‘s role in the
cover-up of Tillman‘s fratricide from public scrutiny! And instead of punishing
McChrystal for his actions, the Senate promoted him!
So, I got motivated to take out my box of Tillman documents, and take a closer look at
General McChrystal‘s actions in the aftermath of Tillman‘s death. I reviewed General
Jones‘s 2004 15-6 report, the 2007 Dept. of Defense Inspector General report (IG report),
transcripts from the two 2007 House Oversight & Reform Committee‘s Tillman hearings,
the 2008 House Oversight Committee‘s final report, the 2007 General Wallace report press
conference transcript, and other newspaper accounts about the Tillman case.
May 25th 2009 Letter to Senator James Webb
After completing my review, I concluded that Congress, the Dept. of Defense Inspector
General, and the top leadership of the Army had acted to shield General McChrystal from
close scrutiny and to protect him from punishment for his central role in orchestrating the
cover-up of Pat Tillman‘s fratricide.
During the final two weeks of May, I wrote another long letter to Senator Webb. I asked
the Senator to place a ―hold‖ on General McChrystal‘s confirmation and to take a closer
look at McChrystal‘s role in the aftermath of the Tillman fratricide.
James Webb had been a hero to me for three decades. I hadn‘t always agreed with his
positions, but I had never before doubted his integrity or his sense of honor. At the time, I
thought perhaps Senator Webb was unaware of McChrystal‘s actions (perhaps he had been
given incomplete information from Congressional staffers such as Gerald Leeling and
Gordon Peterson?) Or, perhaps I thought I could shame him into finally doing the right
thing for the Tillman family: ―I‘d like to think that after three years in Congress you
haven‘t yet learned the lesson your grandmother Hodges asked of you decades ago when
you first worked in Washington DC, ―Did they teach you how to lie yet?‖
My letter to Senator Webb became the introduction to my document, ―Did They Teach
You How to Lie Yet?‖ – Senator James Webb, General Stanley McChrystal, and the
Betrayal of Pat Tillman‖ (with fifty pages of text and 50 pages of supporting investigative
documents).
―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖ laid out my argument that Congress and the
senior leadership of the Army had acted to shield General McChrystal‘s actions from close
scrutiny and protect him from punishment for his central role in orchestrating the cover-up
of Pat Tillman‘s fratricide. From my 5-25-09 Letter to Senator Webb:
On July 31st 2007, Secretary of the Army Pete Geren and General Cody presented
the findings of General William Wallace‘s review. General McChrystal received no
reprimand. Instead, Wallace singled out General Kensinger as a scapegoat.
However, their defense of McChrystal doesn‘t hold up under scrutiny. General
McChrystal was guilty of the same charges for which Kensinger was scapegoated!
That is, General McChrystal was required to ―inform the family about friendly
fire,‖ failed to ―inform the family about friendly fire in a timely manner,‖ failed ―to
inform the acting Secretary of the Army [his chain of command] of the fratricide
investigation,‖ and (arguably) made ―false official statements.‖
From April 2007 through July 2008, Congressman Waxman‘s House Oversight &
Reform Committee conducted a perfunctory investigation and held two hearings on
the Tillman fratricide. Chairman Waxman‘s decision to narrow the scope of his
investigation to only ―look up‖ the chain of command took the focus off General
McChrystal. And the Committee permitted General McChrystal to ―decline‖ to
appear and they never interviewed him later. After raising questions about the
Silver Star, they didn‘t look into McChrystal‘s role in approving the Silver Star
with a fraudulent citation, justification and altered witness statements. The
Committee never questioned the ―timeliness‖ or misleading contents of General
McChrystal‘s P4 memo.
During May 2008, as previously discussed, the Senate Armed Services Committee
conducted a secret review of General McChrystal‘s role in the Tillman case. On
May 15th 2008 they met in a closed session to question McChrystal‘s actions
during the aftermath of the Tillman fratricide. On May 22th 2008, McChrystal was
unanimously confirmed by the Committee and promoted to Director of the Joint
Staff.
...
I sent Senator Webb a copy of ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖ on May 27th 2009.
His office didn‘t receive this document until probably couple of weeks later (I was sleep
deprived and had forgotten about security delays in mail delivery to the Senate. I should
have just faxed it!) However, I did send his office an email version of the introductory
letter on May 28th.
...
On June 1st, I called Senator Webb‘s Washington office to follow-up and told the phone
staffer it was important for Webb to read my email prior to the next day‘s confirmation
hearing. Another staffer found my email and said he would print it and give it to Senator
Webb.
(I haven‘t had any response to my document from the Senator‘s office).
On June 1st, I finally called Gerald Leeling (legal counsel for Chairman Senator Carl
Levin) to whom Gordon Peterson (Senator Webb‘s Military Legislative Affairs Assistant)
had referred me to a year previously. I had a brief discussion with Gary Leeling.
Although he confirmed the existence of the hearing, in response to my questions, he only

said ―it was in executive session‖ and the Tillman case had ―been thoroughly reviewed
with the information available to us at the time.‖
General McChrystal’s June 2nd 2009 Senate Confirmation Hearing
On June 2nd 2009, The Senate Armed Services Committee held the General McChrystal‘s
confirmation hearing for his promotion to four-star general and commander of the
Afghanistan War. The Senators didn't press McChrystal aggressively during the nearly
three-hour hearing. As David Corn commented on PBS‘s News Hour:
―And so the Pat Tillman questioning, the questioning about detainee abuse, I
thought, seemed very orchestrated and didn't give a full airing to these very, I think,
hot-button issues‖. … ―You know, he came up with what sounded to be a plausible
explanation, but, again, a lot of what happened today made it clear to me that
Democrats and Republicans had both decided, "He's our guy in Afghanistan‖
Only Senator McCain and Senator Webb asked General McChrystal to comment on his
handling of the Tillman fratricide. Senator McCain asked McChrystal ―why he
[McChrystal] forwarded the Silver Star recommendation in the form that it was in.‖
Senator Webb said ―You have not … been on the record in terms of how you personally
feel about this incident, and I would like to give you the opportunity to do that.‖ Neither
Senator asked McChrystal any follow-up questions.
Note: For more detailed information on the Confirmation hearing, refer to the
Appendices: ―Senate ASC 6-02-09 Confirmation Hearing‖ (from ―Did They Teach You
How to Lie Yet?) , ―General McChrystal‘s Testimony at Senate ASC 6-02-09
Confirmation Hearing‘, and ―Rebuttal of Thom Shanker‘s Post-Hearing NYT Articles.‖
During the June 2nd Senate Armed Services Committee‘s confirmation hearing, I found it
to be curious that both Chairmen Senator Levin and General McChrystal, at the beginning
of their remarks, specifically mentioned the previously secret 2008 confirmation hearing:
From Chairman Senator Levin‘s opening remarks (p. 3 transcript): ―You [McChrystal]
may want to address … the Tillman matter in your opening statement. Both subjects were
discussed in executive session of the Armed Services Committee last year in connection
with your nomination to your current position as director of the Joint Staff.
From General McChrystal‘s opening remarks (p. 10 transcript): ―You gave me the
opportunity to discuss in detail one of those failures, Corporal Pat Tillman, in closed
session with this committee a year ago, in advance of my confirmation as Director of the
Joint Staff, which I appreciated. I stand ready to answer any additional questions you may
have.‖
Perhaps Levin and McChrystal mentioned the closed hearing to avoid the possible
allegation they were trying to hide the existence of McChrystal‘s previous confirmation
hearing?
―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖
In Senator James Webb‘s 1983 novel, A Country Such As This, Congressman Judd Smith
argued: ―And no, the military isn‘t just fine. The point is, it isn‘t corrupt. It‘s a system
with human failures.‖
But when ―human failures‖ systematically extend up every single link in the chain-of-
command (to include the Chair of the Joint Chiefs, Army Chief of Staff, and the Secretary
of Defense) up to and including the White House, how is this not a corrupt country? Every
single institution in this country has failed the Tillman family, including the Army
leadership, Congress, White House and the mainstream media.
Perhaps Senator Rowland, in Senator Webb‘s novel, Something to Die For, hit the nail on
the head:
―How lofty it must have been to have burnt with the purity of the Revolution!
Before the days of multi-million dollar election campaigns that brought politicians
to their knees before the monied temple of the contributors. Before the time of
computerized politics that cause them to await the wisdom of those oracles known
as pollsters before they spoke. Or maybe it had been trash from the get-go, myths
to feed the public.‖
...
It was a travesty of justice that Pat Tillman's family had been handed a tarnished Silver
Star, while General McChrystal was confirmed, promoted to the highest rank in the Army,
and handed his fourth star!
I wrote my May 25th letter to Senator Webb believing the Senate Armed Services
Committee June 2nd 2009 confirmation of General McChrystal would be the final layer of
the Army and Congressional cover-ups of Pat Tillman‘s death.
...
However, I was wrong. Thom Shanker and ―The Gray Lady‖ played the final role in this
story, and laid the topmost layer upon the tall stack of Army and Congressional cover-ups
of the Tillman fratricide.
NOTE: This letter is basically an executive summary of a larger document ―Did They Teach You How to
Lie Yet?‖ that I sent to Thom Shanker (with fifty pages of text and 50 pages of supporting documentation).
...
They ought to make a movie about this. Mr. Smith comes to Washington.‖ ―Yeah, I called my pa last night
and he says, ―Judd boy, you been up there with them muck-a-mucks two days, now. Did they teach you how
to lie yet?‖
Memorial Day 2009
Senator James Webb,
Five years ago on Memorial Day weekend, five weeks after he was killed in Afghanistan,
Pat Tillman‘s parents were finally told their son was ―probably‖ killed by friendly fire.
This Memorial Day weekend, the Senate Armed Services Committee has scheduled
General Stanley McChrystal‘s confirmation hearing for June 2nd. Chairman Carl Levin
and Senator John McCain don‘t foresee any problem with his confirmation.
Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell said, "We feel terrible for what the Tillman family
went through, but this matter has been investigated thoroughly by the Pentagon, by the
Congress, by outside experts, and all of them have come to the same conclusion: that there
was no wrongdoing by Gen. McChrystal."
However, Pat Tillman‘s parents believe McChrystal played a central role in the cover-up of
their son‘s fratricide. Pat Tillman Sr. said, "I do believe that guy participated in a falsified
homicide investigation.‖ Mary Tillman said, "It is imperative that Lt. General McChrystal
be scrutinized carefully during the Senate hearings."
Mary Tillman has harshly criticized the actions of General McChrystal, especially
regarding his ―Personal For‖ (P4) memo sent on April 29th 2004 (ostensibly to alert
President Bush against making embarrassing public statements about Tillman‘s heroism or
his Silver Star):
In her book ―Boots on the Ground by Dusk,‖ Mary wrote:
―Not only is he [McChrystal] lying about the circumstances surrounding Pat‘s

death, … he is proposing false language for the Silver Star narrative. … His
statement [P4 memo] indicates that no one had any intention of telling us, or the
public, that Pat was killed by fratricide unless forced to do so.‖
And shortly after General Wallace‘s findings were released in July 2007, Mary said:
"That memo [P4] is damming as hell. And yet, nothing happens to [McChrystal].
He is writing fraudulent language in that memo. He is giving examples of how they
can script the Silver Star award, even though Pat was killed by fratricide. And he is
saying we need to keep our leadership abreast of things so they don't embarrass
themselves, IF the circumstances of Pat's death should become public … ―
―He should be saying 'We're going to have to put a hold to the Silver Star and we're
going to have to notify the family [of suspected friendly fire].' That is what he
would say if he was innocent, but he is not. He is trying to find a way that they can
continue this false, elaborate story of theirs. And the fact that he is off the hook is
atrocious.‖
I believe the Senate Armed Services Committee should postpone General McChrystal‘s
confirmation and take a closer look at McChrystal‘s central role in the Army‘s handling of
Pat Tillman‘s fratricide.
Five years ago, Pat Tillman‘s family were handed a tarnished Silver Star. It will be a
travesty of justice if McChrystal is confirmed by the Senate, promoted to the Army‘s
highest rank, and handed his fourth star.
...
close scrutiny and protected him from punishment for his central role in orchestrating the
cover-up of Pat Tillman‘s fratricide:
Last year, the Senate Armed Services Committee conducted a secret review of General
McChrystal‘s role in the Army‘s handling of the Tillman fratricide.
Shortly afterwards, on May 27th 2008, I spoke briefly with Senator Webb on NPR radio
during ―The Diane Rhem Show‖ (40:56). Webb spoke of a recent review of the handling
of the Tillman fratricide:
―I think what happened in the aftermath of Pat Tillman‘s death was really tragic.
I just went through a fairly thorough review of that process at the request of the
Chairman of the [Senate] Armed Services Committee [Senator Levin] and the
bottom ...
I talked to his father years ago when my book ‗Born-Fighting‘ came out.
What we do know, this is what I think is so disturbing, is that the Army knew that
this was a friendly fire incident fairly quickly, they did not tell the family, they
allowed a ceremony to go forward which implied otherwise, and his own brother,
which had served with him, it was kept from him until the ceremony took place.
I‘m not sure where responsibility for that decision really lies, in terms of the chain
of command, how it was handled publicly, but it was really wrong.
Someone like me has to have a tremendous amount of respect for what Pat Tillman
did in terms of stepping forward among other things. You cannot help but still feel
angry about how his death was used.‖
Committee -- Gary Leeling [Lead Counsel for the Personnel Subcommittee of the
Senate Armed Services Committee] , 202 224-9339. He is out of the office until
next week.‖
case) and figured I was just getting blown off.
A year later, after General McChrystal‘s nomination as the new commander of the
Afghanistan War, I finally realized Senator Webb‘s review was for a previous Senate
May 22th 2008 General McChrystal was unanimously confirmed by the Committee and
...
I share your anger about how Pat Tillman‘s death was used. But, I don‘t understand why
you were unable to determine ―where responsibility for that decision really lies‖ to cover
up Tillman‘s fratricide.
I doubt you actually conducted a ―fairly thorough review‖ of General McChrystal‘s role.
General McChrystal was the central figure in the Army‘s cover up of Tillman‘s friendly
fire death. McChrystal received confirmation of Tillman‘s fratricide within two days, had
the responsibility to tell the family, made the decision not to tell the family about fratricide,
and he approved the ―misleading‖ Silver Star award.
...
“I just went through a fairly thorough review of that process at the request of the
Chairman of the [Senate] Armed Services Committee [Senator Levin]… I’m not sure
where responsibility for that decision really lies, in terms of the chain of command, how it
was handled publicly … You cannot help but still feel angry about how his death was
used”:
I share Senator Webb‘s anger about how Pat Tillman‘s death was used. But, I
don‘t understand why Webb was unable to determine where responsibility lay for
the decision to cover-up Tillman‘s friendly fire death. I doubt Senator Webb
actually conducted a ―fairly thorough review‖ of how the Army handled Tillman‘s
fratricide.
General McChrystal played a key role in the Army‘s cover up of Tillman‘s friendly
fire death. McChrystal received confirmation of Tillman‘s fratricide within two
days, had the responsibility to inform the family, yet made a decision not to tell the
family about fratricide, and he approved a misleading Silver Star recommendation
(no mention of fratricide, altered witness statements by someone in the approval
chain, and ―inaccurate‖ assertions in the citation and supporting narrative)
“What we do know, this is what I think is so disturbing, is that the Army knew that this was
a friendly fire incident fairly quickly,”:
COL Nixon said it took a ―considerable time to get the truth‖. General Abizaid
told Congress, ―But it is clear that all along fratricide was called as early as the 29th
of April, and that on the 28th of May [36 days later] we conclusively stated it was
fratricide … in terms of fratricide investigations, by the way, that‘s not a slow
investigation. That‘s a fast investigation.‖
Yet, there was nothing ―potential‖ or ―suspected‘ about Tillman‘s fratricide. The
troops on the ground immediately knew it was friendly fire. Confirmation of
Tillman‘s fratricide was passed up the chain of command to McChrystal just two
days after Tillman‘s death by the first investigating officer!
On the 23rd, the day after Tillman‘s death, CSM Birch was ―70% sure‖ and LTC
Bailey ―was certain‖ it was fratricide. CPT Scott, the first 15-6 investigating
officer, confirmed Tillman‘s fratricide just two days after Tillman‘s death (not five
weeks), and immediately passed that information up the chain of command to LTC
Bailey who told Col. Nixon:
―And certainly, by the next day [24th] when we did the investigations, I [ Bailey]
confirmed it. Because I called him [Nixon] back within a day or two and said, ―Sir,
I want you to know now, after getting the first five interviews‖ in fact, that was, I
guess, the next day.‖ … ―So, after [Scott] did his first five interviews, he came back
to me and said, ―Sir, I‘m certain. I‘m sure.‖ And then I called [Nixon]. … I think
it was the 24th. (p. 53). (Note that General McChrystal was next in line in the chain
of command, followed by Abizaid at CENTCOM).
It‘s puzzling that the DoD IG Chronology (Appendix B) asserts that Nixon was told
of suspected fratricide on the 23rd, but told McChrystal only of Tillman‘s death,
which McChrystal passed onto General Abizaid. Yet, McChrystal testified in
General Jones 15-6 that he was told of possible fratricide by Nixon ―… about a
day [23rd] or two [24th] after the incident. No more than three days later [25th].‖
Which account is correct?
Somebody is lying here. Nixon, McChrystal, or Abizaid (or all three).
In actuality, McChrystal quickly notified his chain of command. McChrystal told

General Abizaid of probable fratricide on the 23rd, and updated Abiziad with
confirmation on the 24th. This information surely went up to the Secretary of
Defense and the White House.
“… they did not tell the family,”:
General McChrystal said in his Jones 15-6 statement: ―there was a conscious
decision on who we told about that potential [fratricide] because we did not know
all the facts. … I believe that we did not tell the family of the possibility because
we did not want to give them some half-baked finding.‖ Then, he immediately
contradicted himself, saying: ―I did not know there was a decision not to tell the
family. They had another [son] in the firefight.
...
When General Cody was asked why McChrystal couldn‘t have just called
Tillman‘s family about potential fratricide he replied, ―in the casualty reporting
business … we do not encumber the JSOC commander [McChrystal] with all of
that … that‘s done by the regiment and done by the Army through SOCOM.‖
Secretary Geren added, ―So it was General Kensinger‘s responsibility.‖
However, if you look at Appendix D: ―Casualty Reporting & Next of Kin

Notification Process‖ (p.80, DoD IG report), you‘ll see that McChrystal‘s Chief of
Staff was responsible for sending a supplemental casualty report to USASOC after
learning of friendly fire.
It‘s also noted on the flowchart that both McChrystal and his Chief of Staff knew
about fratricide no later than the 25th and yet did not send a supplementary casualty
report as required by regulations (this finding is not included in the DoD IG Report
conclusions).
General Wallace asserted that McChrystal acted ―reasonably and quickly‖ when he
alerted his higher headquarters about the fratricide investigation. Secretary Geren
said ―General McChrystal, when notified of the friendly fire incident, he alerted,
through his P4 … his chain of command.‖
During the Waxman Hearing, General Abizaid said: General McChrystal did
exactly the right thing. He sent a timely message [P4] in a timely fashion through
the most secure channels‖
Yet, there was nothing ―timely‖ about McChrystal‘s P4 memo! Secretary Geren
implies that McChrystal learned about potential fratricide on the 29th, then sent the
P4 to alert his superiors. However, on April 23rd (NLT 25th), COL Nixon told
McChrystal about probable fratricide and the 15-6 investigation. How can waiting
six days to send a P4 be considered ―quickly‖?
“… they allowed a ceremony to go forward which implied otherwise, …”:
General McChrystal approved the Silver Star recommendation package and sent it
on to Secretary of the Army Brownlee without telling him about Tillman‘s
fratricide. At Tillman‘s memorial service, a Navy SEAL friend spoke of Tillman‘s
―heroic‖ death that using an account that was given to him by the Army.
Secretary Geren was asked why McChrystal received no punishment after being
held accountable in the DoD IG report for inaccurate Silver Star award information.
Secretary Geren replied that McChrystal ―reasonably and appropriately‖ presumed
the Silver Star packet presented to him for his signature was accurate. He said that
McChrystal was aware it was friendly fire when he approved the award and that he
―had no reasonable basis to call into question the recommendations that came up
endorsed by the commanders in the field …‖
But wouldn‘t General McChrystal have a ―reasonable basis‖ to question a Silver

Star package which contains no mention of friendly fire since he had been informed
of confirmed fratricide?
General McChrystal testified he relied on four factors to conclude that Tillman

deserved the Silver Star. Yet the DoD IG found he ―did not directly, or clearly,
state these four factors in the award recommendation.‖ (And if McChrystal only
knew what was in the recommendations, merely signed off on the paperwork, how
could he know about these four factors!)
...
And Secretary Geren disregarded the DoD IG review which found General
McChrystal ―accountable for inaccurate and misleading assertions contained in the
award recommendation package‖ and ―accountable for not notifying the award
processing channels [Secretary of the Army] that friendly fire was suspected to
ensure that the recommendation was considered based on accurate information.‖
Both of the Silver Star witness statements were altered to remove any mention of
friendly fire and contained inaccurate statements. Inspector General Gimble said
this was done ―somewhere in the approval chain‖ but refused to ―speculate‖ who
was responsible. It appears that COL Nixon, Nixon‘s XO, and/or General
McChrystal were involved.
The Silver Star narrative justification and citation bore little resemblance to reality
and were carefully and misleading edited to imply Tillman died by enemy fire
without actually coming out and saying it.
Overall, it doesn‘t appear that Senator Webb and the Armed Services Committee did a
thorough job of reviewing McChrystal‘s role in the aftermath of the Tillman fratricide. I
don‘t see how they could confirm General McChrystal given his role in the cover-up of Pat
Tillman‘s fratricide.
...
On July 31st 2007, Secretary of the Army Pete Geren presented the findings of General
William Wallace‘s review of the previous Tillman investigations. General McChrystal
received no reprimand for his role in the handling of the Tillman fratricide. Instead,
General Wallace singled out General Kensinger as the scapegoat responsible for the public
believing the Army covered up the Tillman fratricide.
However, Secretary Geren and General Cody‘s defense of McChrystal doesn‘t hold up
under scrutiny. General McChrystal was guilty of the same charges for which Kensinger
was scapegoated! That is, General McChrystal was responsible to ―inform the family
about friendly fire,‖ failed to ―inform the family about friendly fire in a timely manner,‖
failed ―to inform the acting Secretary of the Army [his chain of command] of the fratricide
investigation,‖ and (arguably) made ―false official statements.‖
[NOTE: see ―General Wallace‘s Review of Tillman Fratricide‖ attachment for details]
...
During 2007, Congressman Waxman‘s House Oversight & Reform Committee conducted
an investigation and held two hearings on the Tillman fratricide. However, Congressman
Waxman‘s Committee appeared to conduct a half-hearted investigation.
Chairman Waxman‘s decision to narrow the scope of his investigation to only ―look up‖
the chain of command took the focus off General McChrystal. The Committee permitted
General McChrystal to ―decline‖ to appear and they never interviewed him later. After
raising questions about the Silver Star, they didn‘t look into McChrystal‘s role in
approving the Silver Star with a fraudulent citation, justification and altered witness
statements. The Committee never questioned the ―timeliness‖ or misleading contents of
General McChrystal‘s P4 memo.
[NOTE: see ―House Oversight & Reform Committee‘s Tillman Fratricide Hearings‖ for
more detail]
...
The Senate Armed Services Committee June 2nd confirmation of General McChrystal will
be the final layer atop the Army and Congressional cover-ups of Pat Tillman‘s death.
During the April 24th 2007 Congressional hearing, Mary said,
―… Congress is supposed to take care of their citizens. … Pat died for this
country, and he believed it was a great country that had a system that worked. It is
not perfect. No one has ever said that. But there is a system in place to allow for it
to work, and your job is to find out what happened to Pat.‖
In your 1983 novel, A Country Such As This, Congressman Judd Smith argued: ―And no,
the military isn‘t just fine. The point is, it isn‘t corrupt. It‘s a system with human
failures.‖
Perhaps Senator Rowland, in your novel, Something to Die For, hit the nail on the head:
―How lofty it must have been to have burnt with the purity of the Revolution!
Before the days of multi-million dollar election campaigns that brought politicians
to their knees before the monied temple of the contributors. Before the time of
computerized politics that cause them to await the wisdom of those oracles known
as pollsters before they spoke. Or maybe it had been trash from the get-go, myths
to feed the public.‖
***
―Across the room … my mother‘s father, B.H. Hodges, stares out at me … as he has done in every office I
have occupied for more than twenty years. … Defiant he was, and tragic too. He was a fighter, a lonely
champion of lost causes who himself lost everything because of the causes he championed.‖
-- James Webb, ―A Time to Fight‖ (2008)
Four decades ago, you were drawn into the Randy Herrod case. A Marine patrol was
accused of killing sixteen Vietnam Villagers. Herrod, the patrol leader and veteran of five
months, had been found not guilty. Yet Sam Green, a black eighteen year old with eleven
days in Vietnam had been convicted even though no testimony had been presented that he
had actually killed anyone. From Robert Timberg‘s ―The Nightingale‘s Song‖:
―The case continued to bedevil Webb …. He wanted to help Green, but wasn‘t sure
what he could do. … He joined forces, pro bono, … to try to get the conviction
overturned in a civilian court. … The secretary [of the Navy] declined to act. …
About two weeks later, in August 1975, Webb received a telegram …: TRAGIC
CONCLUSION SAM GREEN DESTROYED HIMSELF.‖
―He had never met Green, spoken to him only once by phone, but he had
committed himself to clearing his name. … He felt helpless, his sense of futility
laced with outrage. Isn‘t any of this going to come out right? … Green was dead,
but Webb couldn‘t let the case go. He … filed an appeal … asking that Green‘s
dishonorable discharge be upgraded to honorable. Webb personally argued the
case before the board.‖
―In December 1978, eight years after the shootings and three years after Green‘s
suicide, Webb wrote to Mrs. Green: ―At last, Sam‘s name is cleared.‖ He
explained that her son‘s discharge had been upgraded to a general discharge. …
―This is small solace, I know,‖ wrote Webb, ‗I only regret we were unable to do
more for him sooner.‖
...
I never met Pat Tillman. I never really knew anything about him until a year and a half
after his death. But, I‘ve taken the cover-ups of his death a bit personally the last few
years. Why? I feel a sense of kinship with Pat Tillman. I‘m not in his league, but I was an
Airborne Ranger and an autodidact and a bit of maverick. And I‘ve always had outrage for
injustice and rooted for the underdog.
I‘ve been bedeviled by the Tillman case. For five years, I haven‘t been able to let the case
go. I hoped this could be one small cause I might be able to make a difference with all the
other shit going on the past few years. It would be nice if this ―letter‖ of mine would make
a difference.
...
For thirty years your books have dealt with themes of honor, integrity, loyalty, and
betrayal. Re-reading your books, I noticed many parallels between your books and the
story of Pat Tillman‘s death. On April 3, 2008, I sent your office a letter asking you to
become an advocate in the Senate for Mary Tillman‘s struggle for the truth about her son‘s
death (I doubt my letter made it past your gatekeeper Gordon Peterson).
I believed you would feel a sense of kinship with Pat Tillman and his family:
The Tillman‘s are of Scots-Irish descent. Military service was prevalent and
respected in the Tillman family. Mary Tillman‘s uncles were at Pearl Harbor, her
brother was a Marine, and her father was a Marine during the Korean War. Mary
wrote, ―From the time I was very little, I was aware of my father‘s pride in being a
Marine. When I was three years old … I would stand between my parents, feet
digging into the soft leather of the big front seat, and sing the entire Marine Corps
―Pat Tillman was driven by a core of honesty, integrity, and loyalty. His mother
wrote, ―Pat was honest and incorruptible; he would be offended and outraged about
the actions taken in the aftermath of his death. … Honor, integrity, dignity; those
weren‘t just adjectives in Pat Tillman‘s life; they were his life. Pat Tillman was the
embodiment of loyalty and commitment. … He was such a loyal person. He
always wanted to do right by the people who mattered to him.‖
Similarly, in A Country Such As This, Senator Judd Smith said, ―If nothing ever
works out all the way, and if all things change, what‘s left? Your family and your
friends and your values, that‘s what‘s left. And your duty to them. … They‘re the
only important things in life. … And that the rest of it might change a million
times, be called wrong or right or anything else, but you must never violate your
loyalty if you wished to survive the judgment of the ages.‖
Five years ago, Pat Tillman‘s family were handed a tarnished Silver Star. It will be a
travesty of justice if McChrystal is confirmed by the Senate Armed Services Committee,
promoted to the Army‘s highest rank, and handed his fourth star.
But, perhaps you were right years ago in your novel, ―A Sense of Honor,‖ when CPT
Lenahan said, ―I guess that‘s what the world does to you. It makes you realize that honor
and loyalty are traps with no reward.‖
...
I feel you owe a duty to Pat Tillman and his family. A duty to place a ―hold‖ on General
McChrystal‘s nomination and stop his confirmation on June 2nd.
Yeah, that could be a lost cause. You‘d piss off a lot of people. But, at least you would
give Mary Tillman the small solace of knowing there is one man of integrity in the Senate
willing to stand as her advocate. Someone willing to ―be a lonely champion of lost
causes…‖ Perhaps you need to take a long look at the picture staring at you from your
office wall?
You‘ve been a hero to me for three decades, since I was a teenager, through my years as an
Airborne Ranger LRRP, to the present day as a firefighter. I haven‘t always agreed with
your positions on the Vietnam War, etc. But I‘ve never before doubted your integrity.
I‘ve always trusted your sense of honor.
I‘d like to think that after three years in Congress you haven‘t yet learned the lesson your
grandmother Hodges asked of you decades ago when you first worked in Washington DC,
―Did they teach you how to lie yet?‖
Sincerely
SSG, Co. ―F‖ (Ranger), 425th Infantry MI ARNG 1983 – 1991

April 3, 2008
Dear Senator James Webb,
Four years ago Pat Tillman was killed by ―friendly fire‖ in Afghanistan. Six
―investigations‖ and two Congressional hearings later, Pat‘s family is still struggling to
learn the truth about the circumstances of his death and those involved in the cover-up of
his fratricide.
Mary Tillman, Pat‘s mother, has written a memoir, Boots on the Ground by Dusk: The
Life and Death of Pat Tillman. Her book will be released on April 29th.
I‘m writing to ask that you consider becoming an advocate in the Senate for Mary
Tillman‘s struggle for the truth. Perhaps you could arrange to meet Mary in May during
the Washington D.C. leg of her national book tour? Mary‘s home phone is (408) 841-
9912. Her editor at Rodale Press is Leigh Haber (212) 808-1340. Her publicist is Beth
Davey (212) 808-1627.
I believe you might feel a sense of kinship with Pat Tillman and his family. They are
Scots-Irish. Military service was prevalent and respected in their family (e.g. Mary‘s
father was a Marine in the Korean War). Like your own son, Pat did not feel he should
remain privileged during a time of war. After 9/11 he enlisted (with his brother Kevin) and
they fought together in Iraq and Afghanistan. Pat Tillman was driven by honesty,
integrity, and loyalty. He lived his life intensely, was well-read, and was an independent
thinker; ―… sensitive and fierce, a poet and a warrior, as Irish as the day is long.‖
I‘ve read your books for thirty years, starting before my eight years in the Army and
continued my past seventeen years as a firefighter. After recently re-reading your novels, I
noticed several parallels between Pat Tillman‘s fratricide and your novels:
In Something to Die For, Col. Fogarty was ordered into a mistaken battle, posthumously
awarded the Medal of Honor, and eulogized by the President during a televised memorial
service. The mistaken battle was covered-up. Similarly, a dangerous order resulted in Pat
Tillman‘s fratricide. He was posthumously awarded the Silver Star and eulogized by
Senator McCain during a televised memorial service. Tillman‘s fratricide was covered-up
by Army generals, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, and the White House.
In Fields of Fire, Lt. Hodges lost men after he was ordered to place them into a dangerous
LP. Later, Hodges was shot during a firefight around a disabled tank. Similarly, Lt.
Uthlaut was ordered by his TOC to split his platoon, despite his repeated protests, to both
get ―boots on the ground by dusk‖ and escort a disabled humvee. During the resulting
fratricide Uthlaut and his RO were wounded and Pat Tillman killed by criminally negligent
friendly fire.
In A Sense of Honor, Cpt. Lenahan and Fogarty were kicked out of the Naval Academy to
protect their superiors from a ―hazing scandal.‖ Similarly, Lt. Uthlaut (First Captain at
West Point) was offered up as a scapegoat and kicked out of his Ranger Battalion.
In The Emperor’s General, Army lawyer Frank Witherspoon railed against the injustice of
General MacArthur‘s war-crimes trial of Japanese General Yamashita. Just before the
2006 elections, Kevin Tillman railed against recent injustices in ―After Pat‘s Birthday.‖
Last year, on April 24, 2007, the House Committee on Oversight and Reform held a
hearing entitled ―Hearing on Misleading Information from the Battlefield.‖
Kevin Tillman, Pat‘s brother, began his testimony with a prepared statement:
―Two days ago marked the third anniversary of the death of my older brother, Pat Tillman,
in Afghanistan. To our family and friends, it was a devastating loss. To the nation, it was
a moment of disorientation. To the military, it was a nightmare. But to others within the
government, it appears to have been an opportunity.‖
―Revealing that Pat‘s death was a fratricide would have been yet another political disaster
... So the facts needed to be suppressed. … An alternative narrative had to be
constructed. Crucial evidence was destroyed including Pat‘s uniform, equipment and
notebook. The autopsy was not done according to regulation, and a field hospital report
was falsified. An initial investigation completed … before testimony could be changed …
[and which hit disturbingly close to the mark] disappeared into thin air and was
conveniently replaced by another investigation with more palatable findings.‖
never used to arrive at an honest or even sensible conclusion. … The handling of the
situation after the firefight was described as a compilation of ‗missteps, inaccuracies and
errors in judgment which created the perception of concealment.‘‖
―Writing a Silver Star award before a single eye witness account is taken is not a misstep.
Falsifying soldier witness statements for a Silver Star is not a misstep. … Discarding an
(15-6) investigation that does not fit a preordained conclusion is not an error in judgment.
These are deliberate acts of deceit. This is not the perception of concealment. This is
concealment.‖
Mary Tillman, Pat‘s mother, also testified at that hearing about the fratricide cover-up:
―We had officers that we trusted. We had high regard for them. … in your heart they are
your kids and you turn them over, and we trusted. Certainly, we knew they could die or
they could come back wounded … But we never thought that they would use him (Pat) the
way they did.‖
[Mary wrote: ―… the Army was placed in a position to spin the narrative of Pat‘s death …
(General) Yellen stated it was like, …‘It went up to the 2-star level and the 2-star took it
right to the 4-star level … now all of a sudden, … ‗Here is the steak dinner, but we‘re
giving it to you on this … garbage can cover.‘ You know, ‗You got it. You work it.‘‖]
―And we shouldn‘t be allowed to have smokescreens thrown in our face. … in every way,
they (Army CID investigators) dodged. They are dodging us, and the (Department of
Defense) IG condoned that even though they make the public believe they did such a grand
job because they pointed the finger at four generals and five other officers. That is a
smokescreen. These officers are scapegoats.‖
―It is a bit disingenuous to think that the (Bush) Administration did not know about what
was going on, something so politically sensitive. … The fact that he (Pat) would be killed
by friendly fire and no one would tell (Defense Secretary) Rumsfeld is ludicrous … … the
idea that they wouldn‘t tell Abizaid (Centcom commander) what was going on if he didn‘t
already know is ridiculous.‖
I believe you might feel a sense of kinship with Pat Tillman and his family:
The Tillman‘s are of Scots-Irish descent. Pat‘s picture is among those of famous
Americans featured on the cover of Parade Magazine‘s October 3, 2004 issue, entitled
―Can You Guess What They All Have in Common?‖ (adapted from Born Fighting.)
Military service was prevalent and respected in the Tillman family. Mary Tillman‘s uncles
were at Pearl Harbor, her brother was a Marine, and her father was a Marine during the
Korean War. Mary wrote, ―From the time I was very little, I was aware of my father‘s
pride in being a Marine. When I was three years old … I would stand between my parents,
feet digging into the soft leather of the big front seat, and sing the entire Marine Corps
Your own son chose to leave college to enlist with the Marines. Likewise, Pat Tillman
chose to leave a multi-million dollar NFL contract (and new wife) to enlist in the Rangers
with his brother Kevin. Pat didn‘t feel that he ought to remain privileged while others
were sent to fight. As his mother testified, ―Pat had high ideals for the country. He did,
and he thought it was imperfect. He certainly didn‘t join for political reasons. He thought
the country was in need. It didn‘t matter who was in office. It didn‘t matter which party
he voted for. That is beside the point. The country was in need.‖
(Ironically, Pat and Kevin were later sent to fight in Iraq although they had come to
believe, in Pat‘s words, ―This war is so fucking illegal.‖)
Similarly, in Fields of Fire, Lt. Hodges said, ―They were only soldiers. They had never
owned or determined the reasons for a war, and they had not asked for this one. They had
merely yielded to their honor and tradition and agreed to fight it. And they were not
wrong, not wrong.‖
Pat Tillman was driven by a core of honesty, integrity, and loyalty. His mother wrote, ―Pat
was honest and incorruptible; he would be offended and outraged about the actions taken
in the aftermath of his death. … Honor, integrity, dignity; those weren‘t just adjectives in
Pat Tillman‘s life; they were his life. Pat Tillman was the embodiment of loyalty and
commitment. … He was such a loyal person. He always wanted to do right by the people
who mattered to him.‖
Similarly, in A Country Such As This, Senator Judd Smith said, ―If nothing ever works out
all the way, and if all things change, what‘s left? Your family and your friends and your
values, that‘s what‘s left. And your duty to them. … They‘re the only important things in
life. … And that the rest of it might change a million times, be called wrong or right or
anything else, but you must never violate your loyalty if you wished to survive the
judgment of the ages.‖
Pat Tillman lived his life intensely, led by example, and went all out every play. He was
well-read and an independent thinker. In school, he earned a 3.84 grade-point average.
Pat had written in his journal since he was sixteen years old (his wartime journal was
―lost‖ by the Army immediately after his death).
Pat Tillman was a character much like Cpt. Lenahan and cadet Fogarty in A Sense of
Honor: ―He is sensitive and fierce, a poet and a warrior, as Irish as the day is long. He is,
in fact, myself in a matchbox.‖
Over the past thirty years I‘ve read all your books. I started with Fields of Fire as a
teenager, and continued reading your books during my eight years serving in an Airborne
LRRP company [SSGT, 1983 -1991, Co. ―F‖ (Ranger) 425th Infantry MI Army National
Guard] and my past seventeen years as a firefighter with the City of Grand Rapids, MI.
After recently re-reading your books, I noticed several parallels between your novels and
Pat Tillman‘s fratricide:
In Something to Die For, Col. Fogarty was ordered to place his Marines into a precarious
fight in Eritrea. This mistaken battle was covered-up by the Secretary of Defense and
Fogarty was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor by the President during a
nationally televised funeral service:
―He [Secretary of Defense] knows the administration‘s position on the matter was a
cover-up. Eritrea was a mistake. But it worked. And they didn‘t want the
president to look bad.‖
―Ron Holcomb [Secretary of Defense] never told a lie, at least not in the way he
could be caught in it. …As a consequence, the remarks were a mix of bald truth,
diplomatic half-truths, and what Holcomb had privately called ‗necessary,
unconfirmable distortions.‘ Nonetheless, they would become the government‘s
official pronouncement on the day‘s action.‖
―And the media gave them their forum, always ascertaining beforehand that their
allegations were borne out by facts if not the truth.‖
Similarly, Pat Tillman died as a result of a dangerous order to split his platoon, was
posthumously awarded the Silver Star, and his memorial service was televised with
Senator McCain among the dignitaries offering eulogies. Tillman‘s fratricide was covered-
up by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Army generals and the White House.
…
In Fields of Fire, Lt. Hodges lost three of his men because he was ordered by Lt. Kersey
(at the Battalion command post) to put them out into a dangerous LP:
―LPs on the other side of this wire are crazy as hell. … The rule I use is, would I
think it made any sense if I got sent out on it? And I wouldn‘t. So I don‘t like it.‖
―Now, if the Lieutenant believes the LP shouldn‘t be out there, I suggest he go talk
with the battalion staff.‖
―Hodges did not know how to force his point. ―Can‘t ask for more than having the
Big Six consider it, I reckon.‖
―Bullshit.‖ … ―He (1st Lt. Kersey) ain‘t gonna talk to the Colonel about this. … As
long as he‘s looking good to the Man, he couldn‘t give a rat‘s ass how many people
are bleeding.‖
―He (Lt. Hodges) had met a dozen Kerseys in the Marine Corps already. They
held all ranks, although to him they seemed to be mostly Majors.‖
Lt. Uthlaut was Pat‘s platoon leader. His platoon had been held up by a broken
humvee. Maj. Hodne at the TOC wanted ―boots on the ground by dusk‖ in the
village of Manah merely so he could mark that task accomplished on-time on his
checklist. Major Hodne, through Cpt. Saunders, ordered Lt. Uthlaut to split his
platoon. Half would go to Manah, and half would escort the humvee to the
highway for pick-up. Lt. Uthlaut thought it was dangerous and unnecessary to split
his platoon. He repeatedly argued the point with Cpt. Saunders in the TOC.
Near the end of Fields of Fire, Lt. Hodges is ordered to secure a dangerous perimeter
around a disabled tank. During the ensuing firefight, he is shot in the face and killed:
―Hodges grunted. ―Fucking tank.‖ … Snake shifted his gaze to the treadless tank
that had anchored them in such an indefensible position. It sat like a wounded
mastodon in the middle of the exposed paddy. … The company was digging a
perimeter around it, to protect it.‖
Similarly, Tillman‘s platoon was put into danger by a disabled humvee. During the
―friendly fire‖ that resulted from splitting his platoon Lt. Uthlaut was hit in the face, his
RO shot in the leg, and Pat Tillman killed by criminally negligent fire by the lead vehicle
of the second section (Tillman was killed by rounds fired from only 35 meters away).
...
In A Sense of Honor, Cpt. Lenahan and cadet Fogarty were kicked out of the Naval
Academy to protect their superiors from a ―hazing scandal‖:
―Admiral, I‘ve got a man in trouble on a plebe-indoctrination charge. … My man

won‘t stand a chance.‖
―Do you realize the implications if this gets out, Captain? You were there when
these violations were going on. … If we sided with Fogarty, we could lose the
whole plebe system. … In fact, we‘ve lost more than Fogarty. I‘m afraid you‘ve
just become a casualty yourself. … You get orders out of here before somebody
decides to investigate you.‖
Similarly, Lt. Uthlaut (First Captain, top of his West Point Class) was offered up as a low-
ranking scapegoat and kicked out of the Ranger Battalion for his ―failure‖ to control his
platoon during the ―friendly fire‖ incident. (Captain Saunders and Major Hodne later
denied they ordered Lt. Uthlaut to split his platoon).
...
In The Emperor’s General, Army lawyer Frank Witherspoon railed against the injustice of
General MacArthur‘s war-crimes trial of Japanese General Yamashita:
―… what he‘s [General MacArthur] doing is a sham. We‘re Americans, Captain.

We‘re supposedly bringing an accused man into the American system of justice. …
He‘s convened a military commission! It‘s not – a – court.‖
―I reminded him that we‘re supposed to be operating under traditional American

concepts of law, such as fairness, decency, and justice. … Do you realize what this
trial – if you can call it a trial – this illegal, judgeless commission is going to look
like? It‘s going to be nothing but a public circus! ... why are we wasting our
credibility as the United States on this man?‖
Kevin Tillman, Pat‘s younger brother, enlisted and fought with Pat in Iraq and
Afghanistan. After Pat‘s death, Kevin refused all interviews and remained silent for 2 ½
years. Just before the November 2006 elections, Kevin finally broke his silence with a
short essay ―After Pat‘s Birthday‖ (excerpted below):
―It is Pat‘s birthday on November 6, and elections are the day after.‖
―Somehow our elected leaders were subverting international law and humanity by
setting up secret prisons around the world, secretly kidnapping people, secretly
holding them indefinitely, secretly not charging them with anything, secretly
torturing them. …Somehow that overt policy of torture became the fault of a few
bad apples. Somehow subversion of the Bill of Rights and The Constitution is
tolerated. Somehow suspension of Habeas Corpus is supposed to keep this country
safe.‖
―Somehow the most reasonable, trusted and respected country in the world has
become one of the most irrational, belligerent, feared, and distrusted countries in
the world. … Somehow American leadership, whose only credit is lying to its
people and illegally invading a nation, has been allowed to steal the courage, virtue
and honor of its soldiers on the ground.‖
―Luckily this country is still a democracy. People still have a voice. People still
can take action. It can start after Pat‘s birthday.‖
...
―Did they teach you how to lie yet?‖ (Senator Smith‘s dad in A Country Such As This)
Last summer, on August 1, 2007, the House Committee on Oversight and Reform held a
second hearing: ―The Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department
Knew.‖ The phrase, ―I don‘t recall,‖ was uttered repeatedly by witnesses.
Mary wrote, ―General Brown, retired generals Meyers and Abizaid, and Rumsfeld have
great difficulty remembering what they knew and when they knew it. Someone sitting
next to me whispers, ‗They have collective amnesia.‘ Rumsfeld was asked several times in
various ways when he learned of Pat‘s death, but he couldn‘t recall.‖
Mary complained, ―… we were not happy with the hearing at all. We had spent weeks
helping getting questions prepared and sending information. The Republicans on the
committee were at best indifferent … Most of the Democrats disappointed us as well.
They were not prepared and they didn‘t think on their feet. We expected more from
Congress.‖
The White House claimed ―executive branch confidentiality‖ when the House Committee
on Oversight and Reform requested information about their handling of the Tillman
fratricide. The White House refused to release e-mails and documents or to allow White
House staff to testify before the committee.
During the April 24, 2007 hearing, Mary said, ―… Congress is supposed to take care of
their citizens. … Pat died for this country, and he believed it was a great country that had a
system that worked. It is not perfect. No one has ever said that. But there is a system in
place to allow for it to work, and your job is to find out what happened to Pat.‖
In A Country Such As This, Senator Judd Smith argued: ―And no, the military isn‘t just
fine. The point is, it isn‘t corrupt. It‘s a system with human failures.‖
Perhaps Senator Rowland, in Something to Die For, hit the nail on the head:
―How lofty it must have been to have burnt with the purity of the Revolution! Before the
days of multi-million dollar election campaigns that brought politicians to their knees
before the monied temple of the contributors. Before the time of computerized politics that
cause them to await the wisdom of those oracles known as pollsters before they spoke. Or
maybe it had been trash from the get-go, myths to feed the public.‖
...
Your novels over the past thirty years have dealt with themes of honor, integrity, loyalty,
and betrayal. I believe you might feel a sense of kinship with Pat Tillman and his family.
Perhaps you could arrange to meet with Mary Tillman during her May book tour? And
perhaps you would consider becoming an advocate in the Senate for the Tillman family‘s
struggle for the truth?
Sincerely
P.S.
I was an early supporter of your long-shot ‘06 Senate campaign (from the fall of ‘05
through your election I made six contributions to your campaign). Most satisfying money
I‘ve ever given to a ―lost‖ cause! Perhaps only the ―lost‖ causes are worth fighting for?
Last August, my family and I traveled to Washington D.C. to attend my step-brother‘s wedding. On our
last day in town, we walked around the Capital building and took a snack break next to an old tree.
While walking back to Union Station we stopped by your Senate office. I‘d like to thank your staffer for
a gracious welcome. And your complimentary packets of Virginia peanuts were a hit with my children!
(Nathan‘s ―loot‖ was firmly grasped by both hands).
That night riding the Amtrak train back home, while finishing your novel, ―A Country Such as This,‖ I
was surprised to read the following passage:
―At the corner of south Capital Street and Independence Avenue … he (Senator Judd Smith)
jogged across the avenue, passing through a curtain of shrubbery into a small park. … He found
his favorite tree and removed his coat, folding it carefully inside out, and sat down, leaning
against the tree trunk as though it was a lounging chair. The park was his frequent daytime
hideout. …When it got to be too much, he simply picked up a carry-out lunch and escaped into
the plain view of the park.‖
―His public cloister allowed contemplation … Congress was a dog and pony show. He was
doing vital things, at least part of the time, but it would end someday, just like everything else
always had and always would. … And the gnarled base of his favorite old tree was itself a
throne, from which he could peer out on the Capital, a few hundred feet away, and the House
Office Buildings just across the street. … The Capital building was a wonderfully dramatic
background.‖
It sure sounds like the same tree to me! (A bit of synchronicity?)

Note: see my forthcoming document: Appendices: ―Lies Borne Out by Facts,
If Not the Truth.‖ Time permitting, I may eventually link to each of these documents
on my website: feralfirefighter.blogspot.com
However, I have copied my full email exchanges with Thom Shanker below.
...
APPENDICES:
A: ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖ (refer to separate Volume II binder):
Operational & Administrative Chain of Command (from IG Report)

Fratricide Investigation Flowchart (Appendix C, IG Report)
Casualty Reporting and Next of Kin Notification Flowchart (Appendix D, IG Report)
Timeline of Tillman Fratricide Notification (GuyMontag425 5-17-08)
Transcript of General McChrystal‘s June 2nd 2009 Senate Testimony

Senate ASC 6-02-09 Confirmation Hearing (from ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?)
http://armed-services.senate.gov/Transcripts/2009/06%20June/09-36%20-%206-2-09.pdf
B: E-Mail Correspondence Between David Parish & The New York Times
C: New York Times Articles about General Stanley McChrystal:
(5-12-09) ―Pentagon Ousts Top Commander in Afghan War‖

(5-13-09) ―A General Steps from the Shadows‖
(5-14-09) ―New Commander for Afghanistan‖ (NYT Editorial)
(5-15-09) ―Afghan Villagers Describe Chaos of U.S. Airstrikes‖
(5-26-09) ―Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander Revives Questions in Tillman Case‖
(6-01-09) ―Questions for General McChrystal‖ (NYT Editorial)
(6-02-09) ―Nominee to Command U.S. Afghan Forces Stresses Civilian Safety‖
(6-02-09) ―U.S. Report Finds Errors in Afghan Airstrikes‖
D: ―5 Years Ago: When the Pentagon and Media Lied About Jessica Lynch Rescue‖
...
EMAIL EXCHANGES
THOM SHANKER (NYT PENTAGON REPORTER) & GUY
MONTAG
WEDNESDAY 5/27/09 about 9PM:
Thom Shanker,
I just read your May 26th article, ―Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander Revives
Questions in Tillman‘s Case.‖
This past week I‘ve been working on a long letter to Senator James Webb. I write that
close scrutiny and protected him from punishment. I review and critique Senator Webb‘s
Armed Services Committee review, General Wallace‘s review, and Congressman
Waxman‘s House Oversight & Reform Committee investigation.
I‘d like to send you a copy of my letter. My letter discusses in some detail every point
raised in your article. In addition, I‘ve uncovered new information about the Tillman case
not mentioned at all in your article.
Here‘s a preview of some of the information (without details or documentation):
1. Senator Webb did a ―thorough review‖ last year of the aftermath of the Tillman
fratricide at the request of Chairman Carl Levin for the Senate Armed Service Committee.
(In retrospect, I realize this was part of the vetting process for McChrystal‘s confirmation
last year as Director of the Joint Staff). Webb mentioned this review May 27th 2008 on
the Diane Rhem NPR radio show (about 40 minutes into show). When I tried to follow up,
Webb‘s Military Affairs aide, Gordon Peterson, stonewalled me and referred me to Gary
Leeling 202-224-9339 (legal counsel for Senator Levin)
2.) Congressman Waxman ―invited‖ McChrystal to testify on August 1st 2007. The
Committee permited McChrystal to ―decline‖ to appear at the hearing despite his key role
in notifying senior leadership, writing the misleading P4 memo, and approving the
fraudulent Silver Star. And the Committee never interviewed McChrystal during the next
year until their report was issued. .
3.) General Kensinger was blamed for failing to notify the family because he supposedly
had the ―administrative‖ responsibility to do so. Yet, if you look at ―Appendix D: Casualty
Reporting & Next of Kin Notification Process‖ in the IG report, the flowchart clearly
shows that McChrystal had that responsibility (and it‘s noted both he and his Chief of Staff
failed to make that notification despite knowing about fratricide NLT April 25th.
4). There was nothing ―potential‖ about Tillman‘s friendly fire death. Most of the troops
on the ground knew immediately what had happened. On the 23rd word was passed up
―70% sure‖ to Nixon. But, if you look at the IG report‘s ―Appendix B: Chronology,‖ its
noted that LTC Bailey tells COL Nixon of potential fratricide on the 23rd yet Nixon
supposedly only tells McChrystal of Tillman‘s ―death‖ (no mention of fratricide). How is
that possible? And then supposedly McChrystal tells General Abizaid only of Tillman‘s
death. It looks as though Abizaid wasn‘t being truthful when he testified before Congress
about when he learned about fratricide.
5.) And on the 24th, the initial investigating officer CPT Scott passed on confirmation
(―I‘m certain, I‘m sure‖) to LTC Bailey, who then called COL Nixon (McChrystal was
next in the chain of command). The Army knew of confirmed FF two days after Tillman‘s
death!
6.) McChrystal is praised for his ―timely‖ P4 memo to alert his superiors on the 29th.
There was nothing timely about it. Even if you accept his own testimony at face value, he
knew about friendly fire on the 23rd, 24th, or 25th. Yet he didn‘t send out his P4 until the
29th? How is waiting four to six days ―timely‖?
7.) No one seems to have carefully read McChrystal‘s P4 memo. The contents are
damning. For example, He says ―IF the circumstances of CPL Tillman‘s death become
public.‖ Not when, IF.
Anyhow, I believe you will find it worth your time to read through my letter.
Could send me your e-mail address? Then, I could simply send my documents as
―attachments‖ to an email. Could you also give me a mailing address? (I‘ll Fed Ex a
hardcopy of letter tomorrow).
If you have any further questions, I can be reached at my email: dparish@grcity.us. I can
also be contacted at my home phone, 616-866-0314. (Unfortunately, I‘m a dinosaur who
still doesn‘t have a cell phone, so that option is out!) I‘ll be home tomorrow in the
afternoon and evening.
Sincerely,
WEDNESDAY 5/27/09 10:39 PM:
Please feel free to send me your material, as I would be eager to review it. Above is my
direct e-mail address. Thanks for writing.
Regards,
Thom
THURSDAY 5/28/09 7:27 AM:
Thom,
Thanks for sending your direct contact info.
I‘ve just finished up things (a bit of a all-nighter!)
Could you also send me the best ―snail mail‖ address to send you a package tomorrow? I
would like to send you my material in a binder by Fed Ex, hopefully get to you by Friday.
And a hard copy form would be easier for you to read thru.
But, I‘ll send you my Word documents in the morning.
THURSDAY 5/28/09 8:07 AM:
Thom,
Here is a download of the Appendices material that I wrote included in ―Did They Teach
You to Lie Yet?‖ I‘ll send the rest in a hardcopy form.
I tried to condense a lot of my information into the ―Timeline of Tillman Fratricide

Notification.‖
FRIDAY 7:25 AM:
Thom Shanker,
I sent my document ―Did They Teach You to Lie Yet?‖ by Fed Ex yesterday afternoon.
It‘s supposed to get to your office around 10:30 Friday morning. This is a hard-copy of
what I emailed yesterday, with a numbered Table of Contents and the full set of
appendices. ….
FRIDAY 5/29/09 8:14 AM:
I very much look forward to reviewing you documentary file this weekend, and I thank
you for sending it.
Regards,
Thom
FRIDAY 5/29/09 2:42 PM:
Thom,
I just checked Fed Express. My package was delivered this morning at 9:38 AM. Just
thought I'd pass this information on in case the package hasn't yet made it to your desk.
FRIDAY 5/29/09 3:59 PM:
Yes, it arrived. I will review your documents this weekend. Thanks.
SATURDAY 5/30/09 6:59 AM:
Thom Shanker,
I overlooked your graphic showing a timeline of McChrystal's role in the aftermath of

Tillman's death. If you look in my Appendices, I've included a "Timeline of Tillman
Notification" which compares the IG timeline to my own (my Fratricide Notes has
supporting details). I just wanted to point out a couple corrections:
1.) April 23rd, Nixon is told Tillman "may have" been killed by own troops. He informs
McChrystal:
"may have": CSM Birch was "70% sure", LTC Bailey was "certain".
"informs McChrystal": According to the IG chronology, Nixon tells McChrystal

only of "death". I overlooked this at first, but according to the IG timeline, Nixon
didn't mention potential fratricide to McChrystal, and then McChrystal told Abizaid
only of "death"! Not likely.
And if McChrystal did learn of fratricide on the 23rd and told Abizaid, then
Abiziad lied in testimony before the IG and Congress. (A look at the IG interviews
of Nixon, McChrystal, and Abizaid might be illuminating).
2.) May 16th, "investigation concludes Tillman killed by friendly fire:

This is the 2nd 15-6 investigation by LTC Hodne. The first 15-6 was done by CPT
Scott who verbally passed confirmation of FF to LTC Bailey on the 24th who
passed it onto COL Nixon. CPT Scott submitted his "15-6 Final Report" on April
29th concluding friendly fire. Nixon said this report was only a "draft:. (Scott's
15-6 disappeared, there is no copy! Although the IG said they managed to
reconstruct it somehow.)
You noted that the "Source" for the graphic is the DoD IG and the report of General
Wallace. Do you have a copy of the Wallace Report. I wasn't able to find it. I'd
appreciate you sending me a copy if possible.
Thanks,
MONDAY 6/1/09 06:33 AM:
Thom Shanker,
I just read today's NYT editorial "Questions for General McChrystal."
Why isn't there any mention of McChrystal's role in the handling of the Tillman case?
There wasn't one, except perhaps an obscure reference in the last line "The overall
performance of the Special Operations Command under General McChrystal's leadership -
- both acts of heroism and acts of abuse -- ...".
Will the NYT be publishing a follow up to your May 26th article before the confirmation
hearing?
Sincerely,
MONDAY 6/1/09 6:56 AM:
As such a careful reader of the paper, you are no doubt aware of the strict and important
institutional divide between the newsroom and those who write editorials. Thus, any
question about an editorial should be directed to The Times editorial board, and not to a
newsroom reporter.
Do you have any sense at all that Senators will be pressing on the Tillman case?
Again, thanks for the very detailed and voluminous file you sent. It was very well
researched and quite thorough.
Regards,
Thom
MONDAY 6/1/09 11:08 AM:
Thom,
Thanks for pointing out the separation of newsroom and editorial board. Obvious, in
retrospect.
Do I have any sense that the Senators will be pressing on the Tillman case? I don't see
why they would bring up the subject. They'll probably just ask a few questions about
"enhanced interrogation" at Camp Nama (sp?) in Iraq which will go nowhere. If Tillman is
mentioned, they'll probably say he's gotten cleared by Wallace etc (without mentioning
Senator Webb's review last year).
Could you please answer my question? Are you going to publish a follow-up to your May
26th piece based on my document or any other information you've received? If not, why
not? Why did you even bother to raise questions about McChrystal and Tillman in your
May 26th article?
Sincerely,
MONDAY 6/1/09 11:10 AM:
David,
At this point there will not be a follow-on story on the Tillman investigation prior to the
hearing, although we will see what the hearing brings up tomorrow.
Regards,
Thom
MONDAY 6-01-09 2:00 PM (sent many several NYT email addresses):
June 1st 2009
New York Times Editorial Board,
However, it doesn‘t appear that Thom Shanker is following up with another article. I think
the NYT editorial board would find it useful to speak with him and get a copy of this
document before tomorrow‘s June 2nd confirmation hearing of General McChrystal before
the Senate Armed Services Committee (or read my letters below and attachments).
Feel free to contact me with any questions. Unfortunately, I won‘t be able to respond to
emails until after 9 PM since my home computer is out (until my wife gets home with her
laptop). But, I‘ll be home most of the day if you wish to call my home phone.
Sincerely,
...
No emails sent or received between Tuesday 6-02-09 and 6-05-09
...
FRIDAY 6-05-09 9:11 PM:
Thom Shanker,
First, I thought I‘d pass on my comments about General McChrystal‘s testimony at his
confirmation hearing. For what it matters, General McChrystal just dug himself a deeper
hole with his own words on Tuesday:
1. McChrystal said that he first learned of suspected fratricide and 15-6 investigation after
returning back to Afghanistan from a meeting in Qatar with General Abizaid on about
April 23rd:
During the Jones 15-6 McChrystal said that he "was in Qatar when I was told,
about a day or two after the incident ...". [OK, that matches the 23rd, but was he in
Qatar or Afghanistan?].
During his DoD IG interview General Abizaid said "Gen McChrystal informed him
of CPL Tillman's death while they were in Qatar in a meeting .... he received no
details and did not know friendly fire was suspected." [So we're supposed to
believe McChrystal didn't tell Abizaid about fratricide while they were together in
Qatar on the same day! Or Abizaid lied about not being told about fratricide.]
During his Congressional testimony on 8-01-07, General Abizaid said "on about
the 23rd, Gen McChrystal called me and told me that CPL Tillman had been killed
in combat and that the circumstances his death were heroic." [So was he told ―no
details‖ or ―heroic‖?]
And, the DoD IG Chronology (Appendix B) states that after COL Nixon was told
of possible fratricide and the 15-6 on the 23rd, Nixon only told McChrystal of the
"death" of Tillman and then McChrystal told Abizaid only about Tillman's
"death". [But McChrystal said on Tuesday he was told of fratricide on the 23rd!
McChrystal failed to tell Abizaid about fratricide, or Abizaid lied about not being
informed about it. And Nixon or McChrystal lied about only telling about ―death‖]
So, McChrystal, Nixon, and/or Abiziad lied about when they learned about
―suspected‖ fratricide during their interviews with the DoD Inspector General. A
quick check of their IG interviews would be illuminating.
2.) McChrystal testified that he waited for the outcome of the investigation before making
conclusions, he "wanted some level of truth" before he sent the information on a week later
with his P4:
As I wrote to you before, there was never anything ―potential‖ or "suspected" about
Tillman‘s friendly fire death. The Rangers on the ground being shot at knew
immediately what had happened. On the 23rd word was passed up ―70% sure‖ by
the CSM to LTC Bailey and onto COL Nixon. And on the 24th, the initial
investigating officer CPT Scott passed on verbal confirmation (―I‘m certain, I‘m
sure‖) to LTC Bailey, who then called COL Nixon (McChrystal was next in the
chain of command).
McChrystal knew of confirmed FF two days after Tillman‘s death! Or, are we to
believe Nixon never told McChrystal of confirmation during the following days
they were working together on the Silver Sta r package?
Perhaps McChrystal‘s ―level of truth‖ refers to CPT Scott‘s ―15-6 Final Report‖
dated April 29th. Isn‘t it curious the 29th‘s the same date as the P4? And further
that Nixon only officially appointed Scott on the 29th as well? So McChrystal
could say he just got some ―emerging evidence‖ and started the investigation after
he approved the Silver Star on the 29th? And then CPT Scott‘s 15-6 disappeared!
3.) General Wallace cleared McChrystal of wrongdoing because McChrystal only signed
off on the Silver Star and had no reasonable basis to question a recommendation by
commanders in the field with firsthand knowledge:
But during Tuesday's hearing, McChrystal said he sat down with the
Ranger officers (Nixon, Kauzerlich, Hodne, Bailey) and went over Tillman's
actions on a whiteboard to satisfy himself that Tillman's actions merited a Silver
Star! McChrystal wasn't just signing a piece of paper that dropped on his desk! He
was in the field with the commanders and discussing their firsthand knowledge!
4.) McChrystal said that the Silver Star citation wasn't well written and that he didn't read
it close enough to catch that it could "imply" Tillman wasn't killed by friendly fire:
Absolute bull. The IG concluded that anyone reading the citation would assume
Tillman was killed by enemey fire. In fact, Maj Hodne even said that he edited the
narrrative to ensure it didn't mention friendly fire! And the witness statements were
altered by "someone in the approval chain" (i.e. Nixon, McChrystal, and/or
Kauzerlich) to remove references to friendly fire. IG Gimble preferred not to
―speculate‖ as to who was responsible!
...
Finally, I still don‘t understand why you didn't write a follow-up to your article last week
―Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander Revives Questions in Tillman Case.‖ You wrote
that ―Unless new information on General McChrystal‘s role in the episode emerges
between now and his confirmation hearing, set for June 2nd, the question is not expected to
figure heavily in the Senate debate."
Yet, last week I provided you with a copy of my document ―Did They Teach You To Lie
Yet?‖ (with 50 pages of text and 50 pages of Appendices) describing ―new disclosures‖
about McChrystal‘s role in the Tillman case.
a follow-up article? Or at least include some of my information in your June 2nd article
about the hearing?
I would welcome any criticism from you of my arguments or facts contained in my

document.
Sincerely,
SATURDAY 6-06-09 9:58 AM:
Thank you for your note. Your research is exhaustive and impressive.
My question back to you would be:
resolution of the inquiries and now, apparently, ready to confirm General McChrystal next
week? Remember, as I know you do, that the legislative branch is a key check and balance
not only of the executive, but of the military. It controls funding and confirmation to senior
general officer jobs.
Regards,
Thom
SUNDAY 6-07-09 9:30 AM:
Thom,
You asked why even Senator Webb has expressed satisfaction with the public resolution of
the inquiries into the Tillman case and is now ready to confirm General McChrystal?
I would stress "public" inquiries. General McChrystal appeared in "executive session" (i.e.
closed, secret) during the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 15, 2008 for
his confirmation to Director of the Joint Staff. I would assume he was a bit more frank
with the senators during that discussion. I talked to Gerald Leeling on June 1st about that
meeting. He would say nothing in response to my questions except "it was in executive
session" and "we did as thorough a review given the information available to us at the
time." I would assume Senator Webb knows McChrystal and the Army have been lying
about their handling of the Tillman case.
But, I would guess that Webb, and the other senators, think McChrystal is the best man to
Besides, now the senators are stuck with the "hot potato." They're the last link in the chain
of "investigations" into the handling of the Tillman case. They've got to cover their own
ass now.
Bu my question for you still remains unanswered:

Despite your praise for my document as "exhaustive", "impressive", and "well researched"
none of my findings appeared in your following articles concerning the Tillman case.
Wouldn't my 100 page document qualify as "new information"? (or are only official
government leaks considered authoritative enough to appear in print?)
a follow-up to your May 26th article? Or at least include some of my findings in your June
2nd article about the hearing as a counterpoint to the official government position?
Thanks,
...
No further response from Shanker as of Tuesday 6-09-09

"Lies Borne Out by Facts, If Not The Truth" (September 11, 2009)

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

"Lies Borne Out by Facts, If Not The Truth" (September 11, 2009)

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

―LIES … BORNE OUT BY FACTS,

IF NOT THE TRUTH‖

--- James Webb, ―Something to Die For‖ (1991)

Rebuttal of Thom Shanker‘s Pre-Hearing NYT Article: 35

Rebuttal of Thom Shanker‘s Post-Hearing NYT Articles: 60

Operational & Administrative Chain of Command (from IG Report)

Timeline of Tillman Fratricide Notification (GuyMOntag425 5-17-08)

Transcript of General McChrystal‘s June 2nd 2009 Senate Testimony

C: New York Times Articles about General Stanley McChrystal:

(5-12-09) ―Pentagon Ousts Top Commander in Afghan War‖

-- James Webb, ―A Country Such As This‖ (1983)

-- James Webb, ―Something to Die For‖ (1991)

September 11, 2009

To: Public Editor Clark Hoyt, The New York Times

Note: Following is an ―executive summary‖ that presents a more detailed outline of my

Note: For a very detailed, point-by-point refutation of Shanker‘s assertions, see

Thom Shanker replied:

Again, thanks for sharing your impressive work with me.

―Lies … Borne Out by Facts, If Not The Truth‖

During Kevin Tillman‘s testimony before a 2007 House hearing, he said:

SSG, Co. ―F‖ (Ranger), 425th Infantry MI ARNG 1983 – 1991

--- Senator James Webb, ―Something to Die For‖ (1991)

--- Senator James Webb, ―Something to Die For‖ (1991)

THOM SHANKER, THE NEW YORK TIMES, AND THE

On Friday morning May 29th, I emailed Shanker:

I sent a follow-up email later that afternoon:

Late Friday afternoon, Thom Shanker replied:

―Yes, it arrived. I will review your documents this weekend. Thanks.‖

I decided to write a letter to the editor. To as many editors as I could!

As David Corn commented on PBS‘s News Hour:

Note: For a very detailed, point-by-point discussion of Shanker‘s confirmation hearing

Why did the original article disappear?

Thom Shanker replied:

Again, thanks for sharing your impressive work with me.

But my question for you still remains unanswered:

I never received a response from Thom Shanker.

Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander

[3] But questions have surfaced again after General McChrystal’s

[11] Initially, the Pentagon inspector general’s inquiry criticized General

[7] General Wallace also said that General McChrystal responded

[6] General McChrystal’s memorandum, sent a week after the episode,

[5] A review of the voluminous documents, transcripts and findings made

[4] Officers in administrative headquarters of the Army were most severely

A detailed forensics inquiry by the Army‘s Criminal Investigation Command

[14] Unless new information on General McChrystal’s role in the episode

Timeline: A General‘s role in the Aftermath of a Famous Corporal‘s Death:

―NOMINATION OF U.S. AFGHAN COMMANDER

Thom Shanker reviewed the investigative documents and concluded that

(p.28, ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖):

Overall, it appears Waxman‘s Oversight & Reform Committee acted to protect

Chairman Waxman narrowed the scope of his investigation to exclude examination of

Waxman‘s Committee never questioned the ―timeliness‖ of General McChrystal‘s P4

(p.17, ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖):

Wallace ―cleared‖ McChrystal of wrongdoing. But Wallace merely reviewed the

p.17, ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖):

p.20, ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖):

4.) Officers in administrative headquarters [i.e.General Kensinger] of the Army were

(p.17, ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖):

(p.19, ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖):

In cases of ―Friendly Fire, the combatant commander will convene a legal

Regulation AR 15-6 ―directs that only a general court-martial convening authority

AR 385-40 ―Accident Reporting and Records‖ states that ―Fratricide … must be

In actuality, McChrystal promptly passed up probable fratricide on the 23rd and