Inside the Jihad
Book by a former Qaeda member
20 Dec, 2006
In his new book entitled, ‘Inside the Jihad: My Life with Al Qaeda: A Spy’s Story,’ former member of Al Qaeda, Omar
Nasiri, a pseudonym, tells readers how he served the French, British and German intelligence services whilst funneling messages from Al Qaeda leaders to European-based radical clerics. The ex-jihadist operative, now based in Germany relates his story on terrorism and intelligence in his new book that has recently gone on sale in the US.
“My name is no
t really Omar Nasiri. Members of my family in
Morocco would be in danger if my real identity were known.” He continues, “I was brought up in Morocco and Europe. This
story begins when Hakim, my oldest brother, became a devout Muslim and taught me to become one too. I lived with members of Al-
Qaeda for years, although they didn’t call
themselves that yet. I bought guns for them, which they stored
in my mother’s house near Brussels and shipped all over the
world. I smuggled their explosives into North Africa, where
they were used in Algeria’s civil war. I knew their top leaders
in Europe. These men lived in our house. Later, I went to Afghanistan, where I ate and slept and prayed with Al-Qaeda
in the training camps for a year.”
It is rare to obtain an insid
er’s view of how the Al Qaeda network evolved. Nasiri trained in Bin Laden’s camps in Jalalabad before he was sent back to London. He stated that he served
for a number of years as an operative for the European intelligence services and as an Al Qaeda militant. He spent some of this time in Britain.
Nasiri writes of his experience with Al Qaeda members, “I became a mujahid, mastering
almost every kind of weapon, from Kalashnikovs to anti-aircraft missiles. I learnt how to drive a tank, and how to blow one up. I learnt how to lay a minefield, and how to throw a grenade to inflict maximum damage. I learnt how to fight in cities, how to stage
assassinations and kidnappings, how to resist torture. I learnt how to kill with my hands.”
Nasiri’s statements present
a rare insight into how Al Qaeda was more superior in organization, cohesion and determination in the nineties than what intelligence agencies had believed.