Whether the Prince should render justice to his Subjects in Person

[12]
[CHAPTER
VI]
[13]

SOME readers may think that this is a question about which no discussion is necessary,
seeing that all the ancients, and all discriminating students of politics are agreed that
kings were first established for no other reason that to do justice, as Herodotus shows
of the Medes and Cicero of the Romans ... The chief consideration that should move
princes to do justice is the mutual bond between them and their subjects, whereby the
subject owes obedience and assistance to his lord, and the prince owes justice, care,
and protection to his subject. He does not discharge this obligation by appointing a
representative to act in his name. For just as the subject is bound to swear allegiance
in person, and to render homage and service himself, so there is a reciprocal
obligation on the prince. Indeed, it is not so serious if the vassal swears allegiance and
homage by proxy as if the prince does justice only through his officers. The obedience
due from the subject is not thereby called in question. But the subject on his side has
no guarantee that the prince's officers will not be corrupt. The prince is responsible
before God, and the obligation on his conscience to see that justice is done is not
discharged by his mere instruction to judges to see to it.
Moreover it is of the greatest importance for the preservation of the commonwealth
that whoever exercises sovereign power should himself dispense justice. Union and
mutual amity between a prince and his subjects is best fostered by mutual intercourse.
This advantage is lost if the prince acts only through his officers. Subjects always
imagine themselves despised and neglected by officials, a suspicion more serious in
its results than if they experience actual injustice at the prince's hands, for contempt is
harder to endure than a straightforward injury. But when subjects see their prince
giving judgement in person, they are by this mere fact already half satisfied, even
though he does not thereupon grant their requests. They reflect that at any rate the
king has attended to their petition, heard their complaints, and taken pains to judge the
matter. It is extraordinary how uplifted and delighted subjects are to be seen, heard,
and attended to by a prince even of very modest virtues, or of some mild degree of
amiability. Moreover nothing gives greater authority to magistrates and subordinate
officials, or excites more fear, and reverence for justice, than the sight of the king
enthroned for judgement... In fine, it cannot be doubted that the prince in doing justice
constantly upon his subjects accustoms himself to be in his own person just, upright,
and true. Seeing that this is the greatest boon that can fall to the lot of any
commonwealth, should not one desire constantly and ardently that the prince should
be ceaselessly employed in giving judgement? The true function of the prince is to
judge his people. He must of course also be armed against the enemy, but justice is his
necessary attribute in all places, and at all times.
But the example of wise princes is of more weight than reasons and arguments. Was
there ever a prince the equal of Solomon for wisdom? We read that his sole prayer to
God was for wisdom so that he might judge his people aright, and his judgements
were reported throughout the world, to the wonder and edification of all peoples. Who
was ever the equal of the great Augustus for political prudence? We read of him that
he was incessantly employed in giving judgement? He would not let even illness
prevent him from being carried into the court. Such was the ordinary and daily
function of the Roman Emperors and they won thereby a reputation for justice above
all other princes of the world. ...
Nevertheless I do not think these arguments are of sufficient weight to settle the
question and prove conclusively that the prince should dispense justice in person. It is
true this would be expedient and even necessary if princes were, as Scylax said of
those in the Indies, as superior to their subjects as God is high above mankind. There
is nothing finer or more royal than the spectacle of a prince performing exploits of
virtue in the presence of his people, and out of his own mouth rebuking and
condemning wicked men, praising and rewarding the good, publicly taking counsel of
the wise, and engaging in weighty debate. Only a man who is himself upright esteems
virtuous company and hates evil men, and only a prince who is himself just and true
can dispense impartial justice.
But should we agree that vicious princes ought also to live in the public eye, and
thereby communicate their vices to their subjects?
The least vice in a prince defaces his fair image, and cannot but have the effect of
attracting, persuading, or even compelling his subjects to evil. It is the most natural
thing in the world for subjects to model themselves on the manners, the behaviour,
and the conversation of their prince. No gesture, action, or expression of his escapes
the notice of those who observe him with the closest attention with a view to imitation
... We have seen how, when Francis I, King of France, and Mansur called the Great,
Emperor of Africa and Spain, each in their several times and places began to patronize
learning, immediately the princes, the nobles, the clergy, and common people devoted
themselves with such ardour to the sciences, that never was such a concourse of men
learned in all languages and sciences seen as in their time. Since princes then are a
model to their subjects, let them be as perfect as in them lies, and if they fall short in
this respect, let them not make public appearances.
It may be objected that this is not a good enough reason why a prince should live
retired, and not appear to judge and communicate directly with his people, since they
have the wits, which they should employ, to judge of his actions, and follow the good
and eschew the evil. But I would answer that it is much easier to imitate vice than
virtue, for men are naturally inclined more to evil than good, and whereas there is
only one straight and narrow way that leads to virtue, there are a hundred thousand
side paths that lead to vice ... Such power has a faulty prince of transforming and
turning the hearts of his subjects according to his own good pleasure. He has even
greater power of turning them to folly. I can give another example from the conduct of
King Francis. He once shaved his scalp in order to assist his recovery from a wound in
the head. Immediately first his court, and then everyone else shaved too, so that from
that time long hair which was once a mark of beauty and privilege of nobility became
an object of ridicule. ...
Suppose however we grant that the prince is neither inept, ridiculous or vicious, but
virtuous and well-conducted, the fact remains that daily communication and a too
great familiarity with his subjects engenders a certain contempt for the sovereign.
Contempt of him leads to disobedience to his commands and his laws, and
disobedience spells the ruin of the state. On the other hand, if the prince makes a habit
of appearing in public, but always in great state and in the guise of a severe and
terrible judge, it is true that he may inspire his subjects with respect, but he will also
run the risk of losing their love. Love of the subject for his sovereign is much more
conducive to the preservation of the state than fear, for love always has an element of
fear in it, the fear of offending the object of one's love. But fear by itself can be, and
mostly is, devoid of any admixture of love. Almighty God, the ruler of the whole
world, made manifest what relations earthly princes, who are his true images, ought to
have with their subjects. For God only communicated with men in dreams and
visions, or through the very small body of the elect, and the greatest saints. When He
declared the decalogue in His own voice, divine fire filled the heavens, and thunder
like the terrible sound of trumpets shook the mountains, so that the people threw
themselves upon their faces, praying Him to cease speaking lest they should die. It is
written that He caused them to hear His voice that they might for ever after tremble to
offend Him. Nevertheless He moved them to love Him by blessing them with
manifold and great favours and bounties. The wise prince who imitates in the
management of his subjects the wisdom of God in governing the world will show
himself little to his subjects, and then in solemn state as befits his high authority. He
should moreover choose men of great worth, such as are not easily found, to make
known his will. For the rest, he should constantly bestow his graces and favours on all
his subjects. ...
But granted that the prince has wisdom, understanding, prudence, discretion,
experience, patience, and all the virtues, it is still of doubtful advantage for him to
judge his subjects in person. The best means of preserving the authority of the
monarchy is that the prince should be loved by all, without any alloy of contempt, and
as far as possible hated by none. To achieve this two things are necessary. First, just
punishments must be meted out to malefactors, and rewards to the worthy. But seeing
that whereas the latter is a pleasing task, and the former is invidious, the prince who
wishes to command the affection of his subjects should reserve to himself the
distribution of rewards, whether estates, honours, offices, benefices, pensions,
privileges and concessions, grants of immunity, exemptions, and restitutions, and all
such graces and favours. Any prudent prince should bestow such himself. But for
condemnations, fines, confiscations, and all like penalties, let him delegate their
infliction to his officers, for them to administer good and expeditious justice. If he
manages his affairs in this way, those who have received benefits at his hands are
constrained to love, respect, and honour their benefactor; those who have been
punished will have no occasion to hate him, but will vent their anger on their judges.
The prince, showering benefits on all, but injuries on none will be welcome to all and
hated of none. Nature has provided us with a model in the king of the bees, who has
no sting ... I myself think that one of the admirable secrets of the long success of this
monarchy is the wise practice of our kings, since earliest times, of themselves
distributing graces and favours, while delegating the duty of punishment, without
respect of persons, to their officers. ...
What I have said about the inadvisability of the prince assuming the role of judge has
even more force in popular states, because of the great difficulty of assembling the
people, of making them listen to reason when they are assembled, and having listened,
to pass sound judgement. Such difficulties were the greatest single cause of civil wars
among the Romans until the dictator Sulla vested the cognizance of all causes, save
treason in the first degree, in the magistrates. Moreover the denial of the exercise of
their ordinary and legitimate powers to the senate and the magistrates, in order to
attribute them to those in whom sovereign power is vested, has been a most frequent
cause of the ruin of commonwealths. The true attributes of sovereignty apart, the more
powers a sovereign has, the less secure he is... Perhaps the thing that has most
conduced to the preservation of the Venetian state is that there has never been a
republic in which those in whom sovereign power was vested interfered less with the
business of the council and the magistrates. The Great Council hardly concerned itself
with anything save the appointment of magistrates, the issue of general ordinances,
and the granting of graces, which are, of course, the principal attributes of
sovereignty. All other affairs of state were attended to by the Senate, or the Council of
Ten, and the administration of justice by the magistrates.
If this is well-ordered and praiseworthy in an aristocracy, it is even more desirable in a
popular state, for the more heads, the less counsel, and the less resolution ... We read
that the Roman Republic was never more flourishing than at the time when the people
did not concern themselves with any exercise of power save their rights of
sovereignty. This was the period from the first Punic war till the conquest of the
kingdom of Macedon. But once the Tribune Caius Gracchus curtailed the powers of
the Senate and the magistrates in order to make the people cognizant of matters of all
sorts, nothing but seditions, assassinations and civil wars followed, till this outrageous
licence of the people was exchanged for an extreme servitude. ...
A state cannot fail to prosper where the sovereign retains those rights proper to his
majesty, the senate preserves its authority, the magistrates exercise their legitimate
powers, and justice runs its ordinary course. Otherwise, if those who have sovereign
power attempt to invade the sphere of the senate or the magistrate, they only risk the
loss of their own authority. They are much mistaken who think to exalt the sovereign
by making him aware of his claws, and impress on him that his will, his very glance,
has the force of an edict or a judgement, so that none of his subjects can take
cognizance of any matter which may not be revised or reversed by him. This
engenders an insupportable arrogance and tyranny in the prince. ...