- that we call a “social poetics” - for use by a group of practitioners in coming to a
more articulate grasp of their own practices, thus to develop them. Crucially
influenced by Wittgenstein's (1953) claims - that "Nothing is hidden" from us in
our conduct of our practices, and that "the origin and primitive form of the
language-game is a reaction" - we show how the methods of philosophical
investigation he outlines can also be used to great effect in our everyday affairs.
They work, not in terms of concepts or theories worked out ahead of time in
committee rooms or research laboratories by experts, but in terms of certain
practical uses of language, at crucial points within the ongoing conduct of a
practice, by those involved in it. Crucially, they lead us to focus on novelties, on
new but unnoticed possibilities for 'going on' available to us in our present
circumstances, but present to us usually in only fleeting moments. If we can allow
ourselves to be 'struck by' these novelties, then we can often go on, not to solve
what had been seen as a problem, but to develop new ways forward, in which the
old problems become irrelevant.

"Although theory and experience cannot substitute for each other, they do not
have a clear boundary against each other; rather, it is only through a process of
close and intense interaction that both elements are used most fully" (Gustavsen,
1996, pp.94-95).

"And we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything
hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all explanation, and
description alone must take its place... The problems are solved, not by giving
new information, but by arranging what we have always known" (1953, no.109)

"What we find out in philosophy is trivial; it does not teach us new facts, only science does that. But the proper synopsis of these trivialities is enormously difficult, and has immense importance. Philosophy is in fact the synopsis of trivialities" (Lectures, 1930-32, 1980a, p.26).

"The likeness makes a striking impression on me; then the impression fades. It
only struck me for a few minutes, and then no longer did... Is being struck looking
plus thinking? No. Many of our concepts cross here" (1953, p.211).

"Different genetic forms coexist in thinking, just as different rock formations
coexist in the earth's crust … Developmentally late forms coexist in behavior with
younger forms" (Vygotsky, 1986, p.140).

Gustavsen (1996) discusses the dialogical turn in work-life research to "the idea of
inquiry as a collaborative effort with people rather than an investigation of them..." (p.90,
our emphases). As Gustavsen sees it, central to this turn is a questioning of the whole
relation of theory to practice that has grown out of a new view of the relation of language
to reality, mostly influenced by Wittgenstein's (1953) later work - although, as we will
indicate in a moment, the work of many others is important in this sphere too. As
Gustavsen (in press b) puts it, the new key issues are to do with the constitutive and
formative roles of language in our everyday affairs, along with a de-emphasis on its

representational function: "Everyday language... is [now seen] not so much as a series of
pictures of reality as a set of instruments enabling people to deal with reality. Each word
is an arbitrary collection of signs or sounds: its meaning is found in its use. It can
consequently be argued that, in order to create 'new theory', research must restructure
the language out of which theory can grow. In order to do this, it is necessary to
restructure those forms of practices to which the relevant elements of everyday
languages are bound" (p.7). Indeed, as he points out, we must turn to the idea of what
he calls "process-carrying structures" (Gustavsen, 1996, p.97; see also Gustavsen, 1992,
1993) - that is, we must come to see what in the past was discussed as 'research into'
and 'theory about' a practice by outsiders to it, as now constituting different 'moments'
and 'phases' occurring within the ongoing flow of distinct but interrelated activities
making up the overall conduct of the practice itself (2).

the detailed character of those special “structuring structures” that contain, as one of us has called them elsewhere, "conversational realities" (Shotter, 1993a and b);

Our work in this sphere has been influenced by Bakhtin's (1984, 1986), Volosinov's
(1973, 1976), Vygotsky's (1978, 1986), as well as by Garfinkel's (1967), Taylor's (1985,
1991, 1993), and Bachelard's (1992) work, but we have been most influenced by
Wittgenstein's (1953, 1980a, 1980b, 1981) innovative approach to philosophical
investigation. For it is in terms of his very 'practical' methods of investigation that, it
seems to us, we can begin to articulate linguistically what is involved in creating, within
our everyday, ongoing practices, spheres of conduct to do with their further development
and with their criticism. What is so special about his methods is that they do not work in
terms of abstract concepts. They work by focusing our attention on certain kinds of
events occurring in the situation surrounding us. Indeed, they work by sensitizing us to