3 power reserves.
N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator,
Inc.
, 110 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,244, 62,005-11 (2005) (“
Remand Order
”);
N.Y. Indep. Sys.Operator, Inc.
,
113 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,155, 61,609-16 (2005)(“
Rehearing Order
”). In view of the deference due to FERC’sdeterminations that the NYISO had acted reasonably in notimplementing TEP because problems in the reserves market didnot rise to the level of a market design flaw, and that retroactiverefunds were not an appropriate remedy for NYISO’s tariff violation because its pricing system protected system reliability,we conclude that FERC’s denial of a remedy was not arbitraryand capricious or contrary to law, and we deny the petitions.
I.
The issues before the court arise out of events occurringapproximately two months after the NYISO began operations.
Con Edison
, 347 F.3d at 966-68. Between January and March2000, transmission facility owners — i.e., load-serving entities(“LSEs”) — experienced dramatic price increases for non-spinning reserve (“NSR”) in markets administered by the NYISO. NSR is a power reserve that can be synchronizedwithin ten minutes and is of lower quality than spinning reserve(“SR”), which is available almost immediately. In response tothese price increases, NYISO presented a number of requests toFERC, including immediately suspending market-based bidsand authorizing a cap for NSR bids. The LSEs complained toFERC that the NYISO had violated its tariff and “operated under several market design flaws” by failing to accept bids from other qualified suppliers, and sought correction of these practices andrefunds; they also sought to compel the NYISO to invoke TEP’sremedial measures. FERC found no withholding of capacity byany supplier, but inasmuch as the market was not operating properly, approved the NSR bid cap while concluding that itlacked authority to grant retroactive relief, that the NYISO hadnot violated its tariff, and that it would not require the NYISO
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